NUNN ON THE NONPROLIFERATION ANGLE IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS FOR PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00029R000200350009-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 12, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
25 November 1981
25X1
Chairman, National Intelligence
Council
suggested that I seek
your reactions to the thoughts expressed
in the attached Memorandum-for-the-
record before any decision to proceed.
I would. appreciate having your reactions,
at your convenience. Thanks.
Attachment:
As Stated
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0 CONFIDENTIAL 0
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Nunn on the Nonproliferation Angle in Dealing with
the Soviets for Progress in Arms Control
1. General Perspective. It has been my long-term belief that
common Soviet-US nonproliferation policies and interests are a ready-
made basis on which to build mutual confidence vital not only for
achieving nonproliferation goals, but for making progress on a range
of arms control. issues.
2. Senator Nunn Strikes a Chord. For this reason, I believe
that Senator Sam Nunn has presented a reasonable set of ideas for
what is to be done to move forward with an arms control policy that,
he says, the US "can live with" (see the details in Nunn's "Arms
Control: WhatWe Should Do," Washington Post, 12 November 1981).
3. Prescription: A Crisis Management Group. The centerpiece
of Nunn's prescriptions that have to do with increasing stability in
nuclear crises (and that would necessitate substantial Soviet-US
cooperation) is the creation of a military crisis control center. It
is partly described as monitoring and containing the use of nuclear
weapons by third parties or terrorist groups. Its purpose is said to
provide the mechanism that gives each side more confidence in the
facts during a nuclear crisis. US and Soviet leaders thereby would
be afforded a better chance to determine the origin and parties
responsible for any explosion of nuclear weapons.
4. Role of Intelligence and Proposed Actions. As with all
such conceptual arrarrgements, and should such a crisis control center
ever come to pass, intelligence would play the vital role. With this
in mind, the following actions are proposed:
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SUBJECT: Nunn on the Nonproliferation Angle in Dealing with
the Soviets for Progress in Arms Control
--that we look into an invitation to Senator Nunn,
and members of his staff, to have discussions in
the near future with the DCI/DDCI (and selected key
senior intelligence authorities and analysts)
focussed on the contents of Post article; and
--in preparation for such discussions, we propose
that a paper be prepared that would flag in a
general way the prospective problems in ultimately
achieving anything like the crisis management center
described by Nunn (to include the fundamental problems
of Soviet receptivity and dispostion to join with the
US in such an undertaking) and any potential payoffs
for progress in other areas of arms control.
These would be the necessary and important first steps if the DCI would
wish to earnestly explore what is a reasonable--and perhaps promising--
set of ideas (expressed in a "bipartisan spirit"). In the end, the DCI
could decide whether or not there is merit in the concept for such a
crisis control center and could make his views known to Secretaries
Haig and Weinberger and Director Rostow, et.al.
5. Should SA/NPI Take an Initiative? If most of the above is found
to be congenial, the wheels can start turning with an FYI memo to the DCI
(via the DD/NFA) calling attention to the article (in the context, inter
alia, of our ongoing work on nuclear terrorism) and asking if he wished to
pursue the matter with Nunn along the lines outlined above. It would, of
course, be pointed out that the bulk of any followup work in the govern-
ment would have to be done on the policy side--I suppose mostly by the
Deputy SA/NPI
*The analysis to be done on these sorts of considerations would
have to take into account whether or not the Soviets (and the US)
would be likely to have a stake in the outcome of the kinds of
crises that are foreseen, i.e., the extent to which vital national
interests would come into play.
CONFIDENTIAL
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