ARE WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNISTS REALLY CHANGING? TRUE__ FALSE__

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 38
• Content Type: MEMO

'Al "
I I WP% WP% 100 Aim% I 1409% AIW*j L. A*"% 100,
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
C/ -fi'~ / /3 - 66-
F MF
C E N T R A L C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
30 April 1965
STAFF MEMORANDUMS NO. 13-65
SUBJECT: Are West European Ccamunists Really Changing?
True T-7 False n
Recently the Soviets have been encouraging the Communist parties
of W: ztern Europe to adopt more flexible, nationr....:.y o: tented tactics
in or.'er to improve their domestic political pos.t'.onc. Some of the
i;art.t,:s (e.g., Sweden) have made pro ess in projecting a new inde-
pendent image; others (e.g., Finland)have been slower to respond to
Soviet encouragement. Despite this new tactical approach, none of
the West European parties has yet changed in those ft:ndpmontsl
respects which differentiate Communist parties from other political
parties. However, much change has occurred in the past few years
in the theory and practice of international Communism, serious
disputes have emerged within the movement, and various Communist
parties have become more assertive and independent -In 4L.e+_ conduct
toward Moscow. In time fundamental changes may evolve in some of
the West European Communist parties. Meanwhile, in assessing
Cc.,..unist behavior and party ties with Moscow -- both of which are
often more complicated than they seem on the surface -- care should
be taken to avoid drawing premature conclusions concerning either
the view that all changes are dictated from Moscow or the view that
the Communist parties have become genuinely independent and
"respectable."
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
Introductory G'bser:-atior. s
1. Cc=munism, worldwide; has undergone considerable change
since the death of Stalin. It has lost the semblance of a
monolithic entity with all authority flowing from a single,
supreme source. Differences concerning ideology and policy
among Communist parties and within them, traditionally submerged
or treated as heresy, are now openly discussed. In marry instances,
the more discussion, the wider the differences seem to become.
Even the content of cc-T_unism has changed. The fully educated
comwunist ideologist can no longer end his studies with Marxism-
Leniniem; there are also Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, Marxism-
Leninism-Khrushchevism, and Marxisin-Leninism-Castroism. Many
free enterprise concepts are creeping into economic thinking aLd
planing in the USSR and in Eastern Europe. Changes are also
apparent in the tactics of Ccxxunists, in both national and
intern tioniii affairs. or course, the extent of chuzlge and
the kinds of change vary greatly from party to party.
2. While the view that all this change is a "minuet," a
carefully planned and executed maneuver and a vast hoax, still
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 F- Approved For Release 2007/07/18 CIA--RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
has a few adherents, in our judgment it retains very little
credibility. Ca the other hand, the view that cc munisa has
entered an evolutionary Fuse which will inevitably transform
it into seething unec munist, or tame it, or shear off its
threat to Western democracy, may be gaining wider currency than
either evidence or prudence will support. This much is clear:
the practice, and in s=e respects the theory, of communism in
1965 differs in significant ways from the practice and theory
of ecnmlunism in 1950. What is not clear is how much of the
change is substantive, organic, and permanent, and how much is
tcctical, superficial, and transitory.
3. i other point needs be r:3de. One's vLws :,f international
cc-- .unism are almost certain to be shaped to e significant extent
by one's professional responsibilities. For example, those who
concentrate on collecting and operating against the KGB or against
the hard core ai:aarat of the various communist parties, tend to
see in the attitudes, convictions, tactics, operations and
discipline of that very small group of professional agents the
real truth as it pertains to international communism. They
concentrate on the techniques of the epparat -- party processes,
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
Propaganda, pressure, intimidation, bribery, e-.en m_--der --
designed to maneuver and to control parties cnd go -rnments.
There is, among this group, a tendency to judge de-alopments in
the various parties on the basis of brief glimpser into the inner
workings of the professional machinery. In this ,ontext they
view the problems faced by international ccmmuni -m as having
increased over the years but as offset by impor'ant factors
such as continuing close professional relatioxships among the
hard core apparats.
k. On the other hand, those responsible for studying
and interpreting international coiiunism as - phencmrenon of
national and international politics approach the problem from
the other end. They concentrate primarily on the political
behavior and effectiveness of the various parties and the move-
ment as a whole; they attempt to weigh trr.:ds in the movement
and the various parties in the context o- national and world
political, -sociological, and economic de ciopments. This group
of officers tends to view the many indi. itions of serious
disagreement about fundariental matters eriong and within ccrm'munist
parties as telling the most important s':,ory about international
S-E-C-R-E-T 25X1
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
ccmmunism. They wc-ild attach less significance to evidence of
operational ties between individual party mtbe-s ana the KGB
than to evidence of strife between various factions of a Communist
party, and between some Communist parties and the CPSU.
5. It is, of course, wrong to conceive of all opinion
falling into one or the other of the two groups described here
for purposes of making a point. Most spin{ on within the
intelligence community, and, so far as we can ascertain, most
of the evidence, falls somewhere in between. But where?
6. What follows will not answer the question p:sed by
this paper; indeed, it will almost certainly activate as many
disagreements as it will defuse, and it may cast shadows where
light now seems to shine. It is as unfortunate as it is t.-ue
that discussions of conmunian in the context of change oteen
lose their point in a morass of semantic difficulties or are
blunted by the exception wl ich can be found to any general
observation. Nevertheless, this memorandum may help some of
those who fiud themselves somewhere in between the minuet school
and the evolutionist school to better evaluate the ground under
their feet.
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
General Observations
7. After twenty years of effort since World War II, the
C,==inist parties of Western Europe have not perceptibly improved
their positions in their respective countries. In general, they
have not been making much progress with their old policies,
-appeals, and programs. Most of them have declined in membership
and are having -trouble in attracting and holding youth. Apart
from Italy, France and Finland they have remained only minor
forces in domestic politics. The parties nave also been pro-
foundly affected by developments within the Communist movement
since the death of Stalin. The Twentieth Soviet Party Congress
and Khrushchev'a denigration of Stalin deeply shocked many
Communists who had revere-3 the old Soviet leader and stimulated
intense disputes within many parties over whether and how to
adjust to the new Soviet line. Soviet repression of the Hungarian
revolution in 1965 caused profound disillusionment among West
European Communists, resulting in many defections from the
parties and leading to the disaffection of many non-Communist
leftists who previously had sympathized with the Soviet line.
Togliatti's theory of polycentrism caused party loyalty to
91;Y1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
Moscow to bebrought further in question. Two cost pcrtant
develcrcents affecting the Ccaiunist parties of Western Europe
have been Western Europe's ecoucmic revival and prosperity
and the Sino-Sc viet conflict.
8. The econcmic prosperity and high levels of employ.-ent
achieved in recent years have tended to blur traditional dis-
tinctions between workers and tourgeois. Many workers, particu-
larly the more a~"fluent industrial workers in France, Eelgit,
the Netherlands, West Germany, and even Italy, are tending to
merge into the growing middle class and to feel less alienated
from their national societies. They are losing their inclination
to seek association with an international class Cr party. With
prosperity, employment, and state welfare programs the old class
warfare slogans are losing their appeal and old cornaunist
dogmas their point.
9. Especially since the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress,
the Commnunist parties of Western Europe have reacted to the
new economic and sociological trends in different ways. Where
the party has been dominated by conservative, doctrinaire
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
leaders, there has been very little adjustment to new conciitionb-
Where the party leadership has been more independent minded, the
Communist parties have sought to project a nationalist image
and to adjust their tactics to national circumstances. In order
to compensate for a dwindling working class base they have
again begun to court support.frcm bourgeois elements; they have
sought to reduce antagonism with the Catholic Church; and they
have sought, without much success as yet, to find new ways and
means of appealing to youth. Progress in changing tactics has
varie1 greatly from country to country. The Italian party has
gone farther in adjusting its policies to national circumstances
than any other party in Western Europe. This was due in large
measure to Togliatti, who established a tradition of considerable
party autonomy. Recently there has been some movement in this
direction in Sweden. Adjustment of policies and tactics to
meet national conditions has been less in Finland, France,
Holland, and Belgium, where the leadership has tended to cling
to Stalinist concepts.
10. The Sino-Soviet conflict caused further confusion,
stimulating differences of view within and among the Communist
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
parties as to the proper degrees of national auton=y, party
assertivenE3s, and militancy to excrcice. Groupings have
emerged in various parties favoring differing degrees and kinds
of flexibility in policy and doctrine, and strenuous and divisive
debates on the subject have increased factionalism and intensified
personal rivalries. In some cases, leftist factions have split
off from the Communist parties to form pro-Peiping splinter groups.
11. Fran Moscow's point of view, perhaps the most lnportsnt
change with respect to Western Europe's Ccamsunist parties has
been the diminution of Moscow's direct control, particularly
since the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress. In earlier days,
party leaders in Western Europe responded quickly to hints fray
Moscow that polinies should be changed. If they did not,
Stalin usually was able to engineer the replacement of a
recalcitrant party leaders. But now the Soviets do not always
find the local party leaders responsive to suggested changes in
policy or to Soviet requests for support in their dispute with
Peiping. Some of the Cc nnunist party leaders have taken
add?Antage of the Sino-Soviet dispute and other manifestations of
the weakening in central control over the Communist movement to
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
achieve a greater neasure of independence for their parties.
R aria is the most dr, Wstic case in point, being a C:-- unist-
ruled state in the East European "bloc" btit demonstrating a
remarkable degree of nationalist independence. The Italian
party has also taken advantage of the situation to assert its
independence of judgment and action.
12. These g_neral develol eats in the behavior of
c-,.:nist p~;.rties in Western hsurope are visible to the naked
eye. They r;,int to confusion in the Cccurist novement, to un-
certainty in the various party councils, to a significant
veahcoring of Moseo-ats controls, and to acne gravitation toward
the center in party policies, progrens, and appeals. Are there
some specific observations which would place these changes in a
different perspective, which would suggest that they are
merely tactical and that Moscow's control of the Western European
pat Iles is in tact as effective and absolute as ever!
Specific Considerations
13. The Italian Case: Palmiro Togliatti led the Italian
Comunist Party for nearly 30 years, until his death in mid-1961:.
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 S-~-C-3-E-~
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
The party has weathered nszy storms since it was founded in 1920
and is today the second largest force in Italian politics and
by far the largest Ccnunist party in Western Europe. During
the part decade, membership in the Italian party has dropped about
25 percent and membership in its youth organization (FGCI) has
dropped about 60 percent. Nevertheless, Ca :nist strength at
the polls has continued to increase; nearly 26 percent of
Italian voters now vote Cc munist. Mae size and the following
of the Italian Cozaaunist Party appears to be due to widespread
dissatisfac ion with Italian governmental leadership and acinistra-
tion, a strong popular desire for reform, the b-uperior discipline
and organizational skill of the Ccn munists, and the success of
the party in adjusting its policies and appeals to take advantage
of local and naticnal circumstances.
14. During most of his professional life, Togliatti was
closely allied with the Communist leadership in Moscow. While
he dominated the Italian party, policy formulation was essentially
a one-man operation. Togliatti made the decisions and made them
stick. Apparently, he was close to Stalin, and Stalin gave him
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
considerael e latitude in r- mg t::e Italian show. 'rte an
early period, Togliatti semis to have favored adjuzt=ent in
classic Marxist doctrine to permit the tailoring of strategies
o fit circ instances in Italy. At the sa:.:e tire, Togliatti,
t
as an old Cc=inter= hand, wanted to look to the Soviet Union for
inspiration and example. Consequently he was the more critical
when develoj eats in the US$ did not m=easure up to his expecta-
tions.
15. With the passing of Stalin, and especially after the
Twentieth Soviet Marty Congress and de-Stalinization, Togliatti
became increasingly critical of dev ewlor::^ents in the Soviet Union,
and he ran the Italian party and developed its tactics in an
increasingly independent manner. He was very anxious to avoid
isolation of his party in Italian politics, and he sought tL
develop and maintain a party reputation for political autoncmy
and respectability. He postulated the theory of polycentrian,
under which control over the Co.-=unist parties would be de-
centralized and would depend to a large extent upon willing
cooperation by individual national parties.
7r,Y1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
16. FQiruchchev clashed several tines with Togliatti over
this theory, almost certainly becaube it obstructed Khrushchev's
attempts to reassert control over pro-Soviet parties. Since his
death, Togliatti's views have continued to have important in-
fluence, both on the Italian party and on other parties.* Despite
Soviet dissatisfaction the Italians considered that the 1-5
March 1965 Conference of 19 Communist Parties in Moscow virtually
adopted the position of the Italian Ccmmunist Party -- that there
should be no world conference of Communist parties at this time,
and that no new centralized world Communist organization should
be established.
17. Since Togliatti's death, the Italian party has continued,
occasionally, to clash openly with Moscow over Communist policy.
There have also been some indications of lessening of unity
* The roct dramatic W^^ fectwtion of this influence ' s the
famous "Togliatti Memorandum.," written just before his death,
but published posthhnously by his successors. This iremorcdum
criticized Soviet tactics toirard China and the international
movement and stressed the right of each party to determine its
own policies, based on local and regional circumstances. It also
strongly criticized developments within the Soviet t-nion itself.
- 13 -
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
S-E-C-R-E-T
within the Italian party. Judging from the panty journals 0
, an increasing number of party cadres
and of rank and file members are protesting the lack of intra-
party democracy and demanding meaningful participation in party
decisions. Three groups, vaguely defined to be sure, appear to
have emerged, each holding somewhat different ideas as to
proper stance and policy to assume with respect to such
fundamental questions as the Sino-Soviet dispute, relations
with Moscow, political strategy,,- and tactics, and national
autonomy.
18. How do the main lines of this sketch jibe with the
thesis that the Italian party enjoys autonomy beca.~ze Moscow
told it to or, at least, wanita it to? It appears true that
Moscow has not opposed the desires of Western European Ccmurunist
parties to alter their domestic tactics according to changing
political conditions. On the other hand, Moscow has expected
the various parties to adhere to its general line on national
and international issues -- especially such fundamental issues
as those at stake in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Continued
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
S-E-C-R-E-T
obstruction by the Italian party can hardly serve Moscow's
interests in this regard.
19. There is considerable evidence that the Italian party's
hard core apnarat is in touch with the K? and is used by the
latter in operational matters. Moscow appears to provide
financial support to the Italian party- We can thus assume that
the relationship to the Soviet party Is more ccmplicated than
it appears to be on the surface, and the extent of real Soviet
control is unclear. As against this, however, we would draw
attention to the strong differences which are apparent among
the Italian Communist leaderE, and to the fact that the top
five or six leaders of the Italian party differ as to how much,
and even whether, to respond to clearly conveyed Moscow desires
on matters of importance to the Conmuni st movement.
20? M.^ti ?..^.^. it aYre w?v to hire ? cc-k' ---Y in v We --C, -- ?rn''~.
in some situations, the principle of polycentrism, arid it now
espouses the Togliatti line as to tailoring tactics to local
conditions. There have been instances in which Soviet party
Tunctionaries have even cited the experience of the Italian party
- 15 -
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
to other parties as an example of good national tactics and of the
kind of independent relationship they desire to achieve among
Ccarmunist parties. Ne;-ertheless, we are convinced that the
Italian party's adjustment of its tactics to changing conditions
in Italy, Western F~rope, or the international Cc unist movement
is not the product of Soviet manipulation. It seas more likely
that the Soviets have been forced, and with considerable reluctance,
to accept this course in order 1,o avoid the indignity of being
defied by another major Communist party and to avoid further
chaos in the movement.
21. On the other hand, we think it important to stress
that despite its tactical flexibility, the Italian Communist
Party continues to be organized along traditional "democratic
centralist" lines, and remains fundamentally different from
non-Coaatunist political parties in its structure, goals, and its
viuvn? it CVUtiuues to support Most aspects
of Soviet lolicy, and is i':aaqmentally hot,tile to the US. Though
it has achieved much respectability in Italian eyes, this
should not be allowed to obscure the fact that, for US policy
16
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
S-E-C-R-E-T
purposes, the Italian party remains a hostile force with close
22. The Finnish Case : The top leaders of the Finnish
Comnnis-t Party have long been rigid and unimaginative in
doctrine and tactics. This habit of subservience to Moscow has
hurt the party's domestic political position. This became
apparent last October, when in the election it was not the
Comunist front SK.DL but the Social Democrats who made gains as
a result of urban and youthful dis^tisfaction with the Finnish
government. This setback, together with party leader 7i11e Pessi's
abject support of the Soviet line on the removal of Khrushchev.,
sparked criticism! In the party daily to the effect that the old
guard leaders' conservatism and subservience to Moscow had cost
the party dearly in popale- support. Nevertheless, after a short
period of ferment in the party, old guard leaders Pessi and
Aimo Acltonen were able during December and January to stifle
further criticism.
23. In early February, the Finnish party was visited by
Alekney Belyakov, a high ranking functionary in the International
- 17
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
Section of the Soviet Central Ccamittee. Belyakov addressed
various party leadership bodies, including the Polit.)uro.
he advised that violent tactics were a thing of
the past in western and Northern Europe, and that thB correct
Communist tactics now were to cooperate in a genuine way with
Social Democratic parties in order to improve populaz support;
the parties should try to Impress on he populace, by word and
deed, that the Communist parties were independent of Moscow.
He pointed to the Italian party as an example of proper party
tactics.
24+.
On 20-21 March, the Finnish Politburo admitted three
new inliiiduals, including Arena-Liisa Hyvonen, to membership.
-18-
R-F n-R-R.-T
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
S-E-C-R-E-T
Aaltonen continueGto control the party apparatus, but recent
evidence points to rising ferment in the party, with growing
support within party ranks for the anti-?altonen faction,
supported by the CPSU, and intense maneuvering for advantage
between the two factions.
25. This evidence supports the judgment that Moscow now
is actively pushing at least same West European parties away
from the a1. earance of adherence to Moscow in order to improve
their political appeal and avoid party isolation and stagnation
in nations undergoing political, economic and social change.
It also indicates that, far frczn being able to control events in
the r'1 nni sh party through the "inner a arat, " the Soviets have
found it extre'.Lely difficult to make old guard leaders Pessi
and Aaltonen change their ways, even though the party is faced
with the prospect of further setbacks at the polls and perhaps
an open split in its ranks. Sending high level Soviet officials
to Helsinki and summoning the -Finnish old guard to Moscow for
lectures by the Soviet leaders has thus far been unavailing.
Pessi and Aaltonen merely nod their heads vigorously, then go
hnne and take measures to stifle change or even discussion within
the party.
- 19 -
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
26. In pact, the Finnish case is directly contradictory to
the Swedish one since the Soviets now are supporting liberal
elements in the party against the inner apparat controlled by
Aaltonen. Rather than an example of Soviet contiol over a
Coazaunist party, the Finnish case,
is an example of the extent to which Soviet
control over the Communist parties has deteriorated since the
time of Stalin. On the other hand, there has been no essential
change in the organization or goals of the Finnish party. Indeed,
it has not been able as yet even to change its tactics successfully.
27. The Swedish Case: In the past year or so the Swedish
Communist Pally has experienced some important changes. The
old-time "Stalinist" Hilding Hagberg, along with some of his
more crustacean associates, was replaced as party chairman by a
ycunger man, Carl Henrik Hermansson. Since the party's Twentieth
Congress in January 1964, when this occurred; He_rmansson has
publicly pushed the party forward as a new type of independent,
national and democratic political party which aims at achieving
power by peaceful, parliamentary means. His efforts, and especially
his appearances on Swedish television, were successful to the extent
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
that in the general election of Sept her 1964 the party increased
its share of the popular vote from 14.5 percent tc 5.2 percent
and its seats in parliament from five to eight. Although this is
a small gain it is potentially an :Important change because the
Swedish party had long been stagnant.
28. Prom Moscow's point of view, Hermanseon has been entirely
too independent. He consistently opposed Soviet proposals for a
world conference of Coonunist parties and refused to take the
Soviet side in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Moreover, some of :+is
public statements, including his criticism of the Berlin TTall
and his advocacy of a plebiscite for the three Baltic countries
regarding their inclusion In the USSR, have been quite harmful
to the Soviet position. Hermansson has encouraged cooperation
not only with Ccmiinuiiist parties, but with other leftist groups
in Europe such as Alusel Larsents heretical party in Denmark.
Domestically, his main effort is directed toward cooperation
with the left wing of the Social Democratic Purty. Recently,
Hermansson's efforts have been hindered somewhat by attacks
fran the small, Peiping-sponsored faction of the Swedish party,
led by Nils Hcnberg, but Hermansson still apparently commands
the support of a large majority of the party.
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
29. Against this public image of the party,
far from being independent, the Swedish party
continues to be controlled by Moscow, through an "inner a parat"
of trusted functionaries. Indeed,
in 1963, 25X1
when Hermansson, as editor of the party daily, stimulated
criticism in its columns of party policies, the leader of this
"inner apparat," Erik Karlsson, secured Moscow's approval to
engineer Hagberg's replacem:nt by Hermansscn. Since that time
1 Karlsson
the party from behind the scenes and to support Heransson's
leadership and the new image. The latter's public actions,
especially his open criticism of the CPSU have caused Moscow to
be distrustful of Hermansson. But in December 1964, Karlseon
convinced Moscow that the Npnarat would tie able
to continue to control Hermansson, and the Soviets 25X1
gave their reluctant consent.
30. We feel that this story of hidden Soviet manipulation
of the Swedish party is quite convincing. The method of
manipulation through inner hard core party functionaries is a
time tested technique. We find the proposition reasonable that,
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 S-F c'-R-F_T
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
in order to help the party's position and stave off worse
divisions within the party, the Soviets agreed to let Karlsson
put Hermansson in power, and continued to control events, for
the most part, through the ate.
31. However, it would appear that the Soviets continue to
find the situation in the Swedish party far from satisfactory.
Their distrust of Hermansson may be accompanied by fear that at
same point he might be able to wrest control fram the "inner
ape." Thus, even in Sweden, where the Soviets hold most
of the cards, Soviet control is insecure.
- 23 -
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
ucnerai one Tis .cns
32. Behind the public iage end overt activities of the
Ccr=unist parties of Western Europe, the Soviet party maintains
close ties with certain individual leaders and with sce mem-
bers of the inner epparat of the parties. Members of the inner
group are not always the same people who hold the leading
positions in the party. Sometimes the a arat seeks to hide
its hand not only frcm the non-Coan:unist fcrces of the country,
but also from the rank and file membership of the party and, at
times, even frcn the main party leaders. Soviet control of the
inner apparat may not necessarily mean or assure control of the
party.. although that, of course, is its purpose. In sue., the
situation and relationships with respect to the Soviet party
the various Communist parties, the p , and the party
leaders varies greatly frcm country to country.
33. In the case of the Italian party, for example, the
,qOVjetS apparently maintain close ties with individuals of the
hard core of the party, but this seems less inpo;-tant than the
fact that the Italian party pursues, and has pursued for acme
-24.
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
years, an independent road of its cs.n. Moreover, the leaders
in power since Togliatti 's death appear to be very much con-
cerned not to lose the independence the party has gained, and
they sc^etimres obstruct Moscow's designs in the international
movement as did Togliatti. It appears that Togliatti maintained
a kind of Stalinist attitude toward decision asking and discip-
line within the Italian party, while advocating and practicing
a very un-Stalinist course with respect to party relations
within the international movement. It may be, with the tower-
ing figure of Togliatti removed Pros the scene, that Moscow,
working through the Italian apparat, may attempt to curb the
Italian party, at least to some extent. It is possible that
the Moscow party leaders could encourage the Finnish party to
"he more li.e the Italian party," and, at the same time attempt
to curb the independent attitude of the Italian party.
34. The new "popular front" or "national Communist" tac-
tical approach of the West European Comm nist parties, sup-
ported by Zosccw, has not yet resulted in fundamental changes
in the nature, goals, or organization of any of the West European
- 25 -
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
5-'E-C R-E-T
parties. Indeed, changes of such fu.^.damental.. significance are
not likely to occur- -- if they occur at all -- before .any years
have passed, Nevert..hcless, the importance of chen-e shoudd not
be underrated either. It is possible that sere of the tactical
changes may prove to be more than transitory. For exa=pie, scme
individuals who, like Herman son., lead in transforming the pub-
lic image of their parties, may eventually feel strong enough
to wrrect their parties from Moscow's control. Or acme of the
parties, having practiced the new tactical approach for a num-
ber of years, may eventually find, especially if they have
become prosperous in the meantime, that it is very difficult
to shift from being agreeable and bourgeois in order to become
disagreeable, militant and proletarian once again.
35. And in the meantime, Moscow will find, as it has
already found, that &.spite the fact that it retains important
ties with many of the parties, control over the Communist
t,"._ Y, 1Yply; d,.,,i.uc,. w. ALcad , ~. ~. .t.snfi
parties is. becoming { TI~.^ = - + f f c..1 t A a.. 4 t- b,.
had to resort to traditional pol.iticel tactics -- persuasion,
pressure, cajolery -- to obtain the results it used to achieve
26
.D V I
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
by direct orders or intimidation. Assertiveness by individual
party leaders is likely to become more, not less, pronounced as
time goes on. For example the leader of the Ditch party,
de Groot, continues to feel free to oppose the policies of the
present Soviet leaders, just as he did those of IShzushchev.
This assertiveness will not be significant, as far as we are
concerned, in those parties which are smell and unimportant
locally, or are still heavily dependent on financial and other
support from Moscow. It is already significant, however, in
the Italian party. It may soon become significant in the
Swedish party; and at acme point in the future it may become
significant in the wench party.
36. Even allowing for considerable control over Communist
parties, policies, and activities by a hard core apparatus of
dedicated, disciplined professionals loyal to Moscow's orders,
it is an open question as to whether the effectiveness of that
control is increasing or decreasing. The future of that kind
of control also seems uncertain in the face of the political,
economic, and social trends now visible in Western Europe.
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Moscow may, for sinister and tactical purposes, instruct
parties to adopt un-Ccrunist-like policies, to be independent,
and even to attack Moseow. But if Coniaurjst parties prosper
by being national., by attacking Moscow, and by compronising
kasic Conimuiist tenets, What conclusiors are the rank and file,
the cadres, and party leaders to draw? And how receptive are
they likely to be when Moscow decides that, for sinister or
tactical p;Zrposes, it 'wants those parties to revert? And will
the a.^.xd core a parat be able to jerk the party beck into line?
The yo-yo theory has limitations. Moscow may find when it jerks
the string that the yo-yo keeps spinning off into the distance
and nothing comes back. on the end of the string but a hard
core appzr__t consisting o" P to 5 percent of the party.
-28-
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2
Approved For Release 2007/07/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2