NOTES ON THE RICE POSITION OF CERTAIN ASIAN COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300060044-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: June 29, 1955
• Content Type: MEMO

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OCI No. 3413/55 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Copy No. 34 OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
29 June 1955
MEMORANDUM TO: Deputy Director (Intelligence)
SUBJECT: Notes on the rice position of certain Asian
countries
Thailand's Position: Thailand carried over about 500,000
tons of rice into 19 . An unexpectedly small new crop limited
the total 1955 exportable surplus to a maximum of 1,300,000 tons.
This figure includes the 1954 carryover but not 100,000 tons
set aside as normal carryover into 1956. Exports to date amount
to about 600,000 tons, leaving at most 700,000 tons to be dis-
posed of. The Thai government anticipates little difficulty in
selling this, although the lower grades may move slowly.
. Thailand would like to sell Cambodia-the low-grade varieties
it needs. Cambodia may be unable or unwilling, however, to buy
at prevailing Bangkok rates, even though Thai rice is consider-
ably cheaper than it was last year.
Formosan rice exports: Formosa exports about ten percent
of its annual rice crop, mostly to Japan. Japan has a distinct
preference for the high-quality rice grown on Formosa.
In 1954, exports fell to 36,000 tons, as against a planned
total of 145,000-tons. Exports for 1955 have reached 80,000
tons to date, most of which was probably from stocks carried
over from 1954. A serious drought early this year damaged the
first crop, resulting in the loss of as much as 200,000 tons.
Formosa's ability to export a planned 182,000 tons in 1955 thus
depends on the size of the second crop, now in production.
Since Formosa's average postwar exports of rice have been
relatively small in comparison with those of Burma and Thailand,
its production cannot be considered an important factor in the
over-all Asian rice situation.
Burma's shipping capabilities: Port facilities would not
limit Burma s ability to SEEP rice to Laos and Cambodia. The
peak loading capacity at Rangoon, which handles 81 percent of
Burma's rice exports, ranges from 15,000 to 17,000 tons-per
day. This full capacity is seldom utilized.
Dept. review completed CON F ,
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CONF I'
Ship congestion this spring has not been due to limited
loading capacity, but to the refusal of Chinese Communist
inspectors to accept rice presented for shipment. They main-
tain that its quality falls far short of the standards set in
the protocol of 3 November 1954 for the sale of 150,000 tons
of old-crop rice.
Burma has plenty of rice which would meet Cambodian and
Laotian standards. It has made an intensive but to date un-
availing effort to open negotiations with these countries.
Laos' rice needs: American minister Yost in Vientiane
has consistently emphasized this spring Laos' urgent need for
rice, perhaps as much as 40,000 tons. Droughts in the past
two years, coupled with the depredations of the Viet Minh,
have rendered many of the people, particularly in northern
Laos, destitute. Yost fears serious political complications
if these people's need for food is unfulfilled.
An impending triangular arrangement involving the United
States, Japan and Thailand will substantially alleviate the
situation in Laos. Under this arrangement, Thailand will
export up to 25,000 tons to Laos. It will receive payment in
the form of credit to its open account with Japan, and the
latter will be reimbursed through the shipment of an equiva-
lent amount of American surplus rice. This deal appears to
be approaching consummation.
The position of Cambodia: Cambodia anticipates a def-
icit of 1h.000 tons,o rice this year. The effects of the
shortage will become most serious from September to November,
when famine conditions.are expected in certain areas.
Cambodia pleads its inability to procure rice commer-
cially at this time because of a serious foreign-exchange
shortage. It recently accepted an Indian offer to give
Cambodia 5,000 tons and to sell it an additional 40,000 tons
on very attractive terms, which include provision for deferred
payment. This will leave a balance of 130,000 tons to be
imported. The Cambodian hope to arrange barter deals for
about half of this amount, but maintain the rest will have to
be supplied by the United States. The Baldwin mission considers
this estimate overly optimistic. It feels that the US may be
called upon to provide substantially more than 65,000 tons under
the surplus disposal program.
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Burmese and Thai officials allege that the Cambodians
have been evasive in reacting to their approaches regarding
the sale of rice. It seems apparent that the Cambodian govern-
ment is stalling in the hope of getting American rice free, or
at least under more attractive terms than Burma and Thailand
can provide.
HUNTINGTON D. SHELDON
Assistant Director
Current Intelligence
pNFID NTIAL
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