COMMENT ON SALISBURY SERIES IN NEW YORK TIMES, ENTITLED 'RUSSIA REVIEWED'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300030012-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: October 12, 1954
• Content Type: MEMO

OCI No.'0316 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Copy No. ' 5 OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
12 October 1954
TO Deputy Director (Intelligence) p
SUBJECT: Comment on Salisbury Series in New York Times,
Entitled "Russia Reviewed"
Ttia A6
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a few small items of limited intelligence value.
1. Generally speaking, when Mr. Salisbury is discussing
some aspect of Soviet life which he has observed, or with
which he has had intimate contact, such as living conditions
in Moscow, the problem of censorship, or the amount of
drunkenness and graft in the USSR, he is accurate and com-
plete and does a commendable job of reporting. However, when
.he speculates on the more obscure areas of Soviet affairs,
his reporting and interpretation, we believe, are tenden-
tious and misleading. He appears to overstate the changes
which have taken place in Russia in the many months since
Stalin's death. He underplays many of those things in Soviet
life which were harsh and cruel under Stalin, and which have
remained unchanged under the new regime. Like many journal-
ists writing on the Soviet Union, Mr. Salisbury picks the
most spectacular interpretation for a given event in an
effort to catch the reader's eye. In so doing he often
stretches his evidence thin and thereby distorts what we,
believe to be the true picture of events.
2. We are in major agreement with Mr. Salisbury's
comments on the new course in the Soviet Union (article 1,
19 Sept.); on the personalities of leading Soviet figures
(article 5, 23 Sept.); on Moscow living conditions (article
6, 24 Sept.); on forced labor and living conditions in
Siberia (articles 9 & 10 Sept.); on drunkenness, violence and
graft (article 13, 1 Oct.); and on censorship (article 14,
2 Oct.) Within each of these articles, however, we find
minor points of disagreement, either in emphasis, interpre-
tation, or fact. In none of them has Mr. Salisbury uncovered
any facts not heretofore known to us, with the exception of
3. We are in major disagreement with Mr. Salisbury's
analysis of the events surrounding the 19th Party Congress
and Stalin's death (article 2, 20 Sept.); his views on the
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role Beria played in the period immediately after Stalin's
death (article 3, 21 Sept.); his views on Soviet foreign
policy today and in the future (article 7, 25 Sept.); his
views on the Soviet governments policy toward religion
(article 11, 29 Sept.); and most important his interpre-
tation of the role of the army in the day to day operation
of the government since Stalin's death (article 4, 22
Sept.).
a. Mr. Salisbury believes that Stalin was murdered
by his subordinates because the 19th Party Congress and
the Doctor's Plot showed that Stalin was preparing to
eliminate some or all of them, including Malenkov, from
power. His interpretation of the 19th Party Congress
is that Stalin was "shuffling the cards so that only he
could know who would come out on top."
We believe that in the 19th Party Congress,
although Stalin played a major role, Malenkov, through
personnel appointments and by virtue of his delivery of
the major speech on that occasion, clearly enhanced his
position. We believe also that the Doctors' Plot was
most probably directed against Beria and his supporters
and that Malenkov was probably also involved in its
inception. (Tab I)
b. Mr. Salisbury believes that Beria "held Moscow
in the hollow of his pudgy hand" during the days immedi-
ately following Stalin's death, and that, at this time,
he could have used force to become another dictator.
.Because he didn't, he lost his one opportunity and for
this reason was later purged.
We feel that Mr. Salisbury offers a completely mis-
leading picture here. The proof he adduces does not
stand up on close scrutiny. In our view Beria, while
he had gained strength by Stalin's death, was in no
position to effect a palace coup at that time. Instead,
he attempted in the four montE-s following Stalin's death
to cement his power in the MVD and use this as an
instrument by which to seize power. His purge was a
result of action taken by the other members of the
ruling group when they became certain of his aims.
(Tab II)
c. Mr. Salisbury appears to believe that the USSR
today wishes to negotiate a formal accomodation with
the US which would allow both nations to live in peace
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and prosperity by"mutually agreeing to respect each
other's interests. He feels that chief value Moscow
places on improving relations with Britain and France is
that "by this path it may ultimately arrive at the big
show--negotiations between Russia and the US."
We believe that the tactics that the Soviet Union
has been following in the Post-Stalin era are designed
to split the Western coalition, isolate the US, and sow
dissension so that it will be unnecessary either to
negotiate a "formal accoiiodation" with the capitalist
world or to make war upon it. We feel that the USSR's
new-found "reasonableness" is an expedient directed
toward the same end as Stalin's intransigence--world
domination. When the Soviet leaders feel the "reason-
ableness" has outlived its usefulness, they.will drop
it for another tack. (Tab III)
d. Mr. Salisbury appears to believe that there is
"no whip" behind the present Soviet campaign against
religion. He states that churchgoers do not'fear for
their jobs and that hundreds and thousands of churches
have been opened in the near past.
We believe that this is misleading and that the
present campaign is a serious attempt by the leadership
to mold the people into fit subjects for a communist
regime. Communist party members are being expelled
from the party if they are found participating in
religious activities. Although churches were opened
during the war, many, if not all, of those opened were
again closed after the war. We have no information
indicating reopening of churches on anything like the
scale Salisbury claims. Mr. Salisbury, in this piece
as in many of his others, distorts factual material to
make it appear that the present Soviet leaders are
bringing a fundamental change to the Soviet Union's
social structure. This we feel, is a dangerous
inaccuracy. (Tab IV)
e. Mr. Salisbury believes that from the moment
of Stalin's death the army as a group, and particularly
Marshal G. K. Zhukov, as an individual, have increased
their power and are now playing a prominent'role in the
day to day operations of the government. He feels that
they have a large role in_the making of policy, and
that their influence is one of moderation.
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We feel that this common interpretation of events
since Stalin's death is a dangerous misconception. We
interpret the facts as indicating an increase in
prestige of the military in the Soviet Union, but not
necessarily any enhanced influence over policy: We feel
that the military arm of the Soviet government, like all
other arms, is completely under the control of the
Communist Party and takes its policy from the party. We
believe that the last year and a half has seen a normal-
ization of relations between the top political leader-
ship and the military, that, as in western countries,
the military is now being used in a staff advisory
capacity in the formulation of policy and that this
comparatively increased role has misled many to feel
that the military dominates the country. We feel also
that, in the absence of strong proof, it is a dangerous
assumption to believe that the military is any more
reasonable or moderate in its attitude toward the West
than any other group in the Soviet Union. (Tab V)
4. Mr. Salisbury's technical article (No. 12 of 30 Sept.
concerning atomic energy sites and Soviet airforce achieve-
ments) is wholly based on speculation. OSI regards the
article as spotty, cursory, and inaccurate in some respects.
Mr. Salisbury presents no new information on either subject
in this article.
HUNTINGTON D. SHELDON
Assistant Director
Current Intelligence
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19th Party Congress and Stalin's Death
1. Mr. Salisbury states that: "It is by no means im-
possible that Stalin was murdered on or about March 5, 1953,
by the group of his close associates who now run Russia."
Comment: We agree that Stalin's death is still "an open
quest on," particularly since we are dependent on Soviet
sources for this information. Salisbury though, slanting his
presentation toward Stalin's murder, comes up with no new or
solid evidence circumstantial or otherwise on this point. It
is worth noting that the reported facts of Stalin's fatal
illness are perfectly reasonable from a medical point of view.
There are no discrepencies between the medical bulletins and
the autopsy findings. There are no indications that either
the diagnosis or the treatment was faulty, and the reports
clearly reflect symptoms in existence for several years.
2. "The great role, the only important one at the
Congress (October '52) was played by Stalin himself."
Comment: Although Stalin certainly monopolized the spot-
light byy publishing his "Economic Problems" a few days before
the Congress convened, Malenkov's status was significantly
enhanced by presenting the principal report of the Congress.
We, therefore, could not agree that his role was reduced "to
the customary level of party hackwork."
3. "The net effect of the party congress and the per-
sonnel changes was to give the impression that someone was
deliberately shuffling the cards in such a way that only he
(Stalin) would know who was to come out on top."
Comment: We believe that the entry of younger Party
people suc as Aristov, Andrianov, Ignatov, Pegov and Mik-
hailov to the top party echelon may well have reflected
Stalin's decision to let Malenkov reinforce his position by
having a new pro-Malenkov group added at the top.
4. In connection with the vigilance campaign in late 1952
and early 1953, "rumors circulated--nobody knew at the time
which ones were true and which were false. There had been
arrests in TASS, the news agency. The head of TASS, Nikolai
Palgunov, a man known for years to be very close to Mr.
Molotov, had vanished... Madame Molotov had disappeared."
Other arrests in the Foreign Office, etc.
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Commernt: While we were aware that Moscow was rife with
rumors7urg the vigilance campaign, we were not informed as
to the specific subject matter. With respect to the specific
rumors cited above, however, we believe them to be false.
5. Beria--half Jewish.
Comment: We have been unsuccessful in verifying this
contention.
6. Only Stalin knew who would survive the Doctors' Plot.
Comment: In the ultimate sense, since Stalin held sup-
reme power, this is probably true. He could have turned the
plot in any direction he wished. However, the manner in which
the plot is treated in the article i.e. that Stalin ran the
plot alone does not conform to our interpretation. We be-
lieve that Malenkov was probably also involved.
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1. Beria "held Russia in the hollow of his pudgy hand"
at the time of Stalin's death. MVD troops had absolute con-
trol over Moscow from March 6 to 9, and Beria had absolute,
unchallenged, personal control over the MVD.
Comment: These paragraphs give a completely misleading
picture of aria's power at this time, The reports of US
military attache personnel who surveyed the situation in the
center of Moscow from 6 -9 March 1953 do not substantiate the
claim that MVD personnel were the only participants in
the general movement of security patrols into the city after
Stalin's death. The US Air Attache, for example, states that
"At most barricades there was a double or triple line of
troops--at least one of militia and the others of army...
Troops from all branches of service were seen: artillery,
infantry, Soviet Air Force, etc." The use of army troops to
help control the crowds is confirmed by the US Army Attache.
The allegation that there are no army troops quartered
in Moscow is wrong. At least one army rifle division and
other elements are normally barracked in the city, and a
cordon of militiamen would not be expected to immobilize them.
It is the responsibility of the militia to police the
city; in time of crisis or celebration the Commandant of
the City of Moscow (army) assumes overall charge, using
troops of all services as needed. There is no reason to
doubt that this established procedure was followed at the
time of Stalin's death.
There is no reason to believe that the troops (both
militia and military) were brought in for any purpose other
than crowd control. The US Air and Navy Attaches concur
that most police and troops were unarmed. The Army Attache
reported that the militia carried their pistols, while the
Naval Attache, who was close to several in the crowds, says
they wore their holsters empty. None of our service attaches
report seeing any tanks at all.
Furthermore, it seems most unlikely that Beria could es-
tablish unchallenged control over the MVD within a day or so
before Stalin's death, and the fact that replacements in
high MVD posts continued through June suggests that Beria
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was still in the process of consolidating his control of
the MVD when he was purged. The very fact that Beria was so
quietly removed suggests that his control of the MVD was
severely limited even at the height of his power. S. N.
Kruglov, MVD Chief under Stalin and deputy minister under
Beria from March to June, remains as head of the MVD indi-
cating that he did not back Beria.
Thus it is probably inaccurate to say that the MVD
alone controlled Moscow and environs at the time of Stalin's
death, and it is certainly incorrect to state that _Beria
held unchallenged control of the MVD at the time.
2. Flowing from knowledge of his power, Beria's speech
sounded "condescending" toward Molotov and Malenkov, and
Beria gave the impression he was speaking for the army as
well as the police.
Comment: If this "condescension" was apparent in
Beria's delivery, this was not noted or reported by the US
Embassy in Moscow. While Beria mentioned the "glorious armed
forces" of the USSR, he did not pay substantially more atten-
tion to this subject than did Malenkov or Molotov, and we
do not see any implication in his speech that he was speak-
ing for the army.
3. Beria was purged because "he was too big for the
triumvirate, but not big enough to be dictator."
Comment: We substantially agree with this analysis, but
feel that it was not the events of March 4-9, but Beria's
maneuvering during the four months after Stalin's death--
the appointment of personal henchmen to leading positions in
the MVD, the manner in which the doctors' plot was reversed,
the purge in Georgia, the Nationalities policy and removal
of Melnikov--that convinced the ruling group that he was be-
coming too powerful to remain.
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Foreign Policy
1. It is stated that the "one great obstacle to a
successful Soviet policy in Europe" is the fact that "Mos-
cow seems to be no more capable than the West of devising
a really effective solution for the German problem." He
holds that the "whole logic of the situation binds Russia's
hands" because a Soviet withdrawal from East Germany would
threaten Poland and set off a chain reaction that "might
bring the whole jerry-built Eastern Soviet glacis tumbling
down,"
Comment: It is true that the controlling factor in
Soviet olicy toward Germany has been Moscow's unwilling-
ness to make any concessions that would risk the loss of
its hold on East Germany, and mainly for the reasons Salis-
bury suggests. However, the conclusion he draws from this
situation--that Moscow's inability to devise "a really ef-
fective solution for the German problem" precludes "a
successful Soviet policy in Europe"--is based on an inac-
curate appraisal of the Soviet leaders' definition of the
"German problem." Salisbury seems to assume'that the Soviet
leaders, if their hands were not bound, would like to com-
pete with the West in devising a German settlement which
would at once command the acceptance of the Western powers,
dispose of the German problem, and fulfill Soviet objec-
tives, or at least safeguard Soviet interests, with respect
to the new German state.
It seems highly unlikely that the Soviet leaders have
ever believed it would be possible to achieve such a "solu-
tion." Their view of the German problem is cast in entirely
different terms. The USSR's basic immediate aim is to deny
West Germany to Western defense. A rearmed West Germany
closely bound to the Atlantic alliance, and serving as an
advance base and possibly as the spearhead of combined West-
ern military power, would pose a serious threat to the poli-
tical and military security of the Soviet Orbit.
There were two principal ways for the Soviet leaders to
approach this problem of forestalling the association of a
rearmed West Germany with the Western alliance. The first
was to offer the West Germans a more attractive alternative
than Adenauer's policy of integration with the West. Under
the conditions prevailing in this stage of the struggle for
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Germany, however, this could only have been accomplished by
negotiating a German. peace treaty and unification settlement
with the three Western powers. This alternative was unac-
ceptable because it would have placed the decision precisely
on the ground of greatest Soviet weakness--the holding of
genuinely free elections as the basic device and precondition
for arranging a German settlement. The Soviet leaders recog-
nized that they could not compete with the Western proposals
offering a neat "solution" based on genuinely free elections.
They were therefore both unable and unwilling to attempt to
devise an acceptable "solution" in serious negotiations with
the West as a means for blocking West Germany's integration
in the Western defense system.
Moscow's other alternative was to erect an insurmountable
barrier to Western plans for rearming and "integrating" West
Germany by exploiting French and other Western European fears
of resurgent military power and to encourage the French
and other opponents of EDC to seek some alternative to the
EDC policy. This second alternative has been the core of
post-Stalin Soviet foreign policy and Moscow's confidence in
its effectiveness has been buttressed by the belief that the
non-Communist world is entering a period in which conflicts
of interest among its separate national interests will
sharply increase.
The Soviet leaders do not believe that it would be pos-
sible to negotiate a German settlement with the West even
if this were desirable from their standpoint. In the present
situation, Moscow has no choice but to continue its efforts
to undermine the Adenauer government by reminding the Ger-
mans that the alignment of West Germany with the Atlantic al-
liance can only lead to an impasse and that the only hope of
reunification lies in a direct approach to the USSR. The
Soviet leaders probably believe that if they can prolong the
stalemate on the questions of West German sovereignty,rearm--
ament and integration, public support for Adenauer's policies
in West Germany will rapidly decline and pressures will accu-
mulate for a reorientation of German policy. Moscow's aim
is to encourage the emergence of a government in Bonn favorably
disposed to cooperate with the USSR.
If the Soviet leaders can be said to have a "solution"
for the German problem, it is to be found in their efforts
to discredit Adenauer's policies and to bring about a major
reorientation in West German foreign policy. If Soviet dip-
lomacy can accomplish these objectives, the way would then be
opened for moving toward the distant "solution" which en-
visages not a great power agreement on a treaty settlement,
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but rather the formation of an all-German government, through
East-West German negotiations, which would correspond to the
Fierlinger-Gottwald government of 1945 in Czechoslovakia
from which the Gottwald regime of 1948 emerged.
2. Salisbury contends that the new Soviet rulers, as
one of their long-range objectives, hope that eventually
"some kind of modus vivendi or means ofliving together with
the US may be worked out." He suggests that the chief
value Moscow places on improving relations with Britain and
France is that "by this path it may ultimately arrive at
the big show--negotiations between Russia and the US." "The
new leaders," he argues, "feel that under suitable condi-
tions" the US and the USSR could "insure each other peace
and prosperity by mutually agreeing to respect each other's
interests--at least for a time."
Comment: This is one of the most difficult issues on
which o form reliable judgments of Soviet intentions.
There is no convincing evidence to support the view that
the new Soviet leaders are interested in reaching some sort
of formal accon1oaatiou with the United States through nego-
tiations. In fact, the weight of our evidence would seem
to point to a very different conclusion. However, a
distinction should be made between Moscow's interest in
negotiating a formal global settlement with the United
States, on the one hand, and establishing a kind of tacit
modus vivendi for an indefinite period within the frame-
wor of a continuing cold war, on the other. Post-Stalin
Soviet foreign policy has been generally directed toward
this second course in the sense that Moscow has sought to
move the most dangerous sources of East-West conflict
which carried a potential threat of expanding into a general
war. The Soviet leaders' emphasis during the past year on
relaxing international tensions and coexistence reflects
their desire to reduce dangerous cold war pressures. But
this does not mean that they are interested in negotiating
a general accommodation with the United States which in-
evitably would involve obligations And commitments which
would seriously circumscribe their future freedom of action.
The Malenkov regime has affirmed its adherence to
Stalin's thesis that the elements of dissension and division
within the non-Communist world are so great that they will
render impossible any united military action of the western
coalition against the Soviet Union and will eventually de-
velop into situations in which the capitalist countries will
make war against each other. In view of these trends, there
is no need for the USSR either to make-war against the capi-
talist world or to enter serious negotiations for a global
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settlement. Stalin stated that "wars between the capitalist
countries are still inevitable" and declared that the view
that the United States would be able to use its economic and
military power to keep the West united against the Communist
bloc took account only of "the surface of events."
These views which Stalin expressed in his Bolshevik
article published on the eve of the nineteenth Party Congress
in October 1952 were intended as a refutation of the arguments
advanced by another faction within the Kremlin which had
doubted the soundness of Stalin's policies and had challenged
them. This dissident faction, which had argued that it was
dangerous to depend on the internal break-up of capitalism
and the outbreak of internecine struggle within the capitalist
world, presumably contended that it was necessary either to
prepare sooner or later to fight the western coalition or to
come to some sort of accommodation with it. These arguments
were overruled by Stalin's thesis which carried the implica-
tion that it is unnecessary either to negotiate with or to
make war on the capitalist camp.
In his important policy speech to the Supreme Soviet on
8 August 1953, Malenkov stated this prevailing thesis in
the following way: "If today, in conditions of tension in
international relations, the North Atlantic bloc is rent by
internal strife and contradictions, the lessening of this
tension may lead to its disintegration." As long as the
Malenkov regime continues to accept this thesis as the author-
itative concept of its foreign policy, there would appear to
be no reason to believe that, as Salisbury argues, "the new
managers of the Soviet Union probably are willing to go far-
ther than the old Generalissimo" toward reaching an under-
standing with the United States.
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RELIGION IN THE USSR
In general we agree with the account of the treatment
of Jews in the Soviet Union, but not with his conclusion
on religious policy.
1. "The Doctors who were arrested in the plot--with
the exception of two who had committed suicide while being
examined by the MVD....were released and publicly restored
to their positions."
Comment: We cannot verify the contention that two of
the doctor`s committed suicide, but it is true that the listing
of doctors released did not include the names of two of the
original nine. However, the embassy in Moscow believed that
one of them might have died in 1951.
2. "The fact is that, since Stalin came to terms with
the church as a wartime measure, it has regained strength
by leaps and bounds. Hundreds, if not thousands, of ortho-
do churches have been reopened..... Each year the churches
art more and more crowded."
Comment: It is well knwon that thousands of churches
were reopened in the war years, but a large, though inde-
terminable, number were closed down again in the post-war
period of repression. The information that church congre-
gations continue to grow year by year, has been tacitly ad-
mitted, however, in the Soviet press and tends to confirm
our belief that increased religious activity accounts to
a considerable degree for the current anti-religious campaign.
3. "Under Soviet Law--and this law is being scrupulous-
ly observed despite the propaganda campaign against the
church--if a community.of believers,.....requests the govern-
ment to provide it with a church the government is obligated
to do so,, ,Since 1945 the believers of one village after
another all over Russia have applied to the government for
church facilities and these requests have been filled."
Comment: It is true that such provisions are granted
under Sdvi law, but our information indicates that the
government does not feel in any way obligated to abide-by
this law.
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4. "It is quite apparent that there is no whip behind
the current (anti-religious) campaign. Side by side with
attacks on religious superstitions Izvestia publishes eccle-
siastical items--the movements of important church dignitaries
in and out of the country....It is thus quite obvious to all
Russians that no real danger is involved in going to church.
Comment: We believe that the facts presented here are
not comely accurate but in fact, highly misleading. While
it is true that Izvestia does publish ecclesiastical items it
does so only rarely and they are completely overshadowed by
the tremendous volume of anti-religious propaganda. That these
few items are intended primarily as propaganda for foreign
consumption is undoubtedly well understood by Soviet citizens.
Further, the present campaign against religion cannot help but
make churchgoers fear for their jobs. It is known, for in-
stance, that Communist Party members are now being expelled
from the party if found participating in religious activities.
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The Role of the Army
1. "The influence of the Soviet Army in the day-to-day
management of Soviet policy, and particularly the influence
of the dominant group around Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov in the
Army has greatly increased in the post-Stalin era."
Comment: We believe that Soviet policy originates in
the Party Presidium and that it is effected and managed for
the most part, in the Council of Ministers. In neither of
these two groups has the military's proportionate strength
been increased. While there may be indications that the
Army has been receiving preferential treatment of late, there
are absolutely no indications that the Army is assuming any
policy-making prerogatives. In addition, we have no-informa-
tion to support the contention that Zhukov is enjoying the
leadership of a "dominant group" within the Army.
2. "Shtemenko was Soviet Chief of the General Staff
until about twelve days before the announcement of Stalin's
fatal illness."
Comment: We are almost certain that Shtemenko was re-
placed in he fall of 1952, since he was reported in Germany
off and on between then and February 1953.
3. "From the moment of the announcement of Stalin's
death,the military "and this means the real military and not
"political" military, such as Marshal Nikolai A. Bulganin,
or old cronies of Stalin's like Marshals Kiiment E. Voro-
shilov and Semyon M. Budenny) has played an important and
prominent role in Soviet affairs.
"This was shown symbolically in the first picture pub-
lished in Moscow after Stalin's death. It showed twelve men
standing beside Stalin's bier--six in civilian clothes and six
in uniform.
"If anyone in Moscow failed to get the significance of
the picture, he could read in the announcement of the reor-
ganization of the Government that Zhukov, whose name had been
missing from the Soviet press since 1946 and who had himself
been "exiled" from Moscow to the provincial military command
of the Odessa region, had emerged from the shadows and, with
a single stride, regained his old prominence."
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Comment: We believe that Soviet governmental leaders
feared both internal disturbances and external pressures on
the USSR at the time of Stalin's death. We believe they
sought to emphasize the solidarity of the government, Party,
people and military forces, to warn off any internal or ex-
ternal trouble-makers. Thus the return of Zhukov is inter-
preted as a calculated risk by the top leadership, bringing
to prominence an extremely popular and able general.
We note, however, that Zhukov had not been completely
hidden from view since 1946: in 1951, for example, he had
been featured in the press accounts of Polish Liberation Day
ceremonies. We interpret the picture showing the army men
at Stalin's bier-as part of the same effort to emphasize the
solidarity and power of the USSR at a critical time, and note
that two of the "army" men are the political marshals, Bulganin
and Voroshilov.
We do not believe that the military exercised greater
influence from the moment of Stalin's death. In fact, we
believe that the return of Bulganin to direct control as
minister, the merger of the services, and the shift in Politi-
cal Directorate leadership represent efforts to insure politi-
cal domination of the military. As a result, the military
leaders were, at least outwardly, passive during the tense
triumvirate period until June. They did not achieve greater
influence until Beria's purge and after.
4. "Curiously, or perhaps not so curiously, there was
another important military shift just a few days before the
anti-Government Berlin riots of June 17 and the arrest of
Beria on June 26.
. "In this shift the tough, hard-bitten commander of the
Sixty-second Army at Stalingrad, Army General Vassily I.
Chuikov, was suddenly 'transferred to responsible work in
the Ministry of Defense' from the post of Commander in Chief,
Germany, which he had held for five years...
"He was replaced by an active young general named
Grechko, a Ukrainian who had held the important Kiev command
under the watchful eye of wise old Marshal Konev. A leading
member of the Ukrainian branch of the Communist party, Grechko,
while an Army man, was also a protege of Mr. Khrushchev."
Comment: We have no information to support the conten-
tion Ea rechko was a protege of Khrushchev. Chuikov had
been in Germany for five years and was due for transfer. The
separation of Soviet military and political authority in East
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Germany at the end of May was an appropriate time for his
replacement. We learned later that he had simply exchanged
jobs with Grechko. Grechko's Party job in the Ukraine may
have been given him because he was a Military District command-
er in the area. When Chuikov took over, he received a similar
Party appointment.
5. "The importance of the military was further enhanced
when the Moscow meeting was followed by a similar one in
Beria's personal bailiwick in Georgia. Army General Antonov,
a former Chief of Staff closely associated with Zhukov who had
been quietly running the important Trans-Caucasus Command
through one Georgian political upheaval after another, was
the principal figure at this meeting. The meeting was notable
for the absence of political and MVD generals, who usually
crowded the platform of any party meeting in Georgia. Later
it developed that most of these 'generals' had been arrested
along with Beria."
Comment: The Georgia meeting occurred before the Defense
Ministry meeting. It was a special meeting of the Trans-
Caucasus Military District, and the absence of other than
military personnel was normal. Further we have no information
on Antonovts relation to Zhukov.
6. "In the months that followed, the role of the Army
in the Government appeared to harden into a permanent and
accustomed routine. It did not seem in Moscow that the Army
or the Zhukovv group, specifically, was seeking to dictate
Government policy. Rather, it seemed to be holding a watching
brief, but to be participating in discussion of both foreign
and domestic policy."
"There is little doubt, for example, that the Army sought
successfully to obtain modifications in foreign policy that
tended to reduce the swollen commitments of the Stalin era
and, in general, sought to lessen immediate possibilities of
a shoting war..."
Comment: We have no evidence on the influence of the
military aders on foreign policy. Moreover, we feel that
in the absence of strong evidence, it is extremely dangerous
to assume that the point of view of Zhukov or of the pro-
fessional military men as a group is any more or less reason-
able as regards foreign policy than are other points of view
in the USSR.
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7. Zhukov's toast to justice at the diplomatic reception
on 7 November 1953 was a call "on the government to speed up
the adjudication of Beria," and got results six weeks later.
Comment: We disagree with this interpretation and regard
it as mos mplausible.
8. "The customary appeal to the electors was signed by
twenty persons, the first five of them being Marshals of the
Soviet Union--Budenny, Bulganin, Vasilevsky, Voroshilov and
Zhukov. It was an accident of the Russian alphabet that the
five marshals were listed first. But it was no accident that
for the first time one-quarter of the names on the election
list were those of military figures."
Comment: We still believe there is an important distinc-
tion between political generals and professional military
leaders. We consider Bulganin to be a political general,
Budenny and Voroshilov are older officers who are now more
political than military figures, Vasilevsky and Zhukov are
professional officers. Notice also that when the deputies
were elected, 70 out of 1,347 were military officers, almost
the same percentage (5%) as in the previous Supreme Soviet,
elected four years before while Stalin was still alive.
CONHDENTIAL
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