REVIEW OF FOREIGN TRAVEL POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96M01138R001200040041-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2008
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: July 22, 1982
• Content Type: LETTER

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JUL 2 2 1982
V-3. L 9)al 1UHHVI? JUJIIGG
Colonel George J. Mercuro
Chairman
SECOM Compartmentation Subcommittee
Room BD 951, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
SU: Review of Foreign Travel Policy
Dear Colonel Mercuro:
DOJ Review
Completed.
In response to Mr. Leidenheimer's memorandum SECOM-D-225, of
June 28, 1982, and pursuant to the provisions of Director of
Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/20, "Security Policy
Concerning Travel and Assignment of Personnel with Access to
Sensitive Compartmented Information," it is the policy of
the Department of Justice (DOJ), as stated in Department
Order DOJ 2620.3, that any DOJ employee authorized access to
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) notify the Direc-
tor, Security Staff,,when planning foreign travel, whether
official or unofficial. This notification is to be made in
writing, upon submission of which a determination is made
concerning the necessity for a Defensive Security Briefing.
While particular attention is paid to travel'to, or through,
Communist bloc countries, Defensive Security Briefings are
provided on an "as-needed" basis to all SCI-cleared DOJ
personnel.
A copy of the current DOJ Defensive Security Briefing is en-
closed, for your convenience. In addition to this briefing,
the SECOM "Study on Harassments and Provocations" is being
incorporated into the Department's security program. Every
individual receiving a Defensive Security Briefing also
signs a statement certifying that he has read, and under-
stands, the information contained in the briefing. The
Defensive Security Briefing is conducted by a Special Secu-
rity Center staff member who is prepared to provide any
additional information required by the individual.
I have also enclosed a copy of the "Foreign Travel Clearance"
package which has been circulated throughout the Department.
A reciprocal agreement has been made between the Security
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Staff and the Consolidated Administrative Office to ensure that
both parties are notified of any official foreign travel by
Department officials as defined in the memoranda. It is
anticipated that this arrangement will greatly enhance the
Security Staff's ability to provide Defensive Security
Briefings to DOJ Senior Executives.
With regard to an Intelligence Community-wide study of foreign
travel policy, it is my recommendation that DCID 1/20 be
reviewed so as to reflect the provisions of pertinent Execu-
tive Orders and to be consistent with other recently updated
DCI directives.
If you wish to discuss these. matters further, please contact me
on 633-2094, or have a member of your staff contact Mary
Andriacchi on 633-3738.
Sincerely,
Department of Justice SECOM Member
Enclosures
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
DEFENSIVE SECURITY BRIEFING
1. Techniques Used by the Communist Espionage Agencies.
The Communist regimes, through such means as travel controls
and restrictions, surveillance, and harassment, seek to hide
from foreign visitors everything except that which may con-
tribute directly to their political and propaganda aims.
Additionally, those regimes have sought to discredit, sub-
vert, and recruit for espionage purposes, U.S. citizens who
have been traveling in Communist countries for business or
personal reasons. Tight police control over the movements
of all persons gives them great advantages in terms of
opportunities to observe and evaluate the U.S. traveler, and
to exploit or entrap him. The techniques used against
foreign visitors have been extremely clever and range from
psychological to technical. They include:
a. Careful control of the visitor through travel
arrangements made by In-Tourist, ORBIS, CEDOK
and other Communist travel agencies.
b. Physical surveillance of the visitor.
c. Extensive use of telephone taps, clandestine
listening devices, clandestine photography,
and mail censorship.
d. Exploitation of human weaknesses, indiscre-
tions, and vices.
e. Coercion of U.S. nationals by threats against,
or promises of assistance-to, relatives in
Communist countries.
2. Control of Visitors by Communist Travel Agencies.
a. Guides and interpreters are members of, or cooperate
with, the secret police :p}',cncies. 't'hey act_ ,as the ''eyes and
cars" of the es p i ona ',c' :;erv i ces ;Intl their person n1. aecompan.i.-
ment of the tourist. serves as a form of surveillance. It is
therefore important that the visitor be cautious in what he
says and does.
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b. Some. o !the guides nre experienced intelligence per-
sonnel trained to exploit U.S..travelers for intelligence and
propaganda purposes. For example, a civilian employee of
the U.S. Government was questioned in detail by his In-Tour-
ist guide concerning his highly technical scientific research.
The guide, although well in his thirties, explained that he
was a college student working for his degree and needed this
information for his thesis. In another instance, statements
by a Reserve Officer on inactive duty were highly publicized
by the Communist propaganda agencies as praising the Russian
way of life over the free enterprise system of the West.
3. Physical Surveillance.
a. Delegates to international conferences, members of
exchange groups, scientists, industrial contractors, mili-
tary personnel on active or inactive duty, and other parti-
cularly knowledgeable individuals are of great interest to
hostile intelligence. Persons in those categories must
assume that following application for a visa to a Communist
country, biographic and intelligence data on the traveler
are forwarded to the intelligence service of the country
being visited. These individuals may be subjected from the
moment of arrival to obvious surveillance or to surveil-
lance so discreet as to be undetectable. It may be
conducted by male or female agents on foot or in cars and
may cover all travel performed by the visitor whether-by
train, plane, or other means of transportation within the
country. The Communist intelligence services have the per-
sonnel and facilities to keep the target individual under
total surveillance at all times if they so'desire.
b. Should the traveler become aware that he is under
surveillance he should act normally and avoid any actions
that could be even remotely considered compromising or
embarrassing. He should not attempt to "play games" with
the surveillants or attempt to lose-them or embarrass them.
4. Technical Surveillance Devices_
a. .On 26 May 1960, Ambassador Lodge displayed at the
United Nations a wooden plaque of the Great Seal of the
United States which hind been presented by the Soviets to
Ambrlssa.dor llrlrriinnn in 194.5. In 1.952 we found that rl
hidden listen:i.nt; device was concealed in the plaque.
Described as very small, the microphone is even today con-
sidered to be an extremely advanced piece of electronic
equipment.
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b. Mr. Lodge stated that security personnel had found
more than 100 concealed listening devices in United States
embassies and in the residences of American personnel in
Communist countries, including 25 in Poland.
c. It was also reported that guest houses and hotels
where official U.S. Visitors stayed were "bugged".
Evidence that listening devices had.been installed was
furnished in one instance as a result of an experimental
conversation. There was a discussion about a U.S. citizen
in which he was given a rank he did not actually hold.
The following morning Soviet officials addressed him by
that rank and treated him with greater courtesy than he
had previously received.
d. In-Tourist, ORBIS, CEDOK and the other Communist
travel agencies invariably arrange for American travelers
to stay at the better class hotels and there is evidence
that in many cases the U.S. travele rsare assigned rooms
in which listening devices have been installed. Devices
have been detected in telephones, radios, lighting fix-
tures and furniture, and have also been concealed behind
wallboards and imbedded in walls. One may be certain
that telephones in these hotel rooms are tapped. Secret
listening devices have also been planted in bars and
restaurants frequented by tourists and in automobiles.
e. Instances have been reported of hotel rooms equipped
with window mirrors, that is, treated glass which appears as
a mirror on one side, but through which an individual on the
other side can observe or even photograph anything going on
in the room.
f. A number of instances have been reported of rooms
of U.S. travelers having been entered surreptitiously and
their baggage searched. Visitors are urged to keep in
mind that any diaries, letters, notes, and film (both
exposed and unexposed) which are left in hotel. rooms may
be examined, photographed, or confiscated. Any notes or
films valued by the tourist should be kept on his person
but he should never have in his possession any material
which could possibly be. interpreted .:is compromising or in-
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5. Clandestine Photography.
a. Along with developing extremely clever listening
devices, the Communists have made significant technologi-
cal advances in the field of photography. They have
miniature cameras with which they photograph without the
knowledge of the tourist. With telescopic lenses, they
can produce identifiable pictures of persons at a great
distance from the cameras. Additionally, through the use
of infrared, pictures can be taken at night or in
darkened areas with the subject of the photography com-
pletely unaware that his picture has been taken. As in
the case of listening devices, cameras loaded with infra-
red films and with infrared flash bulbs may be planted in
hotel rooms and photography accomplished completely
without detection. They may also be used through window
mirrors.
b. Closed-circuit television is another possible
form of surveillance. A camera for such purposes
could be as small as six by five inches, or about the
size of a pocket radio. It could be effective through
an opening only a little larger than a pinhead.
c. Indigenous photographers accompanying large groups
of American tourists in Communist countries have occasion-
ally requested permission to take candid shots of
individuals in the group. Such photographs can be altered
to make them embarrassing and, thus, useful for attempted
blackmail and recruitment to serve as Soviet agents on
their return to the United States.
6. Mail Censorship All mail to and from Communist coun-
tries is subject to censorship and is a fruitful field for
intelligence exploitation. The Intelligence Services of
Communist countries examine the mail of U.S. tourists from
both a counterintelligence and a positive intelligence
point of view. Tourists should be extremely careful in
writing to or about relatives or friends in those countries
as those people may then become targets for investigations
or exploitation. Extreme care should be taken to avoid
revealing any i_nfornua(:ion which mi.}g,ht. be of positive value
to Conununis(__ i.ntcl l.igcnce co.l.l_ecLion el- oc[:s. In addition,
personal and family problems of a confidential nature, or
any information which might be self-incriminating, should
not be discussed in correspondence mailed through interna-
tional or foreign nails since those matters can he used to
develop pressure against the individuals concerned. U.S.
travelers must be careful in both what they write and to
whom they write.
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7. Exploitation of Human Weaknesses, Indiscretions and Vices.
a. When seeking to subvert, to compromise, to blackmail,
and to recruit U.S. visitors for espionage purposes, foreign
intelligence agents take full advantage of human weaknesses.
These agents are alert to detect immoral and indiscreet behav-
ior of U.S. travelers. Suspicion of irregularities in matters
of sex, liquor, smuggling, black-market activities, illegal
currency exchange, etc., are exploited to the utmost. Failing
to detect a weakness, foreign agents have in some cases
attempted entrapment of innocent travelers. They have
deliberately arranged situations involving U.S. visitors in
illicit sex affairs, have planted compromising material in
their possession, and have worked on their sympathies to
involve them in some illegal or improper act.
b. U.S. travelers must maintain a high level of person-
al behavior at all times. They should remember that they are
guests in a foreign country and representatives of the United
States. They should be temperate in their drinking. Aside
from creating embarrassing or even scandalous scenes, U.S.
travelers, by overindulgence, may set themselves up for com-
promise and a possible recruitment effort. Cases have been
reported wherein intoxicated U.S. visitors have been maneu-
vered into sexual and homosexual activities which were
photographed and which formed the basis for blackmailing them
into espionage. Sexual relations with Soviet citizens, or
citizens of other Communist countries, must be avoided. This
is one of the oldest and most favored methods of compromising
an individual, particularly if photographic evidence is
presented at a later date.
8. Medical and Dental Service. Medical or dental service
should e obtained only from a U.S. Government facility or
from individuals or institutions approved by U.S. Consular
Officials. Speech-inducing drugs, medicines, serums, and
anesthesia are known to have been used under the guise of
medical treatment for the purpose of aiding in interroga-
tions. Consideration should be given to the possibility
that they might be used in certain circumstances where an
enemy maybe interested in obtaining highly sensitive
informaLion. Normally, the place where a traveler might be
exposed to this Lype of LreaLinenL would be i.n a pri_v;.iLe
clinic or doctor's office. Except in emergency, medical
treatment other than from the U.S.-Embassy should be avoided
in Communist countries.
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9. Colic] u:;.i (M.
The fo1.lowin}', se l.. of rn l CS w i 1 1 (0.1 p to keep YOU Cut O 1 , 1-Culb ft :
a . DON ' '.l.'S .
(1) Don't Lake C1a;;:;il.LCd lll,lte.ri,.ll outside L1 1e
LI.S.
Doll, L discuss class:. fiecl i.nforrlaLion outside
(2)
of secure official areas.
(3)
Don' t= fret involved in moral illdiscreLions or
Vices.
(4) Don' t engage in blackmarket or illegal cur-
rency exchange activities.
(5) Don' t accept letters , photog;r,.lphs , packages
or any other material to be smuggled out of
the country for any reason.
(6) Don' t make statements which may be exploited
for propaganda purposes. Do not sign
petitions, however innocuous.
(7) Don't write letters to or about relatives
or friends in Communist countries.
(8) Don't photograph military installations or
other restricted Areas or military person-
nel.
(9) Don't be misled by overly friendly tourist
guides, interpreters, or other citizens.
Be particularly suspicious of guide person-
nel who just ''happen" to know your special
field.
(10) Don't permit photographers to take candid
pictures or you. The results may be any-
(hinf', hul [I ,ll tel-lll ,,.
(1) Do remember th,it, as a U. S. Citi-,,,ell
a
ated w ith the Depart.lllent of .Justice, you
may be a1 target for a[tempted exploitation
by Communist intelligence org,alni_zations.
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(2)
1 ('por(. :tny
SUhVC'i':: iml
0
1I)p;trc~nI or :.usl,cCL~'(I ;1LI (~n~(ILS
I he 0L,i i -
l 1 VL' I)('cln I.IIJ I l? I'L L' i I li :ill ,
f7() I- ,,)V
r(`;i:;on (:11;it VOU 1;111 h;iVC i)ccli
conlpromi.se(I y('11 c;-in discuss the siLuLitlva
in confidence wiLh hi.m. He is noL
in Leres Lcd in darn t; i_n, vour reputation but
ill proLecLitlp, Lhe Un:i.Lcd SL;lLes, You, and
the classified inform tion you possess.
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Memoranduru
Subject Foreign Travel Clearance
Heads of Offices, Boards
Divisions and Bureaus
June; 7, 1982
FifOm Kenneth W. Starr-
Counselor to the
Attorney General
In my memorandum on Foreign Travel of March 5, 1982, I
advised you that all planned foreign travel by officials of the
Department in Levels I through V of the Executive Schedule and
members of the Senior Executive Service must be reported to the
Executive Officer, Consolidated Administrative office, for
clearance by the National Security Council and the Department of
State.
We have been notified by the State Department that the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is now
the sole contact for clearance of foreign travel planned by
officials at or above the Assistant Secretary level or equivalent.
Accordingly, a new form for your use is attached for notification
of planned foreign travel.
In addition to the notification required by the Assistant
for National Security Affairs, travel by Government employees
below the level of Assistant Secretary to Taiwan or to countries
on the State Department's Travel Advisory, or to posts listed on
the Overburdened Posts List must be cleared by the State Department.
Attached are.-the most up-to-date lists, and a form for your use
for this notification. The attached forms are to be forwarded to
the following. address:
Ms. E. Jean Reecer, Executive Officer
Consolidated Administrative Office
Department of Justice, Room 4218
10th and Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, D. C. 20530
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 #JATIUNAL SIC
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SUBJECT: Notification of Foreign Travel
Traveler's Name and Title:
Date(s) of Travel:
Cities/Countries to be Visited:
Purpose:
Anticipated Contact with US and Foreign Officials:
State Department Post Services Requested:
Date:
TO: Consolidated Administrative office
Office of the Deputy Attorney General Attn: E. Jean Reecer
Room 4218, Department of Justice Executive Officer
Washington, D.C. 20530
Telephone:.-, 633-2118
The National Security Council has no objection to this travel.
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 !Jr i~'li'1LiN i Or J if:i'L
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FROM:
SUBJECT: Notification of Foreign Travel
Traveler's Name and Title:
Date(s) of Travel:
Cities/Countries to be Visited:
DATE:
Purpose:
Anticipated Contact with US and Foreign Officials:
State Department Post Services Requested:
TO: Consolidated Administrative Office
Office of the Deputy Attorney General Attn: E. Jean Reecer
Room 4218, Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
Telephone: [phone]
The Department of State has no objection to this travel.
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4D 1 is
OFFICIAL TRAVEL ADVISORY
AFGHANISTAN
IRAN
IRAQ
KUWAIT
LEBANON
LIBYA
PAKISTAN
SYRIA
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LIST OF OVERBURDENED POSTS
Abidjan (Embassy)
Amman (mbassy)
Bangkok (Embassy)
Beijing (Embassy)
Belgrade (Embassy)
Bogota (Embassy)
Bonn (Embassy)
Brasilia (Embassy)
Brussels (Embassy)
Cairo (Embassy)
Caracas (Embassy)
Dakar (Embassy)
Dublin (Embassy)
Geneva (U.S. Mission)
Hong Kong (Consulate General)
Jerusalem (Consulate General)
Jidda (Embassy)
Khartoum (Embassy)
London (Embassy)
Madrid (Embassy)
Mexico (Embassy)
Moscow (Embassy)
Muscat (Embassy)
Nairobi (Embassy)
Ottawa (Embassy)
Panama (Embassy)
Paris (Embassy)
Pretoria (Embassy)
Rio de Janiero (Consulate General)
Rome (Embassy)
Sao Paulo (Consulate General)
Tel Aviv (Embassy)
Tokyo (Embassy)
Warsaw (Embassy)
Ivory Coast
Jordan
Thailand
China
Yugoslavia
Colombia
Federal Republic of Germany
Brazil
Belgium
Egypt
Venezuela
Senegal
Ireland
Switzerland
Hong Kong
Israel
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Great Britain
Spain
Mexico
U.S.S.R
Oman
Kenya
Canada
Panama
France
South Africa
Brazil
Italy
Brazil
Israel
Japan
Poland
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(off rr of flIp lunirp (r rnrol
as~inginn, . CC. 2B53d1
March 5, 1982
MEMORANDUM TO: Heads of Offices, Bureaus, Divisons
and Boards
FROM: Kenneth W. Starr Zt4ney Counselor to the General
SUBJECT: Foreign Travel
Please find attached a copy of a memorandum from the
President with respect to procedures applicable to foreign
travel by officials of the U. S. Government.
The current procedures of the Department in regard to
reporting the foreign travel of officials of the Department
in Levels I through V of the Executive Schedule and members
of the Senior. Executive Service will provide the information
needed to report to the National Security Council and the
Department of State.
All clearing of foreign travel by officials of the
Department shall be directed to:
Ms. E. Jean Reecer
Executive Officer
Consolidated Administrative Office
Room 4218
10th and Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C.
Thanks very much.
Enclosure
cc: The Attorney General
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THE WHITE HOUSE
February 22, 1982
r w 12 S, FH W
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES
SUBJECT: Foreign Travel by U. S. Officials
Foreign travel by high level U. S. officials is essential to
the conduct of our nation?s business. Such travel, however, is
in itself a part of our foreign policy.
Any such foreign travel should be for specific reasons which are
consistent with our overall national security policy and should
be conducted by a delegation as small as possible.
You have already reviewed your general travel policies and
practices as directed in my memorandum of December 16, 1981.
This directive establishes procedures for foreign travel by
senior officials of the Executive Branch. _
Foreign travel proposals of officials at or above the rank of
Assistant Secretary (or equivalent rank) of Executive Departments
and Agencies are to be submitted to the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs for my approval.
With as much advance notice as possible, the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs should be furnished the
following information:
as Objectives of the trip
o Names of senior participants
m Itinerary
List of major events, meetings and
appearances
Upon the completion of such trips or, if appropriate, while they
are in progress, a report should be submitted to me through my
Assistant for National Security Affairs, noting the response of
host governments to U. S. proposals and other significant
information.
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