EL SALVADOR: PERFORMANCE ON CERTIFICATION ISSUES
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March 20, 2008
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19
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Publication Date:
July 11, 1983
Content Type:
REPORT
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~11 E U
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GO It0T GIVE GUT
N I C M 83-10011
EL SALVADOR: PERFORMANCE
ON CERTIFICATION ISSUES
Information available as of 11 July 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Assessment.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The government of El Salvador has made continued progress on
most certification issues during the past six months. Progress in achiev-
ing substantial control over the armed forces and prosecuting those
responsible for the murders of six Americans has been marginal at best,
Improvement has been most evident in the area of government
reforms. Agrarian reforms have made steady advances, particularly in
the distribution of land and titles to thousands of new beneficiaries.
Recent banking laws also have completed a process begun in 1980 to re-
organize financial institutions and reallocate credit to the general
public
Cooperation among moderate elements in the government has
increased over the last six months, with an attendant erosion of extreme
rightist influence. This has enabled the administration to step up the
process of democratization, especially evident in the enactment of an
amnesty law that has reduced the number of political prisoners by 70
percent. Other advances include the creation of a Peace Commission
charged with seeking political reconciliation with the guerrillas and
completing the draft of a new constitution.0
Major weaknesses remain, however, in the government's ability to
safeguard human rights, particularly in the countryside. Killings by
rightwing death squads and elements of the armed forces continue.
Efforts by the military high command to instill respect for human rights
among the rank and file have had some effect in elite units, but little in
poorly trained garrison units and civil defense forces.)
The cases involving the murder of the six US citizens have yet to
reach trial stage because of continued legal and procedural bottlenecks
in the weak criminal justice system. Conspirators in the killings of two
Note: This Interagency Intelligence Assessment, approved by the National Foreign Intelligence
Board, was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. The
Assessment was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State. Also participating were the
intelligence organizations of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps.
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US labor advisers, moreover, continue to avoid prosecution following
appellate court decisions to drop current charges until new evidence can
be developed.
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DISCUSSION
Human Rights
"Making a concerted and significant effort to
comply with internationally recognized human
rights." (Criterion for judging Salvadoran Gov-
ernment's performance.
1. During the past six months, the Magana adminis-
tration in El Salvador has continued to make progress
on some human rights issues, particularly as evident in
the recent implementation of the amnesty law.
however, the measure
ment of progress in El Salvador is a relative thing,
complicated by abuses of prisoners before detention in
a government facility and the use of violence by
extremists against their perceived political opponents.
2. The insurgent war has intensified this year as the
guerrillas have stepped up efforts to broaden their
had been held at the relatively modern Mariona Prison
outside the capital.)
5. We believe the government may extend the
amnesty beyond its mid-July cutoff in an effort to
attract political exiles and disenchanted members of
insurgent groups inside the country. Despite the unex-
areas of control and inflict major damage on the El Salvador: Insurgency-Related Civilian and
country's already crippled economy. The rate of com- Military Deaths, 1981-June 1983
bat deaths on both sides has increased, but the rate of
civilian political deaths' has not changed substantially. Total Number of Civilian Deaths
six months of 1983 show a slight increase over those for
the last six months of 1982-178 civilian political 1,200
deaths versus 160. The average so far this year,
however, is well below the monthly death rate of 217 1,000
for all of 1982. (See accompanying chart.) n
3. m ne trend toward improvement is also retlecteo
in the recently enacted and swiftly implemented
amnesty law. Since it went into effect in May 1983,
the authorities have released more than 500 of the 733 0_0
political prisoners in jail at the time amnesty went into
effect-guerrillas and labor leaders as well as leftist 200
intellectuals suspected of subversion and detained
under the emergency decree. Most of those released J F M A M J J n s o N n. F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J
1981 1982 1983
Political deaths are those that take place outside a zone of
combat and which clearly suggest a political motive-for example,
civilians murdered because of suspected complicity with the insur-
gents. Civilians killed as a result of being caught in a crossfire or
other military-related activities are classified as combat deaths.
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pectedly high number of political prisoners who have
benefited from the law, it reportedly has attracted so
far only about 200 guerrillas and camp followers.
Nevertheless, the president of the government's Hu-
man Rights Commission-which is currently investi-
gating reported cases of abuse of civilians by both
guerrilla groups and armed forces units and attempt-
ing to locate over 100 missing persons-appears opti-
mistic
that others will take advantage of the law. He
notes that guerrillas are required only to sign a formal
request for amnesty, and that they are not interrogat-
ed or required to provide details of their past actions.
Like the released political prisoners, insurgents seeking
amnesty are free to remain in the country or to leave.
Meanwhile, the Amnesty Commission's recently estab-
lished rehabilitation committee is assisting beneficia-
ries in finding work or in resettling on land belonging
to the agrarian reform agencies. Those desiring to
leave El Salvador are offered free passports, and
discussions are under way with governments in Latin
America, Canada, Australia, and Western Europe over
resettlement programs.=
6. Despite these and other efforts-including a
massive publicity campaign-we believe that fear of
reprisals from the extreme left or right will inhibit
most guerrillas and political exiles from taking advan-
tage of the amnesty. The government hopes that fair
treatment of insurgents turning themselves in will
spark additional defections, but this may be offset by
accounts of former political prisoners of abuses before
their internment.)
Control of the Armed Forces
"Is achieving substantial control over all ele-
ments of its own armed forces." 1:1
8. The volume of reporting from various sources on
control of the armed forces has increased slightly since
January and indicates that the performance of the
military remains mixed. The military is stepping up
efforts to professionalize its ranks and instill respect for
human rights. Nevertheless, the intensity of the guer-
rilla war-particularly recent massacres of captured
soldiers-and its influence on domestic lawlessness
probably have generated continued abuses by armed
forces elements against the civilian population.=
9. Military leaders are maintaining their efforts to
reduce human rights violations within the armed
forces. Moreover, reporting indicates more precision in
the last six months in fire control during fighting in
populated areas, particularly on the part of combat
pilots and artillery units.)
12. In addition, the new Defense Minister has
issued a human rights manual to all military units in
the country. Similar guidelines have had only limited
impact within the security forces over the past two
years. Nevertheless, this action helps reinforce the
commitment to curb abuses by field commanders and
their troops.)
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destroy missions against "known subversives."
civil defense personnel
14. Government efforts to investigate mass slayings
that occurred last fall have stalled because of a lack of
witnesses-a frequent problem that underscores the
continuing climate of fear and polarization in El
Salvador.
15. Another widely publicized mass killing under
investigation occurred in February 1983 in Sonsonate
Department. at
least 18 peasant farmers were shot in and around the
farm cooperative of Las Hojas;
as many as 60 more may have been killed. According
to peasant spokesmen, the victims were members of
the National Salvadoran Indian Association who were
targeted by local cattle ranchers following land dis-
putes. Individual members of the local civil defense
forces and some 200 regular troops led by an Army
captain were involved. The captain was placed under
military arrest in April pending further investigations
by government prosecutors of charges that his depart-
mental commander, Colonel Araujo, ordered the kill-
ings. He has since been released. Araujo has publicly
admitted sending his troops to Las Hoias on search and
attached to Araujo's command have threatened wit-
nesses with death, thus prompting peasant leaders to
seek protection from the National Guard. The local
Guard commander has promised to patrol the Indian
cooperatives and provide them with weapons for self-
protection. F7
Progress on Reform
"Is making continued progress in implement-
ing economic and political reforms, including
land reforms."0
17. The Magana administration has made steady
progress in economic, political, and land reforms
during the last six months. This period has been
characterized by increasing cooperation among the
major parties in the government, reflecting a growing
maturation of the still-fragile democratic system as
well as the erosion of power of some extreme right
elements. F--]
18. The continuing movement toward reform was
not affected by the recent power struggle in the
military, which resulted in the resignation of Defense
Minister Garcia in April. Although Garcia had been a
primary force for moderation and had earned the
enmity of extreme rightists for his support of reforms,
his replacement by General Vides represented both
the transition of power through established procedure
and the continued dominance of the pragmatic main-
stream of the officer corps. Furthermore, the impact
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of the crisis in the military was defused by the
intervention of President Magana, who, in requesting
Garcia's resignation, asserted his civilian authority as
constitutional head of the government. ^
19. Vides's generally conservative political orienta-
tion and ties by marriage to the landed aristocracy
suggest he may be less committed to the reform
process than was his predecessor. In addition, extreme
rightists appear to believe he will prove less adept than
Garcia at keeping the military out of partisan politics.
This view gains credibility with Vides's recent ap-
pointment of Colonel Carranza as head of the Trea-
sury Police. Carranza is an important rightist figure
with links to extremist Assembly President D'Aubuis-
son. Nevertheless, Vides has so far shown himself
cognizant of the need to reinforce the moderate
policies of Magana-in part to satisfy US policy
requirements-and we believe that the military under
his command will continue to support the govern-
ment's efforts to strengthen reforms.=
20. Neither factionalism in the military nor escalat-
ing insurgent attacks have deterred the armed forces
from keeping agrarian reform on track. According to
the Agency for International Development, as of 17
June there were some 194,000 beneficiaries in Phase I
(redistribution of large landholdings to peasant cooper-
atives), while Phase III (land to the tiller) has benefited
some 305,196 formerly landless peasants.2 Since Octo-
ber the government has exceeded most of its immedi-
ate goals with regard to title application and distribu-
tion. Applications for new titles, for example, have
climbed from a cumulative total of 38,615 in October
to 64,637 as of 17 June 1983. During the same period,
cumulative distribution of permanent titles to Phase II
properties has grown from 400 to 2,453, suggesting
that changes made last year in management of the
program are now paying dividends. While the govern-
ment is still behind in its schedule for distributing
provisional titles, the rate of distribution has increased
markedly since January from a cumulative total of
34,674 to 42,415. El
21. Progress on land reform continues to be clouded
by rumors and allegations of large-scale evictions of
peasants by former landowners
The government
Y This number includes direct beneficiaries and their dependents
based on a formula of six individuals per familyI
is about to undertake a survey to determine the
number of illegal evictions, and it recently began a
nationwide publicity campaign to discourage such
actions. Meanwhile,
the armed forces continue their efforts to return
evictees to their new lands. As a result, any heretofore
unreported evictions are now more likely to come to
the attention of the authorities. F-1
22. The ability of Magana to continue reforms in
the face of rightist opposition has been reflected in his
handling of economic issues. This spring, for example,
the administration implemented the final step in
reforming the banking system by offering up to 49
percent of the equity in nationalized banks to private
investors, with limitations on the amount an individual
investor can purchase. The offer capped a three-year
struggle to take control of credit out of the hands of a
few wealthy families. In a further sign that extreme
rightwing influence is waning, the Assembly recently
defeated a campaign by major coffee growers to
weaken the powers of the National Coffee Institute,
thereby contributing to equitable returns for small
producers.=
23. The inability of the far right to prevail on
economic issues is mirrored in its overall reduction of
power in the government during the past six months.
In February a dispute in the Assembly concerning rule
changes and a cabinet appointment sparked increased
cooperation by moderate right and liberal deputies
against obstructionist parliamentary tactics by far right
leader D'Aubuisson and his party. This enabled Presi-
dent Magana to replace a rightwing minister with a
moderate from a nongoverning political party, thereby
reducing the share of power for D'Aubuisson's faction
and strengthening executive leverage with the Assem-
bly. Subsequent maneuvers by moderates succeeded in
eliciting D'Aubuisson's public declaration to resign
upon completion of the new cons i titution.)
Elections and Negotiations
Is committed to holding free elections at an
early date and, to that end, has demonstrated
... good-faith efforts to begin discussions with
all major political factions in El Salvador. "F-]
24. Planning for elections has been hampered by
partisan differences over posts to be contested and the
eligibility of candidates, as well as disruptive changes
in the electoral timetable. Nevertheless,
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the major parties in the government
have informally agreed to hold the presidential ballot-
ing on 13 November. A major hurdle, however, will be
the promulgation of the constitution, without which an
electoral code cannot be developed nor the structure
of a new government determined. 0
25. Other problems such as funding and organiza-
tion for the electoral contest finally are being ad-
dressed by the five-man Election Council. Although
the Council remains insistent on devising a new
registration system before November, some political
leaders now acknowledge that such a program almost
certainly is not feasible. Officials of the rightist Na-
tional Republican Alliance and the liberal Christian
Democratic Party, for example, recently have indicat-
ed that they will accept open registration-such as
existed during the March 1982 elections-for the sake
of expediency=
26. Open registration may inspire postelection
charges of fraud among partisan groupings, but it
should help encourage another large turnout on the
part of voters unable or unwilling to return to specific
municipalities as would be required with formal regis-
tration. Turnout will still be determined to a consider-
able extent, however, by the ability of the five guerril-
la factions to coordinate their efforts to sabotage the
balloting more effectively than in March 1982. ^
27. The government's Peace Commission reported-
ly has made recent contacts with political spokesmen
for the insurgent alliance in an effort to determine
their interest in the amnesty program and participa-
28. We believe, however, that efforts to generate
positive leftist interest in the balloting are likely to
prove ineffective. The insurgents continue to reject the
electoral process in favor of negotiations leading to a
power-sharing arrangement. Having increased their
military pressure, the insurgents now are engaged in
major diplomatic lobbying for a dialogue with the
governments of El Salvador and the United States.n
Murders of US Citizens
"Good-faith efforts to investigate murders of
six US citizens and bring to justice those respon-
sible for those murders.-E]
29. The case of the five National Guardsmen
charged with killing four US churchwomen in 1980
has again been set back by judicial procedures. A
lower court decision to begin trial proceedings was
overturned this spring by an appellate court, which
cited irregularities in the presentation of physical
evidence. Technically, this only postpones an inevita-
ble jury trial and allows prosecutors more time to
organize their case.
30. Two other National Guardsmen have confessed
to murdering two US representatives of the American
Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) in
1981 and are due to stand trial following an appellate
review of the evidence. The court, however, has
rejected formal requests by the Attorney General to
prosecute two other participants in the crime, Lt.
Lopez Sibrian and businessman Hans Christ.
year to introduce new evidence or the case will be
officially closed. Reporting indicates that the Magana
adminstration is pressing for prosecution and probably
will appeal to the Supreme Court. =
31. Lopez Sibrian, meanwhile, remains on active
duty but in administrative detention and is not al-
lowed to travel outside the country. F
the government has one
Another conspirator, Captain E uar o
Avila, remains in hiding subject to arrest as a murder
suspect and Army deserter.
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