COUNTERING THE SOVIET THREAT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000100100062-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
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U. S. NAVY INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS
JULY 1977.:-. _-----
STAT
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Every operational commander, from a ship's com-
manding officer to a fleet commander, must know
his capabilities, correctly assess the enemy's
capabilities, and think through the tactics he will
use if the two forces meet. In the past, overwhelm-
ing superiority of force sometimes made up for poor
leadership or bad tactics, though seldom without
great sacrifice of men and ships. Today, no one na-
tion possesses that much of a power advantage at sea.
Good tactics are essential, and that means -more than
looking for a handy compendium of standard tactics
to see a commander through every situation he may
face. The days of the off-the-wall tactical solution are
.past-if, in fact, they ever existed. Certainly, the
wisdom of the past must be recorded and learned,
but success in future naval engagements will favor
the commander who has dissected his problem into
its basic elements, who has analyzed the fundamental
physical principles that will govern anticipated in-.
teractions, and who has established realistic options
with criteria for their use, whenever possible.
This article is an attempt to do just that for one
particular situation, that which the U.S. Navy now
faces in the Mediterranean. It reflects an assessment
of the situation in one of the most complex areas in
which the Navy operates today. It is not meant to be
definitive, but instead is offered as a challenge, par-
ticularly to junior officers, to think through this tac-
tical problem and challenge the authors in sub-
sequent interchange. Clearly there are other solu-
tions, and we hope this one will stimulate discus-
sion, generate ideas, and most important, demon-
strate that tactical thinking in the Navy rightfully
belongs at all levels of rank and command.
,In time. of war, allied naval forces in the Mediter-
ranean are charged with establishing sea control and
projecting power. Each can be divided into two basic
tasks:
Sea Control:
~ Establishing an acceptable .level of risk for naval
forces
~ Keeping the sea lines of communication open for
all allied shipping
Projection of Power:
Tactical air projection
Amphibious assault projection
Of these four tasks, priority must always be given
to establishing an acceptable level of operating risk
for naval forces. This is analogous to an air com-
mander requiring air superiority before he can pro-
ceed with other tactical air missions. The threat in a
given sea operating area must be reduced to a degree
that some of our naval combat capability can be
spared to conduct the other three naval tasks in sup-
port of our land forces. Until that point is reached,
all naval assets that can play a role will necessarily be
dedicated to establishing a naval operating environ-
ment.
Establishing an acceptable level of risk does not
mean that nothing else will be pursued until the
probability of survival is total- There will always be a
risk. The urgency of the land commander's require-
ments will largely determine what level of risk is
acceptable in a particular circumstance. Deciding
when assets can be spared and other missions at-
tempted will be one of the most difficult judgments
to be faced in wartime. If the naval commanders
judgment is wrong, his farces may not survive long,
and their potential support to the ground campaign
will be lost in short order.
Once an acceptable level of sea control risk has
been established by the naval commander, the needs
of. land and air commanders must then figure into
establishing the relative importance of the remaining
tasks. Naval assets may be available to accomplish all
of them simultaneously, but chances are that this
will not be the case. Which of the other -missions
should.bez undertaken first? The kinds of choices for
support of the land campaign include:
Carrier air support-Daily sorties of attack aircraft
Amphibious reinforcement The safe movement into
the theater of a Marine amphibious force, for exam-
ple, with 40-50,000 troops, 300 aircraft, and all the
follow-on -support would require many ships, all. of
which must be protected by control of the sea lines
of communication.
Other reinforcement-The safe movement, for exam-
ple, of one air squadron into the theater as external
reinforcement would also necessitate the assured ar-
rival of four or five cargo ships daily to bring the am-
munition and spare parts necessary to support it at
normal operating levels. Such movement would re-
quire control of the sea-lanes.
~ Normal resupply-The safe movement of merchant
shipping to meet the minimum daily needs of allied
military forces in the Mediterranean theater would
require as many as 20 tankers and cargo ships a day..
This does not include the- support for reinforcement
forces or for civilian 'requirements. Obviously, one
can live off stocks for a while, but in the long run,
10-20 ships must berth each day, or ground and air
forces will quickly grind to a halt.
Traditionally in the Mediterranean, it has been as-
sumed that Commander Sixth Fleet in his NATO hat
as Commander Striking and Support Forces Southern
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Europe (ComStrikForSouth) could handle the two
projection of power functions (tactical air and am-
phibious support), and the allied navies could handle
the two sea control functions (establish acceptable
level of risk and sea lines of communication con-
trol).1 The change in today's threat, however, makes
the combined efforts of these forces necessary. On the
one hand, ComStrikForSouth will need all the help
he can get from the allied naval forces to establish
that acceptable level of sea control risk for his carriers
early in the game because those carriers will be a
primary target of the enemy attack. On the other
hand, the change in the nature of the threat at sea is
such that eliminating it will depend much more than
ever before on the presence of aircraft carriers. Since
these will belong to ComStrikForSouth, his support
will be essential for any allied operation.
The threat today is primarily from missiles and, to
a lesser degree, from torpedoes. This missile threat
implies that the enemy can attack us from much
greater range. The aircraft is one of our best means of
responding to the increased range of the threat.
With its speed of reaction, range of operation, and
capability to take sensors up in the air, the aircraft
can extend the range at which we can detect the
enemy and take counteraction. Hence, any concept
of operations in the Mediterranean must concentrate
on the role of sea-based tactical air power in counter-
ing missiles and even torpedoes. There is also a
threat from guns and bombs, but it is pointedly ig-
nored here because these weapons must be used at
very close range, and we should be able to deny the
enemy that opportunity.
Air-to-Surface Missiles: To develop an overall con-
cept of operations, we must look successively at each
threat. Let's start with the threat from missiles
launched from aircraft. The Soviet air-to-surface mis-
sile inventory over the past decade and a half has
increased only slightly in quantity. The quality will
improve markedly as the "Backfire" aircraft enters
naval service more and more.' Today, sizable num-
bers of aircraft-launched missiles could be directed
simultaneously at allied naval forces in the Mediter-
ranean by Soviet land-based naval aircraft. How
many raids they could send in one day, or how long
they could sustain such raids with attrition and the
'for a description of the NATO role of U.S. naval forces in the Mediter-
ranean, see Admiral Means Johnston, Jr., USN, "NATO's Southern Re-
gion: Problems and Prospects.- U.S. Naval lautitute Proceedings, January
1975, pp. 47-51.
'See William D: O'Neil, "Backfire: Long Shadow on the Sea-Lanes,'
ProcalMgr, March 1977, pp. 26-35.
normal decline in the availability of aircraft is uncer-
tain.
Older Soviet naval aircraft flying a low profile
from existing bases in the Crimea could cover the
Mediterranean as far west as Sardinia. If they wanted
to come in high, exposing themselves more to land-
and sea-based air defense networks, the range could
be extended all the way across the Mediterranean.
The newer "Backfire" can cover the entire Mediterra-
nean at will. Once in the area of our forces, Soviet
SOVIET MISSILE LAUNCH PROFILE
aircraft can theoretically target and launch weapons
from as far as 200 miles.
Figure 1 shows the pilot's theoretical choices. He
could come in high and launch from far away but
would be quite vulnerable to detection. Or, he could
come in low and be less detectable but would need to
close his target before launch. Neither is a simple
problem. First, he must locate his target. Either he
must use his radar or electronic sensing devices, if we
are emitting electronic information which he can use;
or he must work with preprogrammed information
from satellites or reconnaissance aircraft. However,
even when he has located our task force, he then
must identify the specific target which he wants
most to destroy. If we are disciplined and minimize
the use of electronic devices characteristic of specific
types of ships, all targets on his scope will look
much the same, making the target choice difficult.
So, while our facing large missile raids perhaps twice
a day is a formidable threat, his picking out the prize
targets can be a formidable problem as well.
The fleet has three counters to the air-launched
missile threat: to destroy the aircraft before it
launches its missile; to destroy the missile before it
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hits its target; or to deceive or decoy either one.
There are four methods of destroying the aircraft:
The first is to intercept it with carrier aircraft. If
the enemy can launch his missiles from approxi-
mately 150-200 miles, carrier aircraft must establish
a defensive perimeter around the naval force to detect
the incoming raid and engage it before it reaches
launching range. If the defensive perimeter is estab-
lished at 100 miles, and the fighters dash out to
intercept at 200-250 miles, that perimeter will be
about 625 miles in circumference. If each aircraft on
that perimeter can cover a circular search area of
about 100 miles diameter, half a dozen aircraft on
station 24 hours a day would be required to provide
360? defense. That degree of coverage would stretch
the capability of any aircraft carrier operating today.
Hence, the naval commander must space his aircraft
thinly on the defense perimeter, accepting gaps be-
tween search areas. Alternatively, he can hope to de-
fine more precisely the direction from which the
threat is expected and favor that part of the defense
perimeter with a higher density. At the moment, the
air threat in the Mediterranean can probably come
only from the Crimea. It is relatively safe for the
naval commander to concentrate his limited air sur-
veillance assets toward that side of his defense
perimeter. In the future, should the Soviets gain ac-
cess to air bases in North Africa or Yugoslavia,
shorter flight distances would extend the threat sec-
tor to a full 360? around the force, creating greater
problems for allied naval commanders.
The second method of destroying the aircraft is
with ship-launched surface-to-air missiles. The
coverage envelopes of today's allied shipborne missile
systems are limited to about 40 miles (excepting our
dwindling assets of Talos). Thus, the enemy aircraft
is easily capable of launching from outside our mis-
sile envelopes. To compensate for this range disad-
vantage, a defensive barrier can be established on
some perimeter away from the carrier or other high-
value unit. Again, the problem of inadequate defen-
sive assets influences tactics. Surface escorts, like air
defense fighters, are in short supply. With antiair
missile ships at 100 miles, for instance, a 625-mile
defense perimeter is more than can be covered by
even 15 surface escorts with missile systems that
range only 40 miles. Again, gaps in the barrier must
favor a specific threat sector. In either case, this de-
fense is only marginally effective because Soviet air-
craft can still launch their missiles from outside or
over the top of the missile ship defense perimeter.
But, because their missiles have great distances to
fly, they can be detected and engaged for a longer
time if we erect these barriers with fighter aircraft
.4
and guided-missile-armed ships.
ll~ Our third defensive capability against air-launched
missiles is the NATO land-based air defense network
composed of interceptor aircraft, a radar system for
early warning and interceptor command and control,
and Nike/Hawk missile systems. While the Nike
missile sites are fixed installations that may be cir-
cumnavigated, the enemy must consider their
capabilities in any penetration of these combined de-
fenses. Even if a high-density raid against the fleet is
not fully engaged by land-based air defense systems,
a cross-tell network will enable land-based radars to
provide early warning to ships. And, because Soviet
aircraft must pass through these defense systems both
en route to their targets and on return to their bases
as well, there will be two-way attrition which, over
time, will greatly diminish the air threat. .
Finally, the fourth way of countering the enemy
planes is to strike at Warsaw Pact air bases using-
land- or sea-based air assets. This is a complex topic
that cannot be considered in detail here, but it
should not be neglected.
The second means of countering the air-launched
missile is- to destroy the missile in flight. Here we
must rely-on shipboard missile systems and particu-
larly the small but very important inner circle of
point defense missile and gun systems.
The third means of countering the air-launched
missile is to deceive or decoy either the aviator before
launch or the missile after launch. We can decoy
with various electronic countermeasure devices which
take his incoming signal, distort it, and make it look
different to him. We can deceive by any number of
means. One of the most important is to carefully
control our own electronic emissions. As noted ear-
lier, we don't want to identify a particular high-value
unit for him with emissions characteristic of that
ship alone.
Figure 2 summarizes the air-to-surface missile
problem. Against the long-range missile fired from
aircraft, a combination of sea-based antiair warfare
systems, carrier fighter aircraft, and the land-based
air defense network can be used in a sequence of bar-
riers which the enemy must penetrate.
Surface-to-Surface Missiles: A second major missile
threat comes from those `Iaunched by surface ships.
These missiles have grown from negligible numbers
in the early 1960s to a peacetime Soviet inventory in
the Mediterranean of about 20-30 types today. We
can expect these missiles to be on launchers ready to
fire, for most Soviet missile ships are one-shot affairs
with no reload capabilities. Soviet ship-launched-
missiles are fired from two ranges. Approximately
two-thirds of the inventory are short-range (30 nau-
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tical mile) missiles.-The remainder can be launched
from over 100 miles but would require intermediate-
targeting.
The tactical counters to these missiles are the same
as against aircraft-launched missiles: destroy the ship
before she has a chance to launch, destroy the weapon
after launch, or deceive/decoy either the ship or the
weapon. Destruction of the weapOn.after launch and
deception/decoying are basically the same for this
case as the previous one and hence will not be ad-
dressed again.
To destroy the ship, three basic fleet assets can be
employed: '
ll~ Submarines: Allied submarines are more than a
match for Soviet surface ships. The fundamental lim-
both it can be done successfully.
Tactical air support of maritime operations by
land-based attack aircraft of the U.S. Air Force or the
air forces of our allies in Italy, Greece, and Turkey.
While most of the Mediterranean can be covered by
these land-based aircraft, those available in theater
are in short supply and in high demand for other
missions.
Subsurface-to-Surface Missiles and Torpedoes: The two
remaining categories of threat can be combined: mis-
siles and torpedoes launched from submarines.
Our counters to the submarine-launched weapons
are tactically the same three as against air- and
surface-launched missiles: destroy the submarine, de-
itation in the Mediterranean would be the availabil-
ity of enough submarines to do these chores and
others, and whether there would be enough time to
get them into position.
~ Attack aircraft from carriers: countering a heavily
surface-to-air missile-equipped Soviet surface ship is
not a simple-function for an aircraft. It takes skillful
use of weapons and resourceful air tactics, but with
stroy the weapon, or deceive/decoy the submarine or
the weapon. With respect to destroying or
deceiving/decoying missiles, the tactics are similar to
the air and surface problems and will not be dis-
cussed. There are different tactics for deceiving/
decoying the submarine herself, however.
There are large numbers of torpedoes in Soviet
submarines in the Mediterranean in peacetime and
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modest numbers of missiles. These weapons take on
enhanced threat value because the submerged sub-
marine is so difficult to locate. We have a reasonable
probability of detecting the torpedo-firing sub-
marines out to the ranges of their firing positions. To
reach that position, the enemy submarine must pene-
trate the numerous close-in defenses that would be
around the high-value unit: antisubmarine aircraft,
our own submarines, helicopters, and destroyers. Be-
yond that, our chances of detecting the missile-firing
submarine are much reduced. For instance, in mov-
ing from 5 to 25 miles, our defensive perimeter
quintuples. This forces us to extend our defensive
perimeter as in air and surface defense beyond the
point where all arcs are well covered. In addition,
water conditions are notoriously bad in the Mediter-
ranean, particularly in the summer. As water condi-
tions deteriorate, submarine invulnerability in-
creases. Year-round, the submarine has the advantage
in the Mediterranean.
The main problems for even the torpedo-firing and
short-range, missile-firing submarines are locating
and identifying the target. They can do that with
acoustics alone-from our noise. But if the water
conditions are bad for us, they are bad for the Soviets
too. If they want to verify their acoustical data, they
must put up a periscope and look or listen. To see an
aircraft carrier, usually the biggest ship they are
likely to be after, they must be within 10-12 miles.
If we help, however, by indiscriminate use of elec-
tronic. equipment unique to particular units, the
Soviet submarines can verify our identity from much
farther away.
The long-range missile shooter cannot target and
identify on his own. He must have some outside
help-maybe an aircraft which can see or hear us
from hundreds of miles. Insidious as this may seem,
in fact, this vital communications link gives us
another point at which we can attack his system.
Our antisubmarine assets are divided into those
which are capable of direct support or defense of spe-
cific forces and those which are employed in attrition
operations. The difference is important because there
are several tactical ways of employing antisubmarine
forces:
Direct support of a task force is little more than
establishing a multi-unit point defense system-
distributing various combinations of defensive units
around the high-value unit. Antisubmarine units
that are capable of keeping up with the carrier or
whatever is the high-value unit can be employed in
this role.
ll~ Attrition operations can be subdivided into choke
point control and open area search. An example of
choke point control would be closing off the Sicily
Straits, Gibraltar, or the Dardanelles both on and
below the surface by means of submarines, maritime
patrol aircraft, land-based helicopters, smaller de-
stroyers, and mines to establish a barrier. Choke
point control is an attrition tactic which wears the
enemy down as he, tries to come and go through
these narrows. In open area search, submarines and
maritime patrol aircraft can be sent ahead to search
out and destroy the enemy if his approximate loca-
tion is known, or if an area needs to be sanitized of
any threat before its use by high-value units. This
tactic could be used to establish an enclave or safe
haven for friendly forces.
It is very important that antisubmarine actions
be fully integrated because ancisubsurface opera-
tions are not as likely to be sequential as are antiair
or antiship. One unit plays his strengths to the
others weaknesses. Success in antisubmarine warfare
today comes from coordinated operations, not the
unique capabilities of any one system.
In sum, in seeking to destroy the submarine, we
have a wide variety of weapons and sensors, Each of
them has only a modest probability- of success by it-
self. If our tactics are good, we should be able to
make --the ,cumulative probability of success of a
teamwork effort quite respectable.
We also must be conscious of special things we
can do to decoy or deceive the submarine. There are
particular opportunities here because a submarine is
reliant primarily on one sensor, her acoustics. We
must look at water conditions carefully and decide
whether we would be better advised to operate in
areas of high shipping density and consequent confu-
sion of sound for the submarine, or whether it would
be best to reduce our noise to a minimum and oper-
ate where the water conditions give us the best op-
portunity of detection. We should also not neglect
the potential of acoustic deception techniques.
Operational Concept: In establishing an overall de-
fensive posture, an operational commander must con-
sider possible conflicts between optional tactics
against each of the four threats. The situation will
vary with the assets available, to him and the ex-
pected threat. He may not be able, for instance, to
place his guided-missile ships on a 100-mile perime-
ter and still have sufficient antisubmarine escorts for
a close-in defense against torpedo-firing submarines.
-Or he may not be able simultaneously to have a tight
circular defense to detect torpedo-firing submarines
and a random formation to confuse enemy aircraft,.
Numerous trade-offs will have to be made in devis-
ing a coordinated defensive disposition. That is the
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 kind of trade-off which operational commanders are
paid to make. They will make such decisions based
in large part on their estimate of the relative danger
of each of the four threats but also on their knowl-
edge of our own force strengths and weaknesses.
In the Mediterranean, a commander must also
consider the special circumstance created by the
Soviet practice of trailing and even targeting our
ships with "tattletail" surface combatants or sub-
marines in peacetime. There is a critical difference
between land and sea warfare. At sea there are no
front lines. Allied and Soviet ships commingle in
peacetime, particularly when formations are large
and dispersed. The Soviets can close their targets
with impunity. But, at the same time, we are
forewarned by their actions which we usually can see,
We could then expect a coordinated, preplanned,
initial attack from aircraft, surface ships, and sub-
marines. However, the very coordination of the at-
tack would alert our forces and trigger appropriate
counter-tactics-
If they shoot first, we cannot afford to delay in
response. Once the attack is launched, everything
will hinge on how well we are trained and how well
we have thought through our tactical options. There
The Soviet surface units rendezvousing at Kythira anchorage
in the Mediterranean today would be foolhardy to do so should
war erupt. It seems unlikely that Russia would reinforce its
surface fleet in the Mediterranean if war were imminent since
there is a high probability that no Soviet surface ships could
survive if we controlled the air.
will be no room for misfire or miscalculation. Once
the war has started, it will be too late to train, to
develop tactics, or to explain options.
Once there is a period of sustained conflict, the
air, surface, and subsurface conflicts would proceed
differently. The air-to-surface threat would be of the
most concern in the short term because of the speed
and quantity of attack the enemy could present. It
would build quickly but then would drop off fairly
quickly through attrition. While it would taper off
significantly, it would never disappear entirely be-
cause there would always be the concern that the
enemy might reinforce his land-based air forces from
a distant area into a base within range of the fleet.
The subsurface threat would be the most difficult
to handle. It would build up more slowly because
submarines would have to move into position, and it
rnntigUad
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would take a long attrition operation to wear them
down. But, if Gibraltar were closed, the threat could
be made finite and eventually eliminated.
The surface threat would build up very quickly,
but it would also wear down very quickly. Enemy
surface ships could not survive in an air environment
which we control. Besides,, once they have fired their
one load of missiles, they are eunuchs. Here again, if
Gibraltar were closed, the threat could be contained
and limited. An interesting question to contemplate
is whether a Soviet admiral would reinforce his
Mediterranean surface fleet in advance of hostilities
knowing that there was a high probability that.none
would come out.
In summary, in the Mediterranean, sea-based air
power is at center stage. Carriers are essential both to
the sea control and the projection of power roles.
While carriers will certainly be the honey to which
the bear is attracted, they also provide the only sea-
based capability to reduce the Soviet bomber force
and the most flexible and rapidly moving capability
to attack Soviet submarines and surface ships. They
are important, therefore, for the contribution they
can make to every other mission that is to follow.
They are to be defended not for the sake of self-
defense, but in the name of every naval mission that
will follow their successful defense.
The issue which will interest ground and air
commanders most is how long it will take to estab-
lish an acceptable level of sea control risk and get on
with other tasks. The answer will depend on how
well we survive the initial preemptive attack if that
is how hostilities commence. If we survive well, sea
control can be established quickly, at levels where
naval assets can be diverted to support other opera-
tions. If we survive poorly and must wait for rein-
forcements or repairs, it will take longer-maybe
too long. Once an acceptable level of risk is estab-
lished, the priority of assignment of naval assets to
tactical air support, amphibious assault, resupply, or
reinforcement will depend on the remaining threat
and the urgency of other ashore requirements as rec-
ommended by the land.and air commanders.
There are four key points to this concept for con-
taining the Soviet threat in the Mediterranean.
~ First, an acceptable level of sea control risk must
be established quickly. To do so we must pay atten-
tion to the indicators of a buildup, be alert, have
good tactics to counter the preemptive threat, and be
operationally ready.
Second, once such a level of sea control is estab-
lished, the remaining enemy threat at sea can be
worn down through attrition.
Third, most of the requirements of land com-
manders can be met, but probably not so quickly as
they would desire.
And finally, the difficulties of the naval threat,
the complexities of that threat, and the conflicting
demands that will be placed on the naval command-
ers must be understood. There will be difficulr
choices to make. The wise establishment of priorities
among these choices will play a major role in
whether the land and air as well as the naval cam-
paigns succeed in the Mediterranean theater.
Admiral Turner entered Amherst College in 1941 and
two years later transferred to the U.S. Naval Academy.
After graduation in 1946 (Class of 1947). he served a
year at sea before entering Oxford University where his
studies as a Rhodes Scholar led to a masters degree.
After Oxford, he held a variety of sea assignments, in-
cluding command of a minesweeper, a destroyer, and a
guided-missile frigate which he placed in commission. His shore duties
included the Politico-Military Policy Division in the Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Systems Analysis, the Advanced Management Program at the Harvard
Business School and Executive Assistant and Naval Aide to the Secretary
of the Navy. In 1970. he assumed command of a carrier cask group of the
Sixth Fleet. In 1971, he served as Director of the Systems Analysis Divi-
sion of the Office of the C\O and after char as President of the Naval _
War College. Assignments in recent years have been Commander, Sec-
ond Fleet and Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe. It
was while serving in the latter billet that he submitted this article for
publication in the Prscredings. Shortly thereafter, his classmate President
Carter nominated Admiral Turner for his present billet, Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence.
Commander Thibaulc is a native of Lexington, Was-
1-11,
biochemistry from Tufts University, a master of arts in
education from Boston University, a master of science
in political science from George Washington Universi-
ty, and is a Distinguished Graduate of the Naval War
College- He has served as department head in the USS
Aluliphen (AKA-61), USS Rohinron (DD-562), USS Soky (DD-707), and
executive officer in the USS &m7 (DD-933). He has had duty at the
French Naval Academy and has served on the staffs of the United Na-
tions Command, Korea and the U. S. Second Fleet. Commander
Thihault was executive assistant and senior aide to CinCSouth. He is now
assigned as Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence.
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