STAFF NOTES: SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070027-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: December 9, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
n, Err-z, a
UU no
Soviet Union
pastern Europe
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
146 25X1
December 9, 1974
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SOVIET UNION ? EASTERN EUROPE
This publication is prapr'od for regional specialists In the Washington com-
munity by the USSR ? t:astern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
Iigonce, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
December 9, 1974
USA Institute Analyst Comments
on Vladivostok Arms Understanding. . . . . . . 1
Ups and Downs of
Church-State Relations in Poland . . . . . . . 5
USA Institute Now
Formally Covers Canada . . . .
Belgrade Diss.'%isfied with
Vienna's Diplomatic Note
Yugoslavia: The Search
for National Security--Part III. . . . . . . . 10
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USA Institute Analyst Continents on
Vladivostok Arms Understanding
The senior strategic analyst at Moscow's USA
Institute has described the Vladivostok arms under-
standing as the best possible under present condi-
tions, even though it permits a "terribly high"
level of warheads.
G. A. Trofimonko, a well-informed advisor to
the leadership on strategic matters, offered his
opinions to an embassy official late last week. His
endorsement echoed an fnvsc-tia commentary of Docem-
ber 4, which said the results were the best attain-
able "under present circumstances." Both reflect
sensitivity to criticism in the US, and possibly also
in the Soviet Union, of the ceilings negotiated at
Vladivostok.
Trofimenko Implied that the major impact of the
agreement would be to limit the total number of
launchers available to the USSR and the number c.f mul-
tiple independently targetable re-entry vohtcles (MIRV)
available to the US. He expressed surprise, however,
at the limit placed on MIRV launchers (1320), saying
he had expected a figure closer to 800. He saw little
prospect of a reduction, however, as long as the USSR
is faced by a hostile China.
Commenting on the exclusion from the Vladivostok
accords of US forward-based systems--a perennial So-
viet bugbear--Trofimenko said that the issue would have
to be taken up at the MBFR talks in Vienna. He did not
amplify on this but it could presage a new Soviet ef-
fort to have air forces and nviclear weapons considered
in this venue.
Trofimenko's remarks or. US targeting strategy--
the so-called "Schlesinger doctrine"--were significantly
less disapproving than those he and other members of the
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USA Institute have made over the past few months.
Trofimenko said that although the Soviets were still
critical of the doctrine, the summit had modified
their chief objection--that the coverage of more
targets would spur the acquisition of more warheads
by both sides. in fact, he said, with warheads now
fixed at high levels for both sides, the Soviets
themselves might move to a similar strategy.
Trofimenko failed to repeat another favorite
Soviet complaint that the Schlesinger doctrine seeks
to make nuclear weapons "usable" by providing for
their graduated use in time of nuclear war. I
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Ups and Downs of Church-State
Relations in Poland
After a summer of what seemed to be progress,
church-state relations in Poland are again on the
down trend.
The latest incident involved the destruction
of a chapel in Warsaw on November 23. The regime
claims that it demolished the chapel only because
it was a part of an old people's home that was unsafe
for occupancy and that would be too expensive to
renovate. The officials contend they notified the
Curia of the planned demolition and, after receiving
no response, had the sacraments removed before
destroying the building.
Church officials admit that they had held
discussions on the chapel with representatives of
the regime, but say they proposed it be relocated
instead of destroyed. They accuse the authorities
of "unilaterally" destroying the chapel without
prior notice.
Cardinal Wyszynski has seized upon the incident
to intensify and broaden his criticism of the regime.
A communique from the plenary session of the Polish
Episcopate in late November stipulated that normal-
ization of relations between Warsaw and the Vatican
can become "full and lasting" only if preceded by
"normalization" at home. The bishops added that
although they will continue to cooperate closely with
Rome, they "have direct responsibility for the Church
in Poland."
Cardinal Wyszynski is suspicious of the ,rap-
prochement between the Vatican and the regime that
was reached earlier this year. He is determined to
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be the arbiter between the Holy See and the Polish
government, and insists that he will determine when
"normall.zation" with the state has been achieved.
He will no doubt continue to use such incidents as
the chapel demolition to keep church officials
militant. In the meanwhile, the regime will keep
up its efforts to weaken church influence, but
without risking a major confrontation.
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USA Institute Now
Formally Covers Canada
The Soviet weekly Economic Gazette (No. 48,
signed to press on November 26) has identified
Yevgeniy Shershnev as deputy director of the "in-
stitute of the USA and Canada," indicating that
the name of the institute has been changed. The
addition of Canada to the institute's name has not
yet been officially announced, but the next issue
of the institute's monthly publication will prob-
ably confirm the change.
The institute has been involved in Canadian
studies for at least the past two years. In the
May 1974 issue of its journal, USA: Economics,
Politics, Ideology (SShA), a review of the insti-
tute's organizational structure and program of
studies mentioned that, because of Canada's in-
creasing role in the North American continent, the
institute had created a new sector to cover Cana-
dian socio-political and economic problems.
SShA began to publish frequent articles on
Canada in 1973. This year the journal has covered
Canadian-US conflicts of interest, Canada's infla-
tion and unemployment, Canadian parliamentary elec-
tions, the 22nd National Congress of the Communist
Party of Canada, Canada's growing patriotic move-
ment, and the Canadian search for new markets.
We have no information on who heads the Canada
sector nor of its membership. Institute personnel
who have had experience related to Canada include:
--Boris Alekhin, a young member who did re-
search in the US on American ccmpanies and their
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Canadian subsidiaries. He wrote an article on US
capital in Canada for SShA'a November 1973 issue.
---Vladimir Fedorovich, 50, an economist and
senior researcher, who has traveled to Canada. In
1968 he was editor of the Canadian edition of Soviet
Union Today.
--Vladimir Krestyanov, 53, the institute's
ubiquitous scientific secretary, who was assigned
to the Soviet embassy in Ottawa for three years in
the 1960s.
--Aleksey Nikolayev, 46, a member of SShA'a
editorial board, who was a visiting professor of
economics at the University of Saskatchewan in
Regina, Canada, during the 1964-65 academic year.
in the 1960s he was an economic adviser in the
CPSU Central Committee apparatus, concentrating on
North America and Western Europe.
--Yuriy Rigin, 42, an economist and senior re-
searcher at the institute, who was a graduate stu-
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Belgrade Dissatisfied with
Vienna's Tlomatic Note
Belgrade's dispute with Vienna over Slovene
minority rights in Austrian Carinthia threatens to
worsen. Late last week, the Yugoslavs expressed
strong displeasure over Austria's answer to their
protest of October 29.
On December 6, a Tanjug editorial described
the Austrian response as "absolutely unsatisfactory
and negative." It accused Vienna of continuing the
assimilation program begun after the Nazi Anschluss
of 1938. The editorial warned that since Vienna has
"closed the door" to bilateral talks, a solution will
have to be sought in the international arena.
Despite this threat, Belgrade has apparently not
yet firmly decided on its next step. One option is
to appeal to the Four Power signatories to the 1955
Austrian State Treaty, which guarantees the equality
of national minorities in the country. The Yugoslavs
have already clashed with Austrian representatives in
a UN sub-committee, and some Yugoslav officials may
argue for taking the matter to the floor of the UN.
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Yugoslavia: Thu Gdarch for National Security
Part III: The Goner , got Lheir Chance
Tito'a determined effort to cover
all oontinganaiea that could ariao dur-
ing the aucanonion period has lad to a
major otrangthaning of the internal ac-
ourity complex. Professional military
offioera who have long oritioi::ad the
civilian adminia t?ra tion for failing to
halt the deterioration of domestic dia-
oiplina have boon given the key ;jobs,
They now face a complex tank with many
treuoheroua--but +,)all-marked--pitfalla,
Tito, trusting nothing to chance, has
also neon to it that the top civilian
leaders have adequate means to counter-
act over-noaloua aotivitioo by the now
unif?rmed watchdogs.
Tito's assignment of military officers to key
internal security posts drops one of the regime's
thorniest problems squarely into the laps of his
generals. In the process of adjusting to Yugo-
slavia's assertive national minorities and diverse
political and economic interests, Tito long ago
abandoned attempts to rule by fear and fiat, and
he does not intend to turn back. He wants the army
to tighten internal security controls, but without
inflaning special interest groups that would take
umbrage at every genuine--or imagined--abuse of
power.
The lowly state of the civilian security agen-
cies is directly elated to their failure in the
first two decades after the war to strike a proper
balance between protecting the federation and re-
specting the sensitivities of Yugoslavia's national
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minorition. When the civilian secret police (8b1i)
and its ambitious patron Aleknandr Hankovic fell
from grace in 1966, the whole nacurity effort was
gradually undermined by a program of decentraliza-
tion that atomized ronponnibiiition for maintaining
internal security. An the public lost respect for
it, morale and effectiveness within the norvico de-
teriorated.
Throughout the early 1970s, military officers
were among the most vociferous critics of the de-
caying of order in Yugoslavia. Additionally, the
failures of the civilian services created openings
for the olito military counter-intelligence organ-
ization (KOS) --which had nou,.ralized the SD!) for
Tito during his showdown with Ranhovic--and al--
lowed it to accumulate more and more influence be-
hind the scones.
The heyday of back-stage power for the KOS
probably extended from October 1971 through Juno
1973; during this time Colonel General Ivan Mis-
kovic, thn head of the organization, served as
Tito's personal adviser on national security. Mis-
kovic was purged in mid-1973, after recurring rumors
of his excessive ambition and abuse of power.
However murky the details, the Miskovic affair
did leave the clear impression that the power of
the security apparatus, unrestrained by systematic
political control, was an open invitation to seri-
ous political trouble. Although the experience with
Miskovic did not sour Tito on his overall prsmise
that generals make more efficient security direc-
tors than civilians, it probably did contribute to
the heavy preponderance of civilians in the newly
reorganized national defense council. This body
appears to be the only credible check on potential
abuses.
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Far their part, the military manngeru of the
new internal security nyntom are presumably in-
clined t.-, avoid the mistaken of their pr-edueunnors .
Some atopu have already been taken to upgrade the
political reliability of the high command.
Evan before the now system wan introduced thin
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noveral nigh-ranking o- corn, notorious for their
advocacy of a "firm hand" in domestic affairs, had
boon wooded out of the service. Five generals--
including Ivan Gonnjak, Tito's defense minister
from 1953 to 1967--have reportedly been forced to
retire. The circumstances of their removals sug-
gest that they were tarred with allegations of col-
laboration with the Soviet-supported Cominformint
plotters. All the retired generals, except for
Cosnjak, were reportedly placed under arrant.
Those officers advocated a strong-arm federal
presence similar in some respects to the Stalinist
program of the Cominformistn, but there in no hard
evidence of any military involvement in the plot.
It appears more likely that Tito wanted the high
command to clean its own house of questionable in-
fluoncos before it assumed responsibility for the
nation's internal security.
There are still oorious quoutions dbout the
army's ability to avoid the traps that have drawn
past internal security managers into political
error. The veterans and reserve officers organi-
zations throughout the country are hotbeds of ultra-
conservative sentiment. Their close relationships
with active--duty officers may mo..n that the now
system will not be able to work evenhandedly in
politically sensitive disputes.
The other clear dancaor is that the rr,_litary
loadoruhip--accustomod to the command relation-
ships of army life--will demand more of civilians
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than the civilians are able to t1l vcr.
warning that the now caretakers will not So easy on
disetdent intellectuals.
trin or e writer Miheijlo Mihnjlov wan a firm
Some measures for checking abuse of power exist,
but moat of them appear to be functions centered on
the federal regime in Belgrade. A committee of the
p;.rliamont--chairud by the former minister of the
interior, Luka Banovic, a civilian--in z!uthorizad to
review the activities of the ministry. The now an-
curity law also leaven the power of review over the
military security agencies to the commander in
chief--Tito. But the law appears to limit the
rights of local civilian officials to demand an ac-
counting from the security norvicnn.
Belgrade's first interest in supervising the
military-security complex is to ensure that the
powerful men guiding the repressive arm of govern-
ment avoid the gins of personal ambition and dis-
loyalty. Since early summer, top party officials--
moat notably Stone Dolanc, socrotary of the presi-
dium's executive committee--have been active in
briefing the party organizations of the security
services. While the Cominformist afiai. undoubt-
edly loomed large in those talks, the party organ-
izations almost certainly received orders to
atr?ngthon their role an the regime's in-house
watchdog.
In sum, Tito's preoccupation with the whole
area of national security has resulted in the
creation of a predominantly civilian "high command"
--the National Defense Council--that would run an
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all-out national defense effort against foreign ag-
grension. Within that body, he has succeeded in
craatincj a sansa of unity and common purpose close
to that which enabled the Yugonlava to liberate
thamsnlvoa from Nazi occupation. in the field of
internal security, however, the prospect for fric-
tion is ovident. A serious minatep, by the now mili-
tary managers or by their civilian overseers, could
wall pit them against each other and lead to the
very political instability t?he.,P Tito's organizational
overhaul in designed to avoid.
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