LONGER TERM IMPLICATIONS OF VIETNAM S DOMINATION OF INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00176R001400120001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/05/07: CIA-RDP85TOO176R001400120001-8
National Secret
Intelligence
Council
Longer Term Implications
of Vietnam's Domination
of IndochinaF7]
National Intelligence Council
Memorandum
Secret
NIC M 82-10011
September 1982
Copy. 32 ,
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Warning Notice Intelligence Sources
or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
 Approved For Release 2007/05/07: CIA-RDP85T00176R001400120001-8
National
Intelligence
Council
Longer Term Implications
of Vietnam's Domination
of Indochina
National Intelligence Council
Memorandum
Information available as of 1 August 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This Memorandum has been discussed with the
National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the
Intelligence Community. The views presented are
those of the author of the NIC
Analytic Group. Comments are welcome and may
be addressed to the autho
Secret
NIC M 82-10011
September 1982
 Approved For Release 2007/05/07: CIA-RDP85T00176R001400120001-8
Secret
Longer Term Implications
of Vietnam's ination
of Indochina
Scope Note The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in 1978 resulted in the overthrow
of Pol Pot and the establishment of the Heng Samrin regime under the pro-
tection of a Vietnamese occupation army. This contributed to a large
refugee flow chiefly to Thailand, a Chinese punitive invasion of Vietnam,
an increase in Soviet aid to Vietnam, and a continuing Soviet military
presence in Southeast Asia. Various anti-Vietnamese resistance forces,
including those of Pol Pot, Sihanouk, and Son Sann, variously backed by
the ASEAN countries and China, joined in a loose coalition and continue
armed resistance. The United Nations continues to recognize the ousted
Kampuchean government, further complicating the situation. While many
aspects of Vietnam's control over Kampuchea and related matters in Laos
have been examined individually, this paper brings the main issues of
Indochina together to determine the consequences of continued Vietnamese
domination of Indochina for Southeast Asia, China, the Soviet Union, and
the United States.
The purpose of this Memorandum is to determine just how serious a
problem a Vietnamese-dominated Indochina is likely to pose for the United
States over the next five years. We consider Hanoi's motivations, the
problems facing Vietnam in controlling its neighbors, the roles of outside
powers, and how these factors are likely to affect the future of Indochina.
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Problems Facing Hanoi in Controlling Indochina 3
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Longer Term Implications
of Vietnam's Domination
of Indochina
Key Judgments Vietnamese domination of Laos and Kampuchea is not likely to be weakened
seriously by either internal or external pressures over the next five years.
The main threat to Vietnam's hegemony comes from the resistance forces in
Kampuchea which agreed to form a loose coalition in July. Even if this
improves the ability of the resistance forces to recruit and enables them to
gain additional outside support, Vietnam still should be able to keep the
resistance forces contained in isolated areas along the Thai-Kampuchean
border for the next five years or so. Externally, Vietnam most likely will con-
tinue to withstand Chinese coercion, ASEAN diplomatic pressure, and
international isolation. Of these, the Chinese threat has been Vietnam's
main concern. Since the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979, Hanoi has ex-
panded its armed forces and received over $2 billion in military aid from the
USSR. Vietnam now has the world's third-largest army, numbering about
1.2 million ground forces.
While the possibility cannot be excluded of a major escalation of the conflict
in the Indochina area, perhaps involving Thailand, China, the USSR, or
even the United States, the much more likely prospect will be one of
continuing conflict, limited to engagements along the Thai-Kampuchean
border and perhaps occasional clashes along the Vietnamese-Chinese
border.
Domination of Indochina improves Vietnam's security, but does not enhance
appreciably Vietnam's ability to project power in the rest of Southeast Asia
at this time. Vietnam has not indicated any interest in sending its forces be-
yond Indochina, but will continue to support revolutionary movements in
Thailand and elsewhere. However, to date, the level of support to revolution-
ary movements has been surprisingly small given the large stockpiles of US-
made equipment in Vietnam. In Southeast Asia the Communist insurgencies
tend to be pro-Chinese and not eager to cooperate with Hanoi. In any event,
Vietnamese support is not likely to be the decisive factor in any revolution-
ary movement within the next five years or so.
Continued Vietnamese domination of Indochina is not likely to pose serious
security problems for the United States, at least for the short term. The
threat to Thailand is low and China provides a useful balance to Vietnam's
military power in the region. For the United States, coordination of its
Indochina policies may become a problem should ASEAN and China follow
contradictory policies toward Vietnam. ASEAN unity in opposition to the
Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea may erode and some of its members,
particularly Indonesia, eventually may decide to reach an accommodation
with Vietnam, while China is likely to continue taking a more confrontation-
al approach toward Hanoi.
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Indochina
Thailand
Thailand
Gulf
of
Tonkin
Vietnam
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
0 200
Kilometers
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Secret
a
Longer Term Implications
of Vietnam's Domination
of Indochina
Vietnam's Control of Indochina
Vietnamese influence is pervasive at nearly every level
of administration in Laos and Kampuchea. Several
thousand Vietnamese civil advisers are backed up by
about 220,000 troops deployed in the two small
neighboring states. At the same time, Vietnam itself
is economically depressed and heavily dependent upon
the Soviet Union for economic and military aid. This
aid, in turn, is accompanied by a Soviet military
presence. China and the ASEAN ' countries are
opposed to a Vietnamese-dominated Indochina that is
closely allied with the USSR. Some of this opposition
includes support for the various anti-Vietnamese
resistance forces within Indochina.
Despite economic hardships and outside pressure,
Vietnam's leaders attach a high priority to controlling
Kampuchea and Laos. They have termed the current
situation in Kampuchea "irreversible." Premier Pham
Van Dong has noted that the "defense and integrity of
Indochina is of equal importance to the Vietnamese
people as the economic development of Vietnam."
One main reason that Hanoi attaches such impor-
tance to dominating Kampuchea and Laos is the
danger that these countries pose to the security of
Vietnam if they should once again become allied with
such major adversaries as China and the United
States. Economic gain is not a major motivation for
Hanoi.
Since the I 1 th century, the Vietnamese have fought
and maneuvered diplomatically for control over parts
of Laos and Kampuchea. They were never successful
in gaining full control over the region, which the
French eventually brought under nominal rule in
1893. Almost immediately, however, a struggle for
Vietnamese independence broke out. Many of Viet-
nam's current leaders have been a part of this struggle
since the founding days of the Vietnamese-dominated
Indochina Communist Party in 1930. These early
'Association of Southeast Asian Nations, founded in 1967 by
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
Communist Party leaders were convinced that the
liberation of Vietnam could not be divorced from
independence struggles in Laos and Kampuchea. Geo-
political beliefs also have provided a rationale for
domination of all of Indochina. For example, in 1950
Vietnam's leading strategist, General Vo Nguyen
Giap, noted that:
Indochina is a strategic unit, and a single theater of
operations. Therefore, we have the task of helping
to liberate all of Indochina ... especially for
reasons of strategic geography.
Vietnamese domination of Kampuchea and Laos
evolved in quite different ways. In both Laos and
Kampuchea, the Communist parties had long been
dependent on the Vietnamese Communist Party
(VCP). But relations between the Vietnamese and
Kampuchean Communists have been seriously
strained on several occasions. In 1972 Pol Pot expelled
most of the pro-Vietnamese faction from the Kampu-
chean Communist Party and aligned Kampuchea
more closely with China. By 1976, mutual distrust
was evident as border clashes grew more intense and
the hostilities culminated in the Vietnamese invasion
of Kampuchea in late 1978. In Laos, by contrast, the
relationship between Lao and Vietnamese Commu-
nists was characterized by continued cooperation. No
doubt the leadership in Hanoi would have preferred a
similar arrangement in Kampuchea, but was unwill-
ing to tolerate the independent and provocative Com-
munist leadership in Phnom Penh. Even after installa-
tion of the pro-Vietnamese People's Republic of
Kampuchea (PRK) government of Heng Samrin in
1979, there is still evidence that the relationship
between Hanoi and Phnom Penh is not as close as that
between Hanoi and Vientiane. For example, the Viet-
namese-Lao border delineation has been agreed to,
but the Vietnamese-Kampuchean border still remains
to be negotiated. On balance, Laos enjoys a greater
degree of autonomy than does Kampuchea.
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There are several ways in which Vietnam exercises
control over Indochina. The primary method is
through an extensive network of advisers that ensures
that no significant decision can be made in Laos or
Kampuchea without Vietnamese knowledge and con-
sent. Thousands of Vietnamese advisers at the nation-
al and provincial levels oversee the daily work of their
Indochinese counterparts. Vietnam also has instituted
training programs for both Lao and Kampuchean
officials that are expected to produce politically reli-
able administrators, permit reductions in the numbers
of Vietnamese advisers, and eventually allow some
reduction in the numbers of Vietnamese troops. Such
reductions, however, would not necessarily indicate
reduced Vietnamese influence.
Vietnam's leaders are aware that heavyhanded con-
trol could lead to nationalistic Kampuchean and Lao
backlashes. Thus, Hanoi has taken steps to try to
avoid encouraging anti-Vietnamese sentiment. These
measures include a policy of maintaining strict disci-
pline among Vietnamese troops with the threat of
summary execution for any act damaging Vietnam's
relations with Kampuchea or Laos. Among the more
subtle methods of influence was the "Sister Province"
arrangement, whereby middle and lower level Viet-
n mese officials were made responsible for providing
advice and assistance to corresponding levels of ad-
ministration in Laos and Kampuchea. Influence also
is 'provided through coordination of mass media. The
news services of Laos (KPL) and Kampuchea (SPK)
generally follow the lead of the Vietnam News
Agency on reporting major events. Individual travel
by Lao or Kampuchean officials is routed through
Hanoi, suggesting further opportunity for influence.
Semiannual conferences of the Indochinese foreign
ministers also are held to coordinate foreign affairs.
Ir} addition, coordination of banking, postal service,
hydrology, and other activities are called for in vari-
ous treaties and agreements.
While Vietnam no doubt prefers to exercise indirect
influence in Indochina, the Vietnamese leadership has
not hesitated to intervene directly. For example,
Kampuchean Communist Party Secretary General
Pen Sovan was unexpectedly removed in December
1981, most likely under orders from Hanoi. Such
Secret
changes can be expected because Vietnam can moni-
tor potential threats through its pervasive influence in
the internal security apparatus of Kampuchea and
Laos. For example, Vietnamese are intimately in-
volved with identifying and dealing with individuals
and domestic groups who pose threats to the regime in
Laos and Kampuchea. They supervise reeducation
camps and political prisons in Laos and Kampuchea.
In addition to controlling internal political develop-
ments, the Vietnamese also influence the local econo-
my. For example, Vietnam has diverted commodities
in Kampuchea to Vietnam, including food donated by
relief agencies.
Military force structures and operations in Laos and
Kampuchea also are under direct Vietnamese control.
Some 50,000 Vietnamese troops in Laos and 170,000
in Kampuchea provide security for the two govern-
ments. Vietnam also channels essential logistic sup-
port to the Lao and Kampuchean armed forces.
In Laos, military assistance is provided through a
group which is subordinate to Vietnam's Ministry of
National Defense. This group is supervising the tran-
sition of the former Pathet Lao insurgents into an
armed force numbering some 65,000 personnel, in-
cluding about 50,000 ground forces organized into
eight infantry regiments and 71 infantry battalions.
This structure is similar in size to Laos's former
Forces Armees Royale (FAR) organizations, which
numbered about 45,000 ground troops. In addition to
the military advisory network, Vietnam maintains
four infantry divisions and two independent infantry
regiments in Laos under a front headquarters located
near Paksane.
Vietnam's military advisory and logistics network in
Kampuchea is more extensive than that in Laos
because of the need to build new indigenous armed
forces following defeat of the Democratic Kampu-
chean (DK) forces in 1979. A force of about 30,000
PRK troops has been trained, including four brigade/
division-sized units. In addition to military advisers,
Vietnam maintains about 13 infantry divisions in
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Kampuchea, some of which are actively involved in
training PRK forces. Unlike those in Laos, Kampu-
chean battalions are being used directly under com-
mand of Vietnamese fronts and divisions in action
against resistance forces.
Problems Facing Hanoi in Controlling Indochina
Improving the economy in Vietnam, defeating the
resistance forces in Kampuchea, and defending the
border with China are the main problems facing the
leadership in Hanoi. The resistance forces in general,
and the Communist DK forces in particular, pose the
most difficult problem for Hanoi's Indochina policy.
Among the consequences of this policy is the loss of
considerable foreign aid and investment, which has
compounded Vietnam's already serious economic
problems. Also, Vietnam's domination of Indochina
and China's response have necessitated the expansion
of the Vietnamese army to the point where it now
numbers about 1.2 million troops, making it the third-
largest army in the world.
The Kampuchean Resistance. Hanoi has tried to deal
with the Kampuchean resistance in several ways,
including attacking its bases along the Thai border,
building up an indigenous PRK army, and trying to
undermine outside support for the resistance forces.
This year Vietnam has committed about eight divi-
sions to the campaign in Kampuchea. PRK troops
have been assuming a very modest share of the
internal security role, but they will not be able to
assume full defense responsibilities for the foreseeable
future.
Recent trends have not been favorable for the resist-
ance forces. The two main groups-the Communist
Democratic Kampuchean forces backed by China,
and the non-Communist forces of Son Sann supported
by Thailand and other ASEAN countries-distrust
each other. The militarily stronger DK tolerates the
non-Communist forces largely in order to help pre-
serve its UN membership, which is retained primarily
through the efforts of the ASEAN countries. A third
group, associated with Prince Sihanouk, has been
insignificant militarily, but legitimized Sihanouk's
claim to participate in the loose coalition of resistance
forces established in July 1982. Sihanouk evidently
retains considerable popularity. For example, as a
result of his visits to refugee camps, several thousand
people agreed to move to Sihanouk's border
headquarters.
In 1981 the overall size of the resistance forces
expanded by a few thousand troops, but subsequent
growth has been limited because the main source of
recruits-Kampuchean refugees in Thailand-has di-
minished. The militarily strongest group, the DK, has
not been able to overcome its bad image in Kampu-
chea, earned as a result of the widespread atrocities
committed under its Pol Pot leadership. In less than
four years, the brutality of the Pol Pot regime caused
an actual drop in the population of between 1.2 and
1.8 million people. 2 The other two resistance forces
also have been unable to make significant inroads into
the interior of Kampuchea and are of doubtful viabili-
ty without considerable outside support of food, arms,
and ammunition. The resistance forces in Laos are
even weaker and pose no serious threat to the Lao
Government or to its Vietnamese backers.
The Vietnamese Economy. Hanoi is clearly under
economic pressure, and how the leadership handles its
economic problems could affect the Indochina situa-
tion. Vietnamese officials have acknowledged that the
economic situation in 1980 was worse than at the end
of the war in 1975. Today, Vietnam, Laos, and
Kampuchea remain among the world's poorest coun-
tries, with annual per capita incomes below $100.
Vietnam's poor economic performance was largely the
result of bad management, bad weather, conflicts
with China and Kampuchea, and the loss of foreign
aid and trade. The direct impact of Hanoi's Indochina
policy on the Vietnamese economy is difficult to
measure, but the resulting economic isolation and the
cost of maintaining 1.2 million men under arms
compound already serious economic problems.
The loss of foreign aid has been a major setback for
Vietnam and has led to an uncomfortable dependence
on the Soviet Union. Foreign aid was to have played
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Table 1
Indochina Military Trends:
Ground Force Personnel
615,000
680,000
800,000
900,000
1,200,000
Opposite China and northern Vietnam
100,000
100,000
200,000
400,000
700,000
In Kampuchea
0
0
220,000
150,000
170,000
40,000
40,000
45,000
50,000
50,000
47,000
47,000
47,000
47,000
50,000
NA
NA
NA
20,000
30,000
NA
20,000
30,000-
35,000
35,000
NA
NA
3,000-
5,000
7,000-
8,000
NA
NA
500-
1,000
500-
1,000
NA
NA
NA
6,000-
8,000
a Includes main forces, active duty militia, and economic construc-
tion forces.
b Estimates of resistance forces are less certain. Their numbers vary
widely during each year.
an unusually large role in its 1976-80 Economic Plan,
which called for foreign contributions of $5.4 billion
while the entire national income for the same period
was projected at only about $25.5 billion. Both China
and the United States were to play important roles in
Vietnam's economic development. Previously, China
had been an important contributor, providing between
$10 billion and $20 billion in economic aid to Vietnam
between 1955 and 1975. In mid-1978, China stopped
aid to Vietnam and cut off petroleum exports which
accounted for about 50 percent of Vietnam's total oil
requirements. Shortly thereafter, the Vietnamese in-
vasion of Kampuchea led to the termination of addi-
tional foreign aid from several other countries. During
the same period, Vietnam unsuccessfully pressed
claims for about $3 billion in US aid that Hanoi
argued it was supposed to receive as part of the 1973
Paris Agreement. The loss of Chinese and other
Secret
foreign aid has not been completely offset by in-
creased Soviet assistance. Furthermore, economic iso-
lation of Vietnam as a result of the Kampuchean
invasion has deprived Hanoi of important trade and
investment capital.
Vietnam's poor economic performance also has put
added pressure on the USSR. Hanoi has been unable
to meet payment obligations on a $3.5 billion external
debt. In 1981, debt service payments alone amounted
to about 77 percent of ,total exports. Rescheduling of
the debt has brought only temporary relief and for-
eign creditors hope that Moscow will once again come
to Hanoi's rescue.
Hanoi has not been willing to withdraw its forces from
Kampuchea to regain foreign aid and trade opportuni-
ties despite the fact that control over the Lao and
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Kampuchean economies does not provide Hanoi with
any significant offsetting economic benefits. Indeed, it
probably constitutes a net drain in Vietnamese re-
sources. Should Vietnam press the "socialist transfor-
mation" of the Lao and Kampuchean economies,
Hanoi would probably be faced with responses similar
to those encountered in southern Vietnam, including
peasants' reducing acreage, hiding grain from govern-
ment collectors, and leaving farms and villages for
exile abroad.
Roles of Outside Powers
USSR The USSR generally supports Vietnamese
efforts to dominate Indochina. The main concern
from the Soviet perspective is China. A stronger, more
united Indochina aligned with the USSR presents
China with a worrisome, second-front problem. Since
Laos is vulnerable to Chinese pressure and Kampu-
chea could revert to a pro-Chinese orientation if
Vietnamese occupation forces were removed, the So-
viets see it as to their advantage to support Hanoi.
This support helps keep China out of Indochina and
also provides Moscow with access to military facili-
ties, further strengthening Soviet influence in South-
east Asia. Moscow also enjoys the support of Vietnam
and Laos in international forums. For example, Viet-
nam and Laos voted with the USSR on 42 of 43
important issues before the United Nations in 1981,
whereas the ousted Pol Pot government, as noted, still
controls the Kampuchean seat in the United Nations
and consistently votes against the Soviet position. On
a larger scale, the relationships of the USSR with the
Indochina states, when added to its dominance of
Mongolia, its presence in Afghanistan, and its ties
with India, raise fears in Beijing of persistent Soviet
efforts to encircle China.
The two main levers of Soviet influence in Vietnam
are oil and arms. The USSR now provides over 90
percent of Vietnam's petroleum needs and is the sole
source of military equipment. Since the Chinese inva-
sion of Vietnam in 1979, the USSR has provided
substantial amounts of military assistance to Viet-
nam, as indicated in table 2.
Soviet military aid to Indochina has declined after the
massive infusion in 1979 and friction over aid pro-
grams has strained Soviet-Vietnamese relations some-
Table 2
Soviet Military Assistance to Vietnam,
1979 Through July 1982
MIG-21 /Fishbed
SU-17/Fitter
SU-22/Fitter
Transports
TU-134/Crusty
AN-26/Curl
11-18/Coot
YAK-40/Codling
AN-2/Colt
Helicopters
MI-24/Hind
KA-25/Hormone
MI-8/Hip
MI-6/Hook
Naval Vessels
Petya-class light frigates
Yurka-class fleet minesweeper
K-8 minesweeping boats
Osa II-class missile-attack boats
SO-1 submarine chasers
Shershen-class torpedo boats
Zhuk-class patrol boats
Polnocny-class amphibious assault
landing ships
Ground, air defense weapons, and missiles
Tanks
APCs/armored cars/armored
reconnaissance vehicles
Self-propelled assault guns
Artillery
SA-2/Guideline and SA-3/Goa launchers
SA-2/3 surface-to-air missiles
SS-N-2/Styx missiles
SSC-L/Sepal antiship cruise missiles
257
53
161
3
40
112
16
37
37
22
1,715
259
272
216
451
49
418
48
2
 Table 3
Soviet. Aid to Indochinaa
Million US$
Total
575
1,780
1,240
1,265
Economic aid
485
700
545
950
Military equipment
90
1,080
695
315
what. The Soviets have pressed Vietnam into replac-
ing many officials who have been accused of
corruption and inefficiency in administering Soviet-
provided aid. Furthermore, the USSR has begun to
provide aid directly to Kampuchea and Laos rather
than through Vietnam. This, in effect, causes Viet-
nam to relinquish some control over its two neighbors.
Assuming continued poor economic performance in
Indochina and no major new sources of foreign aid,
Soviet assistance will continue to be critical. However,
it will be difficult for the USSR to meet increased
demands from Indochina. The cost of supporting
other allies has increased for the USSR. At the same
time, Soviet economic growth rates have been declin-
ing and domestic labor and energy problems are
growing more serious. Thus, Soviet economic growth
in the next several years probably will be too small to
meet mounting domestic investment requirements and
simultaneously maintain growth rates in military
spending, raise the Soviet standard of living, and
increase foreign aid. In such circumstances, Vietnam
will continue to be relatively low on Moscow's list of
priorities and, therefore, cannot be assured of in-
creased aid. Moscow, however, probably will continue
to meet Hanoi's minimum needs.
China. From China's perspective, Vietnamese domi-
nation of Indochina is part of a series of anti-Chinese
acts promoted by the Soviet Union. China has charac-
terized Vietnam as the "Cuba of the East." Beijing
has developed a long-term strategy to "bleed Vietnam
Secret
white," while at the same time raising the "cost of
empire" for the USSR. The main feature of this
strategy includes support for resistance forces within
Indochina, especially the Democratic Kampuchean
forces of the deposed and pro-Chinese Pol Pot regime.
China also maintains a large, threatening force along
Vietnam's northern border. China's leaders apparent-
ly hope that a combination of factors will eventually
lead to a change in Vietnam's Indochina policy and
relations with the USSR. These factors include:
? The aging leadership in Hanoi.
? Vietnam's dismal economic performance.
? The debilitating effects on Vietnam of having simul-
taneously to fight in Kampuchea, occupy Laos, and
defend the northern border.
? Nationalistic reactions in Vietnam to overdepend-
ence on the USSR and anti-Vietnamese reactions
by the Lao and Kampuchean people.
While China has tried to improve relations with
countries that have been close to the USSR such as
Syria, Libya, Ethiopia, and Angola, the Beijing lead-
ership has not made any serious attempts to improve
relations with Vietnam. The preconditions for better
relations were spelled out in the July 1982 PRC white
paper on Sino-Vietnamese relations, which continued
to link normalization to complete withdrawal of Viet-
namese troops from Kampuchea and abandonment of
Vietnam's role as a "tool of Soviet expansionism."
Even if the Kampuchean problem were resolved,
China would most likely continue to oppose a mili-
tarily strong Vietnam allied with the USSR. Thus,
there is little basis for improved Sino-Vietnamese
relations within the next five years.
ASEAN. ASEAN has been in the forefront of diplo-
matic activity to pressure Vietnam into withdrawing
its troops from Kampuchea. In July 1981, ASEAN
held an international conference on Kampuchea that
called for Vietnamese withdrawal and self-determina-
tion for the people of Kampuchea. ASEAN diplomacy
also has been successful in denial of the Kampuchean
UN seat to the Vietnamese-installed government in
Phnom Penh. In July 1982, ASEAN finally succeeded
in persuading Son Sann, Sihanouk, and Khieu Sam-
phan to form a loose coalition of the Kampuchean
resistance forces.
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Table 4
Refugees Departing Indochina
Total
152,900
311,700
276,600
190,300
140,500
36,400
Vietnam
117,300
247,800
212,000
80,800
83,900
32,700
Laos
26,500
56,800
54,600
74,300
27,800
3,700
Kampuchea
9,100
7,100
10,000 b
35,200
28,800
0
a To 30 June 1982.
b In addition, about 750,000 were displaced and probably returned to Kampuchea.
Thailand has been in the lead of most ASEAN efforts
on Indochina. For Bangkok, a serious problem result-
ing from the Vietnamese domination of Indochina has
been the large influx of refugees. Most of the Indo-
china refugees flee to Thailand where they overbur-
den local relief capabilities (see table 4). Since refu-
gees also have provided the main source of manpower
for the resistance forces, the refugee resettlement
camps are closely watched and occasionally harassed
by Vietnamese forces or the Vietnamese-backed
Kampuchean forces.
ASEAN unity in opposing Vietnam is fragile because
of underlying differences about whether China or
Vietnam poses the greater threat. Indonesia is more
inclined to see a strong Indochina bloc as useful to
balance China. Differences with regard to the threat
also are reflected within each of the ASEAN coun-
tries, thus contributing to an ambivalence that is
likely to increase.
Questions Concerning the Future of Indochina
Will Vietnam's hold on Kampuchea and Laos be
significantly weakened? Vietnamese domination of
Kampuchea and Laos is not likely to be weakened
seriously by either internal or external pressure over
the next five years or so. Internal pressure comes
mainly from the resistance forces in Kampuchea,
which may grow modestly under the coalition frame-
work. The coalition possibly could combine Siha-
nouk's popularity with the more effective military
structure of the DK, but the deep distrust between the
Kampuchean resistance groups limits the extent of
their cooperation. In any event, the resistance forces
are not viable without substantial outside support, and
there is little chance for them to become more self-
sufficient within the next five years. Vietnam has
been successful in containing resistance forces in
remote areas along the Thai border. Furthermore,
Vietnam will continue to build the local administra-
tive and party infrastructure to deny the resistance
forces the opportunity to spread and seriously chal-
lenge the regimes in Phnom Penh and Vientiane.
Besides the resistance forces, there are no other
organized internal opposition groups capable of bring-
ing any significant pressure on Hanoi to change its
Indochina policy.
Externally, the main source of pressure against Viet-
namese domination of Indochina is the threat of a
 Approved For Release 2007/05/07: CIA-RDP85T00176R001400120001-8
second attack by China. But the military balance
along the Sino-Vietnamese border has changed dra-
matically since the Chinese invasion of 1979. Vietnam
has expanded its armed forces by over 300,000 per-
sonnel and received about $2 billion in Soviet military
assistance since 1979. During the same period, Chi-
nese forces in the border area have not been upgraded
significantly. Vietnamese forces in the northern areas
now total about 700,000 personnel, well in excess of
the 400,000 troops that China committed against
Vietnam in 1979.
Other external pressures on Vietnam are largely
diplomatic in nature. Political and economic isolation
is irritating for Hanoi. The Vietnamese announce-
ment of a partial troop withdrawal in July probably
was designed to undermine international opposition to
Vietnam. Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach also
has suggested that a neutral zone could be established
along the Thai-Kampuchean border. These and other
Vietnamese initiatives are likely to continue, but will
not seriously weaken Hanoi's influence over Laos and
Kampuchea.
How will Vietnam's severe economic problems affect
its domination of Indochina? There are two main
ways in which economic problems could affect Ha-
noi's control over Indochina. First, the burden of
sustaining a very large military force structure could
theoretically be reduced if occupation forces were
removed from Laos and Kampuchea, and relations
improved with China. Second, Vietnam's chances of
gaining badly needed foreign aid and trade might
increase if its troops were pulled out of Kampuchea.
But both of these lines of reasoning are flawed.
Demobilization of large numbers of Vietnamese mili-
tary personnel while unemployment continues to be
relatively high would compound Hanoi's economic
problems. Furthermore, there are no signs that the
cost of maintaining a large force structure is becom-
ing intolerable. While Hanoi would be eager to obtain
Western aid and trade, the amounts that Hanoi can
realistically expect to receive are small and not likely
to be a significant stimulus to economic growth for
the next five years at least. For example, France has
promised $34 million and India pledged about $12
million in aid. At the same time, other donors, such as
Norway, are phasing out aid programs in Vietnam.
OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries) also deferred a previously approved $31 million
loan to Vietnam. Furthermore, Vietnam is considered
a poor risk by private investors. Hanoi has fallen
behind in repaying several foreign loans and has
accumulated a foreign debt of over $3 billion while
running an annual trade deficit of $600-800 million.
Although other countries may establish modest aid
and trade programs in Vietnam, Laos, and Kampu-
chea, marginally reducing Soviet influence in Viet-
nam over the longer term, aid and other sources of
trade are unlikely to have a major impact on Viet-
nam's future. Thus, the series of dependent relation-
ships which now characterize Indochina-Laos and
Kampuchea dependent on Vietnam, and Vietnam, in
turn, dependent on the USSR-are not likely to be
changed much over the next five years.
Will Vietnam become a "Cuba of the East, "a Soviet
proxy, or an exporter of revolution in Southeast Asia?
Domination of Indochina does not enhance apprecia-
bly Vietnam's ability to project power at this time.
Unlike Castro's Cuba, Vietnam has not indicated any
interest in sending its forces beyond Indochina. Viet-
nam has transferred some captured US weapons to
insurgents in El Salvador. However, the scale of such
efforts has been small given Vietnam's ideological
affinity with many revolutionary groups and large
stockpiles of US-made military equipment, including
over 1 million small arms. Within Southeast Asia,
most of the Communist insurgencies are pro-Chinese
in orientation and are unlikely to fall under Vietnam-
ese influence. In any event, Vietnamese materiel
support is not likely to be the critical factor in
determining the success of any Communist insurgen-
cy in the next five years.
Will a Vietnamese-dominated Indochina threaten
Thailand? The threat of a large-scale, direct attack
by any combination of Indochinese forces against the
Thai armed forces is remote for at least five years.
Such a move would not serve Vietnamese or Soviet
interests and would most likely result in stronger US
and Chinese backing of Thailand. China has threat-
ened Hanoi with a "second lesson" if Thailand is
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attacked. However, Vietnam can be expected to
mount operations against the resistance forces along
the border, and these operations could escalate to
include clashes with Thai forces. In addition, Vietnam
has attempted to establish a front organization in
Laos with subversive potential for Thailand. But this
endeavor is quite small and appears to have little
chance of developing into a serious threat to Thailand
within the next five years. Thailand will also continue
to monitor the activities of the 70,000 or so Vietnam-
ese who have resided in northeastern Thailand, most
of whom migrated in the mid-1950s.
What major changes, if any, are likely in Soviet and
Chinese policies toward Vietnam and Indochina?
Given Vietnam's economic difficulties, Hanoi proba-
bly will seek additional aid from the USSR. However,
as noted, it seems unlikely that aid levels will be
increased significantly. Moscow provides some aid
directly to Laos and Kampuchea, but this probably
represents Soviet concern for more efficient use of
their aid rather than deliberate efforts to undermine
Vietnamese influence in Indochina. In return for
Soviet aid, Moscow will continue to extract conces-
sions from Hanoi. Soviet military access to Da Nang
and Cam Ranh Bay will continue, and the Soviets
may gain more direct access to certain sectors of the
Vietnamese economy. For example, the Soviets re-
cently gained direct management authority in devel-
oping a Vietnamese offshore-oil leasehold. Vietnam
also exports labor to the USSR and Eastern Europe to
help reduce the trade deficit. At least 50,000 Viet-
namese "guest workers" are now overseas and this
number could reach as high as 300,000, according to
some reports. While these and other relationships
between Moscow and Hanoi are likely to produce
some friction, there is not likely to be any significant
change in Soviet policies toward Indochina during the
next five years.
China also is unlikely to change its Indochina policy
over the next five years. Chinese support of the
resistance forces in Kampuchea and Laos and threats
of a second invasion of Vietnam cost Beijing relatively
little and are easy to sustain. There is always the
possibility that China would change its Indochina
policy if the leadership in Beijing concluded that the
current strategy was counterproductive and contribut-
ed to closer ties between Vietnam and the USSR.
Such assessments by Beijing could result in Chinese
efforts to reduce Vietnam's dependence on Soviet food
and petroleum, for example. However, China is more
likely to continue its opposition to Vietnam's occupa-
tion of Kampuchea and Hanoi's close military ties to
Moscow.
What major changes, if any, are likely in ASEAN
policies toward Vietnam and Indochina? Although
Thailand will continue to urge ASEAN to maintain
diplomatic pressure on Vietnam, Indonesia and the
Philippines are more inclined to accommodate to
Vietnam's domination of Indochina unless Hanoi were
to press its claims in territorial disputes with Jakarta
and Manila. Singapore and Malaysia are more sym-
pathetic with the Thai view of Vietnam as a threat.
One indicator of changing ASEAN views on Vietnam
is the trend in the nature and magnitude of military
expenditures. In most of the ASEAN countries there
was increased interest in upgrading military capabili-
ties to deal with external threats, rather than insur-
gencies, after the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea
in 1979. If, in the future, most of the ASEAN
countries do not feel directly threatened by Vietnam,
we can expect to see some decline in the levels of
defense expenditures.
Who will occupy Kampuchea's seat in the United
Nations? The seat is currently held by Pol Pot's
deposed Democratic Kampuchean regime only be-
cause the ASEAN countries have been successful in
denying the seat to the Vietnamese-installed Heng
Samrin government. The annual debate on Kampu-
chean credentials has been resolved in favor of the DK
by a 2-to-1 margin for the last two years. However, the
vote is more representative of support for the principle
of nonrecognition of regimes imposed by foreign
invasion, rather than an endorsement of the Pol Pot
regime. While the DK seat was not in immediate
jeopardy, support was beginning to erode as leading
Western countries, such as the United Kingdom,
ceased support for Pol Pot. The formation of a
coalition of resistance leaders including Sihanouk and
Son Sann under the DK name has given new respect-
ability to the DK and probably ensured retention of
 Approved For Release 2007/05/07: CIA-RDP85T00176R001400120001-8
the UN seat for the next five years or so. Should the
coalition split, however, support might erode and
movement toward an "open-seat" formulation would
be likely. The open-seat approach would still keep the
Heng Samrin regime from participating more directly
in UN humanitarian relief and gaining more support
for economic development activities. If the Heng
Samrin regime won control of the UN seat, ASEAN
diplomatic prestige would suffer a serious setback.
How serious a problem does a Vietnamese-dominated
Indochina pose for the United States? Although there
is the potential for dangerous escalation of the conflict
in Indochina which could involve the USSR, China,
and the United States, it seems more likely that the
conflict will remain limited to engagements along the
Thai border and occasional clashes along the Chinese
border. Hanoi is unlikely to risk a deep attack into
Thailand, and direct outside intervention on behalf of
the resistance forces also is unlikely. Nevertheless,
Vietnam's attacks against resistance forces will occa-
sionally spill over into Thailand
Continued Vietnamese domination of Indochina is not
likely to pose serious security problems for the United
States over the next five years. The threat to Thailand
is'low, and China provides a useful balance to Viet-
namese military power in the region. Moreover, the
Vietnamese have reason to doubt how much Soviet
support they would receive for a more aggressive
policy. Indeed, friction has arisen between Hanoi and
Moscow over the amount and uses of Soviet aid, the
administration of Kampuchea and Laos, and other
issues. This friction also is likely to limit the further
growth of Soviet influence in Vietnam. These consid-
erations will tend to check Vietnamese power and
Soviet influence in the region for at least the next five
years.
The more likely problem for the United States is apt
to! be coordinating its Indochina policies with ASEAN
and China if they follow contradictory policies toward
Vietnam. ASEAN-eventually including even Thai-
land-might decide to reach an accommodation with
Vietnam, while China is likely to continue taking a
more confrontational approach toward Hanoi.
Secret
Another development related to Vietnam's domina-
tion of Indochina may be an increase in the movement
of refugees, particularly if economic conditions do not
improve, even though Thailand has discouraged fur-
ther immigration. Most of the refugees flee to Thai-
land, where they often overburden local relief capabil-
ities. Most of the refugees prefer resettlement abroad.
This would cause Thailand to try to prevail on the
United States and other countries to accept larger
numbers of refugees.
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