IT'S CARTER VS. CASTRO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000100140013-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2007
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: June 26, 1978
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2007/06/20 :CIA-RDP99-004988000100140013-5
AFc?ZCI~e. ~PPyk1RItiD TINE .y--
~- O:l PAGE 26 June 1978
The two leaders argue about Cuba's role in Zaire
6 f ~ don't really desire to get into a pub-
lic dispute with Mr. Castro through
the news media," pretested Jimmy Car-
ter at the start of his press conference last
week. In fact, howe~rcr, he was already
deeply involved in a shouting match with
the Cuban Premier over Havana's in-
volvement in last month's invasion of
southern Zayre.
For the second time in 14 months,
Zatre's Shaba region, once known as Ka-
tanga province, had been invaded by Ka-
tangese rebels who had fled to neighbor-
ing Angola is the mid-1960s anti were
now trying to regain their homeland. Ev-
erybody agreed that the Katangese had
once fought for the Portuguese against the
Angolan guerrilla armies but switched
sides W the strongest of these groups,
Agostinho Neco's Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola, which later
came to power. Even Castrri conceded
that throughout this period and until some
time in early 1976, the Cubans in Angola
had helped train and arm the Katanxese
because they were fighting with the Pop-
ular Movement against two rival liber-
ation groups.
Carter's ornament Iast week seemed
t0 be that CzsL*o, who h3.s admitted know-
ing ofthe iavasionplan inadvance, should
have taken decisive action to stop iL .Of
Castro's 20,000 troops in Angola, Carter
charged, 4,000 were located in the north- ~
eastern region of the country where the
Katangese were based. At the very least,
Carter implied, Castro could have nett- .
fled neighboring countries, or the Oros-
nizatian of African Unity, or the "world
at large," of impending trouble.
Some of Carter's details were a bit t
fuay. He alluded to "a story published, I
think, in TLS magazine the Iasi week in
May" and recalled that "later Castro in-
formed one of our own diplomats that he
knew about the impending invasion
ahead of time and that heat-rttpted to no-
[ify President Neto of Angola and was un-
successful" TI:uE's cover story on Africa
reported that Castro had called in Lyle
Lane, the raalaag US, diplomat is Ha-
vana, and told him ht knew of the in-
vasion in advance and had tried unsuc-
cessfuuy to head it off. Castro told Lase
he had indeed notified Neto, who was us-
able io deter the Kataagese, '
Two days before Carter's press caa-
ference, Castro told his side of the story
to a group of visiting American Congress.
men and jo~analists; his account clashed
with Carter's on a number of key points.
Castro insisted that after the Popular
Movement triumphed aver its rivals in
early 1976, the Cubans stopped hekpiag
the Katangese. Fie maintained that theca
had been. no arntaci between them and
his military or ckviliaa personnel since
that time. _
Castro singled out Carter's National I
Security Adviser Zbigaiew Brteanski as ,
the villain is the Administration who pre-
vailed on the President to "pertxtrate this `
absolute lie" about the Cuban invoivo-
went Gesturing with one of his long Co-
hiba cigars, Castro said: "We have never
lied, either to our friends or to our ene-
mies. We may keep some things private,
and we may be discrtti, but we have nee- ;
er used lies~as as instrument of politics" i
ater, is an iatervizw with TIME Dip-
lomatic . Cotrespoadeat Strobe Tal-
bott, Castro insist~sd that Cuba's goals to
Africa. were peacxful apes. "We are not a ,
military power," he said. "We have no nu- i
clear weapons, no navy, no strategic forc-
es. We are just a small country whose most
important raw material is it: spirit, the
willingzress of our people to sacrifice and
demonstrate solidarity with other peoples.
In the current cases mentioned moss of-
ten, Angola and Ethiopia, we have pro- I
vented two historic crimes. the occupation
of Angola by South Africa and the dis-
integration of the Ethiopian state as a re-
i salt of foreign aggression." At week's end, ,I
Castro took t-he offensive: He told Amer-
ican TV interviewers Chat the CIA recent-
iyoffered LTNITA, a rebel group inside An-
gola, support in its fight against the
Popular Movement's Ncto. Responded a
White House aide: "That is absurd.,.
Meanwhile, the Carter Adurinistra- ~
lion was trying hard to convince Con-
gress that it "had the goods? on Castro,
as one White house official put it CIA Di-
rector Stansfield Turner was die hed
to Ca itol Hill wrth w t e
.preces o parole eve a on
to charts, maps and accounts furnished
by captured Kataagese soldiers, the ev-
idence included a letter seat by the Ka-
tangese rebel loader Nathaaiek Mbumba ,
to President Keanelh Kauada requesting
permisaioa for the rebels to crQSS Zam-
bian territory as their way to Shaba. The y
letter, which was not shown to Congress, ,
supposedly said that Cuba had bees j
"helpful" in planning the attack.
Congressmen were not altogether im-
pressed. "That letter reminded me," said i
one, "of a politician soliciting aid by say-
lag, `Support me because I've got so-and-
so backing me up.' " Remarked Con- ~
gressman Charles Diggs, chairman of the
House Subcommittee on. Africa: "I don't
think there was a soul in? that room
who came away convinced." But on the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
New York Republican Jacob Javits con-
cluded that the Administration was cor?
rest is its assessment of Cuban activity,
although others were not so sure. Macey
felt the Administration's cancers about
the Communists war getting is the way
of the mama goal of US. Afiicaa polity
-tramely, bringing as cad to white mi-
noriri tale.
STAT
At week's end the White House
seemed is be trying W downplay the con- (
troversy, if only because it realized that i
without documentation the dispute might
never be resolved. Nonetheless, the Ad-
ministration was sticking to the main con-
clusions ofits intelligence reports: that the
Cuban presence in Angola is all-perva-
sine today; that Cuban assistance to the
Kataagese insurgents has never stopped;
and that last month's Shaba invasion took
place with the cooperation of both the Cu- ,
bans anti the Angolan goverameaL
hatever the truth about the degree
of Cuban involvement, it seemed
clear that both Washington and Havana
were seeking to exploit the issue for their ,
own purposes. The Carter Administration
was trying to demonstrate that the Cu- ~,
bans had broken one of black Africa's
most sacred poetical principles: respell
for the sanctity of existing national i
boundaries. In a larger sense, Washington ';
was emphasi2ing to both Moscow and Ha-
vens that the buildup of Soviet-Cuban in-
fluence throughout Africa mast be ended
if East-West detente is to be strengthened.
Castro's motives in denying any involve-
ment with the Katangese might be de-
fensive ones: to dissociate his regime from
a dubious, and worse, a failed venture.
While the debate continued, tight
Western governments (plus Japan and
Iran) met in Brussels and agreed to put
up at least S70 miklion to rescue the
Zairian government of President Mobutu
Sere Seko from banlavptcy during the
next three months under a stringent for-
mula that British Foreign Secretary David
Owen called "a monitorable plan for eco-~
nomic assistance." After soma earlier
protest, Mobutu now seemed ready to
accept a few restrictive conditions on
how he spends Zaire's money. Mobutu
is also expected to seek increased
military assistance from the West At
week's end, Zairian intelligence sources
claimed that Katangess rebels have again
begun massing, threatening to renew the
insurgeacq. ^
Approved For Release 2007/06/20 :CIA-RDP99-004988000100140013-5