SPECIAL OPERATIONS FIELD MANUAL -- STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROVISIONAL)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 26, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: February 23, 1944
• Content Type: REGULATION

Aprov~or Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
97
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
FIELD MANUAL -
STRATEGIC SERVICES
(Provisional) _
OSS ARC?iVES
WASHINGTON
NC) CHANGE NN CLAS`l
DECLASSIF{C'l)
NEXT RCVIEW DATE
AUTH: HR 7U-2
DATEJ,,
25X1
Prepared under direction of
The Director of Strategic Services
Approvg IpF.gr.,jplQg .2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100EYT0010-5
 ~/SL
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FIELD MANUAL
91MCN.6014 E4-
?STRATEGIC SERVICES
(Provisional)
Strategic Services Field Manua;' No. 4.
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-R?P89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.
23 February 1944
This Special Operations Field Manual - Strategic
Services (Provisional) is published for the information
and guidance of all concerned and will be used as the
basic doctrine for Strategic Services training for such
subjects.
It should be carefully noted that Special Operations
as defined in this Manual covers the following subjects:
(1) sabotage; (2) direct contact with and support of
underground resistance groups; (3) conduct of special
operations not assigned to other Government agencies
and not under direct control of theater or area com-
manders. Special Operations do not include promotion of,
or engagement in, guerrilla activities or subversive mari-
time activities, which will be the subjects of other pro-
visional basic field manuals.
The contents of this Manual should be carefully con-
trolled and should not be allowed to come into unauthor-
ized hands.
AR 380-5, pertaining to handling of secret docu-
ments, will be complied with in the handling of this
Manual.
4~e z4A'i't, 9
William J. Donovan.
Director
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION I -PRINCIPLES AND METHODS
1. THE MISSION, OBJECTIVE, AND
IMPLEMENTS . . . . . . . .. 1
2. DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . 1
3. METHODS . . 3
SECTION II -ORGANIZATION
4. ORGANIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 3
5. ORGANIZATION AT FIELD BASES . . . 3
6. ORGANIZATIONAL FUNCTIONS . . . . 4
7. ORGANIZATION OF FIELD OPERATIVES 4
8. CONTACT WITH. AND SUPPORT OF UNDER-
GROUND RESISTANCE GROUPS . . . 4
SECTION III - PROCUREMENT OF PERSONNEL
9. ORGANIZATION FOR PROCUREMENT . . 4
10. SOURCES FROM WHICH PERSONNEL ARE
DRAWN . . . . . . . . . 5
11. TYPES OF PERSONNEL REQUIRED . . 5
SECTION IV - TRAINING
12. ORGANIZATION FOR TRAINING . . . . 5
13. SCOPE OF TRAINING . 6
14. TRAINING OBJECTIVES . . . . . . 6
SECTION V - SUPPLY AND COMMUNICATION
15. THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS SUPPLY
PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . 7
16. ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPLY . . . . 7
17. SUPPLIES FOR SABOTEURS AND
RESISTANCE GROUPS . . . . . . 8
18. PAYMENT AND SUBSIDIES . . . . 8
19. RADIO AND OTHER SIGNAL EQUIPMENT . 8
20. TRANSPORTATION . . . . . . . 8
SECTION VI - COORDINATION OF SPECIAL
OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES WITH THAT OF
OTHER OSS BRANCHES AND THE ARMED
FORCES AND OTHER AGENCIES OF THE
UNITED NATIONS
21. COOPERATION WITH OTHER OSS
BRANCHES . . . . . . . . . 9
22. COOPERATION WITH SIMILAR AGENCIES
OF ALLIED GOVERNMENTS . . . . 10
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
23. COOPERATION WITH THE ARMED FORCES
10
24. COOPERATION WITH GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES . . . . . . . .
10
SECTION VII - PLANS AND ORDERS
25. IMPORTANCE OF PLANS AND ORDERS.
11
26. ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR
THE PREPARATION OF PLANS AND
ORDERS . . . . . . . . . .
11
27. PROCEDURE IN OPERATIONAL PLANNING
11
SECTION VIII - SABOTAGE TECHNIQUES
28. DEFINITION . . . . . . . . .
12
29. PLANNING SABOTAGE .
12
30. TRAINING OF SABOTEURS . . . . .
12
31. TYPES OF SABOTAGE
13
32. METHODS OF SABOTAGE .
14
SECTION IX - MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL
OPERATIONS FUNCTIONS
33. ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS . . . . .
15
34. MORALE OPERATIONS ACTIVITY . . .
15
35. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY . . . . .
15
36. ASSISTANCE TO THE ARMED FORCES.
15
37. DIRECT CONTACT WITH AND SUPPORT OF
UNDERGROUND RESISTANCE GROUPS .
15
38. SPECIAL OPERATIONS NOT ASSIGNED TO
OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES AND
NOT UNDER THE DIRECT CONTROL OF
THEATER OR AREA COMMANDERS .
16
SECTION X - THE SELECTION OF SPECIAL
OPERATIONS TASKS AND MISSIONS
39. TYPES OF TASKS . . . . . . . .
16
40. SELECTION OF MISSIONS TO COORDINATE
WITH THE MILITARY PLAN . .
17
41. AUTHORIZED MISSIONS . . . . . .
19
42. TASKS SHOULD BE PRACTICAL . .
19
43. MISSIONS MUST BE APPROVED BY THE
MILITARY COMMANDER . . . . .
19
44. CHECK LIST . . . . . . . .
19
APPENDIX "A" TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS
FIELD MANUAL
CHECK LIST - FOR SO (WASHINGTON) . .
20
CHECK LIST - FOR SO (THEATER) . . .
24
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FIELD MANUAL
STRATEGIC SERVICES
(Provisional)
1. THE MISSION, OBJECTIVE, AND IMPLEMENTS
The mission of the OSS is to plan and operate special
services, (including secret intelligence, research and
analysis, and morale and physical subversion) to lower
the enemy's will and capacity to resist, carried on in sup-
port of military operations and in furtherance of the war
effort. The mission of the Special Operations Branch is
to carry out that part of the OSS mission which can be
accomplished by certain physical subversive methods as
contrasted with the operations of the Morale Operations,
the Operational Groups, and the Maritime Unit. The
primary objective of the Special Operations Branch is
the destruction of enemy personnel, materiel, and instal-
lations.
2. DEFINITIONS
a. OVER-ALL PROGRAM FOR STRATEGIC SERVICES ACTIV-
ITIEs-a collection of objectives, in order of priority
(importance) within a theater or area.
b. OBJECTIVE-a main or controlled goal for accom-
plishment within a theater or area by Strategic Services
as set forth in an Over-All Program.
C. SPECIAL PROGRAM FOR STRATEGIC SERVICES ACTIV-
ITIEs-a statement setting forth the detailed missions
assigned to one or more Strategic Services branches,
designed to accomplish a given objective, together with
a summary of the situation and the general methods
of accomplishment of the assigned missions.
d. MISSION-a statement of purpose set forth in a
special program for the accomplishment of a given
objective.
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: C1A-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
e. OPERATIONAL PLAN-an amplification or elabora-
tion of a special program, containing the details and
means of carrying out the specified activities.
f. TASK-a detailed operation, usually planned in
the field, which contributes toward the accomplishment
of a mission.
g. TARGET-a place, establishment, group, or individ-
ual toward which activities or operations are directed.
h. THE FIELD-all areas outside of the Western Hem-
isphere in which Strategic Services activities take place.
i. FIELD BASE-an OSS headquarters in the field,
designated by the name of the city in which it is
established, e.g., OSS FIELD BASE, Cairo.
1. ADVANCED OR SUB-BASE-an additional base estab-
lished by and responsible to an OSS field base.
k. OPERATIVE-an individual employed by and re-
sponsible to the OSS and assigned under special pro-
grams to field activity.
1. AGENT-an individual recruited in the field who
is employed and directed by an OSS operative or by a
field or sub-base.
m. COVER-an open status, assumed or bona fide,
which serves to conceal the secret activities of an opera-
tive or agent.
n. CUTOUT-a person who forms a communicating
link between two individuals, for security purposes.
0. OPERATIONAL GROUPS-a small, uniformed party of
specially qualified soldiers, organized, trained, and
equipped to accomplish the specific missions set forth
below.
p. RESISTANCE GROUPS - individuals associated to-
gether in enemy-held territory to injure the enemy by
any or all means short of military operations, e.g., by
sabotage, espionage, non-cooperation.
q. GUERRILLAS-an organized band of individuals in
enemy-held territory, indefinite as to number, which
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
conducts against the enemy irregular operations in-
cluding those of a military or quasi-military nature.
3. METHODS
The methods to be used by Special Operations are
all measures needed to destroy enemy personnel, materiel,
installations, and his will to resist. The major classifica-
tions of SO methods are;
a. Sabotage.
b. Direct contact with and support of underground
resistance groups.
c. Special operations not assigned to other govern-
mental agencies and not under direct control of theater
or area commanders.
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION
4. ORGANIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES
The Special Operations Branch is included under
Strategic Services Operations and is responsible for the
following :
A. Sabotage.
b. Direct contact with and support of underground
resistance groups.
c. Conduct of special operations not assigned to
other governmental agencies and not under direct con-
trol of theater or area commanders.
d. Organization, equipment, and training of such
individuals or organizations as may be required for
operations not assigned to other governmental agencies.
5. ORGANIZATION .AT FIELD .BASES
Each field base will normally include an SO section,
the head of which is responsible to the Strategic Services
Officer in theaters or to the Chief of OSS Mission in
neutral countries, and which will participate in the plan-
ning and execution of SO activities in that theater or area.
SO personnel both at the base and in the field will be
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
responsible for carrying out the approved SO special
programs and such additional operations as may be au-
thorized by the theater commander for that theater or
area.
6. ORGANIZATIONAL FUNCTIONS
a. At headquarters in Washington and in the thea-
ters of operation the SO units, assisted by other OSS
units, are responsible for:
Recruiting Training
Planning Supply
Administration Liaison
Staff work
b. SO in its activities will be assisted by the intelli-
gence branches, the operating branches, Services and
Communications Branches, Schools and Training
Branch, Field Photographic Branch, and other OSS
organizations.
7. ORGANIZATION OF FIELD OPERATIVES
Field operatives work individually or in groups as
required by the mission and objective. Many operatives
working with the underground must of necessity operate
alone. Carefully selected and trained units will be organ-
ized specially for specific coup de main projects.
8. CONTACT WITH AND SUPPORT OF UNDER-
GROUND RESISTANCE GROUPS
SO operatives may assist and train agents for contact
with and support of resistance groups. In order to per-
form this function effectively, they must ascertain the
needs of the resistance groups, arrange for communica-
tions with the base and assist in the delivery of such
supplies as can be obtained. On occasion it may be prac-
tical for SO operatives personally to serve as leaders of
already organized resistance groups.
SECTION III - PROCUREMENT OF PERSONNEL
9. ORGANIZATION FOR PROCUREMENT
The SO Branch is charged with the responsibility for
procurement of its personnel. Civilian clerical personnel
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27 CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
is procured through the Services Branch, both in the
United States and abroad. Other personnel, including
military and naval, is procured in the United States
through the Personnel Procurement Branch and at for-
eign bases through the Services Branch. At all times
military and naval personnel must come within the ap-
proved allotment of grades and ratings for the theater set
by Washington Headquarters.
10. SOURCES FROM WHICH PERSONNEL ARE DRAWN
SO may recruit civilians of United States or other
nationalities. By agreement with the armed forces, mem-
bers of the United States Army, Navy, and Marine Corps
may be assigned to OSS and detailed to SO for service.
Members of the armed forces of our Allies may be at-
tached to OSS and detailed to SO for duty, in each case
by agreement with the authorities of the nation concerned.
11. TYPES OF PERSONNEL REQUIRED
A. Base personnel will be either military or civilian
and are individually selected for their ability to perform
special functions.
b. SO agents and operatives are selected for their
intelligence, courage, and natural resourcefulness in
dealing with resistance groups. In addition they must
have stamina to be able to live and move about unde-
tected in their area of operation. Normally, they should
be fluent in the local language and be a native of a
nationality acceptable to the authorities and people of
the area.
SECTION IV - TRAINING
12. ORGANIZATION FOR TRAINING
Basic training courses are provided by the Schools
and Training Branch. The Special Operations Branch
collaborates with that Branch by developing satisfactory
training courses for the schools. Training is a continuous
process and it is the responsibility of each SO chief, both
in the United States and in the field to see that training
progresses satisfactorily.
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
13. SCOPE OF TRAINING
Because of the hazardous nature and specialized
technical requirements of SO, it is important that every
individual in the organization receive a thorough school-
ing in the work he has to perform. For field operatives and
all those having to do with planning, servicing, and com-
manding field operatives, training starts with the basic
school courses which include instruction in secret intelli-
gence and morale operations as well as special operations.
Special schooling for each mission is given to the in-
dividuals assigned to it. For specific tasks schooling be-
comes intensive and detailed and concludes in a final
briefing or instruction just prior to the execution of the
task.
14. TRAINING OBJECTIVES
8. FOR OPERATING TECHNIQUES
The SO operative must be able to assume perfect
cover or concealment. He must know how to employ
underground methods of communication without un-
due risk to himself or others. He must know how to
recruit, incite, train, and direct the operations of agents,
saboteurs, resistance groups, and agents provocateur.
b. FOR SABOTAGE TRAINING
The saboteur, according to the methods he is to
employ, should be skilled in sabotage by resistance, or
by destruction, or against personnel, or by coup de main
projects. He should be able to reach his objective, per-
form the act of sabotage effectively, and either avoid de-
tection or effect an escape. He should preferably be able
to incite, organize, train, and lead sabotage groups.
C. MORALE
The maintenance of high morale is the responsi-
bility of all SO commanders and is especially important
because of the hazardous, lonely work of SO operatives.
From the time a recruit reports for duty until his service
is at an end, building up and holding up his morale is
an essential training objective for all officers who have
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
anything to do with the man. SO officers must be per-
sonally well-acquainted with each man in their units.
Schools and Training Branch officers will inject morale
building into their training courses and SO officers will
cooperate with the Schools and Training Branch follow-
ing the progress of their men in the schools. During
periods of inactivity or waiting, SO officers will see to it
that men are kept occupied with work or diversions
directed towards the tasks on which they will be em-
ployed and to the maintenance of their morale. Frequent
specific checks of the status of morale of each man and
each group will be made by responsible SO officers. Senior
officers will inspect the units commanded by junior of-
ficers to insure that morale is maintained.
Covering the entire field of sabotage and resistance
groups in a number of large theaters of operation means
that SO is confronted with a complicated and extensive
problem of supply. It will be necessary to obtain thousands
of standard items included in the supply tables of the
armed forces and in addition many special items necessary
to sabotage, underground communication, and resistance
groups. Clothing, food, medicines, arms, ammunition,
demolition materials, communication equipment, naval
equipment, air equipment, money, and other supplies will
be necessary to SO activity.
The OSS Services Officer at field bases or in Washing-
ton fills requisitions for supplies, money, and transporta-
tion. It will not always be possible to communicate with
the Services Officer, especially in active service in the field
where supplies may be needed on the spot and immediately.
To meet these emergencies SO officers and operatives may
be supplied with special funds or through the theater com-
mander authority may be obtained to requisition on
vouchers from civilian and other sources. It is essential
that all responsible SO officers and operatives have a
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
thorough training in the handling of supplies, trans-
portation, and money.
17. SUPPLIES FOR SABOTEURS AND RESISTANCE
GROUPS
One of the greatest obstacles to underground and
resistance activity is the difficulty of obtaining needed
equipment, and one of the most important functions of
SO is to see that the underground and resistance groups
receive adequate equipment for effective operations. SO
officers and operatives should maintain a continuous sur-
vey of the supply requirements of the underground and
resistance groups they deal with, report such requirements
to the theater or other commander, and make every effort
to see that their needs are satisfied.
18. PAYMENT AND SUBSIDIES
Special funds are provided for the financial support
of underground and resistance personnel. Great care
must be exercised in disbursing funds for these purposes as
oftentimes an individual activated by money may not be
a stable character.
19. RADIO AND OTHER SIGNAL EQUIPMENT
The Communications Branch of OSS is the normal
source of supply for radio and other signal equipment. All
equipment of this type must be obtained through this
source.
20. TRANSPORTATION
a. Arrangements for transportation of such SO mili-
tary and civilian personnel as have been requested by
the theater commander from the United States to
theaters of operation are made through the transporta-
tion officer of the theater officer's staff. The necessary
passports are secured from the Special Relations Office.
Arrangements for overseas shipment of material are
made through the Cargo Unit of the Services Branch.
b. Transportation of SO personnel and cargo within
theaters is arranged by the Services Officer on the staff
of the Strategic Services Officer. When movement of
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
personnel or cargo is required in a place where OSS
services officers are not available, arrangements for
transportation should be made through nearest appro-
priate channels of the Army or Navy.
SECTION VI-COORDINATION OF SPECIAL OPERA-
TIONS ACTIVITY WITH THAT OF OTHER OSS
BRANCHES AND THE ARMED FORCES AND
OTHER AGENCIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
21. COOPERATION WITH OTHER OSS BRANCHES
a. GENERAL
The activities of the branches of OSS are inter-
dependent. SO activities must be correlated with those
of intelligence and the other operating branches. SO
is part of the OSS team and all of its activities must be
planned and executed as part of the OSS program.
b. INTELLIGENCE
SI, X-2, R&A, and FN supply information to SO.
Such information will include information from the
intelligence services of the armed forces and our allies.
SO should obtain its own operational intelligence from
the underground and resistance organizations with
which they are in contact. Much of the information
which SO uncovers will be useful to the intelligence
services and others and should be turned over to SI. To
avoid duplication of effort and the risk of discovery by
the enemy, SO and SI activities in the field will be co-
ordinated for the benefit of both services.
C. MORALE OPERATIONS
The functions of MO an SO will often overlap.
Activities of SO may have "an effect on the morale of
our friends or enemies and SO personnel may be re-
quired to assist in MO activities in the field. This will
be necessary where MO will not have a field organization,
and when MO will train SO personnel to execute MO
missions. Sabotage and activities of resistance groups
will increase in extent and effectiveness as a resistance
spirit is increased by morale operations. MO and SO
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
I-
must work together as each will often be able to aid the
other. SO will often require the development of atti-
tudes or states of mind and will request MO to cooperate.
22. COOPERATION WITH SIMILAR AGENCIES OF
ALLIED GOVERNMENTS
Our Allies have agencies which in whole or in part
parallel the functions of OSS. The governments-in-exile
of enemy-occupied countries all have intelligence organ-
izations and are in active communication with the under-
ground and resistance groups in occupied areas. It is the
duty of OSS and SO to cooperate with the similar agencies
of our Allies. It will often be necessary for SO to be the
subordinate teammate of an agency of an Allied govern-
ment. Every effort must be made to avoid the frictions
and misunderstandings which can develop so easily when
agencies of Allied governments are working together on
the same task.
23. COOPERATION WITH THE ARMED FORCES
The fact that the Strategic Services are under the
command of the theater commander is not enough to
insure that OSS will most effectively play its part as a
member of the military team. It is the responsibility of
Strategic Services Officers and special operations officers
and operatives to insure that all plans and activities are
integrated with the plans of the theater commander.
Military plans may call for drastic and sudden changes in
the special operations plan and it will be necessary for
operatives and officers to conform.
24. COOPERATION WITH GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
Political, diplomatic, and administrative branches of
our government and the governments of our Allies partici-
pate in the war effort at home and abroad and SO opera-
tions must conform to the accepted policies and programs
of these agencies. By political and diplomatic activity and
through the supply of foods, medicines, and other mater-
ials, the government agencies are often in a position to
assist in special operations activity. SO must never per-
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-012588000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
form functions reserved to other government agencies
except when duly authorized.
25. IMPORTANCE OF PLANS AND ORDERS
SO activities must conform to the missions laid down
in OSS special programs or in approved projects to be
incorporated in special programs. Based upon these mis-
sions, SO must prepare, in coordination with all branches
of OSS, operational plans for the accomplishment of those
missions. SO must see to it that SO plans are coordinated
with those of other branches. SO personnel and units
must always be prepared to act promptly and decisively in
furtherance of those plans when an opportunity presents
itself. Unless plans are based on accurate information and
worked out in exact detail, SO operatives and agents will
be working at a great disadvantage. Slipshod planning
will result in discovery by the enemy, heavy casualties, and
failure. A failure means that SO methods will be revealed
to the enemy, putting him on guard, and making it diffi-
cult or impossible to succeed after the failure.
26. ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
PREPARATION OF PLANS AND ORDERS
a. The over-all responsibility for OSS planning is
stated in Section IV, Provisional Basic Field Manual for
Strategic Services.
b. Within the scope of approved Strategic Services
programs, the chief of the SO Branch in Washington or
at a field base is responsible for the preparation of opera-
tional plans and orders covering SO activities. Similarly,
the commander or chief of any SO activity in the field is
responsible for the preparation of operational plans and
orders for the personnel engaged in that activity.
27. PROCEDURE IN OPERATIONAL PLANNING
Planning is a continuous process in which all respon-
sible officers participate. It will be the duty of the chief of
SO branch or section to develop operational plans covering
the missions included in Strategic Services programs. He
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
will also prepare operational plans for activities which the
theater commander desires to have accomplished in con-
nection with military operations, and which have not yet
been included in OSS special programs. Within the limits
of security control a description of such activities will be
sent to OSS, Washington, to be included in OSS special
programs, which are to be executed within that theater.
The process of preparing operational plans and orders will
vary widely according to the situation. A plan may consist
of a simple verbal recommendation and an order may be
an equally simple verbal instruction. Another plan may
call for months of detailed preparation and the develop-
ment of the corresponding orders may likewise entail
laborious work. Procedure must never impede effective
operation, and when the preparation of formal orders
threatens to slow down action, oral orders must be used.
The United States War Department Staff Officers Field
Manual, FM 101-5, may be consulted with respect to
forms for operational orders. The Strategic Services de-
tachments within the theaters are subject to the direction
and control of the theater commander and an adherence
to military procedure will facilitate OSS work.
SECTION VIII - SABOTAGE TECHNIQUES
28. DEFINITION
Special Operations sabotage includes all secret physi-
cal subversive activity which destroys or impairs the
effectiveness of enemy resources, production, personnel,
materiel, and installations.
29. PLANNING SABOTAGE
The planning of sabotage will cover a large range of
subjects from the most simple act to the highly scientific
operation involving inconsiderable original research. Once
a sabotage task has been decided upon, careful plans
should be prepared for its accomplishment. The enemy will
always have a defense against sabotage and no plan can
succeed unless this defense is penetrated successfully. Even
in the most violent and open sabotage, surprise, deception,
and withdrawal are fundamental to planning.
30. TRAINING OF SABOTEURS
For all types of sabotage, including the most elemen-
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
tary, the personnel employed should be thoroughly trained
in the use of sabotage implements and devices as well as
concealment, deception, and withdrawal. For each specific
sabotage task individuals or groups should be specially
selected, trained, and rehearsed. The details of basic train-
ing for sabotage are covered in the courses of the Schools
and Training Branch of OSS. For the training of opera-
tives and agents for specific tasks, information and assis-
tance will be obtained from the intelligence services of OSS
who will provide information from all other available
sources, military, governmental, and civil.
31. TYPES OF SABOTAGE
a. INDUSTRIAL SABOTAGE
Industrial sabotage includes attacks on natural
resources such as mines, oil wells, and water supply;
attacks on processing and handling facilities such as
refineries, smelters, factories, and warehouses; public
utilities such as electric, telephone, railroad, road, water,
and gas systems; and, essential supplies such as forage,
foods, and medicines. Physical attacks on management
and labor personnel are part of industrial sabotage.
b. MILITARY SABOTAGE
Military sabotage includes attacks on lines of com-
munication, supplies, installations, equipment, materiel,
and personnel. Included are roads, railroads, waterways,
and their equipment; aircraft, airports, and their instal-
lations; radio, telephone, and telegraph systems; food,
water, arms, ammunition, medical, and other supplies;
key personnel, staffs, sentries, outposts, bridge and other
guards.
C. POLITICAL AND PUBLIC SABOTAGE
Political and public physical sabotage covers the
liquidation or physical harassment of political and ad-
ministrative leaders and physical interference with their
effectiveness, the demoralization or terrorization of the
population by physical means, and physical attacks on
collaborationists.
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
32. METHODS OF SABOTAGE
a. SABOTAGE APPLIED TO INDIVIDUALS
Includes liquidation, capture, delays, interferences,
and physical attacks on personnel.
b. SABOTAGE BY DESTRUCTION
Thousands of destructive methods are available
including explosions, fires, floods, wrecks, accidents,
leaks, breaks, overwork of machinery, maladjustment of
machinery, and the adulteration of lubricants, fuels and
products.
C. SABOTAGE BY RESISTANCE
Physical resistance by riots and mob action is best
conducted by native resistance groups. SO contributes
by giving support, supplies, and when necessary, leader-
ship. MO contributes by inciting and instructing resist-
ance groups to acts which impede the enemy's military
progress, such as absenteeism, slow-down in production,
and other acts of passive resistance and simple sabotage.
Sabotage by resistance may result in overlapping func-
tions of MO and SO. Hence, in this field MO and SO must
cooperate and coordinate their activities. (See the Pro-
visional Basic Field Manual for Morale Operations.)
d. COUP DE MAIN PROJECTS
Coup de main operations are usually attacks
against important targets and are executed by a care-
fully selected and trained group of SO operatives.
e. DEFENSE MISSIONS
The defense mission is one that is designed to pre-
vent the destruction of installations by the retreating
enemy. This includes protection of important bridges
and tunnels; wire communications, including wires,
transformers, repeater stations; power plants, radio sta-
tions, water and sewage systems. It also includes activi-
ties to prevent the mining of roads by the enemy, the
blowing up of supply dumps, as well as other activities
that will prevent the enemy from impeding the progress
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
of the invading forces. Resistance groups, under the
guidance of SO operatives, will be the primary agency
in the accomplishment of defense missions.
SECTION IX-MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL
OPERATIONS FUNCTIONS
33. ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS
As a member of the OSS-Military Team SO may be
called upon to perform a variety of functions in support of
the Armed Forces, other branches of OSS and govern-
mental agencies of the United States or its allies.
34. MORALE OPERATIONS ACTIVITY
SO may be required to execute field activity for MO.
MO activity may include: physical activity for MO effects;
the subversion of important individuals; the distribution
of subversive pamphlets, posters, or the marking up of
slogans; the creation of riots and disturbances; the work
of agents provocateur; the spreading of rumors; incite-
ment to resistance; and countering the effects of enemy
morale operations.
35. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY
SI may call upon SO to gather information and to
transmit it. X-2 may ask SO operatives to assist in discov-
ering and neutralizing the work of enemy intelligence
agents.
36. ASSISTANCE TO THE ARMED FORCES
SO may be called upon by theater and other com-
manders to perform special activities such as to provide
guides, interpreters, couriers, and signal men, and to de-
fend or protect installations within the enemy areas. In
support of the military plan SO may be required to create
diversions with false signals, sabotage, and attacks by
resistance groups for the purpose of deceiving the enemy.
37. DIRECT CONTACT WITH AND SUPPORT OF UN-
DERGROUND RESISTANCE GROUPS
SO will maintain liaison with resistance groups; to
encourage, instruct, and direct them, and to supply them
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
with munitions, food, medicines, communication equip-
ment, and other materiel.
38. SPECIAL OPERATIONS NOT ASSIGNED TO OTHER
GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES AND NOT UNDER THE
DIRECT CONTROL OF THEATER OR AREA COM-
MANDERS
From neutral areas or in areas not under a military
commander, SO may recruit and train personnel or con-
duct operations in enemy or enemy-occupied countries as
directed by Strategic Services in Washington, Chief of the
OSS Mission and at field bases. For this type of operation,
instructions must be clear and explicit to make sure that
SO does not overstep its authority or clash with any other
agency, or provoke undesirable diplomatic or political
complications. The Chief of the Diplomatic Mission should
be advised of such contemplated operations.
SECTION X-THE SELECTION OF SPECIAL
OPERATIONS TASKS AND MISSIONS
In sabotage and in contact with and support of re-
sistance groups there is a large field of possible SO tasks,
including :
a. ORGANIZATIONAL TAsxs-the recruiting of agents,
gaining contact with and establishing good relations
with such groups, assisting in their training, organiza-
tion, leadership and supply.
b. OPERATIONAL TASKS
(1) Sabotage of enemy resources, productive facil-
ities, personnel, materiel, and installations, as well as
protection of vital installations and equipment re-
quired by our own forces and the civilian population.
(2) Miscellaneous special operations tasks in sup-
port of the other branches of OSS and the Armed
Forces and governmental agencies of the United
States and its Allies.
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
40. SELECTION OF MISSIONS TO COORDINATE WITH
THE MILITARY PLAN
As SO is a member of the OSS-Military Team it is
necessary that its activities always be in proper relation-
ship to the military plan of the commander. The status of
military activities will have a direct and important bearing
on the type of special operations engaged in.
a. DURING A RELATIVELY STATIC OR PREPARATORY
PHASE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY
(1) Such a phase .may extend over a long period of
time during which the opposing forces will be gather-
ing strength or breaking down resistance by bombing
from the air and submarine warfare, or maneuvering
for strategic advantages on the flanks or by the clear-
ing of lines of communication. During a preparatory
phase the activities to be engaged in depend on the
situation. However, attacks on military communica-
tions, installations, and personnel can be effective
during a preparatory phase when the enemy is operat-
ing in extremely hostile occupied territory, far from
its home base, with limited and vulnerable lines of
communication. Under such favorable circumstances,
activities of resistance groups can make it extremely
costly for the enemy to hold the territory and main-
tain communications.
(2) Industrial sabotage will reach its greatest
effectiveness during a preparatory phase of military
activity and the primary objectives should be those
facilities whose destruction will cause maximum in-
convenience to the enemy. The selection of industries
to attack will depend on their relative importance to
the war effort and this will depend upon the over-all
production position of the enemy. Only a careful and
accurate survey of the production picture, industry
by industry, will enable SO to determine what ob-
jectives to attack and then a full knowledge of manu-
facturing techniques will be necessary before the best
targets can be selected. As a general rule, critical
materials and sources of supply, bottlenecks of pro-
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
duction and vital storage and transportation systems
should be selected. The foregoing should not pre-
clude the application of general sabotage to anything
and everything which may hurt the enemy, if and
when included as part of an approved program. These
activities should be very carefully coordinated with
air intelligence and the air bombing program.
(3) SO may also contribute to an MO program of
encouraging slow-downs, mistakes, confusion, de-
moralization, absenteeism, riots, disturbances, and
resistance of all kinds as long as they do not interfere
with calculated attacks on the more important ob-
jectives.
b. DURING AND JUST PRECEDING A PERIOD OF INTENSIVE
MILITARY ACTIVITY
(1) A period of intensive military activity may
include air, land, or sea battles or combined opera-
tions; offensives, retreats or sieges; warfare of move-
ment or position; landings or river crossings; and,
the campaign may extend over large or small areas
of land or water and involve large or small forces.
During such a phase SO activity should be concen-
trated on those missions which will give direct and
immediate aid to the armed forces.
(2) Missions may include attacks on enemy per-
sonnel, materiel, and communications and they may
include defenses of communications and installations
which the commander may wish to protect from
enemy demolition.
(3) The selection of specific missions will depend
on the situation and the military plan. Under one set
of circumstances, it may be necessary for SO to con-
centrate all its efforts on blocking enemy transporta-
tion. When the enemy forces are not too strong and
are operating in a hostile territory, a general organ-
ized resistance on the part of the civilian population
may give the greatest help to the military com-
mander. In selecting missions, every possibility should
be considered and carefully examined in relation to
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
other possibilities and the military plans before rec-
ommendations are made.
In general, SO activities will fall within the scope of
its prescribed functions, as described in pars. 1 and 3,
Section I. In the field, these may be modified as the theater
commander requires. However, all SO missions must be
included in approved programs covering the accomplish-
ment of definite objectives.
Unless it is reasonably feasible to accomplish the task
assigned with the personnel and equipment available, such
SO task should not be undertaken. This does not mean that
SO should be unwilling to take risks. SO should always be
on the offensive, planning and executing its activities in
an aggressive spirit and willing to accept considerable
losses and to risk failure.
43. MISSIONS MUST BE APPROVED BY THE
MILITARY COMMANDER
The responsibility for success of military operations
rests with the commander. For security reasons, it will not
be possible for SO to be acquainted with all of the military
plans. It is essential, therefore, that all SO missions with-
in theaters be acceptable to the theater commander and
be approved by him.
44. CHECK LIST
In Appendix "A" there are summarized in the form of
a check list a number of the more important points that
may have been presented in this manual. This check list
may serve as a brief list of reminders to SO personnel to
assist them in the course of their work.
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
APPENDIX "A"
to
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FIELD MANUAL-
STRATEGIC SERVICES
(Provisional)
CHECK LIST
For SO (Washington)
Does the projected activity conform to approved
Strategic Services special programs or to additional activi-
ties approved by competent authority for inclusion in
special programs?
2. PLANNING IN IMPLEMENTATION OF PROGRAMS
a. Is planning complete, covering tests as to suitabili-
ty, feasibility, and practicability?
b. Have provisions been made for :
(1) Coordination of planning with appropriate
allied agencies?
(2) Recruiting and training of necessary person-
nel?
(3) Equipment, supplies, funds, and administra-
tive services?
(4) Adequate communications?
(5) Transportation to the theater?
c. Have SO plans been coordinated with those of
other OSS branches to ensure perfect teamwork and to
avoid duplication?
d. Have these plans been approved by appropriate
authority?
E. Has all pertinent intelligence been forwarded to
the field for use in current and further operational
plans to be made there?
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
f. Has the field been informed of the steps being
taken by the various branches of OSS, Washington, for
the implementation of the approved special programs?
g. Have all standing instructions in respect of SO
activities been complied with?
SUPPLIES : PROCUREMENT, TRAINING, AND
EQUIPPING OF PERSONNEL
3. SUPPLIES
a. Has the field been consulted regarding supply re-
quirements for the special programs?
b. Based on that information have lists of supplies
and equipment required for the projected activities been
prepared and submitted as a requisition to Procurement
and Supplies Branch?
c. Has close liaison been maintained all the way with
Procurement and Supply to determine :
(1) Availability of supplies and equipment?
(2) Time required to obtain such material?
d. Has the base been notified of what part of the sup-
plies will be sent from Washington?
e. Has branch chief in the field been notified to initi-
ate requests for supplies and equipment as soon as need
can be foreseen?
f. Has the field been informed of new special devices
and weapons that have become available since plans
were made, and have descriptions of their functions and
operating details been sent to the field, as well as the
quantities available?
g. Has provision been made for adequate funds for
the activities under this program?
4. SUPPLIES OF OSS FUNDS AND SPECIAL EQUIP-
MENT FOR RESISTANCE GROUPS
a. Has the field provided detailed information regard-
ing needs of the resistance elements for money, supplies,
and equipment?
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
(1) What is available from stocks at the base?
(2) What has to be shipped from the U.S.?
b. Have all needed steps been taken to obtain these
materials through Services - Procurement and Supply?
5. SHIPMENT OF SUPPLIES
a. Has theater commander approval been received
from field for shipment of supplies and equipment?
b. Has field been informed of :
(1) Schedule of shipment of supplies and equip-
ment?
(2) Shortages in the shipment?
6. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
A. Has personnel about to be sent abroad in connec-
tion with prospective activities been examined individu-
ally for:
(1) Proper training?
(2) Proper inoculations for overseas service?
(3) Regular equipment and special equipment?
(4) Careful security check?
b. Has plausible "cover" been worked out and ap-
proved?
7. TRAINING OF PERSONNEL
a. Has continuous contact been kept by the SO offi-
cers with men in training? Has that contact been main-
tained in a manner consistent with security?
b. Has special training for the specific assignment
been completed satisfactorily?
c. Has the trainee been informed as far as possible
consistent with security, of his proposed assignment?
d. Has indoctrination of personnel been completed?
e. Has special emphasis been placed on security
throughout the training course?
f. Are you satisfied with the security and discretion
of the individual?
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
g. Has the individual been thoroughly coached in his
"cover" story?
h. Has provision been made for utilizing this person-
nel in event of delay in transportation?
8. REPORT S
Have you arranged with the field to send you detailed
reports of :
a. Operational plans made in the implementation of
special programs?
b. Successes or failures in the field in the effort to
carry out the missions?
c. Effectiveness of any special devices?
d. Any new methods developed for the use of special
devices?
e. Status of personnel-by activities under programs?
f. Cooperation received from pertinent allied organi-
zations?
g. Supply of resistance forces :
(1) Supplied directly by OSS?
(2) Supplied directly by the theater commander?
9. TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONNEL
a. Has theater commander approval been given to
transportation schedules for personnel?
b. Have all the proper documents been prepared and
all authorizations received?
c. Has overseas security check been made by OSS,
Washington?
d. Has final security check been made?
e. Has final inspection been made of physical condi-
tion and equipment of personnel?
f. Has the field been notified giving names, grades
of personnel being sent, as well as the numbers that are
to follow, if any, to complete the allotment for the pro-
jected activity?
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
CHECK LIST
For SO (Theater)
Does the projected activity conform to approved
Strategic Services special programs or to additional activi-
ties approved by competent authority for inclusion in
special programs?
2. PLANNING IN IMPLEMENTATION OF PROGRAMS
a. Is operational planning complete, covering tests
as to suitability, feasibility, and practicability?
b. Have provisions been made for:
(1) Coordination of planning with appropriate
allied agencies?
(2) Recruitment and training of necessary addi-
tional personnel?
(3) Equipment, supplies, funds, and administra-
tive services?
(4) Adequate communications?
(5) Transportation to, within, and from the area
of action?
c. Have SO plans been coordinated with those of
other OSS branches to ensure perfect teamwork and to
avoid duplication?
d. Has the plan been checked against pertinent intel-
ligence from all sources?
e Have instructions been included in the plan for
training of personnel and indoctrination in security and
responsibility in the projected activity?
f. Has provision been made in the plan for prompt
reports of field personnel to base :
(1) Information obtained?
(2) Progress of activities?
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
(3) Additional assistance required - supplies,
funds, equipment, personnel?
g. Has provision been made in the plan for the in-
clusion in the required biweekly reports on all activities
to SO in Washington, of:
(1) Copies of operational plans as soon as security
conditions permit?
(2) Effectiveness of any special devices?
.(3) New methods developed for the use of special
devices?
(4) Status of personnel - by activities under pro-
grams?
(5) Cooperation received from pertinent allied
organizations?
SUPPLIES : PROCUREMENT, TRAINING, AND
EQUIPPING OF PERSONNEL
3. SUPPLIES
a. Have requirements for supplies and equipment
been carefully worked out?
b. Have arrangements been made with Services to
obtain in the theater what is available there from Amer-
ican and allied military supplies?
c. Has Services requisitioned the remaining needs
from Procurement and Supplies Branch in Washington?
d. Has the final approved list been checked as,. to
time required to get such material to the field?
e. Have descriptions of functions and operating de-
tails of latest OSS weapons been received?
f. Has requisition been made for these weapons?
g. Have required funds been requisitioned?
h. Have steps been taken to obtain required amount
of foreign currency?
i. Have arrangements been made for adequate dis-
guise and cover for personnel?
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
4. SUPPLIES OF OSS FUNDS AND SPECIAL EQUIP-
MENT FOR RESISTANCE GROUPS
a. Is a continuing check kept of needs of resistance
groups for funds, equipment, and supplies?
b. What is available from stocks at base?
c. What has to be shipped from the United States?
d. Have arrangements been made for a continuous
supply service to the resistance groups?
5. SHIPMENT OF SUPPLIES
a. Has proper requisition been made for items men-
tioned in "4" above?
b. Has theater commander approval been forwarded
to Washington for shipment of items?
c. Has schedule of shipments been worked out with
Washington?
6. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
Has personnel on arrival been examined individually
for:
b. Physical condition;
c. Equipment;
d. Training;
e. Indoctrination;
f. Security?
7. TRAINING OF PERSONNEL
For personnel trained at the base, have the following
points been checked carefully:
a. Has continuous contact been kept by SO officers
with men in training? Has that contact been maintained
in a manner consistent with security?
b. Has special training for the specific assignment
been completed satisfactorily?
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
 Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5
c. Has the trainee been informed as far as possible
consistent with security, of his proposed assignment?
d. Is the indoctrination complete?
e. Has special emphasis been placed on security
throughout the training course?
f. Are you satisfied with the security and discretion
of the individual?
TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONNEL
8. AUTHORIZATION FOR TRANSPORTATION
a. Have all the proper documents been prepared con-
sistent with the individual's cover or protection and his
proposed activities?
b. Has the individual a supply of money consistent
with his cover?
c. Have arrangements for transportation of the indi-
vidual to destination been worked out with military
authorities?
d. Have arrangements been made to insure estab-
lishment of the individual's secret communications with
the base?
e. Have all measures covering security of individual's
departure been taken?
f. Have arrangements been made for the individual's
withdrawal in case of necessity or when his task is com-
pleted?
Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010010-5