THE CIA: REJECTING A PLEA TO HELP MORO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000100140073-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2007
• Sequence Number: 73
• Publication Date: May 29, 1978
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2007/06/22 : CIA-RDP99-00498R000100140073-9
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-21
THE WASHINGTON POST
29 May 1978
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak
TRejecting a Plea t
Rigid clamps placed on secret U.S. in
telugence operations by a fearful Con
greys forced the Central Intelligence
Agency to reject a top-priority request
for help from Italy in that nation's agony
during the abduction and murder of
Aldo Moro by left-wing, terrorists. -
The request was delivered to the CIA
by CESIS, a secret liaison arm of Italy's.;
intelligence service. It asked assistance;
from the CIA in dealing with the men-
ace of the Red Brigades, Ch---istian Dem-
ocratic leader Moro's kidnappers and
Despite softening of the anti.CI A mood
in Congress, fear of political attack that
might damage President Carter, 'Ada:
Turner and the CIA itself dictated ex-
treme caution in replying to Rome.
. An affirmative reply, had it come,
would have required days.or_even a
week more in a situation where speed
was imperative if Moro was to be saved.
The 1974 law, written by former sena- ,
for Harold Hughes (D-Iowa) and Rep.
Leo Ryan (D-Calif.), requires a full-
fledged meeting of the National Secu
rity Council and a specific presidential
directive to the CIA before any clandes-!
tine operation can be started. Then
comes notification of the four congres-I
sional committees. ' .
The only exception is. a "generic"
presidential finding that permits clan-1
destine CIA help in dealing with "inter-
national" -terrorism. The president
made that finding months ago. But CIA
lawyers; agonizing over Italy's request
for help, could not absolutely prove
that the Moro-Red. Brigades case in.
volved "international" terrorism.
"Sure," one administration official
told us, "we know that the Red Brig-
ades are armed with communist-bloc
guns, but that isn't easy to prove. Sure,
we are pretty certain they get training
in Eastern Europe, but we don't have
absolute proof." Lacking proof of inter-
nationalization, the witch-hunt atmo
sphere that has dominated Capitol
Hill's handling of the CIA the past few
years called for extreme caution. _
With great reluctance, Turner sai
no to his Itali an counterparts. Instead .
of gaining access to the CIA's expertise,)
the Italian government accepted overt
assistance from a single State Depart-
ment psychiatrist, who went to Rome
and performed creditably in advising
the Italian government on psychologi-
cal aspects of the case..
...,These tragic overtones of CIA impo-)
tence in a matter of extreme urgency
to Italy go far beyond Italy alone. In the'
past, U.S. intelligence would have been
on the scene helping to unlock the;
secrets of the Red Brigades, it would;
also. have been the. beneficiary of in-1
In an earlier era, such a request to be
helped by what used to be the Western)
world's most effective intelligence or-1
ganization would have been instantly'
and routinely met. Not so today. Bur-
dened with restrictions imposed by
Congress and targeted as enemy No. 11
by some of its own former operatives,i
the CLA was finally compelled to say noI
CIA Director Stansfield Turner and
his legal advisers wrestled with the re-,
quest for two weeks before rejecting it.
Theoretically, they might have ruled
the -other way, without running afoul i
of the law.
---Their fear, .however. .went deeper.
than the. cold print of the law. They;
feared, probably rightly,' that even if
CIA's clandestine help to Italy in a mo-
ment of extreme agony had been ruled
technically legal, the chance of dis-
covery by unfriendly congressional
sleuths could have fanned it into an-
other political expose. That this was
neither subverting a legally elected
government nor intruding in another
country's election made no difference.
The law is clear. Signed Dec. 30,1974,
it prohibits all undercover "operations
in foreign countries," other than rou-
tine intelligence gathering, "unless and
until the president finds that each such
operation is important to the national
security of the United- States." Each
clandestine operation must be reported
-to literally dozens `.`of congressmen:
members of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions and House International Relations
committees, as well as the two intelli-
gence committees.
STAT
valuable, on-the-spot information about)
the Red Brigades and about methods of
Italian intelligence. -
Exposure to such details is the heart
and soul of the intelligence game, per.
mitting the U.S. agents to compile a
record that some day could be essential
in uncovering future terrorist opera-
tions-perhaps in the United States it-
self. But the CIA's hands were tied in a I
case demanding speed, courage and po-
litical support. The result: a costly de-
feat in the war to preserve democratic
institutions.
Approved For Release 2007/06/22 : CIA-RDP99-00498R000100140073-9