INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMANT SOUTHERN AFRICA: AT A TURNING POINT?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00176R001400080002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 5, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/07/19: CIA-RDP85T00176R001400080002-2
SECRET 1
5 May 1982
Southern Africa: 4t a Turning Point?
Summary
In light of the stalled Namibian negotiations and what they
have called "South Africa's undeclared war against its neighbors,"
the Frontline States appear to be increasingly skeptical about the
possibility of peaceful solutions to regional security problems.
The Maputo summit in early March pledged to increase Frontline
security cooperation and to expand support for the insurgencies of
the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and the
African National Congress (ANC).
Even while they talk of stepping up the fighting, the
Frontline states are still pursuing negotiations over Namibia, if
only to avoid responsibility for a breakdown in the talks. The
Frontline's attitude towards the Namibian settlement process may
reflect increasing pessimism over the course of negotiations, and
a belief among some Frontline states that the likely terms of a
settlement would be too favorable to Pretoria. In addition, they
are preoccupied with mounting regional and domestic problems, and
they seem to doubt that a settlement of the Namibian question
would contribute significantly to a resolution of their other
security problems.
While they resolved at Maputo to develop greater self-
reliance in combating South Africa, the Africans could not
counteract Pretoria's superior military and economic power without
a dramatic increase in external support. But the Maputo summit
may be a warning to the West that if help is not forthcoming and
Frontline security concerns eased, they will have little recourse
but to increase their reliance on military support from the Soviet
Union and its allies. They know that more Communist support is
unlikely to help them much, but by implying a new willingness to
accept Soviet support, they hope to provoke the West into stronger
Approved For Release 2007/07/19: CIA-RDP85T00176R001400080002-2
efforts to restrain South Africa.
This assessment was prepared under the auspices of the National
Intelligence Officer for Africa by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of
African and Latin American Analysis. The assessment responds to a request
from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Frank Wisner. It was coordinated
informally at the working level with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
of the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and intelligence
representatives of the military services. Research was completed on 29 April
1982.
NIC M 82-10008
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2007/07/19: CIA-RDP85T00176R001400080002-2
SECRET 70
Frontline Policy During the Past Year
Fear of South African reprisals has made the Frontline
States very cautious in their policies towards Pretoria. After
the Zimbabwean settlement, the Frontline States tried to avoid
confrontation with South Africa and concentrated on developing
their economies and reducing their dependence on Pretoria. South
Africa's stranglehold on the region's transportation network,
dominant role in bilateral trade relationships, and overwhelming
military su eriority dictated that Pretoria's neighbors tread
carefully.
The South African raid in January 1981 on ANC facilities
near Maputo left little doubt about Pretoria's willingness to
strike aggressively against what it considered excessive
assistance for anti-South African insurgents. Moreover, the
extent of South African support for insurgencies in neighboring
countries--the National Resistance Movement of Mozambique and the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)--as
well as its military strikes against Angola for its support to
SWAPO, underlined the consequences for any Frontline state of too
much practical support for the anti-apartheid cause.
Most black African governments attributed the collapse of
the Geneva "pre-implementation" conference in January 1981 to
Pretoria's perception that it could get a better deal from the
new US Administration, and the Frontline States initially were
distrustful of US efforts to restart the negotiating momentum for
a Namibian settlement. This distrust was fueled by later reports
that the United States wanted a "comprehensive" settlement that
linked Namibian independence to Angolan accomodation of UNITA and
to withdrawal of Cubans from Angola. The new US Administration's
early efforts to repeal the Clark Amendment were also disquieting
to the Frontline. Frontline suspicion probably reached its
highest point when the US vetoed the UN Security Council
resolution condemning the major South African incursion into
southern Angola in late August.
The Frontline pessimism toward the US-led Contact Group
effort eased later in the year as a consensus on a negotiating
approach emerged from the Contact Group and the South Africans
appeared to be going along. Botswana, Zambia, and Tanzania
enthusiastically supported negotiations and expressed optimism
about the Prospects of success.
Tanzania's suggestion early in January
1982 that the Frontline states approve the Phase I package
without calling a meeting appeared to have broad support.
SWAPO, however, continued to oppose elements of Phase I,
particularly the "one-man, two vote" electoral provision, and the
2
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/07/19: CIA-RDP85T00176R001400080002-2
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2007/07/19: CIA-RDP85T00176R001400080002-2
SECRET _qI
negotiating momentum dissipated. A Frontline meeting of Foreign
Ministers was convened in late January and, after a tour of
Frontline capitals by Nujoma, the Frontline States and SWAPO
refused to accept the electoral provisions of the Phase I
proposals. Despite pressure from the Contact Group, the
Frontline States made little effort during February to. overcome
SWAPO's opposition, and instead asked the Contact Group to go
back to the South Africans and persuade them to accept either a
proportional representation or a single-member constituency
scheme. At the same time, Communist efforts to obstruct
negotiations appeared to have increased: the Soviets offered
SWAPO increased aid if it abandoned negotiations, and a high-
level Cuban delegation touring southern Africa in early February
heavily attacked Western efforts and probably offered some
Frontline states increased military and security assistance.
Frontline concern and preoccupation with serious domestic
problems and with perceived South African "destabilization"
policies appear to have grown markedly in the last year. Several
events contributed to the increased alarm over regional
developments. These included South Africa's continued control of
an area of southcentral Angola, alleged South African involvement
in coup plots in Zambia and the Seychelles, a significant
expansion of South African-backed insurgent activity in
Mozambique, and the sabotage of transportation routes through
Mozambique vital to Zimbabwe. The Frontline States had made
various entreaties to the Contact Group countries, particularly
the United States, to restrain South Africa. Continued South
African assertiveness--felt most intensely by Angola and
Mozambique--added to a growing suspicion that the West was
colluding with South Africa.
The impetus for the Maputo summit stemmed in part from
Tanzanian President Nyerere's visit to Mozambique, where Machel
explained how precarious his position had become. Nyerere
subsequently heard similar complaints from Kaunda, who repeated
allegations that South Africa was trying to subvert his
regime.
The Maputo Summit
Unlike most other Frontline meetings, the Maputo summit did
not primarily address Western initiatives, but instead
concentrated on exploring regional security problems and seeking
ways to respond collectively. The Maputo meeting was significant
not because of any new dramatic departures undertaken by the
Frontline, but because of the expression the meeting gave to a
number of trends already underway.
The Frontline rhetorical attack against South Africa and its
Western supporters was strong but not unusually so. The
Frontline leaders maintained that Pretoria's growing
aggressiveness was aimed at increasing Frontline dependence on
3
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/07/19: CIA-RDP85T00176R001400080002-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/19: CIA-RDP85T00176R001400080002-2
?
0
Pretoria, delaying Namibian independence, and preventing
liberation in South Africa. The Frontline leaders also announced
their intention to increase regional cooperation to counteract
South Africa, and to provide more support for SWAPO and the ANC
to enable them to intensify the armed struggle.
Few concrete actions were taken at Maputo. The Frontline
States agreed to send a defense team to Angola to assess the
security situation and make recommendations.
25X1
The Frontline leaders apparently spent little time
discussing the impasse over Namibian electoral procedures. The
Contact Group's Maputo demarche was dismissed as adding nothing
new and warranting no change in their position. SWAPO, which had
anticipated pressure to accept the proposals, was instead given
responsibility for drafting a response which was predictably
negative. For a variety of reasons--to be discussed below--
Frontline leaders supported SWAPO's desire to step up the
fighting.
Impact of Maputo Decisions
Security Measures Although the Frontline States remain
alarmed about the South African threat, they have not moved
dramatically towards greater regional cooperation or towards
greater reliance on Communist support. Tanzania has followed up
an earlier decision to provide modest military training support
to Mozambique.
defense team plans to visit Angola short y.
The Frontline pledges to increase military cooperation are
unlikely to amount to much. They are strapped financially, and
many face pressing internal security problems which would prevent
them from aiding their neighbors.
25X1
25X1
25X1
The Frontline States' inability on their own to counter
South African aggressiveness may make them more receptive to
longstanding Communist offers of increased assistance 25X1
Most Frontline States, 25X1
however, distrust Soviet motives, and some are dissatisfied with
the quality of Soviet and Cuban military aid and would like to
reduce the role of the Soviet Union and its allies as the primary
military aid suppliers in the area. In the near term, the
Frontline continues to look for non-communist sources of aid--
Mozambique, for instance, recently signed a military cooperation
agreement with Portugal. Moreover, the Frontline States most
likely are skeptical that more Communist support will do much to
deter Pretoria; 20,000-25,000 Cubans and Soviet arms did not stop
South Africa and UNITA from retaining control over a third of
Angola during the past year. 25X1
4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/07/19: CIA-RDP85T00176R001400080002-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/19: CIA-RDP85T00176R001400080002-2
OF- SECRET
Support for Insurgents
Despite Frontline pledges to provide more support for SWAPO
and the ANC, it is unlikely there will be much change in
insurgent activity. SWAPO has stepped up its military activities
in Namibia in an attempt to make good on its promise to the
Frontline to put more pressure on South Africa and bring a sense
of urgency to the negotiations. SWAPO may also believe that this
is its last chance to prove to the Frontline that it is a viable
military force. SWAPO probably will not be able to resume the
level of activity reached before the major South African
operations into Angola began last summer. Once the rainy season
ends, SWAPO activity probably will decline again, regardless of
any increase in Frontline aid.
African reprisals, however, have prevented most Frontline States,
particularly Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Botswana, from stepping up
their support for the ANC.
Namibian Negotiations. Although the new Contact Group
proposal for "one-vote, counted-twice" appears to have dealt with
Frontline objections that the proposed system is too complex,
most Frontline States have demonstrated little desire to press
SWAPO on the basic issue of the combined electoral system,
despite their irritation over Nujoma's failure to appear in
Luanda. Several Frontline States expressed deep resentment over
the Contact Group's refusal to o back to the South Africans on
this issue.
The inability and/or unwillingness of the Frontline States
to force SWAPO's acquiescence on Phase I reflects a variety of
attitudes held by separate states.
-- Angola desperately wants a settlement in order to end
South African incursions into southern Angola and has
been urging its Frontline allies to press SWAPO to
accept. Luanda appears unable to exert much effective
pressure itself because of its heavy dependence on Soviet
and Cuban support and its weak, divided political
leadership.
-- Zambia and Botswana also want a negotiated settlement but
have until recently let Tanzania take the lead. Kaunda's
pessimism over the course of negotiations--as well as his
personal predilection for dramatic moves--led him to call
for direct talks with the South Africans, a move that is
opposed by some Frontline states.
-- Tanzania seems determined to play a low-key role at this
time. Despite strong Contact Group entreaties, Dar es
Salaam has refused to pressure SWAPO even" while
ears o ou
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/07/19: CIA-RDP85T00176R001400080002-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/19: CIA-RDP85T00176R001400080002-2
SECRET
expressing approval of the new Contact Group proposals.
Nyerere may simply be waiting for a more propitious
moment, believing it unwise to expend much effort now
when the prospects for success do not seem very good.
-- Both Zimbabwe and Mozambique seem preoccupied with their
own problems. The Zimbabweans are somewhat sympathetic
to SWAPO, and Mozambique has been following Tanzania's
lead, but neither has paid much attention to Namibia.
At the same time, the Frontline States may now see the
negotiating task as more formidable than previously thought. The
continuing impasse over a seemingly minor Phase I issue most
likely increased their pessimism that the more difficult Phase II
issues can be resolved. Moreover, the Frontline States have been
briefed on the US-Angola talks begun earlier this year and are
now fully aware of the US position that a regional settlement
centered on Namibia must also include movement on related Angolan
issues, namely Cuban withdrawal and accommodation of UNITA. The
Frontline States may believe not only that there is little
prospect for a successful outcome but also that the likely terms
of settlement would be too favorable to Pretoria. This
pessimistic attitude about the future of negotiations has
probably reduced Frontline willingness to expend much effort over
the current impasse.
SWAPO, for its part, seems emboldened since Maputo. It
delivered a stiff reply to the Contact Group's Maputo demarche,
stepped up the fighting in Namibia, threatened to pull out of
negotiations if delays continued, and called (without Frontline
approval) for direct talks with the South Africans. Nujoma
spurned the Contact Group in Luanda--apparently at Soviet
behest--and instead,went to Havana, presumably to plan for the
military struggle.
Implications
The Maputo summit's focus on regional security problems, the
Frontline's attitude towards the Namibian negotiations, and the
Frontline's pledge to respond collectively to South African
actions probably reflect deepening pessimism among the Frontline
States about the prospects for peaceful change and regional
stability and growing disillusionment about the Western role in
the region. While not irreversible and not fully shared by all
Frontline States, a growing consensus along these lines among the
Frontline States could lead to a breakdown in the Namibian talks
and increased regional tensions.
The Frontline States still want a negotiated settlement as
much as ever--witness Kaunda's personal initiative to try to
break the stalemate--but not just any settlement. Their
disillusionment over Namibia, as well as doubts that a Namibian
settlement would encourage more restrained South African behavior
6
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/07/19: CIA-RDP85T00176R001400080002-2
 Approved For Release 2007/07/19: CIA-RDP85TOO176R001400080002-2
SECRET
elsewhere in the region, may cause them to lower their
expectations about Western efforts to promote regional
stability. They recognize, however, that only the West can
significantly reduce regional tensions. They are frustrated
about having nowhere else to turn.
The Frontline States appear..to be groping for ways to
counter South Africa's increasingly aggressive regional policy.
At Maputo, they spoke of a more self-reliant approach, but they
require external assistance in order to have even a remote chance
of success.
Their recent pledges of defense cooperation may be aimed at
demonstrating to the West their seriousness and determination to
combat South Africa. Despite growing apprehension about the
relationship between Pretoria and the West, the Frontline States
undoubtedly would prefer that the West come to their aid by
reining in Pretoria. But the Maputo summit may be a warning to
the West that if help is not forthcoming and Frontline security
concerns eased, they will have little recourse but to increase
their reliance on military support from the Soviet Union and its
allies. They know that more Communist support is unlikely to
help them much, but by implying a new willingness to accept
Soviet support, they hope to provoke the West into action.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/07/19: CIA-RDP85TOO176R001400080002-2