COPING WITH THE AFTERMATH OF AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96R01136R003100140004-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2007
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/05/23: CIA-RDP96RO1136ROO3100140004-7
SURVIVAL
Pages 242-258
Volume XXII, Number 6
November/ December 1980
Coping with the Aftermath of
Afghanistan
As the Moscow Olympics ended and the Soviet garrison in Afghanistan settled in for what appeared to
be a long stay, the Western nations continued to search for ways to manage the crisis, to contemplate
a solution, and to draw its lessons for the next time.
The following three articles focus on the nature of the crisis and the policy problem presented to the
West. Ernst van der Beugel's is a broad assessment; he identifies both the continuities at play in Afgha-
nistan - the Soviet willingness to exploit targets of opportunity, and the lingering bipolar nature
of international politics despite much commentary to the contrary, and - what is new - the decrease in
American power, let alone hegemony, and its implications for American policy-making and the Western
Alliance.
Barry Blechman and Douglas Hart focus on the utility and illusions of military power. They look
specifically at the case of the Soviet withdrawal from Iran in 1946 and conclude that it was hardly a
nuclear threat by the United States that induced the Soviet troops to move out. Joseph Hajda discusses
the American embargo on grain exports to the Soviet Union, concluding that as an instrument of
pressure on Soviet leaders it was at best limited. The United States Administration was far too opti-
mistic in its assumptions that the Soviet Union would have great difficulty in circumventing the embargo.
Finally, in a letter to the Editor, A. J. R. Groom suggests that perhaps the West is using a double
standard towards intervention when judging the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He suggests that the
West should be helping the Soviet Union find a solution to her Afghanistan predicament, rather than
moralizing about her policy and gloating over her dilemma.
After Afghanistan
The massive Soviet military intervention and
occupation of Afghanistan gives rise to many
questions. Perhaps the most important of these
is whether the Soviet Union has entered a new
phase in her foreign policy, in which direct military
intervention outside her own traditional sphere
of influence is becoming a normal expression of
Soviet state interest.
It is not for the first time that this question is
being asked; it arose - some 30 years ago - over
the Korean conflict in 1950. The attack by
North Korea on South Korea was generally
regarded as proof that the Soviet Union had
entered a new phase in which she was willing
to use military means in order to attain expan-
sionist objectives. The consequences then were
profound. Post-1950 Western political develop-
Ernst van der Beugel is Chairman of the Council of the
institute. This article is a revised version of a piece that
appeared in Dutch in Internationale Spectator, May 1980.
ments, including the rearmament of West
Germany, were at least partly the result of this
interpretation, which was widely shared at the
time. Whether this interpretation was actually
correct, whether the Soviet Union had indeed
begun to execute an expansionist strategic
masterplan, was however as difficult to answer
with confidence then as it is today.
The reasons for Soviet decisions, their motiva-
tion and timing inevitably remain a matter of
speculation. It is possible today to take detailed
and extremely precise satellite pictures of military
deployment in the Soviet Union, but the decision-
making process of the leaders in the Kremlin
remains obscured by an almost impenetrable
fog. This applies as much to academic experts
on the Soviet Union as to those who are in
charge of policy-making in the West. No
President of the United States can have much
insight into the Kremlin's decision-making
Helen Young, Chief, Current News Branch, 697-8765 Daniel Friedman, Assistant Chief
For special research services or distribution call Harry Zubkoff, Chief, News Clipping & Analysis Service, 695-2884
 Approved For Release 2007/05/23: CIA-RDP96R01136R003100140004-7
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