SOUTH VIETNAM: NATIONAL COHESION AND VIETNAMIZATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090042-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: August 20, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
.Intelligence 1Vlemorandum
SO~JTN VIETNAM; NATIONAL COHESION AND VIETNAMIZATION
Secret
i~.
20 August 1970
No. 1459/70
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WAR~TII~G
7"his document contains information alferting the nations}
defense of the United States, within the meaninb of 'Title
18, sections icJ3 and 7J4, of the US Code, .cs amended,
Its transmission or rc~?caation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an i.mauihorizcd person is prohibited },y law.
GROUP l
L%CLUOCU YHOM AUTOMATIC
OOW NIIItAU1NO ANO
ULf:I.Al191PICATION
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CENTRAL Il`?TELLIGE'~ICE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
?. 0 Augus t 19 70
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
South Vietnam: National Cohesion and Vietnamizati~n
Introduction
Political stresses that have developer'. over
the last year may in the long run significantly af-
fect the ability of South Vietnam to hang together
and to continue the war as US farces withdraw.
Since it became an independent state in 1954,
South Vietnam has been short on nationalism and long
c:~ regionalism, sects, and personal coteries. What
Kittle political cohesion exists has been superim-
posed from above., and today the country is held to-
gether by the government and military apparatus,
which together provide the guidance and coherence
required for the effort against the Communists.
Since mid-1969, bolder opposition agitation,
growing economic unrest, and recurring doubts about
allied willingness to stay the course against the
enemy have been significant problems for the goc'ern-
ment. The impact of these problems on national
stability and cohesion could eventually be magnified
as ~~:ze US presence--so far an important stabilizing
factor--is further reduced.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current InteZZi-
gence and coordinated tuith the Office of Economic
Research, the Office of National Estimates, and the
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs. The Direc-
torate for PZ~zns ryas consulted in the drafting and
is i~n gener~aZ agreement with its findings.
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The Communists are keenly aware of the chronic
inability of the South Vietnamese to cooperate
politically, and they hope to exploit some future
schism within the South Vietnamese Government to
.help ahem take over the country. The government,
however, has already weatherer? a number of serious
prorlems since it took office in 1967, and its
r.PCOrd sug3ests that it will somehow muddle through.
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Fissiparous Tendencies in South Vietnam
1. There is only one political group in
South Vietnam that has an organizer? follo?~aing in
every major region, operates under a central author-
ity wii~h relatively good discipline, and is guic?ed
by a common political philosophy: the Communist
Party contrclled from Hanoi. ?The Communists are
aware of the advantage this gives them, and, though
they recognize demonstrated allied tenacity on the
battlefield, they still count heavily on their su-
perior dedication and organization to give them
the requisite staying power to win the struggle for
control of the South.
2. On the non-Com~~unist side, there are no
national parties. Only the government apparatus
and the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)
operate on a national scale. In a very real sense,
the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) is the most im-
portant anti-Communist political force in the coun-
try.
3. Most parties are regional. The nationalist
(VNQDD) and Revolutionary Dai Viet parties are
strong in Military Regior, I and in some cities.
The militant Buddhists are important along the north-
ern coast, the Cao Dai ;sect in Tay Ninh Province, and
the Hoa Hao sect in the delta. Some parties, like
the leftist National Progressive Force, are largely
the figment of their "leaders'" imaginations.
4. There ha~,re been a number of attempts
during the last two or three years to amalgamate
regional groupings into nationwide political con-
federation President Thieu formed the Lien Minh
iii 1968 and the National Social Democratic Front
(NSDF) in 1969. Senator Don initiated a National
Salvation Front after Tet 1968. Each was adver~,
tised as a broad, national alliance for political
mobilization against the Communists, but each soon
degenerated into a vehicle to serve the persor~~zl
ambitions of individual leaders. The history of
these alli4~nces--like those of the militant Bud-
dhist leadership, the Vietnamese Confederation of,
Labor, the 'regional parties mentioned above, and
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the several attempts at cooperation by opposition
leaders--is one of fading interest, schisms, and.,
before long, virtual collapse.
5. There are exceptions, but few South Viet-
namese individuals are attracter.? to service in a
higher cause. Family obligation is strong, but
there is little sense of national duty. Few South
Vietnamese are willing to subordinate personal ad-
vantage to the common good. Mutual trust is rare,
and peers seldom work closely together for long.
Politicians, administrative officials, and military
officers want to get support, but they are willing
to give very little in return. These are some of
the reasons why the NSDF, for example, began to
fall apart as soon as it was put together in 1969?
why President Thieu is less inclined than formerly
to consult closely with peers such as Prime Minis-
ter Khiem; and why the South Vietnamese Army, the
Regional and Popular forces, and the National Po-
lice did little to coordinate their respective
operations against the enemy until forced to do so
from above.
6. An apparatus of ,almost two million troops
and officials has been put together, but the common
purpose is essentially negative: to prevent a Com-
munist takeover. Probably the strongest impulse to
unite was inadvertently provided by the Tet offensive
of 1968, when the Communists became much more widely
identified as a common enemy and when officials anc?
troops tackled their missions with a new sense of
urgency. On is?1e other hand, as most Communist main-
force units withdrew from the battlefields to the
border sanctuaries in 1969 and as the enemy's threat
to the villages seemed to recede late that year, the
anti-Communist motivation lost some of its urgency.
?. Funds, direction, and coherence for this
politico-military apparatus are provided through the
national leaders in Saigon, whose role is critical
to the functioning of ;.:~e whole anti-Communist ef-
fort. Central coordination is essential if the
South Vietnamese are to hang together and continue
...L~
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the battle against a Communist tukPOVe:r. In the
event of serious erosion of this role at the na-
tional level, military commanders and province
chiefs would have grave doubts whether non-Commu-
nists could win the struggle. Desertions, coTM-
ruption, and private deals with the enemy are
chronic enervating diseases in South Vietnam that
probably would destroy what vitality has developed
over the years in the government and military ap-
paratus, Although this mechanism now has a momen-
tum of its own and probably would not disintegrate
overnight, any piecemeal decay on the government
side would be made to order for the Communists,
making it easier fox them to reach accommodations
and to neutralize or capture control of piece after
piece of the government apparatus in the villages,
at the province level, and in Saigon.
8. The political framewor)c for the vital
central authority is now provided largely by the
Constitution of 1967, which was estabiishec? with
the help of US inspiration, pressure, and guidance.
The Constitution rests mainly on a foundation of
t1S support and ARVN acquiescence; not on ~..he tra-
ditional values of South Vietnam. Despite its es-
sentially alien origins and character, however,
the constitution is now an important part of file
total government structure, which binds the coun-
try together any' keeps it functioning after a
generation of subversion, insurgency, and conven-
tional war.
9. South Vietnam has moved during the last
ten years from rule by the Diem family through a
succession or military coups and collective rule by
a military directorate to a constitutional for.^.'~at
providing at least a semblance of representative
government. More important, however, the constitu-
tion gives a promise of stability, of continuit~~,
and of orderly transition in government. It is
likely that most South Vietnamese would think aban-
donment of the constitution signals a reversion to
personal cr factional rule and a new era of un-
certainty, especially regarding the commitment
against the Communists.
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10. Overseas reaction to such a reversion
could also be costly =or the Saigon government.
The Communists would be pleased if the government
were to rely heavily oil broad police-state controls
or suspend the constitution and reimpose military
r~i1e. Many captured enemy documents mention the
importance of public opposition in the US to the
Vietnamese commitment, and tkie Communists welcome
any development that stYengthens such sent_ment.
President Thieu is also aware of the importance
of US public opinion and would prefer to handle any
crisis without dramatically, harsh measures or mili-
tary rule for the same reasons the Communists would
welcome an extreme reaction.
11. i1S support will remain vit~~l for a long
time, and the South Vietnamese Government anc~ army
will continue to give US views due weight. Never-
theless, as Amer~.can military power d~.minishes in
South Vietnam and the South Vietnamese have to rely
more and more on themselves, American political in-
fluence will probably also ebb. American advisers
will probably find more of their advice ignored,
sometimes more pointedly than in the past. The
recent rise in incidents symptomatic of anti-Amer-
ican feelings may mar)c the beginning of a general
decline ire the influence of Amerman views and
values. As US forces withdraw, the constitution
will increasingly depend on the support of the
South Vietnamese armed forces. The stability of
the structure will be determined more by South Viet-
namese attitudes and values, with less and less
reference to the US.
Three Types of Stresses
12. In view of the near-compulsion of South
Vietnamese groups to split apart and of tree prob-
able decline in US influence as a stabilizing fac-
tor, national unity and durability will rest in no
small measure on how well the country regulates
the con{'licts within its own body politic. If
economic. unrest or violent agitation, for example,
generate so much heat, that they lead to a wide-
spread conviction that it is more important tc~ oust
the government .Immediately than to do it constitu-
tionally, and if the army should share that
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conviction, the present relatively stable system
would disappear.
13. There are at least three basic situations
that could persuade the South Vietnamese to tale
such an extreme step. First, if street agitation
became so extensive or violent thai?: it seemed clear
that the government was losing control, or if the
government were gravely 9.neffec~ual in coping with
any other development, the chances of an army coup
would rise sharply,
l4. Second, if the government came to be re-
garded as hopelessly unfair by South Vietnamese
standards, as the Diem regime was in its handling
of Buddhist grievances in 1963, the army might
let the Thieu government fall before the assault
of opposition .forces .
15. Third, if the military became convince?
that the regi.r~e was participating ir; what it re-
garded as a "s~r_11-out"--for example, by negotiating
to give the (~;;:~ununists real power in a coalition
government --some army leaders would be strongly
tempted to step in and prevent the arrangement.
The army might consider that the possible da;zc~~ar
of losing US support by resisting the formation
of a coalition was less serious than the dangers
that would arise in trying to compet.' politically
with Communists within the government.
Agitation and Government Effectiveness
16. Last April ar.?d May, a crisis in confidence
seemed to be developing within the government a~
protest demonstrations became more and more common.
Dissidents began to ?~ake courage from their growing
numbers, and the government looked anything but
effective. Vario;is high officials privately
blamed each other, and by early June it appeared
that Prime Minister Khiem and the ministers of
finance and economy might be made the scapegoats
and replaced. The government has so far manage d
with a carrot-and-stic}: approach to keep the situa-
tion under control without pushing the panic button,
1~ut, where it his dared,it is using progressively
greater force.
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l7. The three most active groups of dissidents
in recent months have been students, Buddhist monks,
and veterans; of these the gove::nmerit has cracked
dawn hardest on the students. The application of
harsh measures has been gradual. First the govern-
ment yielded to some student demands concerning the
handling of arxested .student leaders. As student
street demonstrations developed, the government
used force to disperse them. By early summer, how-
ever, the government, no longer content merely to
disperse the students, broke with precedent to
pursue them into what had been the campus sanctuary.
In one case, the police invaded a campus meeting
room after hearing a report that a speaker was
encouraging students to refuse their military obli-
gations. Militant student agitators are still in a
minority, and the government can afford to take such
measures without fear of antagonizing whole student
bodies.
18. The students have become more careful
since this crackdown, but the militant leadership
has beaten the moderates in a recent election of
the Saigon Students Jnion, and more militancy is to
be expected. There have been reports that student
leaders from Saigon have visited other cities to
lay the groundwork for more widespread antigovernment
activity. Tougher police measures against the sons
of South Vietnam's budding middle class, the bureau-
cracy, and military leaders could easily make the
government seem insensa.tive and inept, unless the
police behave with great skill and have their full
share of luck in the coming months.
19. Although th'e' militant Buddhists are~cur-
gently 3ivided among themselves over shat strategy to
pursue, the most activist among thQm are quietly
trying to lay the groundwork for more widespread
agitation focused on the peace theme. But they have
noted the government's tougher attitude toward dis-
sidents, including Thieu's repeated warnings against
agitation that tends to undermine the war effort,
and they, like the students, are proceeding more
cautiously. Thich Tri Quang's advice to follow
the parliamentary path is prevailing for the moment
over Trich Thien Minh's more militant counsels. Tri
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Quang does not want to lose another confrontation
with the government, as the 'Buddhists did during
their Struggle. Movement of 1966. Moreover, he
seems~to have been more deeply impressed by Thich
Thien Minh's incarceration in a government jail in
early 1969 than Minh was himself. This summer, at
least, the more activist militant Buddhists are
biding their time, while their more cautious broth-
ers camg:~ign for _an opposition slate headed by Vu
Van Mau in the Senate election campaign.
20. If the militant Buddhists sY:ould ever
mount a really serious attacl; on the government,
with its many educated Catholic functionaries and
high officials, the result could be a communal
dispute reminiscent of the Buddhist-Catholic cones
frontations at the end of the Diem era. ~,t present,
the antagonism between the Buddhist and Catholic
religious communities is only a dormant problem.
Last fall, follov~ing the appointment to the govern-
ment of some former members of the old Can Lao, the
secret political organization that helped Diem con-
trol the country, there was some concern tlldt Bud-
dhist-Catholic friction might revive. Thieu ap-
parently judged that danger was slight, however,
and communal friction has not developed into a
serious problem since then.
21. Of the three current major. dissident
groups, the militant veterans who are demanding
better 1?-using and other benefits present the most
difficult problem for the government. The police are
not being encouraged to use the same: kind of tough
measures against the veteran squatters and demon-
strators that characterized their actions against
students. Some veterans are beginning to use~fire-
arms, however, and there have been clashes with
police and between veterans' groups at different
locales outside Saigon. Veterans in Saigon have
been stopping motorists an3 extorting money from
them before letting them pass. Clearly some of the
more militant veterans are beginning to consider.
themselves as a privileged group enjoying special
immu~iity from government restraints. The fact is
"that, every man and officer i.n the ARVN sees himself
as a future veteran and is likely to sympathize with
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the veterans if they take 'a beating from police
inob-control squads. In spite 'of the 'dang~~~r of
adverse army reaction, however, the 'government
dares not risk appearing completely ineffectual
by letting veteran mob action go unchecked. The
Thieu regime has already taken some 'step's to meet
veterans' demands fir increased benefits and better
housing, and it undoubtedly hopes' that the veterans
will bear most of the onus in any further clashes
with police.
Economic Unrest
22. Inflatio;:l in South Vietnam has persisted
this year, with pri;;es' increasing at an annual rate
of about 50 percent. Administration officials and
milit2ry men, among others, are 'selling family pos-
sessions and taking extra jobs to make ends meet.
Although resentment is still widespread, some psycho-
logical adjustment to inflation has tal'cen place.
Accordingly, at this point Presidenti: TP,iieu seems
to be concentrating on doing nothing to spark a
new wave of unrest such as was unleashed when he
decreed a series of austeri .y taxes last October.
The long-sought enabling legislation on which his
anti-inflation program is based is still awaiting
attention in the Senate while many Senators are
out campaigning for re-election. Thieu is probably
happy to Y.,-,ve this excuse for inaction because al-
most any move he could take to reform the economy
and damp the inflation is likely to convince most
South Vietnamese that 1-.he 'government is to blame
for their economic problems.
23. It is problematical whether the govern-
ment can escape anew wave 'of economic unrest much
longer. The 'war is a heavy financial burden, as
well as a heavy human burden, for the 'South Viet-
namese, and the productivity of the war-torn econ-
omy remains limited. There ~is little 'confidence
in the currency, and the value 'of the 'piaster on
the black market has been at an extremely low level
for several months. So far, Thieu and his advisers
have apparently found no way to ease the economic
pain without incurring unacceptable political risks.
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Fear of Coalition
?4. Any development that raises serious
doubts about the government's prospects for survival
immediately affects its authority, a~:3, if such
doubts endure and grow, undermines its ability
to hold the country together in the. long run. So
far, the problem that has caused President Thieu
the greatest concr,~ ~-n has been the poasibilit;y of
a negotiated coalition with the enemy.
25. The Communists' confidence i:~n their own
cohesion and durability, coupled with their knowl-
edge that the non-Communist S~~uth Vit~tna;~Pae do not?
cooperate well among themse].vfas, .?i?,,~~~.~~. 3 1,nng way to
account for their insistenc~G; L~:i ~ -, :~ ?; ,;.,~,;, govern-
ment as a key part of any na-gotis,fc:~ peace se~.tle-
ment. President Thieu and r~ia~iy oihers on the non-
communist side seem to agree That coalition would
be just a way-station on the ic:ad to Communist
takeover, and they oppose it adamantly.
26. Although the government has become gen-
uinely more confident as the military and security
situations have improved and although it strives
to appear confident and relatively flexible at the
Paris talks, much of what it does and says is de-
signed to hide a basic lack of confidence in its
prospects if a negotiated settlement were to give
the Communists a real shot at political power.
From mid-1968 until mid-1969, when Thieu considered
the possibility of an eventual negotiated settle-
ment, he made two attempts to organize a grand
political alliance to support the government. Boti;
the Lien Minh and the NSDF founderec', on the compet-
ing ambitions of the various prima donnas, including
Thieu, who would cooperate only on their own terms.
There is nothing in this experience to suggest that
the non-Communist politicians will eventually learn
to orchestrate their efforts, as the government ap-
paratus and the military establishment are still
only learning to do. So far, however, the Commu-
nists have let Saigon off the hook in the talks by
refusing to negotiate a settlement unless the Sai-
gon leadership first reorganizes itself to enemy
satisfaction.
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27. Because the Communists are unlikely to
buy anything less than an odds-on chance to win
eventual complete control, it is extremely diffi-
cult at this stage to foresee the two Vietnamese
sides agreeing to a settlement. Assuming that this
basic impasse is not broken and that the war is
protracted indefinitely, the Communists will un-
doubtedly look for other ways to encourage and ex-
ploit political weaknesses of the government.
Partly with this in mind, they are already trying
to rebuild their political and subversive infra-
structure in the countryside and in the cities.
28, Meanwhile, President Thieu is consistently
squelching any renewal of speculation that some
version of coalition may be under consideration,
and is repeatedly reassuring the country, p'artxc-
ularly the armed forces, that tYye government will
never agree to such a solution.. ~rhe problem of
maintaining confidence in the government's pros-
pects for survival will probably become more diffi-
cult as US forces are further reduced, especially
if the enemy mounts new military pressure on gov-
ernment-controlled areas and inflicts serious losses
on the army and on pacification programs,. Recurrent
anxieties among the South Vietnamese about the stead-
fastness of US support would then probably intensify,
rumors about a deal with'the enemy would become more
believable, ana the government's standing in the
country would be weakened..
Conclusion
29. As of mid-August the government seems to
have at least temporarily res?~rained most of the
protest groups, except for the politically sensitive
veterans, and it is displaying more confidence in
its ability to rule South Vietnam than it showed in
May and early June. Dissatisfaction with the econ-
omy. is likely to get worse during the coming year,
however, and South Vietnamese confidence may waver
as US forces continue to withdraw.
30. The government has already weathered a~
number of serious problems, including the schism
between President Thieu and Vice-President Ky, the
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Tet offensive of 1968, the trauma of negotiating with
the Communists in Paris, last fall's economic un-
rest, and last spring's wave of protest agitation.
Although these problems were ~,iot handled in an out-
wardly impressive way, the government's record sug-
gests that it may muddle through over the next year
or so as Vietnamization proceeds.
3J.. zf, however, it does not manage to cope
with future stresses or challenges to its authority,
the consequences will be serious. 'rhe most likely
alternatives to the present constitutional govern-
ment--a military regime or a new era of instiability--
are both unpromising. The enemies of a military re-
i~?i_, Communists and non-Communists, would exploit
the establishment of a military government in their
appeals to the American public, adding to the dif-
ficulties of an ord~~:rly turnover of US military_-e-
sponsibilities to the Vietnamese. Aside from a mili-
tary regime, however, no single group or alliance
seems to have the cohesion to govern effectively.
Tn a new era of instability, the danger would be
great that South Vietnam would come apart at the
seams politically, despise the demonstrated prog-
ress of her armed forces.
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