A BLUNT MESSAGE FOR THE SOVIETS: 'REMOVE YOUR TROOPS FROM CUBA'

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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
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Approved For Release 2007/06/21: CIA-RDP99-00498R000100050008-1
Part II -- Main Edition -- 25'F eptember 1979
LOS ANGELES TIMES 23 SEPTEMBER 1979 Pg. 1E (25)
A Blunt Message for the Soviets:
`Remove Your Troops From Cuba'
BY GEORGE BUSH
Some years ago, the United States received advice on
how to deal with Cuba from no less an authority than So-
viet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. Wtih his special gift for
metaphor. he told the United States to deal with Cuba as
the proverbial Russian peasant did with his live-in goat.
That is, get used to the smell, but don't bother to pretend
liking it. There was, after all, no choice in the matter, he
said.
So far, at least five Presidents in two decades have not
accepted Mr. Khrushchev's quaint advice. I earnestly hope
that President Carter will be the sixth.
The recent revelation that 2,000 to 3,000 Soviet combat
troops are now resident in Cuba is the latest in a pattern of
probes and thrusts that have come to characterize Soviet
policy from the African Horn to the Isthmus of Panama.
The matter is serious, both in its practicar implications
for the SALT treaty and other U.S.-Soviet agreements,
and in its symbolic implications for the so-cal, e? non-
aligned nations and those that depend on American mili-
tary strength.
The latest chapter in the long and tedious storyyof Cuba,
the goat that won't go away, began in July when Ameri-
cans were sharply reminded of the status of Soviet-Cuban
relations. Ramon Sanchez Parodi, a senior Cuban diplomat
in Washington, stated bluntly that Soviet-Cuban activities
"will continue to increase in all fields, including military
collaboration." When asked specifically if he meant at
home or abroad, Sanchez Parodi replied, "across the
board."
Yet, as specific as the Cubans are about their frank rela-
tions with the Soviets and their denunciation of the United
States, the Administration has been anything but straight-
forward in its assessment of the Soviet combat presence in
Cuba.
On July 27, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance solemnly as-
sured Sen. Richard Stone (D-Fla.), "There is no evidence
of any substantial increase of Soviet military presence in
Cuba over the past several years."
On Aug. 31, the secretary entered a correction; "We
have confirmed the presence of what appears to be a So-
viet combat unit of 2,000 to 3,000 men."
Five days later, the State Department amended the cor-
rection and said it was "a Soviet combat brigade . and
this force has been in Cuba since the mid-'70s," thus at-
tempting to shift the blame to previous administrations,
Eight days later, the imbroglio worsened. After a storm
of criticism, the Administration modified the amendment
to its correction: Everything is okay; the Soviets are not
combat troops, but troops training Cuban soldiers. Ap-
parently the Carter Adw nistration is not bothered by the
idea of Soviets training Cuban troops who can then be sent
to Central America or to Africa to join their 40,000 breth-
ren who have, over the past decade, dedicated themselves
to overthrowing regimes friendly to the West. After all, as
the Administration told us earlier, those troops are a "sta-
bilizing influence" in Africa.
.What is the average American to make of all of this?
I would suggest that the Soviet combat presence in Cuba
is much more serious than the Administration suggests.
The combat brigade in Cuba is intimately connected
with a series of provocations stretching back over four
years. In 1976, the-Soviets began rearming Cubanmilitary
units; in 1977, they installed an advanced electronic anten-
na in Cuba capable of eavesdropping on U.S. communica-
tions, and renewed construction of a naval port in Cienfue-
gos Bay (which President Nixon had forced them to halt in
1970).
in 1978, the Soviets shipped advanced MiG-23 fighter
bombers to Qyba, and this ear they have supplied one
training submarine and one oceangoing submarine along
with a fleet of 24 two-engine turboprop military transport
Geode Bu*, the United SLQtW former U.N. aet t eetnrte-
envoy to Nitta and CIA director, u a candidate for At 1990
STAT
planes. Further, just a few days ago in the midst of our dis-
cussions with the Soviets on the combat troop issue. they
supplied a seventh guided-missile patrol boat to Cuba-
making the Cuban Navy a prime force in the region.
These efforts should be recognized for what they are: a
direct attempt by the Russians to establish a meaningful
military presence in the Caribbean. Moreover, in addition
to its strategic importance, the Caribbean area contains
many of the refineries that turn foreign crude oil into gas-
oline and other fuels that keep America running.
The Carter Administration argues that, technically, the
Soviet buildup in Cuba does not violate the promises that
Khrushchev gave to President John F. Kennedy in 1962.
But technical arguments notwithstanding, the Soviet initi-
ative clearly violates the spirit of those promises. It is a
provocation, and the Soviets know it is a provocation.
This message is not lost on the governments of Guate-
mala, Honduras and El Salvador, who watched a Cuban-
assisted revolution in Nicaragua replace militar;STAT-
man Anastasio Somoza with the Sandinista ivauuual
,Liberation Front. The implications are clear. Soviet-
trained Cubans trained important elements of the Sandin-
ista coalition, which almost. certainly will use Nicaragua as
a staging area for quiet assistance to radical movements in
surrounding Central American republics.
The Soviet objective is to pursue a policy that separates
the United States from its friends, but doesn't provoke an
open confrontation-and it's working. So far, Washington
hasn't been able to define the problem properly, much less
develop an adequate response. It is clear that Castro,
backed by the Soviets, is stepping up the export of revolu-
tion in this hemisphere.
The Soviet provocation should also be seen within the
broader context of international affairs. Over the past 15
years, the Soviet Union has engaged in the most massive
accumulation of armaments that the world has ever
known, catching up with the United States and even sur-
passing us in many critical areas. The Soviet Union, with
an economy less than one-half as large as ours, is spending
40% more than we are on arms.
As their nuclear umbrella has spread and America has
retreated, the Soviets have also become more aggressive in
many parts of the globe. Since the fall of Saigon in 1975, at
least six nations-Cambodia, Ethiopia, Angola, Afghanis-
tan, Mozambique and South Yemen-have hoisted the red
flag over their capitals and proclaimed their Marxist orien-
tation.
The Soviet combat troops in Cuba only confirm the fad
that the Soviet Union is now probing and pricking at every
exposed point on the American flank, seeking both sym-
bolic and geopolitical advantage. The Cuban issue has thus
acquired a symbolic importance around the world that
matches its strategic implication in our own hemisphere.
The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 offers a perfect example
of the symbolic importance of such events. After the con-
frontation, Khrushchev revealed that his military advisors'
greatest concern had not so much to do with Cuba's
security, but rather with the question of "whether the
Chinese or the Albanians would accuse the Soviets of ap-
peasement or weakness." By the same token, American
acquiescence to a Soviet challenge-only 90 miles from
our shore-would make it absolutely clear that we have
lost our nerve. We may have peace, as President Carter
but it will-be-apeace-thateehoes Neville Cba+a~ --
berlain's 'peace in our time" four decades ago.
There is also a lesson about American intelligence to br,
learned from this Cuban fiasco. In recent years, a favorit?
sport of some of our politicians has been to bully the Intel-
. ..._...___-_ _~_--
Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), who now seems bewildered
that somehow the Soviets slipped into Cuba under our
President Carter, to his credit, has never openly
continues to link the CIA with Watergate, thus de
(See TR.nnPq Pn r_F-
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 Approved For Release 2007/06/21: CIA-RDP99-00498R000100050008-1
;Part II -- Main Edition -- 25 September 1979
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 25 SEPTEMBER 1979 Pg 9
Ship repairs for Soviets
'Greece
puts strain
on US links
By Helen Mellas
Special to The Christian Science Monitor
Athens
Relations between Greece and the United
States have taken a turn for the worse follow-
ing the signing of an agreement between
Greece's Neorion shipyards and the Soviet
Union.
The agreement calls for repair of Soviet
commercial ships as well as Red Navy fleet
supply vessels. Neorion is located on the is-
land of Syros, in the middle of the Aegean Sea.
Greek-American relations are regarded as
having deteriorated during the last few
r months over Greece's inability to return to
the military wing of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) on its own terms.
On the shipyard deal, the government of
Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis has
taken the position the agreement is nothing
more than another commercial deal. But
Caramanlis critics argue that the decision
was primarily political, since the Neorion
shipyards are essentially controlled by gov-
ernment banks, and the Greek Ministry of
Foreign Affairs is understood to have
monitored the negotiations closely for
months.
The US Government already has ex-
pressed its concern to the Greek Government
for what it has called a precedent-breaking
agreement, while NATO also has asked for an
explanation. The Neorion agreement and
NATO are expected to be among the main
topics of conversation during the meeting in
New York this week between Greek Foreign
Affairs Minister George Rallis and US Secre-
tary of State Cyrus Vance.
Negotiations for Greece's reintegration
into NATO's military wing are stalemated at
present. One more team of NATO experts left
Athens some 10 days ago without making any
progress. Premier Caramanlis is adamant on
returning to NATO on the basis of a special re-
lationship with about the same status as ex-
isted prior to Greece's withdrawal following
the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.
Turkey, on the other hand, threatens to use
its veto, a prerogative extended to all partici-
pating nations by the NATO charter, on
September 18, 1979 (25)
Defense/Space Daily
Page 65
ARMY CHIEF WARNS OF 'CRITICAL WINDOW' IN '82-'83
Gen. E. C. Meyer, Chief of Staff of the Army, yesterday warned of what he called a
"critical window" in 1982-83 when the military balance wLll shift to a position of "oppor-
tunity" for the Soviet Union.
Meyer renewed his call for support of the requests for a 5 percent real annual increase
in defense spending in FY 1981 and beyond to correct the deficiencies in the United States
military force and to send a message to the Soviets that the U. S. intends to build up its
forces to meet the threat.
He said there is a real need by the Army for the 5 percent increase in defense spend-
ing, "to fill in the voids" and purchase critical items necessary to redress the unfavor-
able trends favoring the Warsaw Pact forces in Europe.
Meyer identified the "voids" needing attention as command and control-, the ability of
the Army to fight in chemical, nuclear and bacter'o'ogical, as well as conventional en-
vironments, and the ability for rapid deployment -- "to go somewhere and do something. "
He said, "We need more airlift" in order to surge forward "the way we need to do. "
The Army Chief said the Martin Marietta Pershing II is one of the important upgradings
of the force required in Europe. The Pershing II, or some other follow-on long range
ballistic missile system is needed as well as cruise missiles, he said. The Pershing II
can be deployed by 1982-83 within those nations "willing to accept it, " Meyer told his
first meeting with reporters since taking over the command of the Army.
He also issued a plea for the funds being sought in the President's supplemental for FY
1980. It is essential that the funds in that amended request for the Army be supported,
he said, or "$700 million will have to be taken out of our hide" to pay for inflation and
fuel.
TROOPS ............. CONTINUED
mg a dedicated service. He has, however, taken several
,teps that have diminished our capabilities to monitor So-
viet activities. Early in his administration, for example, he
suspended overflights of Cuba that might well have picked
up evidence of the Soviet much earlier. He also
naively cut back on human in, preferring to rely
instead on more satellite technology.
One of the first steps that should be taken in response to
the Cuban issue, then, is to make a thorough review of our
intelligence capabilities. We can ensure that our citizens
are protected from abuses of their rights while still
strengthening our foreign intelligence- capability. It would
be especially reassuring if the President, the Senate and
House committees would promptly move to do just that.
Furthermore, it is urgently necessary that the Adminis-
tration join forces with some of its critics-Sens. Henry
Jackson (D-Wash.) and Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), for example
-to conduct an overall review of Soviet expansion in the
world and the strategic interest of the Western democra-
cies
Finally, the President should send a very blunt message
to the Soviet Union: Remove your combat troops from
Cuba.
The Soviets want many things from us-SALT, grain
trade and technology. We don't need to threaten or resort
to public bombast. We do need forceful, determined pres-
idential leadership that results in action. The world is
watching. 0
Greece's return unless Greece agrees to in-
creased Turkish operational control over cer-
tain parts of the Aegean Sea.
With these developments in full swing, Mr.
Caramanlis is preparing for his official visit
to the Soviet Union from Oct. I to 5. It will
Mark ti'e first visit tr, c.~~ n
i11 -,jet by u
Greek leader. Mr. Caramanlis is expected to
sign a declaration of friendship with his So-
viet counterpart in Moscow, along with a se-
ries of commercial agreements that have
been negotiated by Greek Government offi-
cials and Soviet Union delegations.
Conservatives and some Western diplo-
mats have expressed their apprehension over
Greece's opening to the Soviet Union at a time
when Greek-American relations are becom-
ing progressively strained.
However, the Caramanlis government has
not in any way slowed its tireless effort to tie
Greece to the West. The Premier is known to I
have stated more than one.. ??Grecc< belongs
to the West. not only ideologically but also or-
ganizationally. through its accession to the
European Community."
Still, political analysts here recognize that [
the country is going through a critical phase
Mr. Caramanlis's lifelong ambition of making t
Greece part of Europe, they argue will re f
main in jeopardy so long as Greece is kept out i
of the military wing of NATO. And the Soviet
Union is bound to exploit all circumstances in
irder to drive one more wedge int: NATO,
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