INDIAN POLITICS: ADAPTING TO A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090059-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 59
• Publication Date: December 28, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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Confidential
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Indian Politics: Adapting to a Changing Environment
DOCUMEtIT S:9!S All
FiE
DO NOT DESTROY 01A
Confidential
28 December 1970
No. 1504/70
11
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WARNING
This (l ccuncnt contains information alfccting the national
dcfcusc of the United Statcs, within the meaning of Titlo'
18, sections 793 an .1 79'I, of the US (:oolc, as anuendcd.
Its transmission or n vclatcol, of its coict(.nls to or rc-
cciI)t by an unauthorized IRcrson is lrrohihitcd by law.
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SPECIAL NOTE
On 27 December, India's President Giri,
acting on Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's rec-
ommendation, dissolved Parliament. National
elections will be held in late February or
early March--the precise timing to be an-
nounced within a few days. The endorsement
of early elections by the Ruling Congress
Party hierarchy and the recent fall of the
Bihar State Government into opposition hands
were factors that apparently clinched Mrs.
Gandhi's decision to seek a fresh mandate
for her party's "socialist and secular poli-
cies and programs."
The Intelligence memorandum which fol-
Zows was written before the events of 27 De-
cember. It is being issued as prepared be-
cause, other than for Mrs. Gandhi's electoral
decision, its substance remains valid. The
map should now show Bihar State in stripes
(OC Zed or supported). Sentences 3 and 4
in para 25 are now outdated.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
28 December 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Indian Politics: Adapting to a
Changing Environment
Introduction
National elections must take place in India by
February 1972, but could be called as early as this
winter or next spring. The timing rests with Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi, who has good reasons for
making either choice. Her popularity has risen over
the course of the year, but her party'srorganization
remains weak in much of the country.
India's political parties are currently strug-
gling to adjust to a-.new order. The split in the
long-dominant Congress Party in November 1969 caused
a major shake-up that has forced most parties to re-
assess their identity and devise new tactics. Al-
though Mrs. Gandhi survived the Congress split, she
now heads a minority government that must rely on the
support of a variety of generally left-of-center op-
position parties and independents. Her dependence
on these groups has invigorated the opposition, pre-
senting it with new possibilities for participating
in electoral alliances and coalition governments at
both the state and national level.
Instability and fluidity may well be? the pre-
vailing features of Indian politics over the next
several years. Attempts to reunify the two Congress
parties have so far failed, and polarization of the
political system to the right and left has not come
about, largely because political expediency and op-
portunism--rather than ideological conviction--gov-
ern political decision-making in India.
Note: Ths memorandum was produced by the Office of
Cut'rent?IntelZigence and coordinated within the Direc-
torate of Intelligence.
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The Political Situation in India
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Ruling Congress-led or supported
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[] Organization Congress-led or
supported government
Non-Congress Party government
President's rule
CEYLON
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CON1 1L)F,N'1.'IAL,
Background
1. A year has passed since the Congress Party
split, divorcing Prime Minister Gandhi and more than
half the party's membership from the segment headed
by old-time, relatively conservative leaders. This
move was a dramatic break from the past, for no longer
would the Indian political scene be monopolized by
one, basically centrist party. Under the leadership
of Mrs. Gandhi's father, the Congress Party had spear-
headed the long drive to independence, and for the
next 22 years it dominated political activity both
in the states and in New Delhi. Since the Congress
split, political forces have been unable to forge
anything resembling a stable realignment to adjust
to the new situation.
2. The split in Congress had been in the
wind for several years. Since her selection for
the prime ministership in January 1966, Mrs. Gandhi
has nutured a strong instinct for political survival,
a development unforeseen by the Congress bosses who
had supported her nomination in the expectation of
profiting from her political inexperience and assumed
malleability. Until the national election in 1967,
however, Mrs. Gandhi was principally a creature of
the Congress hierarchy and had evidenced little prom-
ise of emerging as the independent-minded, often un-
predictable leader she is today.
3. The Congress' debacle at the polls in 1967
signaled a major turning point for the party and for
Mrs. Gandhi. Although its popular vote fell only
four percent, the number of seats the party held in
the lower house fell from 73-75 percent attained in
the three previous national elections to 54.6 per-
cent. In the state legislative assomb.lies, Congress
retained an absolute majority in only half the 16
states where elections were held, and a number of
influential state party leaders were among the cas-
ualties. Amid an atmosphere of disillusionment and
confusion, a caucus of senior Congress bosses again
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CON 1"!1)F.N'IIA.[.
selected Mrs. Gandhi as prime minister; this all-
India figure was thought least likely to interfere
with their vested interests. Meanwhile, the small
opposition parties, whose development had been
stunted by two decades of Congress predominance,
basked in the glow of electoral success. They had
discovered that alliances were the key to denying
Congress the towering parliamentary majorities it
had constructed from its electoral pluralities dur-
ing the Nehru years.
4. The period between 1967 and 69 was essen-
tially one of governmental drift. Important policy
decisions were deferred as Mrs. Gandhi failed either
to challenge or submit to the "syndicate"--the lead-
ers who dominated the party organization. Increas-
ingly, however, she began to ignore these old-time
party bosses and look to her own coterie of advisers,
generally younger man who shared her enthusiasm for
socialist reform as an antidote to India's economic
woes.
"Syndicate" Members Confer at Time of Congress Split
5. Following the death of President Husain in
May 1969, the question of a successor precipitated
a clash between Mrs. Gandhi and her opponents in
Congress that ultimately split the party. She re-
fused to accept the choice of the party bosses for
President and tacitly endorsed V. V. Giri, who ran
successfully as an independent. To strengthen her
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PARTY POSITIONS IN THE LOWER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT
Mrs. Gandhi's Core of Support (273 seats)
Ruling Congress Party . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . 225
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) . . . . . .
. . . . . 24
Communist Party of India . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . 24
The Opposition's Core of Support (131 seats)
Organization Congress Party . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . 63
Swatantra Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . 35
Jana Sangh Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . 33
Others (116 seats)
Communist Party of India/Marxist . . . . . . . .
. . . . 19
Samyukta Socialist Party . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . 17
Praja Socialist Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . 15
United Independent Group . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . 25
Unattached Independents . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . 30
Indian Revolutionary Party (BKD) . . . . . . .
. . . . 10
Vacancies . . . . .
2
Total Membership . . . . . . . .
. . . 522*
* cluding nonpartisan speaker
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Y :)EN'I.'IAL
position and to refurbish her credentials as a
champion: of the people, she urged nationalization
of the banks, a long-time objective of the Con-
gress that had been shelved by the party's right-
wing. She thus forced the resignation of her
foremost opponent, the conservative Morajii Desai.
Tension between the two factions mounted through-
out the fall of 1969. The die was cast when the
party bosses supported a no-confidence motion that
the opposition parties had brought against the gov-
ernment the first day of the winter session of
parliament. The vote reaffirmed support for Mrs.
Gandhi as prime minister, and she faced the new
year as head of her own independent faction, the
Ruling Congress (RC).
Making it With a Minority Government
6. Throughout 1970, Mrs. Gandhi has concen-
trTited on consolidating her power and sharpening,
h~.:. image as a "progressive" socialist, always
with an eye on the next round of parliamentary
elections that must take place before the current
five-year term ends in February 1972. For the
first time, India is experiencing a minority
government. In the 522-seat Lower House--the
more important of the two houses in terms of
financial control and ministerial responsibil-
ity---the RC holds only 225 seats. The govern-
ment achieves a narrow majority of 273 when Mrs.
Gandhi receives the support of two frequent al-
lies--a small South Indian regional party,
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), and the pro-
Soviet Communist Party of India. The more mod-
erate of the two main socialist parties (Praia
Socialist Party) and most of the independents
can usually be rallied as well, thus reducing
the danger of the gover,ment's falling on a
no-confidence vote. The opposition bloc, headed
by the old-line party bosses' Organization Con-
gress (OC), normally can muster only about 131
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CONFIDEN'i JAL
votes, around half of which derive from two right-
wing parties, the conservative Swatantra and the
Hindu nationalist Jana Sangh. The remaining lot
of about 118 votes, coming from small parties cover-
ing the spectrum of Indian politics, is sought by
both Congress groups.
What Do The Parties Stand For?
7. Ruling Congress--In the heady atmosphere
immediately following he party split, Mrs. Gandhi's
RC sought to project a more progressive image, par-
ticularly in the economic sphere, by adopting an
ambitious resolution that reiterated the Congress'
traditional commitment to socialism and called for
the nationalization of general insurance, the aboli-
tion of the privileges and payments to the former
rulers of princely states, official procurement of
major agricultural commodities, and a predominant
role for government in the import-export trade. The
rapid implementation of existing land reform legis-
lation, including a ceiling on urban property, and
an increase in the role and scope of the public
sector in the economy were also listed as objec-
tives.
8. Six months later, at the party's June meet-
ing, however, RC leaders could report -little prog-
ress on the party's economic program, which was un-
derstandable considering the magnitude of India's
economic problems. To divert attention from this
situation, the government focused on emotion-laden
communal problems. A bloody series of Hindu-Muslim
confrontations, particularly in Bombay, gave Mrs.
Gandhi a pretext for patriotic affirmations of devo-
tion to Indian secularism. In effect, she was making
a bid to welcome Muslims and other minority groups
into the RC. F..s an election strategy this was a
prudent tack, for the RC must win heavily in the
northern, Hindi-speaking belt where Muslim votes
can determine victory or defeat for many candidates.
9. Mrs. Gandhi's government has yet to dem-
onstrate significant forward movement in any major
problem area--economic growth, population control,
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education and unemployment, or center-state relations.
She has tried to substitute appeals for reinvigor-
ated nationalism for positive action as a time-buy-
ing device in anticipation of approaching elections.
10. Organization Congress--Since mid-1970,,
the RC has mute s it ver a. attacks against the OC,
largely because the old-line faction has proven in-
capable of mounting any real threat. Heavy on aging
leaders and low on rank and file, the OC has failed
to come up with a program that could attract sizable
sections of the electorate. The OC now assesses
its minority position more realistically, however,
and has focused on what must be done if the party
is to gain some share of power in the next govern-
ment.
11. The most important result of an OC con-
clave in June 1970 was the adoption of a political
resolution calling on all "democratic, nationalist
and socialist" forces to unite in order to "Save
India, Save Democracy." Party leaders contended
that Indian democracy was being jeopardized by Com-
munist subversion resulting from Mrs. Gandhi's re-
liance on the pro-Soviet CPI and her government's
partiality toward the USSR. In addition, they
faulted her administration for not curbing leftist
extremists, particularly the pro-Mao terrorist,
Naxalites of West Bengal, who are a constant threat
to law and order. Swipes were made at the govern-
ment's economic policies, specifically the heavy
losses incurred in public sector projects and
the RC's declared intent to expand the government's
role in industry and trade.
12. The OC fully realizes the need to expand
its popular base by electoral arrangements with
other opposition parties, but no firm alliances
have yet been achieved. It now appears that any
electoral relationships will consist of ad hoc
agreements arising from local political situations
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rather than from a formal nationwide alliance
The two rightist parties with which the CC shares
some ideological affinity, Swatantra and the Jana
Sangh, reacted favorably to the CC's earlier pro-
posal for a "grand alliance" of opposition parties
and have since expressed disappointment that the
OC has not followed through.
13. There are several fundamental reasons for
the OC's hesitation about making such a commit-
ment. The party has already been stigmatized--to
a greater extent than it probably deserves--for
being rightist and reactionary. In essence, personal
rivalries rather than ideological differences forced
the Congress split. As long as communalism remains
a sensitive political issue, too close an association
with the foremost Hindu nationalist party, the Jana
Sangh, can only be a liability, alienating the im-
portant Muslim minority. Swatantra's fundamental
espousal of a laissez-faire economic policy--free
enterprise, private ownership of land--and its
Western-oriented image are inconsistent with the
avowed socialistic coals of either Congress faction.
14. Regional variations pose further problems.
In the states of Gujarat and Mysore, where the OC
forms the government, there is strong opposition
from OC leaders to obligatory alliances. In Gujarat
for instance, the major opposition to the OC govern-
ment is provided by the Swatantra. Party. Although
the OC leadership is openly divided on the issue,
it appears that the choice of alliance arrangements
will remain the prerogative of regional leaders.
15. The Non-Congress Parties--The Congress
split caused rejoicing among opposition parties.
The two major Communist parties--the internation-
ally independent Communist Party/Marxist (CPM)
and the more moderate, pro-Moscow Communist Party
of India (CPI)--view it as a new opportunity to
press for a leftward orientation of government
policies and the CPI, particularly, sees a chance
to win new respectability on the Indian scene.
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Aided by India's increasingly permissive political
climate and by their willingness to compete within
the Indian democratic system, the CPM and CPI are
now rocogr;zed as legitimate contestants for power.
The former aversion toward cooperation with Commun?
ists in electoral agreements or coalition state
governments is rapidly evaporating.
16. Both the CPI and CPM support Mrs. Gandhi's
socialistic goals and provide conditional support
to her government, primarily to prevent its replace-
ment by right-wing forces. The CPM, with its 19
members of the lower house, remains aloof, however,
and is officially opposed to joining in a coa-
lition with the RC. Mrs. Gandhi is not solely de-
pendent on the 24 CPI votes in Parliament, but her
safety margin is narrow enough to dissuade her from
seriously alienating the party and losing its fu-
ture support.
17. Among the non-Communist opposition, the
party with the most to gain from electoral alliances,
at least in the short run, would appear to be the
Swatantra. Small and conservative, with support
largely confined to three states, it may have fore-
stalled its demise by seeking participation in multi-
party coalition government elsewhere in India. It
has encountered reverses in Gujarat, and i uncer-
tain of its position in Rajasthan. In Orissa, where
Swatantra theoretically leads a coalition government,
it actually supplies little more than a name to
another older and strongly rooted regional party.
Some OC leaders have questioned the value of any
formal alignment with Swatantra since a number of its
members will probably eventually drift to the OC
of their own accord.
18. A larger and better organized party, the
Hindu nationalist Jana Sangh, has sought to expand
its base for several years and has cast about for
mergers with other non-leftist parties. Thus it
is favorably disposed to closer ties with the OC,
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(X)N I" I I )EN'I'1,V,
but like the other opposition parties refuses to
have its support taken for granted and assumes an
independent stance on some issues. The main social-
ist parties are undergoing serious organizational
problems and will have difficulty sustaining nu`ional
support.
Electoral Alliances
19. The most significant step toward a new
electoral strategy was taken in Kerala's mid-term
election last September, the first state-wide election
since the Congress split. In the first outright
electoral "understanding" (Mrs? Gandhi insisted it
was not an "alliance") between the RC and a Commun-
ist party, Mrs. Gandhi's faction openly campaigned
with the CPI-led front. Although the pecularities
of the Kerala situation preclude duplication through-
out India, it is still noteworthy that such a ven-
ture, inconceivable several years ago, was success-
ful for both parties. In contrast, the OC with its
rightist allies--and ironically with an "understand-
ing" with the extremist CPM--was ignominiously de-
feated, attesting both to the unpopularity of con-
servatives in that traditionally leftist state and
to the poor quality of local OC leadership.
20. Since then, Mrs. Gandhi has kept one of
her ablest lieutenants, C. Subramanian, busy as a
liaison officer, giving credence to reports that
similar electoral experiments will be tried in other
parts of the country. The next testing comes in
late December in Tamil Nadu, where the OC and the
Dravida Munnetra Kayhagam (DMK) are contending for
power. Subramanian and the CPI are behind the for-
mation of a seven-party alliance whose prime aim is
to defeat the OC, which now controls eight of the
ten municipalities going to the polls. Although
the OC lost control of the state in 1967, it still
enjoys a major asset in K. Kamaraj, a former president
of the unified Congress Party and a proven vote
getter in Tamil Nadu. The RC, buoyed by its success
in Kerala and recognizing its minimal strength in
Tamil Nadu, clearly feels it has little to lose by
strongly supporting an anti-OC alliance.
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21. Along with this jockeying for allies,
there are tentative efforts to garner support for a
reunification of the two Congr .s groups. There has
been talk of forming a separate "unity" bloc in Par-
liament to keep alive the idea of reconciliation.
The Indian press speaks of a "silent majority" of
Congress parliamentarians who have no major personal
stake or deep emotional involvement in the politics
of the Congress split and who think their own elec-
toral chances would be bettered by a reunion of the
party. At this point, however, there appears to be
little prospect of reconciliation. The OC insists
that Mrs. Gandhi must express regret for forcing the
split and must renounce her understanding with the
Communists. Many within the RC allege that the hidden
hand of big business lurks behind unity proposals.
If the fortunes of RC continue to rise, and its par-
liamentary position holds, OC overtures for re-merger
will spark little interest. Nevertheless, neither
future reunification nor the possibility that indi-
vidual members of the OC may recross the aisle can
be entirely dismisse1.
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(1ON F I L)1,N'1'IAL,
Timing of Elections
22. Every Indian politician is anxious about
his prospects in the next national elections, and
his suspense is heightened by not knowing when they
will be held. Many seriously believe they will not
be re-elected. In past parliamentary elections,
voters have regularly rejected nearly one-third of
the incumbents and many constituencies have experi-
enced important political and economic changes since
the 1967 elections. Particularly vulnerable are OC
parliamentarians whose access to patronage and power
was undermined by their move to the opposition benches.
23. The timing of elections rests with Mrs.
Gandhi, and she has given no hint of her inclinations.
A good case can be made for either early elections
or postponement. One factor in favor of early
elections is the fact that the opposition is cur-
rently fragmented, both in the states and in the
center. Moreover, the economy today is in a relatively
favorable position, t.c?spite rising prices and unem-
ployment. It has recovered from the immediate ef-
fects of the two worst drought years of recent times
(1965-67) and the current foodgrain crop is expected
to set an all-time record of 104 million metric
tons. Although industrial production lags behind
officially planned growth rates, there are signs
of moderate expansion in many consumer-oriented
industries. The outlook for the current fiscal year
is for a small increase in both national and per
capita income in real terms. Moreover, India is
essentially an agrarian nation and--despite improve-
ments in technology and seed--the greater proportion
of its agriculture remains heavily dependent on the
seasonal monsoon rains. If next summer's monsoon
is inadequate, Mrs. Gandhi's campaigning will be
made more difficult.
24. On 15 December, a Supreme Court ruling
invalidated last September's president4.al order
terminating government payments and other privileges
to more than 300 former rulers of princely states.
Mrs. Gandhi strongly supi,orted the cut-off and she
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could seize on the verdict as a campaign issue sure
to win support from the masses. If elections are
held in early 1971, the focus would probably be on
national issues, such as this, rather than on the
local concerns that will play a larger role in 1972,
when the majority of states will elect new legislatures.
25. Militating against early elections is the
RC's recent loss of control of Uttar Pradesh, Mrs.
Gandhi's homeland and India's most pupulcus state.
Although the state's five-party coalition--led by
the OC--may well be short-lived, Mrs. Gandhi would
probably prefer to regain control of this key
state, with its 85 Lower House seats, before national
elections. The ruling coalition in neighboring
Bihar State, though now under RC leadership, is shaky
at best. RC leaders are attempting to bolster the
government there in hopes of securing as many votes
as possible from the large bloc of representatives
from the Hindi-speaking belt in North India.
Outlook
26. Opposition parties, no closer now than
they were last spring to forming a cohesive parlia-
mentary alliance capable of voting Mrs. Gandhi out
of office, withdrew their no-confidence motion be-
fore the opening of the winter session of Parlia-
ment. They were equally unsuccessful in attempt-
ing to censure the government for its imposition of
President's Rule in Uttar Pradesh last October--a
move that provoked widespread parliamentary and
popular criticism. Furthermore, the opposition's
failure to muster more votes from within its own
ranks indicates that many politicians oppose a show-
down with Mrs. Gandhi's government at this time. The
leadership of the Organization Congress has, however,
officially reaffirmed its desire for some sort of
coordination of the rightist-oriented opposition,
even though this may cause defections from the party
in the two states where such alliances are anathema.
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27. The outstanding characteristic of the Indian
political scene today is its fluidity. Polarization
to the right and left has not followed the Congress
split, and expediency and opportunism continue to
k:etermine political decisions. Ideological gaps
have not inhibited alliances between theoretically
incompatible partners where local benefits seemed
possible, and the bargaining for electoral partners
is sure to accelerate as elections draw closer. In
the meantime, Mrs. Gandhi will continue to seek an
expanded mass base by relying on populist politics.
Although such a strategy involves cautious alliances
with the left and verbal attacks on the right, she
will probably continue her basically centrist ap-
proach to dealing with India's problems.
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