THE DISPUTE OVER BELIZE (BRITISH HONDURAS)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210011-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: April 13, 1964
• Content Type: MEMO

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13 April 1.964
NDUM NO. 19-64 (Internal ONE Working Paper --
CIA Distribution Only)
SUBJECT: The Dispute over Belize (British Honduras)
It is likely that Britain will grant complete independence
to British Honduras (which will probably assume the name Belize)
in the next three to four years without malting any territorial
concessions to Guatemala. Guatemala broke relations with the
British after the UK had agreed to give Belize internal self-
government. The Guatemalan government clings to tenuous historic
claims and is vitally interested in establishing an access route
from the Peten, its northern department, to the Port of 1lize.
Once independent Belize will probably continue to resist federa-
tion with Guatemala but will be Filling to grant Guatemala guaran-
teed access routes from the Peten to the sea. Mexico, which also
had historic claims, is not expected to interfere with plans for
Belizean independence unless Guatemala either wins territorial
concessions from the UK or invades Belize. We would expect this
issue to continue to be a source of political and diplomatic
friction and there may be border incidents. However, the chances
are better than even that there will be no military confrontation
between any of the parties (Guatemala, Great Britain or Mexico)
connected with the dispute over Belize.
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1. The Anglo-Guatemalan controversy over Belize, dates
back to the mid-seventeenth century when the Britinh settled
in the region. After intermittent conflict with Spain, England
in 106 secured privileges of use, but not sovereignty, in the
northern half of the colony. Subsequently, the settlers usurped
the remainder of the territory of the present colony. With the
achievement of their independence in 1821, Mexico and Guatemala
became successors to Spain as claimants to the region. Spain
theoretically relinquished all claim to the area when it recog-
nized the independence of Mexico in 1836 and of Guatemala in
1863. Great Britain, however, refused to recognize the position
of either Guatemala or Mexico and eventually negotiated treaties
with both countries by which they implicitly recognized British
sovereignty in the area. Mexico confirmed England's right of
use in 1826 and surrendered its claims in 1893; Guatemala's
acquiescence was apparently given in the "boundary" treaty of
1859 which is today the subject of contention. Guatemala charges
that since Great Britain has never fulfilled its obligations to
help build a road from the port of Belize to Gvatsmala City, the
treaty is void and the territory has reverted to Guatemala.
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Great Britain's Policy
2. The UK has shown no disposition to recognize Guatemalan
claims. It feels that it has made a reasonable attempt to ful-
fill its treaty obligations and moreover, considers the Guatemalan
legal claim to be both tenuous tend extra-legal (while Mexico
possesses historical documents showing that Belize was once part
of Yucatan, Guatemala can offer no such evidence). There is little
doubt that the people of Belize want independence, and it is very
likely that the UK will resist any proposals that are not consis-
tent with self-determination. In sum, Belize was granted limited
internal self-government on 1 January 1964; and Great Britain has
gone on record in support of Belize's aspirations for independence
and has systematically taken steps to move the colony in this
direction.
The Guatemalan Position
3. Guatemala's attitude toward the Belizean dispute has
been contentious and metamorphic since the si~aing of the 1859
convention. Occasionally, Guatemala bemoans the fact that it
didn't take Belize while the UK was preoccupied with World Were
1 and 2. For some Guatemalans the quest for Belize is the quest
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for the Holy Grail; often, politicians attempt to influence and
exploit the issue for personal gain. Responsible members of the
government feel that the territory is esaential for the develop-
ment of the Peten (Northern Guatemala) ; they also fear that
Mexico might absorb Belize, thereby encircling the Peten and
possibly precluding its development and even possibly absorbing
the Peten itself. Finally, there is genuine resentment toward
the British for their disdainful treatment of Guatemala over the
years and a belief that Belize rightfully belongs to Guatemala
regardless of law or the will of the people of the colony.
4. Although the official Guatemalan attitude toward Belize
is at times belligerent (Guatemala broke relations with the UK
last July over the question of moving Belize toward self-
governm,nt),there is evidence to indicate that the general
public remains largely apathetic. There will be a continuin!r;
possibility of border incidents but larger scale hostilitlear,
appear unlikely. Among factors which might be expected to fii;;ter
Guatemala from taking rash action against Belize are the p:;ob-
able d:.sapproval of the United States and the fact that Mexico
would be expected to react very sharply to any military incur-
sion. From the Guatemalan point of view., the limited capability
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of its armed forces, the possibility of tangling with British
regulars; and its present preoccupation with insurgents are all
arguments against a Guatemalan invasion of Belize. In addition,
the Guatemalans have failed to enlist the aid of most Central
and South American countries for their claims to Belize. 7hey
have,, however, elicited token expressions for their claims from
Nicaragua but any practical support seems unlikely.
Belize and Mexico
5. Politically, economically, and socially, Belize has
nothing in common with Guatemala. The people of Belize have
reacted strongly to Guatemala's Irredentist claims and preten-
tions. This reaction has probably been intensified by past
reports that high officials in Premier Price's government were
in the pay of the Government of Guatemala. The opposition party,
the National Independence Party continues to attack the govern-
ment group, the People's United Party, and has probably forced
the Price government ? take a more extreme anti-Guatemalan
position than it might wish or that is in its best interests
(Belize has 140 miles of common border with Guatemala and needs
increased trade and commerce to sustain its economy).
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o. Mexico offers an interesting contrast to the Guatemalan
handling of the Belize dispute. Mexico, interested in the econ-
omic development of its easternmost province, sh ich borders
Belize and desiring to undercut Guatemala's aspirations, is
extremely helpful to the colony. It supports Belize's desire
for independence, cooperates with the Price government to the
maxim;3m extent practical, treats Price almost like a Chief of
State and opposes the Guatemalan claims. As a result, Mexico
can and does wield both political and economic influence in
Belize.
The Outlook
7. From time to the, Bri.tain has been concerned that
Guatemala would ?,;ake direct military action against Belize, but
this possibility has not pressured the UK into making any terrtr
torial concessions. Because of the tot's unfulfilled treaty
obligation to Guatemala cnd the economic burden of supporting
Belize, the UK might be willing to subsidize transportation
facilities benefiting both Guatemala and Belize. Belize will
probably not have any part of a formal federation with Guatemala;
but, at the same time, it is probable, that the Price government
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would be willing to guarantee duty-free transit rights from the
Peten to the sea. Indeed, this seems to be the most reasonable
settlement to the dispute since it would help open up the Peten
(a prime consideration for Guatemala) and would provide badly
needed trade and commerce for Belizean ports.
8. On the other hand, if the Peten begins to develop
economically and if Belize refuses to guarantee Guatemalan tran-
sit rights, then bloodshed would be very likely. Under these
circumstances the United States would find itself in the un-
happy position of watching British and Guatemalan troops battle
each other in Central America. Presently, the Peten is uno
developed and has a scarcity of known resources. However, oil
exploration has been underway since 11055 and although no siz-
able deposits have been discovered, the Peten basin probably
does harbor oil reserves of some undetermined size.
9. In the unlikely event that Great Britain made some
territorial concessions to Guatemala, Mexico could be exile eted
to reverse her support for Belizean independence and press her
own claims to tb% northern half of the colony. Under these
circumstances, a Mexican-Guatemalan military clash would be
possible.
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10. The Belizean issue will remain emotionally explosive
within official Guatemalan circles for the foreseeable future.
From time to time key politicians can be expected to use this
dispute to create a crisis atmosphere to divert national atten-
tion from economic and political problems besetting the govern-
ment.
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