SOVIET NATIONALITIES IN GERMAN WARTIME STRATEGY, 1941-1945

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R-2772-NA
Soviet Nationalities in
German Wartime Strategy,
1941-1945
Alex Alexiev
August 1982
Prepared for the
Director of Net Assessment,
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Rant/
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PREFACE
This report, prepared for the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of De-
fense, addresses the role of Soviet nationalities in German World War II strategy.
Until the Soviet invasion -of Afghanistan in late 1979, the last military engagement
involving substantial numbers of Soviet non-Russian soldiers took place in World War H.
This report. examines the attitudes of German political and military officials toward the
Soviet nationality issue as a potential Soviet strategic vulnerability to be exploited during
that conflict. The author analyzes the failures and the successes of the Germans to case. the
Soviet nationality issue to advance their' military goals by gaining the support of non-Rus-
sian Soviet populations against Soviet forces and by including sizable numbers of Soviet
non-Russian soldiers in German military units'to fight against Soviet forces.
Although hundreds of books have been written on almost every aspect of World War II,
this particular dimension of the deadly conflict' between the two totalitarian states remains
less well explored. In the English-language literature-with the exception of Alexander Dal-
lin's German Rule in Russia, which is still'the best work by far on the subject despite the fact
that- it was written some 25 years ago-there have been few efforts to focus on the nationality
issue as a crucial factor in the war. German scholars "and former participants in the events,
on the other hand, have recently produced a number of important works that provide valu-
able new insights. The present report has used these works extensively along with extant
English-language scholarship and archival materials in an effort to provide a concise and
coherent account of the role of the Soviet nationalities in the war.
This study should be of interest to military and strategic planners who are beginning to
address the Soviet nationality issue in a strategic perspective. When used in combination
with other publications in the series, it offers a more complete understanding of the strengths
and vulnerabilities stemming from multinationalism in Soviet society generally and in the
Soviet armed forces specifically. . '0
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SUMMARY
This study addresses the policies of Nazi Germany toward the Soviet "nationalities during
World War 1I and seeks to examine the effect and implications of the nationality issue in the
armed conflict between the two countries.
Before the German invasion of the ; Soviet Union, the attitudes of the top Nazi leaders
toward the Soviet' nationalities were characterized by a 'mixture `of ignorance and. contempt`
conditioned by Nazi racial 'dogmas. Such attitudes and the imperative of territorial an dizement (Lebensra um) were reflected in Nazr war objectives that aimed at the subjugati on of
the Soviet peoples and their merciless`economic'exploitation-:objectives' that prec'ludedany
meaningful attempt to harness to the German cause` strong' anti-Soviet and nationalist senti-
ments in the Soviet'borderlands.
Despite the generally 'friendly and often ? enthusiastic reception- accorded'-the German
troops in most non-Russian'areas, the Nazi' occupiers initiated occupation policies character-
ized by brutality and contemptuous disregard fo``the `dignity and national aspirations of the'
indigenous populations'
Particularly oppressive were German?occupation policies in the" Ukraine. Following the
dicta of Nazi theorie's' that proclaimed all Slavs`td be' "subhuman" (Untermenschen) Nazi :
officials instituted an occupation'regime in the Ukraine based on'political oppression, forced
labor, and economic plunder that soon alienated the once friendly population. The sane gen-
eral policies, although in a much milder form, were implemented in the Baltic region. The
Baltic states had been forcibly annexed by the Soviet Union only a little more than a year
before the beginning of the war, and the Balts' hopes for the restoration of national sover-
eignty with German help were widespread. Nazi occupation officials, however, had little
understanding or sympathy for the national aspirations of the Balts, and the initial outpour-
ing of Baltic good will was soon replaced by resignati n and resentment.
The sole exception to this typical German occupation conduct was the enlightened poli-
cies pursued by the Germans in the Caucasus. Among the reasons for this atypical approach
were the general Nazi disinterestedness in the region, the fact that the Caucasus remained
under German military rather than civilian administration, and the important role played by
a number of civilian and military officials who were keenly aware of the importance of win-
ning over the indigenous population. German policies that proved particularly popular in-
cluded the granting of significant self-government privileges, implementation of agrarian
reform that reflected popular desires, avoidance of oppressive administrative methods, and
the reintroduction of religious freedom. The peoples of German-occupied territories in the
Caucasus responded with wide-ranging cooperation. The Caucasus example, short-lived and
small scale as it was, was the only conscious effort to apply political warfare methods to a
Soviet nationality area. Its success was a clear indication of the potential of such an approach
in other areas.
In view of the oppressive and often inhuman treatment of the Soviet nationalities, except
in the Caucasus, it is surprising to find that the Germans were able to secure the military
collaboration of huge numbers of Soviet non-Russians. This phenomenon leads us to conclude
that the anti-Sovietism of many non-Russians was of such intensity as to overcome growing
misgivings about and dislike for the Germans.
Two basic forms of military collaboration were observed throughout the war. The first
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one involved the direct incorporation of former Soviet citizens in the Wehrmacht (German
armed forces) as auxiliaries. These auxiliaries were recruited largely on the initiative of
German military commanders without the sanction /or even knowledge of the political au-
thorities. Their numbers are estimated to have been anywhere between 600,000 and 1,400,-
000. Thos would indicate that, for most of the war, as much as 20 percent or more of German
army manpower on the Eastern front was made up of former Soviet citizens. Soviet non-
Russians accounted for more than 50 percent and quite possibly a clear majority of the auxil-
iaries.
The second form of collaboration among the Soviet nationalities in the occupied territo-
ries consisted of units earmarked by the Germans for internal security and antipartisan
functions. Their numbers cannot be estimated with certainty, but we know that indigenous
security formations greatly outnumbered German units in all occupied areas. The most politi-
cally significant form of military collaboration entailed the setting up of national military
units designed primarily for front-line combat. The Baltic nationalities were represented by
three divisions and a large number of smaller units, all of which distinguished themselves. in
combat. Nationals of the Central Asian and Caucasian regions were organized in the so-
called East Legions and together accounted for more than 250,000 volunteers. These.astound-.
ing numbers, and the fact that beginning in 1943 the number of non-Slavs in the Soviet
armed forces decreased greatly, suggest the possibility that some of the Soviet nationalities
may have, been- better represented in the Wehrmacht than in the Red Army. All in all, Soviet
nationalities engaged in military collaboration with.. the. Germans .in truly unprecedented.,
numbers-a fact not generally acknowledged-and provided a major contribution to the Ger-
man war effort.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am indebted to my Rand colleagues Konrad Kellen and Robert Perry and to Colonel
Fred Giessler of the Defense Department for many helpful comments and criticisms of an
earlier draft. Deborah Jensen and Bonnie Swihart provided valuable research assistance with
German archival materials. Helen Barnes struggled valiantly and always cheerfully with my
opaque handwriting and countless umlauts in typing the manuscript. Last, but most, I would
like to thank my friend and former Rand colleague S. Enders Wimbush whose support and
advice are largely responsible for whatever merits this report may have. His friend, ,hip, wit,
and good humor have made this and other projects on which we have worked together a
memorable experience.
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CONTENTS
PREFACE .....................................................................
SUMMARY ....................... ........................................ v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................ vii
Section
1. INTRODUCTION .........................................................
H. GERMAN WAR OBJECTIVES AND SOVIET NATIONALITIES ............ 3
Nazis and Nationalities ................................................ 3
Rosenberg's Views ..................... ....................I......... 6
The Realists .......................................................... 7
M. GERMAN OCCUPATION POLICIES AND THE NATIONALITIES ...........
Administrative and Jurisdictional Divisions .................... ..... .
The Ukraine. ........ .... ....................................
The Baltic States .. .............................. .... ........
9
10
The Caucasus ............... ................................... 20
IV. NATIONALITIES UNDER ARMS ........................................ . 26
The Auxiliaries ....................................................... 27
Indigenous Units ...................................................... .28
National Units ....................................... ............ 28
Baltic National Units .......................................................29
The East Legions ..................................................... 31
V. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................ 34
BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................. 35
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. During the first several months of war. against the Soviet Union, Germany achieved a. ;
series of remarkable military victories. By the end of 1941, it. had occupied 500,000. square
miles of Soviet territory, taken three million prisoners of war, and appeared close' to :final
victory. To explain this unusually successful military campaign, historians have traditionally
pointed to such German strengths as the ability to achieve a surprise attack, German blitz-
krieg tactics, the technical superiority of Wehrmacht (German armed forces) armaments, and
the superior training of the German soldier. Such explanations, although undoubtedly uripoi-
tant, primarily stress factors of a military and technical character and often neglect an equal-
ly or more crucial, albeit political, factor contributing to the calamitous reverses suffered by
the Soviet Union in the initial stages of the war. The Soviets suffered from a political vulner-
ability deriving from the nature of their multinational state, in which peoples of vastly di-
verse 'cultural, political, and' historical traditions were forcefully integrated into a highly
centralized and coercive empire. When strained by war, the artificial bonds tying many of the
subject nations to the empire frayed and broke. In other words, the military debacle that
befell the Red Army in the summer of 1941 was as much the result of disunity, defeatism, and
hostility toward the system among its peoples and soldiers as was the technical superiority
and operational acumen of the enemy. In Solzhenitsyn's apt metaphor, when faced with the
task of defending Stalinism, many Soviet soldiers voted with their feet. It was among the
Soviet non-Russian nationalities that hostility toward the Stalinist regime and the Soviet
cause took particularly virulent and extreme forms. The effect of this hostility, both political
and military, was significant because the war was fought largely on non-Russian territories.
In some of these areas such as the Baltics, the Western Ukraine, and the former Romanian
lands, which had been incorporated into the Soviet Union barely a year and a half before the
war, the invading Germans were often regarded as 4berators and potential allies in a strug-
gle against a common enemy, as the often enthusiastic reception of German troops testified.
The Nazi onslaught thus not only failed to engender the Soviet peoples' unity and will to
resist, but, on the contrary, unleashed powerful centrifugal forces that threatened to under-
mine the Soviet defense effort. The Soviet leadership, when faced with the grim prospect of
open disloyalty by many citizens in and outside the army, took preventive measures.'
It is the purpose of this study to examine the determinants and character of German
policies toward the Soviet non-Russian nationalities and their effects on the Soviet and Ger-
man war efforts and on the nationalities themselves.2 We place particular emphasis on the
analysis of the nature and magnitude of military collaboration with the Germans by the
non-Russian nationalities, in an attempt to examine the military exploitability of the
political warfare opportunities that presented themselves. The report in general is intended
'In late 1941 the Soviet leadership issued top-secret directives acknowledging that most Soviet nationalities have
proved unreliable and warned against using them in large concentrations (General Pyotr Grigorenko to author,
interview, March 12, 1979). For a more detailed discussion, see S. Enders Wimbush and Alex Alexiev, The Ethnic
Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces, The Rand Corporation, R-2787/1, March 1982. See also Susan L. Curran and
Dmitry Ponomareff, Managing the Ethnic Factor in the Russian and Soviet Armed Forces: An Historical Overview,
The Rand Corporation, R-2640/1, July 1982'.
2This report does not deal with German policies toward the ethnic Russians, or with efforts to establish an
anti-Soviet Russian army as the "Vlasov army." This issue has received much attention by World War II historians.
Some of the better-known works on the topic are listed in the Bibliography to this report.
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as a case study of the inherent vulnerabilities, both military and political, of a nonconsensual
multinational state in a period of grave crisis.
Section II of the report outlines the attitudes toward the Soviet nationalities prevalent
among the Nazi leadership and the role envisaged for them in a postwar German-dominated
Europe, and juxtaposes them on the views of German officials who did not share Nazi dogma
and advocated a more pragmatic approach. German policies in the occupied non-Russian
territories and their implications are examined in Section III. Section IV describes the differ-
ent types and degrees of military collaboration with the Germans. The main conclusions of
the study are summarized in Section V.
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II. GERMAN WAR OBJECTIVES AND SOVIET
'
NATIONALITIES
,
The fateful German assault unleashed on the Soviet Union'on June 22, 1941, was soon -
revealed to be a-meticulously well-planned and executed military- campaign which, by early
December, took, the German troops to the outskirts of Moscow. Yet by that time the political
conduct of the war had already severely prejudiced the outcome of the war effort. This para-
doxical, (at first sight) development was the logical'`outcome"of the political 'objectives' ands`
course,of action set for the war'by the''Nazi' leadership==objectives that ipso facto m1rd suc= =
cess doubtful. To'the extent that, the political battle was fought primarily on Soviet non=
Russian territory, 'German failure largely derives,from' the nature of Germany's political'
objectives'toward~the;Soviet'nationalities:=On this issue,?Germax'leaders were divided into'-
two basic schools of thought, which persisted with only minor change until the final stages-of
the war. The firsfand dominant school reflected'the attitudes and intentions of Hitler and the
Nazi leadershi
The war objectives espoused: by'the Nazis faithfully reflected the main postulates of the
national=socialist Weltanschaung. Most relevant among those' were the imperative of ter-
ritorial aggrandizement (Lebensraum) of the German Reich and the racial theories that were
the 'essence' of Nazi ideology.
The war with the Soviet Union, although' often presented for propagandistic purposes as
a struggle between European civilization "and barbarian Bolshevism, was in fact conceived
and conducted as a war of conquest. As such, it was the culmination'-of the Nazis' obsession
with Lebensraum theories, which formulate the core concept'of their ideology. Bemoaning an
alleged unfavorable imbalance between Germany's population and its territory, Hitler be-
lieved that "only an adequately large space on this earth assures a ~ nation freedom of
existence."' The' accomplishment of this overriding political objective of acquiring "land and
soil" for Germany was feasible only at the expense' of Russia'' and her "vassal border
states"-"that giant empire in the East," which Hitler believed to be "ripe for collapse."2 The
actual expansion of German lands expected to result from the war, however, was to come
mostly at the expense of the Soviet non-Russian territories. Although there were few detailed
plans as to the specific areas subject to annexation, the Nazi intentions were unmistakable.
At a minimum, territories considered for incorporation in the Reich included all of the Baltic
lands, Belorussia, the Western Ukraine- (Galicia), and the Crimea.3 At various times, schemes
were hatched to annex all of the Ukraine and parts of the Caucasus, as well as large chunks
of Russia proper. The newly gained territories and populations were to be dealt with
unceremoniously. As Hitler succinctly put it at the beginning of the war: "basically&it is a
'Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, The Riverside Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1943, p. 643.
2Ibid., p. 655.
3See Trial of the Major War Criminals (TMWC) before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 1949,
Document 221 (Bormann protocol of July 16, 1941, conference between Hitler and top German officials on the future
of the occupied Eastern territories), pp. 86-94. (Hereafter cited as the Bormann Protocol.)
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question of cutting the giant cake in such a way that we can first conquer it; second rule it;
and third exploit it."4 What such a program implied for the well-being of the indigenous
populations was clear to the German leadership. A May 1941 study of the potential for and
implications of economic exploitation of territories to be occupied concluded that "if we take
from theqland what we need many millions will undoubtedly starve to death."5
The final stage in Nazi plans for the conquered territories envisaged their complete
Germanization by means of extensive resettlement. This, however, was not to be a traditional
Germanization involving merely the imposition of the German language, culture, and cus-
toms but a radical one that was to ensure that, as Himmler put it, "only people of, pure..
German blood inhabit the East."6 To achieve this objective, the Germans intended.. to, assimilate and Germanize certain populations but expel the overwhelming majority.
According to the most detailed. plan dealing with postwar Lebensraum policies, "Generalplan
Ost," between.46 and 51 million people were earmarked for deportation as "undesirables.'" In
1941, Hitler. insisted on resettlement policies :that would assure the, Germanization of the
Eastern territories in,ten.years with a long-term goal of establishing a Germanic population .
:. .
of 100 million .8
The, espousal of such, radical .policies-.toward the Soviet. peoples, many of .whom had'
remarkable records of cultural achievement and national-political traditions, : can ; best: be
understood in the context of the fanatical racial views held by the Nazi leadership. With very
few exceptions-the Baltic peoples, for example-the Soviet nationalities were deemed by the
Nazis not only to be racially inferior to the Aryans, but of such low racial value as to preclude
the possibility of any meaningful coexistence with the master race. Most'ofthem, and espe- -.
cially the Slavs, were not considered a Staatsaolk,.that is, people capable ,of,political. organiza-
tion , and self government. The . Slavic nationalities,. Ukrainians ? and, Belorussians, ; were.
special targets of Nazi racial abuse. Along with the. Russians, . from whomthey were only
infrequently differentiated,e they were often categorized as Untermenschen, :(sbhuman);
whose sole purpose;wasto serve s:as.the;Germans'..obedient and industrious, servants There
were to be no efforts, to,., improve .their cultural and educational levels or, their materials
well being once their territo~ ieswere annexed., In fact, measures, were to be taken to reetrict
severely the .Slavs' educational: opportunities, food consumption, and birth rates 10
Even lower. than the Slavs onahe Nazi racial.scale were the Soviet nationalities of Asian
,1
origin-1,1, Generally. (ignorant of national, cultural, and ethnic distinctions, the Nazis lumped
Soviet. Orientals togethert,with, others as, "Mongols;" and considered them a threat; albeit a
vague, one, to. Nazi racial, purity and territorial,aspirations. It was the fact that.thef Russian 41bid., p~.. 88..; J
5See Christian Streit, Keine,Kamaraden: Die Wehrmaeht and die, Sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen, 1941 1945,.
ttgart; 1978, p. 63:" , '
Deutsche'Verlags-Anatalt,?Stu
6Das Schwarze Korps,. August: 20;c1942 .citedin Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, i9411 945, London ,.:
1957, p.:279.. -,,. ,; ., ,.. in .,. . . .. .. .,,.::-:. .
THelmut Heiber, Der' Generalplaii Oat Vierteljalirshejte fur Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 6, No. 3, July' 1958, p. 301. A '
detailed treatment of.the' actual 'resettlement and population policies pursued during the war is provided in Robert
Koehl,,RKFDV: German ,Resettlement, and Population Policy, 1939-1945,. . Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
Mass., 1957. -:
8Henry Picker, ' Hitlere'Tischgeschprocheim Fichrers Hauptquartier,Munich, 1968, p. 284. (Hereafter cited as '
Hitlers Tischgesehpr2che.) .,
9Hitler himself often referred to the Ukrainians as "these Russians or so-called Ukrainians."
10There was general agreement among the top Nazi officials that only a four-year elementary school should be
allowed to function in the occupied.territories. Disagreement existed only on the, scope and. content .of instruction.
Hitler, for example, believed that children should be taught only "the meaning of traffic signs, that ,Berlin; is. the
capital of the Reich, and to read and write.a little in German." See. Hitlers.Tischgeschprache, p. 454.,,
1LThese include not only the Soviet Central Asians but also Tatars, Azerbaidzhanis, some North Caucasians, and, ,
others. .
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people had succumbed to this alleged Mongolensturm (Mongol menace), according- to Hitler,
that had led to the degeneration of the race and the victory of Bolshevism. As early as, 1930,
Hitler referred to the Soviet Union"as a'"being with 'a' Slavic-Mongol body" and a Jewish
Bead.."12
Despite these official attitudes, ` specific plans for the treatment of the "Mongols"were not
made-because the Germans did not envisage occupying or colonizing their indigenous territo-
ries in the immediate future. Nonetheless, belief in the racial inferiority of 416'' Soviet Orien-
tals was pervasive and undoubtedly' motivated, the mass executions of'Asiatic-looking Soviet
prisoners of war' that- took place in the first few months 'of the,war.13 `
Among the Caucasian Christianat nationalities, the'Arnians were`'suspected of'being
racially inferior because of their ' alleged' proclivity' for "parasitic` trade practices," said`:to
derive from a 'presumed' lkinship with ` the `Semitic `race'and miscegenation with the Jew8:T4
The Georgians, on the other hand, `were curiously enough*declared to be `Aryans 'and-promised
a dominant position ill the Caucasus` under-German aegis.' 15
The Baltic' nationalities-Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians-were looked 'upon as of
Nordic Aryan stock and, for the- most part',' "Germanizable';'(emdeutsch iiit s hig) , This `did
not mean, however, that-they were considered' equal to'the German Ier envolk (masterrace)
and were to be`spared abuse and discrimination: A' study of the Soviet Union, prepared for the
Wehrmacht High Command before the'German"invasion, provides an` interesting-glimpse` of
prevalent attitudes toward' the` Ba'lts among the Nazi leadership at the time'Although pre-
tending to be a scientific ?study,'it' abounds' in shallow stereotypes ` and` derogatorydepi'ctions
of the Baltic nationalities For - example,' the Estonians aredescribedas a'"generally'dull'and
apathetic people" who do' not ' exhibit much national pride: The'Latvians-`.are'said to possess
few positive character' traitsand to be "suspicious,"cunning and `oppo tinistic." The Lithua-
nians; on-the other hand; are seen as timid, insecure, and of "characteristic 'Eastern subservi-
ence:" Further, they are shown as incapable of-independent initiative and totally lackiin
organizational''talent.16 Such - attitudes ` were` to' find ; a` practical `expression in German
occupation policies later on
In general, the overriding Nazi objective of military-territorial conquest, and political
subjugation of the Soviet peoples and nationalitie'b, strongly conditioned : by-a deterministic
racial theory, precluded any meaningful appreciation of Soviet internal-political vulnerabili-
ties, let alone a conscious effort toward their exploitation. Undoubtedly, Nazi attitudes were
also reinforced by the almost universal belief at the time that the war could be decided by
military means alone and in'a very short time:' The German war effort was thus bereft ad
initio of a crucial political warfare dimension.
120ne of Hitler's most bizarre theories held that until the Bolshevik revolution the overwhelming majority of the
Russian population had consisted of "good-natured blond and racially pure" Russians who were later liquidated or
exiled to Siberia. These were then replaced with Mongols by the Bolshevik government in order to destroy the racial
purity of the Russians and advance the Asians. See Acten zur deutschen Auswartigen Politik, Series D, Vol. XIII,
Document #509. According to another leading Nazi, the Bolshevik revolution succeeded because of the victory of the
"mongoloid elements in the Russian organism over the Nordic ones." See Alfred Rosenberg, Der Zukunftsweg einer
deutschen Aussenpolitik, Munich, 1927, cited in Dallin, German Rule, p.,8.
13See Streit, Keine Kamaraden, p. 50.
14See Patrik von zur Muhlen, Zwischen Hakenkreuz and Sowjetstern, Droste Verlag, Dusseldorf, 1971, p. 51.
'5The preferential treatment of the Georgians is probably also due to the fact that several of them were active as
advisers to leading Nazis. See Dallin, German Rule, pp. 226-231.
lsbee "Sowjet Union: Staatsgebiet and Bevolkerung," Berlin, June 1941, cited in Ortwin Buchbender, Dos T6-
nende Erz, Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart, 1978, pp. 30-32.
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I.- Ostland (includiriggLatvia;'Lithuania, Estonia and Belorussia)
2: "The Ukraine (lil nu?` the: Western Ukraine)'
the establishment of four administrative units called Reichkommtssariate:
9
ROSENBERG'S VIEWS
Perhaps the only notable exception to the dominant Nazi views set forth above is to be
found in the ideas and theories espoused by the noted Nazi ideologue and wartime minister
of the Reich Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories (Ostministerium), Alfred Rosenberg.17
Like other Nazi leaders, Rosenberg subscribed to the basic objectives of the German policy in
the East, as formulated by Hitler. And like Hitler, he believed that it was crucial to German
interests to prevent the reestablishment of a national Russian state after the war. He also
rejected any thought of allowing political sovereignty and self-determination to the
non-Russian nationalities and consistently advocated unequivocal German political
hegemony. Nonetheless, he differed from his ideological brethren in some important respects.
Unlike Hitler, he clearly perceived the ethnic, cultural, and racial heterogeneity of the Soviet
peoples and proposed to exploit it. for .German purposes. For Rosenberg, the main threat to
Nazi schemes of conquest and exploitation came from the Great Russians, and he sought to
neutralize this threat by breaking up the Great Russian state and using the non-Russian
nationalities as ' a cordon sanitaire,, around the ethnic Russian lands.
In the months preceding the attack on the Soviet Union, Rosenberg, who had already
been chosen by, Hitler as the chief .of the future Ostministerium, proceeded promptly to put
his ideas into practice by designing variouio plans for.the political administration of the Soviet
territories to be conquered. The first comprehensive plan to emerge was based on the major
desideratum .of partitioning the Soviet. state .and radially weakening its Russian component.
It envisaged dividing Soviet territory into seven separate units under German control: Great
Russia (Muscovy), Belorussia the Ukraine and, the Crimea, the Baltic states,, the :Don region,
the Caucasus,, and Turkestan 18 The._ essence of this plan was the, formation of ethnically
distinct or. compatible entities,. with the exception of the Don region, that were to be, awarded
territories at Russian expense and treated preferentially. The final prewar blueprint provided
by Rosenberg and,, by. and. large, adopted; as the basis of German occupation policies called for
Muscovy
4-7 Caucasin'
Alone among the leading Nazis,, Rosenberg seems. to have been aware of the political
any practical success'in promotingt lus^ideas. .
significance of a differentiated approach toward. the. nationalities, that is, the :necessity of
winning their allegiance and using their national aspirations to promote German interests.
In the final analysis, because of the ambivalent nature of Rosenberg's attitude, his sycophan-
cy to the Fiihrer, and his ineptitude -inNazi bureaucratic infighting, he-was unable to achieve
47For details on Rosenberg's'career and philosophy, see Dallin, German Rule, passim; and Rosenberg's memoirs,
written in prison after the war and published as Letzte Au/zeichnungen: Ideale and Idole der Nationalsozialistischen
Revolution, Gottingen, 1955.
18Rosenberg's plans are treated at length' in Jurgen Thorwald, Die Illusion, Dromer Knauer Verlag, Zurich, 1974,
pp. 29-37; and Dallin, German Rule, pp. 46-56. His earlier views on the Soviet Union are to be found in Der Mythus
des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts, Munich, 1935; and`Bolschevismus ale Aktion einer lremden Rasse, Munich, 1935.
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The greatest significance of..Rosenberg's unorthodox views within the party hierarchy
may lie in his tolerance of subordinates.in the Ostministeriuni who preached and often prac-
ticed nationality policies radically different from party dogma. These people, together with
other like-minded officials, many of whom were experts on the Soviet Union serving in vari-
ous capacities in military and .civilian institutions, represented a viewpoint that was the
antithesis of prescribed policies.,,What.they all had in common was a conviction that the war
could not be won by military means alone: As a result, they advocated positive political action
designed to win, over the Soviet people in a common struggle against: the communist system.;
The majority of these "realists" were middle-level officials' who, had had' little aiceesssto
decisionmaking circles before the war and yet began playing'an important role once the war
started. This somewhat incongruous development was, in part, the result of the Nazis' inabil-
ity to permeate completely all echelons of government ' with ideologically reliable cadres.
Although the Nazis controlled and dominated all important political institutions and deci-
sionmaking forums, they had been unable to totally co-opt expert middle-level personnel in
many key institutions, including the military. Thus, the Nazi leadership sometimes had to
depend on people who held views contrary to the, policies prescribed to implement its pro-
grams. Not surprisingly, such policies were frequently carried out with less than the requi-
site zeal.
Within the realist school, there were two basic orientations on the nature of required
political action. The first one, espoused bya group of people with pronounced pro-Russian
sentiments, held that the purpose of German political warfare should be to drive a wedge
between the Soviet people and the Stalinist regime. At the same time, these people rejected
the idea of breaking up the Soviet state and cautioned against "antagonizing the potentially
friendly' Russian population by the prospect of partitioning the Russian state."19 They
generally believed that separatist tendencies of the non-Russian nationalities were not
particularly strong and should not be encouraged. Their basic goal was the abolition of the
Bolshevik regime and the establishment of a Free $ussia that would be allied with Germany.
Representatives of this group were particularly prominent in the various intelligence offices
and in military propaganda. Many of them had long records of involvement in Soviet affairs
as diplomats or in other capacities and were staunchly anticommunist. Several would later
play an important role in the anti-Hitler conspiracy.20
Besides the Free Russia advocates, the realist school included a number of officials and
military men who directed their efforts toward forming and implementing a plan of political
action directed specifically at the Soviet non-Russian nationalities. Their approach was char-
acterized by a strong emphasis on the imperative of differentiated-indeed, preferential-
treatment of non-Russians. According to their basic argument, the non-Russian nationalities
were the most staunchly anti-Soviet and thus the most easily mobilizable segment of the
Soviet population. Further, because of their national aspirations, they also represented the
19See OKW (Armed Forces High Command)/WPr, "Weisungen fur die Handhabung der Propaganda im Falle
Barbarosa," June 9, 1941, cited in Dallin, German Rule, p. 57.
20Among the most active members of this group were the former German ambassador to the Soviet Union,
Werner von der Schulenburg; the chief of the organization section of the army, Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg; the
operations officer of Army Group Center, Henning von Tresckow; and a number of younger officers and intelligence
experts such as Heinz Danko Herre and Wilfried Strik-Strikfeldt. Throughout the war, efforts toward a positive
political action were supported and encouraged by the chief of army intelligence on the Eastern front and postwar
architect of the West German intelligence service, Reinhardt Gehlen. Such efforts were also aided on a number of
occasions by the head of German military intelligence, Admiral Canaris.
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most promising future bulwark against Russian expansionism, if given national sovereignty
and treated as German allies. For the most part, people subscribing to this point of view,
many of whom were former academics or diplomats, worked in the Ostministerium.21 Their
influence was felt most strongly in the later stages of the war, especially with respect to
German,policies in the Caucasus and the formation of indigenous military units.
21The key players in this group were Professor Gerhardt von Mende, an expert on Soviet Muslims and Central
Asians who was chief of the section on the Caucasus and Turkestan in the Ostministerium; Otto Brautigam, chief of
the section for general policy in the Ostministerium and a German diplomat with long years of experience in the
Caucasus and the Ukraine; Professor Hans Koch, an intelligence officer and an advocate of Ukrainian nationalism;
and Professor Theodor Oberlainder, who was active as the commander of a large Caucasian volunteer unit and who
gained prominence as the author of several memoranda that were highly critical of Nazi nationality policies. Others
who played an important political role as commanders of volunteer units were Generals Oskar von Niedermeier and
Ernst Kbstring, although they were considered Russophiles.
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III. GERMAN OCCUPATION POLICIES AND THE
NATIONALITIES
ADMINISTRATIVE AND JURISDICTIONAL DIVISIONS
German blitzkrieg tactics and the uninspired. performance of the Red Army in the initial
stages of the' war soon resulted in the loss of huge Soviet territories to the invaders and
provided an opportunity for the German leadership to put into practice its plans regarding
the East. Within days of the German attack, the Wehrmacht had made a deep advai4ce`into-
the Western Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania. By the end of July all of the Baltio?lands
had been occupied, and by late fall the rest of the Ukraine and Belorussia had fallen. The
immediate problem.facing Berlin with respect to the newly occupied territories was dividing
them into-manageable administrative units and clarifying jurisdictional authority over theme
of the various Reich -bureaucracies.
The territorial administrative issue was decided on the basis of an earlier proposal by
Rosenberg, now officially appointed Minister of the Ostministerium:. It proposed the estab
lishment of three administrative units called Reich commissariats.. The Reich commissariat.
Ukraine included all Ukrainian lands except.the Western Ukraine, which was placed. under:
General Gouvernement (Poland) jurisdiction. The second commissariat, called Ostland, incor-
porated the three.Baltic territories and most of Belorussia. The western (Byalistok) region of .
Belorussia was directly attached to Eastern Prussia. The third commissariat was to be estab-
lished in the Caucasus upon occupation. A fourth commissariat, called Muscovy, was planned.
for the .ethnically Russian territories but was never established. Each Reich commissariat
was subdivided into a number of general commissariats..As can be seen, the administrative
division of captured Soviet territories, although entailing a modicum of awareness of the
ethnic factor, was conducted generally in an arbitrary manner, indicative of the lack of well-
thought-out strategy for administering these natio&l areas.
A much more difficult and ultimately troublesome problem was the delineation of juris-
diction and administrative authority over the occupied lands among a number of competing
entities. Although Hitler did give overall administrative authority to Rosenberg's Ostminis-
terium, in reality its power was severely circumscribed by other agencies. Of particular sig-
nificance was the role played by the notorious SS (Schutzstaffel) under Himmler. The SS,
which by 1941 had already become a powerful elite guard within the state, was entrusted
with security functions and liquidation of "undesirable" elements., Throughout the war, the
SS enjoyed complete autonomy from the Ostministerium, and its actions often provoked
serious conflicts with this ministry. Another source of conflict in occupation policies came
from a variety of economic agencies charged with the exploitation of the resources of the
Eastern territories.2 As: in the case of the SS, the economic agencies were independent of
,SS activities with particular relevance to and impact on occupation policies were those of the notorious insatz-
gruppen (action teams) and those of the SS Administration for Racial-Political Affairs. The Einsatzgruppen, who were
part of the SS Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst), were in fact little more than execution squads whose task was to
locate and liquidate "undesirables," that is, Jews, Gypsies, communists, and others. The Racial-Political Administra-
tion, on the other hand, was in charge of determining the racial characteristics of the occupied populations and
conducting racially motivated propaganda campaigns such as the notorious 1942 Untermensch campaign.
2Most important among these were the Four Year Plan under Goring, the Ministries of Economy and Agriculture,
and the so-called Wirtschaftsstab Ost (Economic staff East).
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Rosenberg and pursued their goals without considering the political implications of their
policies. Another important institution competing for authority in the East was the
Wehrmacht. It had full jurisdiction over the territory and population in the combat zone and
was primarily interested in policies that would assure the security of its logistics and rear. It
was, atr the same time, an institution that was less affected than the others with Nazi
ideological militancy-a fact that allowed it to occasionally play a positive political role.
The fragmentation of administrative authority and, at times, conflicting objectives of the
various jurisdictions led to constant bickering, and inconsistent, even contradictory policies.
Yet this seemingly chaotic state of affairs did not result in a lighter occupation burden for the
indigenous population. The absence of centralized authority often meant the opposite.
The Ukraine was without question the. greatest potential prize for Germany in the East.
Its size, strategic location, and economic potential made it the primary target of Nazi Ost-
politik from the beginning of the war. The successful mobilization of Ukrainian human and
economic resources could decisively affec the Germans' military fortunes; conversely, the
failure to do so was bound to prejudice seriously their efforts to subdue the Soviet Union
militarily. As the Wehrmacht troops began pouring into the Ukraine in June 1941, it ap-
peared that successful mobilization would not be difficult to achieve.
The initial contact. between the advancing Wehrmacht units and the Ukrainian popula-
tion was made in Galicia, which, although ethnically Ukrainian, had fallen under Soviet rule
only after. the. dismemberment of Poland in 1939. To the surprise of the Germans, the indige-
nous population received: them as. long-awaited . liberators. In countless towns and villages,
the troops were greeted with bread and salt (a traditional Slav custom of welcoming a cher-
ished guest) and, spontaneous demonstrations : of friendship and good will.: .To most Western
Ukrainians;!. the -German _ invasion meant one-thing--deliverance from the hated .Soviet
regime.- The: reception given the Germans 'in the Eastern'parts,of thec.Ukraine-was far more,:
subdued and did not take on the jubilant character it did in. Galicia. Nonetheless, there is no
question that the overwhelming majority of the Soviet-. Ukrainians looked to-the .Germans
with friendliness and hopeful-expectations,. attitudes,hardly typical toward, foreign- invaders.
Numerous front-line reports by, military commanders and intelligence officers at the time
indicate that over 90 percent of the population exhibited a friendly disposition.3 ,
The reasons. for this seemingly incongruous behavior are not difficult to understand giv-
en the uture. of Soviet rule in the Ukraine.. Although the Soviet regime had exercised control,
over Galicia (a traditional hotbed of Ukrainian nationalism) for' less than two years, it had
managed to completely:: alienate the local population. Immediately upon -annexing Galicia,
following the Nazi-Soviet pact, the Soviet regime embarked on a ruthless campaign designed
to extirpate Ukrainian' nationalist feelings and identity. The repressive measures conducted
by the NKVD (Soviet secret police) were directed especially toward the political elite and the
intelligentsia. Most of the Ukrainian representatives in the various Polish political forums,
as well as the leadership of the several political parties,-were imprisoned and.deported with-
out trial.4 Many prominent educators, businessmen, and clergy suffered the same fate. At the
3See, for example, the intelligence report of the Army Group South, "Stimmung and Lage beim Einmarsch der
deutschen Truppen," October 28, 1941, R6/67, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
4A detailed account'of Soviet repression in the Western Ukraine is given in Eugen Glowinsky? "The Western
Ukrainians," in Nikolai Deker and Andrei Lebed, Genocide in the USSR, The Scarecrow Press, New York, 1958.
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outbreak of war, Soviet authorities proceeded to execute summarily as many of the political
prisoners in local jails as their hasty retreat permitted. Two thousand executed prisoners
were found in the city of Lvov alone .5
'' The roots of discontent in the Eastern parts 'of 'the Ukraine ran, perhaps, even deeper.
These areas had been subjected to an especially brutal form of collectivization, including
mass deportations of Ukrainian kulaks in the early thirties and vicious purges later in the
decade. Again, the Ukrainian intelligentsia, accused of assorted nationalist deviations,
became the prime target of NKVD fury. The magnitude of the physical liquidation of as-
sumed regime opponents in the, Ukraine' is indicated by the mass graves of victims of: the
NKVD discovered later, some of?which'contained' as many as 12,000 bodies9'As in`Galicia
during the Soviet retreat,'many political prisoners were executed, as were `membe'rs of the
technical intelligentsia' and-draft-age youths. In some cities, lists of nationalists ifi "other
politically suspect individuals were compiled and given, to NKVD extermination squads?
The. dismal legacy of Soviet rule in' both parts of the Ukraine had helped prepare a
political climate in which a majority of the population came to. identify its hopes and political'
aspirations with the-invading foreign power. For the Germans, this presented a unique oppor-
tunity, which, if exploited properly, could have resulted in a ;decisive strategic-political pay=-
off..
Yet, within- the, first 'few-'days of the German offensive, it ~ became 'clear that the-:Nazi
leaders were unwilling to seize the opportunities' offered to them: The -first test. of, German
intentions took place in the Western Ukrainian center Lvov. Here, nationalist and anti:,
Soviet, feelings ran so strong that even before the arrival of the' Germans the Ukrainian'
Nationalist- Organization (OUN) had staged a massive revolt that was brutally put down by
the NKVD. Once the, Wehrmacht occupied the city, the Ukrainian nationalists under the
leadership of Bandera, assuming that the Germans would be cooperative, promptly. moved, to
fulfill their political' aspirations by proclaiming the establishment of f-a Ukrainian, stateand
forming a government headed by one of Bandera's lieutenants.8 Although this initial attempt
was designed to give Ukrainian political aspirations a pro-German cast, it was immediately
perceived by Nazi leaders as a challenge to their control. Less than a week after 'the new
government's establishment, it was abolished, acid its leaders, including'Baildera, were
arrested' and thrown into jail.
For the first two months of the war, the occupied Ukrainian territories. were under mili-
tary jurisdiction, and German policies were still somewhat ambiguous. It''was obvious, how-
ever, that positive political action was not intended on any large scale, despite the conducive
circumstances. Several actions of the German political leadership signaled the rejection of a
policy of cultivating the friendship of the indigenous population. The first was the ban of all
Ukrainian political activities following the Lvov affair. More important in its negative im-
plications was the decision to award a large chunk of ethnically Ukrainian territory to the
Romanians and to separate the Western Ukraine from the Reich commissariat Ukraine .9
The Reich's occupation policies in the Ukraine underwent a- major change with the trans-
5lbid., p. 151.
slbid., p. 144.
7A list containing 100,000 names is reported to have been prepared for Kiev alone. Ibid.
8Ukrainian nationalist politics are examined in detail in John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, Libraries
Unlimited, Inc., Littleton, Colo., 1980; and Dallin, German Rule, especially Chap. VI, and passim.
9The area ceded to the Romanians amounted to 10,000 square miles between the Dnyestr and Bug rivers and
came to be known as "Transnistria." Romanian occupation policies were incomparably more humane than those of
the Germans.
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fer of the occupied areas from military to civilian jurisdiction and the appointment of Erich
Koch as the Commissar for the Ukraine. Koch, a fanatical Nazi, was one of the most odious
characters among the Nazi leadership. Even before his appointment he was known for his
hatred of Slavs and his reliance on terror and brutality as preferred. administrative methods.
He was also utterly contemptuous of Rosenberg's ideas of differentiation between the Soviet
nationalities, considering all of them to be equally "subhuman." Indeed, it was because of
Koch's reputation as a ruthless executor of Hitler's directives that he was chosen for the job
despite Rosenberg's vigorous objections.10 Although nominally Koch remained subordinate to
Rosenberg and the Ostministerium, he enjoyed Hitler's confidence throughout the war and
was able to pursue his policies in total disregard of Rosenberg's occasional meek attempts to
initiate a more enlightened course. In short, Koch was perhaps the perfect man to carry out
Nazi plans for the merciless political subjugation and economic plunder of the Ukraine.
The specific policies pursued by the Germans can be divided into two general categories
-those of political administrative and those of economic character. The former were designed
to establish unquestioned German political hegemony, while the latter sought to exploit to
the fullest Ukrainian economic resources and labor. In neither case was much thought given
to the political implications of such actions.
The common denominator, as well as a major determinant of official German attitudes,
was a remarkable degree of racial, cultura' and political intolerance toward the Ukrainian
population. A document containing guidelines for German behavior in the Ukraine prepared
by Koch's administration provides insight into the occupiers' mindset.11 After the obligatory
verbiage about the civilizing prerogative of the "master race" in the, East, the document
asserts that. the character of the indigenous people is "afflicted with feminine traits," which
necessitates "direct control in order to preserve their normal existence." In the absence of
such control, they are said to "suffer the lack of purposeful and organized leadership" in their
economy and _ to, "proceed toward mutual annihilation or to fight "civilized races." On the
other hand, the native population allegedly "considers themselves fortunate to be dominated
by another. power,... the more so the greater their dependency. on the ruling power."" A
necessary; prerequisite for. effective German control is said to be a "hard and uncompromising
treatment under. constant threat and use of punishment and reprisals, even when. no direct
provocation for such exists." In the interest of effecting greater obedience and intimidation,
the guidelines suggest that the population be allowed "neither affluence nor satiety" and sees
"possibilities to curtail. drastically its? material and other needs."
The German political administration, of the Ukraine was characterized by its steadfast
refusal to allow any indigenous,, participation in.the administrative system except at the
lowest. (community) level, despite widespread Ukrainian willingness to cooperate with the
Germans: ,All administrative positions were filled with Reich Germans, which meant that a
large army of bureaucrats, some 200,000 in all, had to be mobilized for the purpose.13 Most of
these . people were totally ignorant of . local circumstances and traditions and incapable or
unwilling to consider the ramifications of their policies. The refusal. of the occupying
authorities to permit even a semblance of self-administration and indigenous participation
eventually became one of the most serious grievances against them, because this stance
10On Rosenberg's misgivings about Koch and Hitler's arguments in his favor, see Bormann Protocol, pp. 90-91.
"See "Richtlinien fur die der Ukraine gegenuber zu verfolgende Politik," November 20, 1941, R6/165, Bundesar-
chiv, Koblenz.
17The only exception was to be made for certain trusted indigenous advisers. Ibid.
13See Theodor Oberlander, "Biindnis oder Ausbeutung," June 22, 1943, R6/70, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
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served to convince many people that the Germans regarded them simply as colonial
subjects.14
Considerable effort was also expended to suppress Ukrainian political activity,, which the
Germans feared might undermine their supremacy. Despite the early ban on political activi-
ties, Ukrainian nationalists organized into two major factions, quickly established political
networks, and gained influence throughout the Ukraine, especially in the cities. Their suc-
cesses were largely due to the tolerance of the military authorities toward the nationalists
and, in many instances, their open cooperation with them. Once the military administration
was replaced by the Koch administration, however, the nationalists were subjected to brutal
suppression by the SS Einsatzgruppen. Although the nationalists were never completely sub-
dued, their activities were severely curtailed and, forced underground.ls.
The occupation authorities scrupulously avoided any discussions and promises'regarding
the political future of the country. Administration officials were authorized only to explain to
the Ukrainians that the damage inflicted on the Ukraine by 20 years of Bolshevism would
require long-term German presence to repair and that-the final disposition of their country
would depend on the behavior of the Ukrainians themselves.16
German policies regarding education and religion in the Ukraine also had far-reaching
consequences on the attitudes of the local population toward-its new masters. The views of
the top Nazis on the subject of education in the occupied Slavic territories were uncompromis-
ing and clear-cut from the beginning. Any schooling for' Ukrainians beyond the ' most ,rudi-
mentary reading and writing skills was considered superfluous and potentially detrimental
to German interests. An educated person, by definition, :was seen as inevitably opposed to
German rule. "To teach the Russians, Ukrainians and Kirghizs to read and write," Hitler
argued, "will eventually be-to our disadvantage; education will give the more intelligent
among them an opportunity to study history, to acquire a historical sense, and hence to
develop political ideas which cannot but be harmful to our interests."17 Such attitudes'were
duly reflected in educational policies that limited education to four years- of elementary
school and, in effect, abolished the school system beyond that. In some cases even four years
appeared to the. Nazis as excessive and was not always permitted. Exceptions to this general
rule occurred only in some areas under militar' jurisdiction in which local commanders
allowed schools to function to the seventh grade.18 Secondary and university education, with
few exceptions, also came to a standstill for the duration of the occupation, resulting in the
dismissal of huge numbers of disillusioned and embittered youth. German educational
policies had a traumatic effect on the Ukrainian population, because in the years since the
revolution the Soviets had established the principle of universal education-however
Sovietized-and the Ukrainians had come to regard education as a basic right.
One of the few areas in which German policies on the whole engendered positive feelings
was religion. Despite years of resolute struggle against the church, the Soviet regime had not
been able to eradicate the religiosity of the Ukrainian people and religious belief had
remained strong, especially in the rural areas. Because of the Soviet record of militant athe-
ism, the Germans were given a unique opportunity to win the sympathies of a large segment
of the population through an enlightened approach. Yet, as in many other cases, Nazi ideolog-
14See, for example, an appeal to Hitler written by prominent Ukrainian leaders, January 14, 1942, R6/165,
Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
15For a detailed account of Ukrainian nationalist activities, see Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, especially
Chaps. IV, V, and VI.
16See "Anweisung an der Reichskommissar des Reichskommissariats Ukraine," November 11, 1941, R6/67, Bun-
desarchiv, Koblenz.
17Hitler's Table Talk, p. 224, cited in Dallin, German Rule, p. 459.
18Dallin, German Rule, p. 461.
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ical apprehensions prevented the crystallization of an effective policy. There were important
people among the Nazi hierarchy who simply did not believe in the political significance of
the religious issue. Their attitudes toward the church were conditioned by the violently anti-
Christian character of national-socialism.19 Others were opposed to freedom of religion in the
occupied'territories because they were afraid that the church might become the catalyst of a
nationalist revival and a potential anti-German movement. This threat was viewed by Hitler
as sufficient cause to repress a unified national church and to encourage religious
fragmentation.20 Another reason why religious tolerance in the East could not be advocated
openly was the realization that such a course might stimulate criticism of Nazi anticlerical
attitudes in the Reich.
Nonetheless, the idea of using the religious issue for political purposes was not system-
atically opposed, and tacit approval was given to efforts to generate pro-German sentiment by
reopening the churches. The revival of religious life in the Ukraine had begun in a spontane-
ous manner under the German military. administration, which not only had tolerated but in
many cases openly supported the reestablishment, of religion. Whenever the Germans exer-
cised toleration and respect for the spiritual needs of the local population, considerable good
will toward them was invariably forthcoming. Pro-German feelings were especially pro-
nounced among segments of the clergy :who had severely suffered under the Soviet. regime.
The Germans, however, remained suspiciols of the nationalistic leanings of the clergy, and
instead of harnessing this reservoir of good will. they consistently attempted to neutralize the
influence of the -churches 21 The result was that a potentially formidable propaganda weapon
against their, atheist Soviet adversaries; was lost.
Nowhere did a correct policy offer greater promise, nor failure assure deeper alienation of
the Ukrainian; population than in the case of the agrarian question. If there was one issue
that had won the lasting enmity of the predominantly rural Ukrainians toward the Soviet
regime, it was the expropriation of their. land and the establishment of collectivized agricul-
ture. More than ten years after the brutal collectivization campaign,. the Ukrainian peas-
antry, in its overwhelming majority; remained bitterly resentful of collective agriculture. For
many of them, the arrival of the. Germans kindled; hopes, for.an-early termination of the hated
system and a return to traditional property ownership.22
Many Germans were also well aware of these attitudes . and.their-political exploitability.
Plans that focused on the agrarian problem as'a key opportunity and.recommended the disso-
lution of the kolkhozes (collective farms) ;and land: reprivatization as. the sine qua non of a
successful.- policy were drafted even before the invasion 23 These and _ similar. plans .by
.19Hitler himself stated that the advent of. Christianity represented the "heaviest blow; to humanity," and he
considered Bolshevism as "Christianity's illegitimate child." See Hitlers Tischgeschpr'che, p. 348.
In one of his typical tirades on the subject, Hitler'insisted that German interests would be best served if "every
village had its own' sect which developed its own image of God." Ibid., p. 348.
21Typical of the ambivalent attitudes of the occupying authorities toward the Ukrainian church is the case of a
synod planned for December, 1942. The Wehrmacht authorities gave' permission for the convening of a joint synod of
bishops from both major Ukrainian orthodox churches in Kharkov. One of the purposes of the,synod was to issue a
declaration of .loyalty and appeal to Ukrainian believers to cooperate with the Germans. The meeting, however,
never took place because the bishops from the Reich commissariat were denied permission to travel to Kharkov. See
Monatsbericht, December 1-31, 1942, by the Chief of the General Staff for Army Group B, January 9, 1943.
The extent of dislike for the collective system is indicated by the fact that in many areas the peasants spontane-
ously proceeded to dissolve the collective farms 'and divide'the'land amongst themselves immediately upon the
retreat of the Soviet Army and before the arrival of the Germans. See, for example, G. H. Ziehm, Abschrift aus den
Bericht, "Getreidewirtschaft in der Ukraine" (no date given), R6/67, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
23See Otto Brautigam, "Aufzeichnung," October 25, 1942, in:TMWC, Document 294-PS, p. 335. German intelli-
gence had prepared a plan envisaging the dissolution of the kolkhozes as early as May 1941 (Dallin, German Rule,
p. 324, and author's interview with Professor Theodor Oberlander, May 26, 1980).
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politically astute German officials were soon to run afoul of declared Nazi objectives, which
could be summed up in one word-exploitation. At least until the end of the war, without
regard for indigenous needs, Ukrainian agriculture was to serve' as the exclusive source of
food for the Wehrmacht and was also expected to'provide significant quantities of "surplus"
foodstuffs for the German civilian population. The overriding objective of securing sufficient
deliveries of agrarian products to satisfy German needs, coupled with callous disregard for
the aspirations of the Ukrainian peasant, resulted in policies that made the needed agrarian
reform impossible.24 Nazi leaders from. both the political and economic administrative
branches feared that doing away with the kolkhoz would, result in major disruptions of
Ukrainian agriculture and have a negative effect on-agricultural output. Under the influence
of Nazi Untermensch philosophy, many leaders also believed that the Ukrainian peasant was
not capable of running a private farm, while `others," such as Koch and his minion9feared
that independent peasants would be more difficult to control.
Although the Nazi hierarchy and occupation authorities were firmly opposed to land
reprivatization, they were undoubtedly aware of the potential for political payoffs for even
minor` concessions. Several efforts were made to exploit the- anticollectivist feelings of the
population with initiatives designed to create the impr'e'ssioril'the Germans were willing to
meet popular expectations but without really upsetting the status quo. The' most important
concession was the so-called agrarian order (Agrarerlass) of. February 1942. Promulgated
with"great fanfare and accompanied by 'a massive propaganda campaign, the Agrarerlasswas
trumpeted as decisive proof of German determination to abolish the kolkhozes at some point
in ''6e future.25 In fact, the order brought little change, and most of the despised kolkhoz
practices were preserved.26 The proposed reforms had a minimal effect, probably because they
were introduced only gingerly and in some cases were openly sabotaged by the 'officials' of the
Reichcommissariat.27 Still, in many areas of the Agrarerlass, German propaganda promising
concessions elicited, 'atzleast initially, a positive reaction. In the few places where, through
the initiative of local German officials or military commanders, more radical solutions to the
agrarian question were attempted, results exceeded expectations. Whenever a. lenient
approach and understanding were shown toward the peasants, they invariably responded
with higher productivity, increased output, and conscientious fulfillment of delivery quotas,
despite serious shortages of manpower and equipment 28
The good will generated by the agricultural order was soon dissipated as the rural popu-
lation realized that the Germans had no intention of carrying out propaganda promises and
as the exigencies of war forced the Nazis to implement ever more exploitative policies and
24German policies in the agricultural area are dealt with at great length in Dallin, German Rule, Chaps. XVI and
XVII. See also Karl Brandt et al., Management of Agriculture and Food in the German-Occupied and Other Areas of
Fortress Europe, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1953.
250n the propaganda surrounding the Agrarerlass, see Buchbender, Das Tonende Erz, pp. 133-138.
26The Agrarerlass envisaged reform in three stages. In the first stage, the kolkhozes were to be renamed "commu-
nal enterprises" (Gemeinwirtschaften). The only difference with the collective farm was the possibility of acquiring
slightly larger household plots freed of taxation. In the second stage, the communal enterprises were to be trans-
formed into "agricultural associations" (Landbaugenossenschaften) in which peasants were assigned specific strips of
land, but work was still to be performed jointly. The third and final phase was transition to private farming.
27By May 1943 only slightly over 10 percent of the "communal enterprises" had been transformed into 'agricul-
tural associations." Except in a few isolated areas, organized transfer of kolkhoz land to private farming was not
implemented during the years of German occupation.
28There were cases where, despite the drastic conditions and shortages, yields exceeded prewar kolkhoz levels
(Dallin, German Rule, p. 350). This was particularly true in areas where the kolkhoz system was abolished outright
as, for example, in the settlements of the Kuban Cossacks. There were also significant increases in yields achieved
through the transition from "commune" to cooperative. Average yield per hectare in 1942 in the communes was 680
kilograms but went up to 850 kilograms in 1943 in the cooperatives. Dallin, German Rule, p. 367.
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harsher treatment. As German demands for food supplies increased, delivery norms often
acquired a confiscatory character. As a rule, at least 80 percent of agricultural produce was
to be turned over to the authorities. In practice, requisitions, especially of livestock, often
approached 100 percent. Such policies soon disillusioned the peasants, and subsequent at-
tempts to mobilize the kolkhozniks with partial reforms and promises fell on deaf ears.29
The German agricultural policies also affected the Ukrainian urban population. The
initial Nazi solution to the problem of how to feed these people was as simple as it was
radical: No provisions were made to provide food for city dwellers. Faced with hunger, Nazi
zealots theorized, the urban people would find a way, through barter or by other means, to
induce the peasants to part with food hidden from German requisitioners. Catastrophic eco-
nomic. conditions soon resulted in many Ukrainian towns.30 Food prices often increased
tenfold from Soviet levels, while wages remained the same 31 Food rations as established by
the occupation administration were totally inadequate, and outbreaks of famine occurred
sporadically. A drastic deterioration in the Ukrainians' attitude toward German rule was
inevitable.
Although the Germans' handling of the agricultural issue, especially their failure to
mobilize a large reservoir of potential supporters and sympathizers, was probably their single
greatest mistake, the policy that most directly alienated the Ukrainians was the practice of
forced labor. The serious depletion of the Berman labor force had raised the question of using
foreign labor (Ostarbeiter) in German industry very early in the war. Originally, labor re-
cruitment in the Ukraine was planned as a voluntary program and appears even to have
enjoyed some support among the population 32 German recruitment methods, however, soon
eschewed ' the principle of voluntariness, and brutal force and intimidation were widely
applied to satisfy the ever-increasing demand for Ostarbeiter. Particularly repugnant were
the methods used, by the infamous SS Einsatzgruppen who staged veritable manhunts,
arresting whole church congregations and burning villages in retaliation for peasant refusal
to volunteer. Once recruited, the Ukrainian Ostarbeiter were treated more like POWs than
"volunteer" workers, in accordance, with the Nazi Untermenseh philosophy. Most were
transported to Germany in cattle cars with little food and no provision for hygiene.. On arrival
in the Reich, the Ostarbeiter were forbidden any social contact with the German population
and were barred from entering public places such as theaters and restaurants. The
magnitude of the forced labor program was, such that the. true intentions of: the Germans
became clear to most Ukrainians within a short time after its beginning.33 This policy
contributed more than any other to the growth of the Ukrainian partisan movement.
German occupation policies in the Ukraine represent the best example of German politi-
cal failure in the East. The Nazi leaders whose short-term goals were limited to maximum
economic exploitation of the country opted for coercion and brutal repression as the preferred
methods toward these goals. In view of the imperatives of Nazi ideology, perhaps it was naive
For example, a decree of. May 1943 that made land tilled individually by peasants their private property failed
to elicit any positive reaction.
SOAs early as January 1942, German situation reports described the economic condition of the Ukrainian popula-
tion as "many times worse than in the Bolshevik period" and the situation in the cities and larger communities as
"catastrophic." See "Wehrmachtpropaganda-Lagebericht fir die Zeit," 1.1-1.2, 1942, cited in Buchbender, Das To-
nende Erz, p. 268.
31Lagebericht der Oberfeldkommandantur, Donez, December 20, 1942, R6/65, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
32See Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, pp. 122-124; and Dallin, German Rule, Chap. XX.
33According to Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, pp. 124-125, within the first ten months of German occupa-
tion, 10 percent of the Kiev population had been deported to Germany. By August 1943, one out of every 40 Ukraini-
ans had become a forced laborer, and the total number of Ukrainian Ostarbeiter toward the end of the war amounted
to a staggering million and a half.
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to expect any other course. The outcome of such treatment was predictable. The initial good
will of the population turned into resentment and the willingness for cooperation into open
hostility, or, at best, indifference. The alienation of the indigenous population led to several
negative consequences. The mistreatment of the peasantry and the stifling of private initia-
tive seriously hampered agricultural production and resulted in mediocre yields. In no case
did agricultural production in the Ukraine as a whole come close to prewar levels.. Thus, Nazi
hopes of feeding both the Wehrmacht and German civilians with Ukrainian produce
remained illusory. As German abuses became more widespread and well known, the opportu-
nities for practical collaboration with. the occupation force by native auxiliaries and local
militia waned. The partisan movement, both pro-Soviet and nationalist, intensified and, from
the summer of 1943, exerted a major disruptive influence on the war effort and
administration 34 A less obvious but no less significant consequence of German, occupation
policies in the Ukraine and elsewhere. was the measurable stiffening of the :Red Army's
combat morale as German abuses were cleverly exploited by Soviet propaganda. To many,
civilians and soldiers alike, the alternative to Bolshevism, exemplified by Nazi policies,
began to look less and less attractive. The implications were clear. As a former. Soviet official
captured by the Germans has put it succinctly: "We have badly mistreated our people; in fact
so bad that it was almost impossible. to treat them worse. You Germans have managed to do
that. In the long term.the people will choose between two tyrants the one who speaks their
own language. Therefore, we will win,the war....."36 .
THE BALTIC STATES
As in the case of the Ukraine, the territory of the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and
Estonia) fell under German sway early in the war and remained under occupation for, more
than three years. These states were incorporated, together with Belorussia, in the Reichkom-
missariat Ostland (RKO) and turned over to civilian administration as early as September 1,
1941.36
Apart from length of occupation, the Baltig area had very little in common with the
Ukraine. It was, first and foremost, 'a region inhabited by a non-Slavic population considered
"Germanizable" and thus exempted from the racial abuse of the Untermensch.doctrine. The
Baltic. lands were scheduled to become a full-fledged province of the Reich, and because of
their more limited resources they were subjected to less economic exploitation. Moreover,
local circumstances created conditions highly conducive to an atmosphere of collaboration
and support for the invaders.
The forced incorporation of the three republics into the Soviet Union following the Nazi-
Soviet Pact of August 1939 took place only a year and a half before the war. This short period
of Soviet rule prevented the Soviet regime from thoroughly transforming Baltic society. How-
ever, Soviet policies, albeit of short duration, had created an almost universal hostility
toward the regime. Upon annexation, Soviet authorities began to eliminate the social strata
34For an excellent account of the Soviet partisan movement, see John A. Armstrong (ed.), Soviet Partisans in
World War II, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1964. Also, Armstrong's Ukrainian Nationalisip (Chap. VI)
contains a good discussion of the formation and development of Soviet and nationalist partisan movements in the
Ukraine.
3'Theodor OberlAnder, Bundnis oder Ausbeutung, June 22, 1943, p. 130, R6/70, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
36For reasons of space, we will not discuss German occupation policies in Belorussia here. It should be noted,
however, that German rule there was more similar to that in the Ukraine than that in the Baltic states. For details,
see Dallin, German Rule, Chap. XI.
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that were considered potentially inimical to the new rule. Large numbers of the intelligentsia
and military and political elites were imprisoned or deported.37 Other Soviet measures that
provoked widespread discontent, such as the nationalization of industry and commerce, which
involved large-scale expropriation of private property, were largely completed by 1941. The
Soviets initiated a collectivization campaign in the countryside, but it had failed to affect the
majority of Baltic peasants at the time of the Germans' arrival.38 An eloquent testimony of
the extent of the Baits' disaffection with the Soviet regime was the spontaneous anti-Soviet
uprisings that broke out throughout the Baltic region in the first few days of the war.39 Most
Baits were convinced that the arrival of the Germans signaled the restoration of their
national independence.
German plans for the Reichkommissariat Ostland, as already mentioned, did envisage a
more lenient treatment of Baltic nationalities. But that did not, by any means, involve treat-
ing the Baits as equals, or acknowledging their political aspirations. Although considered
racially superior to the Slavs, the Balts were deemed as potentially worthwhile citizens of the
Reich but only after having undergone intensive Germanization.
Nazi attitudes toward the three nations differed. Estonians were universally considered
the most Aryan and Germanizable. The Latvians were seen as imbued with Russian elements
and thus less suitable for Germanization.40 Least desirable from the racial point of view were
the Lithuanians, as they were suspected of springing from a strong Russian and Jewish
admixture. To get rid of the undesirable elements, the Germans planned the deportation or
outright liquidation of substantial parts of the native intelligentsia of all three nations.41
Germanization was to lead, in the final analysis, to the eradication of the Balts' national
identity and the disappearance of their ancient nations. No consideration was tobe given to
the Baits' desire to restore their national sovereignty and to reestablish the three Baltic
states. Indeed, any nationalistic tendencies and activities ' of the Baltic population were
deemed inherently anti-German and were to be suppressed.
From the beginning, German occupation policies reflected these plans. The military com-
manders, who administered the Baltic'lands for the first few months, immediately upon the
arrival of the German troops initiated measures that dampened the pro-German enthusiasm
of the native population. Most~consequential was the order to disband indigenous self-defense
units, formed during the anti-Soviet uprisings; and to confiscate their weapons: The tens of
thousands ofBaltic patriots who had taken up arms against the Soviet regime and hoped to
be recognized as loyal German allies 'and co-belligerents were bitterly disappointed. On the
other hand, Wehrmacht authorities allowed and even encouraged the establishment of in-
digenous self-government councils. The principle of local self-government was thus recog-
37During the year-long prewar occupation of the Baltic area, the victims of the Soviet regime, killed or deported,
have been estimated to number 59,700 Estonians, 34,250 Latvians, and 30,500 Lithuanians, including many women
and children. In a single night, on June 13/14, 1941, 48,000 of the Baltic elite were deported to Siberia. Most of those
deported during that year, as well as in subsequent postwar deportations, perished, and less than 20 percent
eventually returned to their homelands after the death of Stalin.
For example, in Estonia 110,000 of the country's 171,000 farms had remained in private hands. See "Monats-
bericht des Kommandierenden Generals der Sicherungstruppen and Befehlshaber im Heeresgebiet Nord," August
15, 1942.
39In Lithuania a large-scale organized uprising took place' June 23_1941-the second. day of the war. Some
100,000 Lithuanian patriots rose up against the Soviets and in bitter fighting drove the Red Army out of the country
at the cost of 5000 casualties before the Wehrmacht arrived. A spontaneous armed rebellion broke out also in Latvia
on July 1, 1941, as German units approached the country. For details on the Lithuanian uprising, see Algirdas
Martin Budreckis, The Lithuanian National Revolt of 1941, Boston, 1968; see also Joseph Pajanjis.lavis, Soviet
Genocide in Lithuania, Maryland Books, New York, 1980.
4OHitler himself was in the habit of referring to the Latvians as 'Bolsheviks."
41See Helmut Heiber, "Der Generalplan Oat," for the Germanization plans for the Baltic area.
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nized for the Baltic area in stark contrast with the policy in the Ukraine and in other Slavic
areas. Eventually, these native administrative bodies were organized at all levels, including
an indigenous government that acted in an "advisory" role to German occupation authorities.
The actual influence of the native representatives on decisionmaking was very limited, but
they -did make their opinions known, even when they were critical of German policies. In
most cases, their positions reflected the national interests of their people; they were hardly
the sycophantic quislings portrayed in Soviet historiography of the period.
The Germans' more liberal attitudes toward the Balts and their recognition of the need
for political concessions to and cooperation with the local population resulted in a more re-
laxed occupation. For instance, the Balts were exempted from the order closing down schools
beyond the fourth grade; the educational system was permitted to function in a more or less
normal manner. Various cultural institutions such as theaters, museums, and' libraries
remained open, although censorship was introduced. The most repugnant methods of labor
recruitment and economic plunder were seldom used.
Still, these political measures could not prevent the steady deterioration of the peoples'
attitude toward the authorities. Apart from the basic Nazi inability to exploit the intense
nationalism - and"independent ' political aspirations of the Balts, a number of `policies , were
particularly objectionable to the population.
A primary reason for the Balts' growing dissatisfaction was the Geririaii failure to return
property expropriated by the Soviets to its rightful owners. The nationalization of manufac=
ture "and commerce, including small business, had caused a strong anti-Soviet backlash, and
it was widely expected that the Germans would reverse nationalization and reinstate private
ownership. Instead, as one astute German observer put it, "to the boundless surprise of the
population the German administration of Ostland preferred to play the part of receiver of
goods stolen by the Bolsheviks."42 The reasons for German unwillingness to reprivatize the
Baltic economy were twofold. First, there was determined opposition by the.Nazi commissar
of RKO, Lohse, a dedicated Nazi with pronounced statist proclivities, who believed that any
decentralization of economic authority would, diminish German rule and his own power. A
second and, much more utilitarian motivation was exploitation. Many of the nationalized
businesses were transformed into German-run companies (Ostlandgesellschaften) with profits
going to the Germans rather than to their legal owners.43 The Baltic area. also attracted
innumerable companies and entrepreneurs from the Reich who attempted to get an economic
foothold in the area and devised various get-rich-quick schemes at the expense of the. native
population.
As the war dragged on and the Germans' military-political and economic positions deteri-
orated, their occupation policies in the Baltics became harsher. Economic conditions grew
progressively worse and began to affect popular attitudes. This was especially true among the
urban population who were forced to cope with serious food shortages and inadequate food
rations, which in some cases were said to be below those of the POWs 44 Increased
recruitment for labor service in Germany, including many women, further intensified
discontent, as induction was often less than totally voluntary.
42Otto Brautigam, "Aufzeichnung," October 25, 1942, in TMWC, Document 294-PS. t,
43As the war progressed, the continuous resentment created by the reprivatization issue forced the Germans to
compromise. A directive reinstituting private property in RKO was passed in February 1943. Its practical effect was
minimal, however, and very few properties were returned to their owners outright. For example, in July 1943 the
Latvian self-government complained to the German administration that the "Bolshevik laws on the nationalization
of property continue to have validity in Latvia." See Protokoll der Sitzung der Lettischen Selbstuerwaltung and der
Fiihrung des Generalkommissariats, August 29, 1943, R6/67, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
44See Allgemeine Lage and Stimmung in Estland (no date given), R6/67, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
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The agrarian stratum of the population was also subjected to harsher treatment. Failure
to fulfill foodstuff delivery quotas frequently led to repressive measures such as used in the
Ukraine. After 1943 the German authorities relied increasingly on intimidation, deporta-
tions, internment in concentration camps, and even executions to accomplish their requisi-
tion goa1o.45 These policies, of course, only served to heighten the distrust of the peasants and
caused widespread resentment among the general population.46
The Balts' progressive alienation from the Germans and their diminishing confidence
that aGerman military victory was in the national interests of their countries were reflected
in their less than enthusiastic response to various call-up efforts in 1943 and later.47 The
unsatisfactory results of the call-ups, especially in Lithuania, generated another wave of
repressive tactics.48 The Nazi administration singled out the intelligentsia as a scapegoat
because of its alleged nationalist and anti-German attitudes and subjected it to severe
reprisals. In many districts in which the call-up turnout had been particularly low, the
leading members of the intelligentsia were arrested and sent to concentration camps.49
Further measures included the closing down of the universities and massive manhunts for
the truant draftees.
The general deterioration of relations between the occupation authorities and the popula-
tion had progressed to the point where by late 1943 nationalist anti-German resistance
groups began operating in parts of the Baltics. The large reservoir of good will for the Ger-
mans, which was present at their arrival, had finally run dry. "The present German civil
administration," a pro-German Lithuanian nationalist remarked in early 1944, "is in such
contradiction with the Lithuanian people, that any useful cooperation between the two is
impossible."50 -
In many ways the Caucasus was unique among the Soviet regions to fall under German
rule. The territories that were actually occupied, primarily in the North Caucasus, were
characterized by an unusually rich mosaic of ethnic, cultural, and religious groups that had
lived in close proximity to one another for centuries while preserving their distinctiveness.51
It was also an area that, while rich in history and cultural traditions, had gained a deserved
reputation as politically volatile and a hotbed of anti-Soviet ferment.
45For a discussion of these policies and their effect, see the report by the Security Service/SD, Litauische Stimen
zur allgemeinen Lage and Stimmung in der Litauischen Beuolkerung, Bericht #53, May 8, 1944, R6/68, Bundesar-
chiv, Koblenz.
46In one notable case that caused immeasurable damage to the German cause, the Gauleiter of the Lithuanian
district of Vilnius called 200 village elders to a meeting to reprimand them for failing to fulfill their delivery quotas.
Following his speech, he ordered his SS henchmen to execute every fifth elder as a warning to the rest. See Presse
Information, #65/43, April 2, 1943, R6/167, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
47For details on the Baltic participation in the German war effort, see the next section.
"For details on the call-up in Lithuania, including a remarkably frank assessment of the reasons for the negative,
response, see "Ubersicht Aber den Verlauf der Musterungsaktion in Litauen," May 9, 1943, R6/162, Bundesarchiv,
Koblenz.
49"Fernschreiben an der Reichministerost, " May 3, 1943, R6/68, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
bOColonel Kazys Skirpa, Denkschrift user die Moglichkeit die Bereitschaft t des Litauischen Volkes fir den Krieg-
seinsatz zu steigern, February 5, 1944, R6/68, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
51The Caucasus is made up of two large geographic regions: the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia. Trans-
caucasia consists of the three republics Azerbaidzhan, Armenia, and Georgia. The North Caucasus, the, only part to
be occupied by the Germans, consisted at the time of the invasion of four autonomous republics (Dagestan, Kabar-
dino-Balkaria, North Osetia, and Checheno-Ingushetia) and three` autonomous oblasts (Adygei, Karachai, and Cher-
kess). All were part of the Russian republic (RSFSR).
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The Caucasian peoples had first come into conflict with the Soviet regime in the immedi-
ate postrevolutionary period when, following the collapse of the Russian empire, they pro-
claimed their political independence by forming four sovereign republics (Georgia, Armenia,
Azerbaidzhan, and North Caucasia). Although the Bolshevik government, along with many
others, officially recognized their independence in 1918, two years later, in the summer of
1920, they were invaded by the Red Army and gradually incorporated in the Soviet Union.
Trouble erupted again as a result of the brutal collectivization campaign beginning in
1929. Popular uprisings and anti-Soviet guerrilla movements were mercilessly put down, and
killings and mass deportations ensued.52
Another wave of Soviet repression reached the Caucasus in 1937 as part of the Great
Purge, which aimed to liquidate the national intelligentsia, including many communists. In
the North Caucasus, the purges took aparticularly heavy toll among the Muslin rkic
nationalities. Islam was vigorously persecuted by the Bolshevik regime from the start, and by
the late 1930s it was almost completely, driven underground. Of the 4000 mosques, 2000
meddressahs (religious schools), and 10;000 mullahs in 1920, only 150 mosques and 150
mullahs. remained by 1939.E
The response of the "mountaineers," as the Turkic peoples of the North Caucasus were
known; to the brutal Soviet policies was armed resistance, primarily in the form of guerrilla
warfare. In many areas such as Checheno-Ingushetia, anti-Soviet resistance took the form of
a massive uprising, which necessitated Soviet deployment of tank and air force units besides
the NKVD units usually used in such contingencies. By the time the Germans arrived, the
Soviets had been fighting the mountaineers for two years in some areas without being able to
pacify the region.
German attitudes toward the Caucasus were also significantly different from those es-
poused in other areas. Apart from the economic imperative of exploiting Caucasian oil, the
Caucasus was considered important only as a valuable military-strategic place d'armes for
future penetration of the Middle East. It was to become, as the "Reichkommissariat Kaukasi-
en," one of the four administrative units of the future Nazi empire in the East, but German
colonization of the region was not envisaged. Racially, the indigenous peoples were con-
sidered to be superior to the Slavs, although the btheorists" from the Racial-Political Ad-
ministration occasionally inveighed against Armenians and others. German policy in this
respect certainly was influenced by the desire to cultivate Turkey, which considered itself a
protector of the Turkic peoples of the area and which exerted considerable influence in
Berlin 54 Also, due to the military circumstances and the short period of occupation, the
Caucasus was never transferred to civilian jurisdiction and remained under Wehrmacht
authority until the German withdrawal. More important, many of the key German
representatives-both military and civilian-who were active in the Caucasus belonged to
the "realist" school of officials. They were keenly aware of the disastrous implications of
German behavior in the Ukraine and were determined to demonstrate the utility of more
enlightened policies.55
52A detailed account of Soviet policies in the Caucasus can be found in Alexander Uralov, Narodoubiistvo v.
SSSR, Munich, 1952. For a Soviet interpretation of wartime policies, see Hadzhi Murat Ibragimbeli, Krakh Edel-
vaissa v blizhnii vostok, Nauka, Moscow, 1977.
53Genocide in the USSR, p. 41.
MOn the role of Turkey in German policy, see Dallin, German Rule, Chap. XIII. For a Soviet view, see German-
skaya politika u. Turtsii (1941-1943), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, 1946.
55The key military personalities involved in the Caucasus campaign were the Commander in Chief of the German
troops (Group A), Field Marshal von List, and, after his replacement, Field Marshal von Kleist; the Quartermaster
General of the Army, General Wagner; and the chief of the Organizations Section of the High Command, Colonel von
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The differentiated German attitudes toward the people of the Caucasus found an early
expression in information materials prepared to acquaint Wehrmacht personnel with the
land and people before the beginning of the campaign. In stark contrast with similar mate-
rials dealing with the Slavic areas, a study put together by the propaganda section of OKW
(Armed Eprces High Command) emphasized the strongly developed national identity and
consciousness of the Caucasian peoples, and characterized in a positive manner individual
nationalities. The Georgians, for instance, were said to be "freedom-loving, brave, and proud"
and of "high culture," while the Armenians were depicted as "industrious, enterprising, and
peaceful."56 Another pamphlet for the troops noted that the indigenous population has a
"highly developed sense of honor, pride, and sensitivity" which should always be taken into
consideration b7 Underlying this new emphasis was the understanding that a successful
policy in the Caucasus would also require a change in attitude on the part of the German
soldier and a different code of behavior than that practiced elsewhere. More than in any other
area, the pamphlet continued, "the German soldier here must show respect for the
population's customs and religious practices and guarantee the sanctity of family life and
property."58
These novel accents in the political conduct of the war found a practical expression with
the beginning of the German campaign in the Caucasus in the summer of 1942. The offensive
carried out by the troops of Army Group A began on June 28 and quickly penetrated. the area.
By late fall, the Germans had taken control of the Don and Kuban steppe areas and had
reached the Volga in Kalmykia. In the south they reached the Great Caucasus Range and
occupied most of the. North Caucasus. They did not, however, achieve their strategic objective
of seizing the oil fields of Grozny and Baku and were not able to penetrate the Transcauca-
sian region.
The rapid German successes were partly the result of the remarkably lackluster perfor-
mance of the Red Army. The Soviet troops often retreated without putting up a fight, and
confusion, panic, and mass desertions occurred with regularity. It was the dismally low
morale of the Soviet troops on this front.that prompted Stalin to issue the famous order #277,
which openly: acknowledged widespread defeatism in the army and ordered the formation .of
the infamous "blocking units" (zagraditelniye otryadi) b9- At least in part, the Red Army's
morale problems can be attributed to the indifferent or hostile. attitudes of the local
population. The Soviet military authorities, on their part, distrusted the civilians to such an
extent that;, some Red Army units : were given categoric orders to avoid contact with the
indigenous population in order to prevent "defeatist contagion."60
At the same time, German troops were being given orders that showed a determination
to win over the local population. Before the beginning of the offensive, the Commander in
Chiefsof Army Group A, Field Marshal von List, issued an order to the troops that. is indica-
tive of this effort. It consisted of the following seven points:
Stauffenberg. Among the civilians, most prominent roles were played by the representatives of the Ostministerium
Gerhardt von Mende and Otto Brautigam.
56See Der Kaukasus: Raum, Bevolkerung, Wirtschaft, OKW, July 1942, cited in Buchbender, Das Tonende Erz, p.
197. -
57Merkblatt far die Kaukasus Armeen, December 1941, cited in Buchbender, Das Tonende Err, p. 198.
58Ibid.
59The order, issued on July 28,'1942, specified that anybody retreating without a specific order from the High
Command was guilty of treason and was to be shot on the spot. Blocking units were positioned several hundred
meters behind the front lines and given orders to shoot anybody, retreating. For details, see Buchbender, Dos To-
nende Err, pp. 203-206.
60Cited in Alexander Dallin, "The North Caucasus," in Armstrong (ed.), Soviet Partisans in World War II, p. 571.
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1. The population of the Caucasus should be treated as friendly nations, except when they
show themselves to be anti-German.
2. The aspirations of the Mountaineers to do away with the collective system should not be
hindered in any way.
3. The reopening of houses of worship of all confessions and the cultivation of religious cus-
toms and traditions is to be allowed.
4. Property is to be respected and requisitioned goods should be paid for.
5. The trust of the population is to be won by exemplary conduct. Its collaboration is.of great
importance in the mountainous area which is difficult to control militarily, and can also
considerably facilitate the further advance of the German troops.
6. All necessary war measures causing hardship to the population should be explained and
justified.
7. The honor of the Caucasus women should be especially respected.sl
Guidelines similar in emphasis but often in much greater detail were also issued for~the
administration and propaganda organs. Apart from the principles, listed above, they stressed
the political importance of allowing the Caucasian peoples wide-ranging self-government and
securing their cooperation in the administration of the region. Further, the indigenous popu-
lation was to be given full autonomy in the cultural and educational domains and in the
reprivatization of the economy.62
Popular attitudes toward the advancing German armies created conditions conducive to
the implementation of these policies. Throughout the occupied areas of the Caucasus, the
Germans were accorded a friendly reception. In some areas, such-as the Cossack and Kalmyk
lands in the North and in the Muslim areas, the welcome was truly enthusiastic.' The Ger-
mans responded by granting self-government privileges to the local population. In some na'
tional areas, "national" or "regional" committees were organized and vested with genuine
administrative authority. Elsewhere, local administration was entrusted to indigenous coun-
cils, mayors, or elders. In most cases the self-government organs appear to have been given
wide responsibilities and to have been respected by the Wehrmacht authorities.63
The reintroduction of religious freedom also generated a strong positive reaction. Within
a surprisingly short time, churches and mosques were able to resume their functions and
assume their traditional role in society, despite sllortages of clerical personnel and 20 years
of Soviet atheistic repression.6 German religious Tolerance was particularly appreciated in
the Muslim areas. Numerous witnesses report an enthusiastic public participation in the
revival of religious life, including the opening of religious schools and `the observation of
Muslim customs and traditions. Public gratitude toward the Germans was often expressed at
religious festivities.65 The Germans also kept their promises in the field of education. The
school system was allowed to function without any restrictions and was administered by the
local authorities. Even higher learning institutions stayed open despite the war disruptions.
As in other areas under German occupation, the most decisive factor influencing indige-
61"Befehl an alle im Kaukasus eingesetzten Truppen," July 1942, R6/65, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
62See, for example, Kaukasusrichtlinien, August 1942, R6/143, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz. For the German propa-
ganda effort in the Caucasus, see Richtlinien feir die Propaganda im Kaukasus (no date given), R6/143, Bundesar-
chiv, Koblenz, and Richtlinien ftir die Propaganda unter den Kaukasischen Volkern, February 19, 1942, cited in
Buchbender, Das Tonende Erz, pp. 191-192.
sDallin, German Rule, pp. 244-247.
One German observer reports, for instance, that in the city of Novocherkask six churches were fuPctioning
within a month of the German arrival. The population's gratitude was expressed in the widespread practice of asking
German soldiers to be honorary godfathers in baptismal ceremonies. See Lagebericht des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei
and des SA, October 16, 1942, R6/143, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
65In one such celebration of the Muslim Kurman feast in Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria, the Muslim community
presented the Germans with 1000 head of cattle and other expensive gifts, including a gold-embroidered saddle for
Hitler, as a sign of gratitude. See Brautigam report to Rosenberg, December 22, 1942, R6/65, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
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nous attitudes was German policy in the economic sector and especially agriculture. The
basis on which the Germans approached the problem was the general agrarian reform of
February 1942. However, in the Caucasus the reform was taken much more seriously and
measures were initiated to put it into practice on a large scale. For example, while in the
Ukrainelonly 10 percent of the kolkhozes were to be transformed into agricultural coopera-
tives, in the Caucasus the figure ranged up to 40 percent during the first year 66 In the
mountainous areas where cattle breeding was the primary economic pursuit, the kolkhozes
were to be abolished outright and private farms reestablished. Indeed, the popular opposition
to collective farming was so strong that in many areas the peasants spontaneously divided
stock, equipment, and land among themselves and dissolved the farms before German
administration had been established. Such faits accomplis were honored by the Germans,
which earned them the confidence of the population. Also politically significant was the
notable restraint in applying Nazi methods of forced labor recruitment. Labor recruitment, to
the extent that it was practiced, depended on volunteers to a degree unimaginable in the
Ukraine 67
The picture of German occupation in the Caucasus was, of course, hardly an idyllic one.
It was marred by many of the typical oppressive measures and transgressions against the
population that were the rule in other areas. German behavior became progressively worse
toward the end of the occupation with the%oviet army pressing on and the German position
becoming increasingly insecure. Nonetheless, occupation policies in the Caucasus were
qualitatively different from those practiced elsewhere and were carried out with a clear cog-
nizance of their political implications. The Germans' conduct in this region was the closest
they ever came to a conscious attempt to use the ethnic factor in political warfare. The results
were indicative of the potential of such an approach.
One significant consequence of the more humane German treatment of the native popu-
lation in the Caucasus was the failure of the Soviets to organize an anti-German partisan
movement of any import. The few isolated partisan groups that operated in the Caucasus
consisted primarily of former party and NKVD officials and received almost no support from
the population.66 Although pro-Soviet partisan actions were of little more than nuisance
value, the people of the Caucasus contributed significantly to the German war effort. The
willingness to collaborate with the occupation authorities was evidently so strong that
internal security of the entire occupied area, including antipartisan operations, was left
primarily in the hands of indigenous military units.69 Large sectors of the front line appear to
have been manned by Caucasian national units in German service. Sizable military units
were also formed by the Germans in the Cossack areas and in Kalmykia. Many were
determi, ed to continue their anti-Soviet struggle after the reoccupation by the Red Army.
Armed resistance to the Soviets in the North Caucasus continued for some time, and there
were efforts to win German support for organized guerrilla warfare behind Soviet lines.70
The implementation of nonexploitative policies in the economic realm secured the
maintenance of acceptable levels of production, and the desperate economic conditions that
prevailed in the Ukraine were observable nowhere in the Caucasus. Perhaps the best proof of
66Dallin, "The North Caucasus," p. 579.
67See "Vermittlung von Arbeitskr5ften far das Reich," November 13, 1942, and "Arbeitseinsatz der Kaukasier,"
December 8, 1942, R6/65, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
"For an excellent discussion of partisan activities in the Caucasus, see Alexander Dallin, `The Caucasus Parti-
sans," in Armstrong (ed.), Soviet Partisans in World War II, pp. 586-632.
69Brautigam report to Rosenberg, December 22, 1942, R6/145, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
70See, for example, "Vorschlag zur Banden Bildung im Kaukasus," September 20, 1943, R6/145, Bundesarchiv,
Koblenz.
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the success of the German policies in the Caucasus is the fact that at the end of the occupa-
tion tens of thousands of local inhabitants decided to throw their lot with the :retreating
Germans, leaving their ancestral homes for an uncertain future.
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IV. NATIONALITIES UNDER ARMS
German policies in the Caucasus demonstrated that military and political payoffs could
result from a calculated approach toward the indigenous population. Policies employed in the
Caucasus did not spill over into other regions, however. The overall record of German conduct
of political warfare with respect to Soviet nationalities is a poor one.
Yet in spite of the demonstrated political ineptness of the Germans, collaboration be-
tween members of the non-Russian nationalities and the German invaders occurred on an
unprecedented scale. The logical explanation for this incongruous development is that the
anti-Sovietism of many former Soviet citizens was of such intensity as to overcome their
misgivings and dislike for the Germans. Nowhere was this more dramatically demonstrated
than in the case of those former Soviet subjects who took up arms against the Soviet Union.
The Nazi attitude toward military collaboration with the subjugated peoples of the East
was unequivocal at the beginning of the Soviet campaign. Under the influence of their racial
and ideological dogmas, and convinced that the Wehrmacht would quickly subdue the Sovi-
ets, Nazi leaders contemptuously rejectedny thought of securing the participation of indige-
nous anti-Soviet elements in the war. "It should never be allowed [in occupied territories],"
opined Hitler, "that non-Germans carry arms. This is very important. Even when at first it
appears easier to secure the military assistance: of the subjugated peoples, it is wrong. They
will inevitably turn against us some day. Therefore only the German should be armed, not
the Slav, not the Czech, not the Cossack, not the Ukrainian...." 1 Apart from the typical Nazi
contempt for the Soviet peoples, Hitler also feared that allowing the nationalities to fight on
the German side would lead to political demands after the war. These official Nazi views were
reflected in the first few months of the war in the disbanding and disarming of indigenous
units that had formed spontaneously in the Baltics and the outlawing of the violently
anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist military organization (OUP).
However, as it became clear that the war was not to be an easy one and as the Germans
suffered more and more casualties, attitudes began to change. The change was only slow and
grudging among top Nazi echelons but dramatic among commanders in the field. Indeed,
many of the latter had never paid much attention to Nazi racial-ideological inanities and,
faced with severe manpower shortages on one hand and the willingness of the indigenous
population to collaborate on the other, had begun quietly to incorporate volunteers in their
units. $y late fall 1941, the practice of recruiting indigenous auxiliaries and volunteers had
become ubiquitous and, a year after the beginning of the war, one million former Soviet
citizens, both Russians and non-Russians, were actively participating in the German war
effort.
There were two basic forms of indigenous participation in the war: the direct incorpora-
tion of volunteers in Wehrmacht or SS units and the formation of indigenous units of various
sizes and functions operating under German supervision.
1Bormann Protocol, p. 88.
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Recruitment of natives from the occupied areas for the Wehrmacht units usually began
on the initiative of local commanders without any official sanction. To redress the serious
shortage of reserves, native volunteers were employed in a variety of primarily noncombat
functions such as truck drivers, ammunition carriers, and medics. Although many natives did
serve in front-line combat functions, they were considered auxiliaries and became collectively
known as Hilfswillige (Hiwis-literally; "willing helpers"). The Hiwis were dressed in Ger-
man uniforms and received the same basic pay and food rations as German soldiers. Material
support was also provided for their families and in case of death or disability? Promotion was
possible only to the rank of corporal.
It is difficult to estimate the exact or even approximate number-of Hiwis in th'l Wehr-.
macht because most unit commanders were aware of official attitudes toward the volunteers
and did not keep records and seldom mentioned them in official reports. Nonetheless, there is
conclusive evidence that the German army enlisted former Soviet citizens in its ranks on an
unprecedented scale. An order by the Army High Command issued in August 1942 specifies
that divisions be allowed to recruit as many auxiliaries as necessary to make up any person-
nel shortages to full order of battle strength. Logistic and support troops were allowed an
extra 10 percents Even these numbers,' however, could be exceeded in special circumstances.
According to a German officer who was actively involved in recruiting, an order by the High
Command that was passed verbally, but never in written form, in the summer of 1942
allowed the recruitment of between 3000 and 4000 auxiliaries per division,4 which
represented approximately one-quarter of personnel strength.5 Several independent reports
confirm that these quotas appear to have been attained in most divisions on the Eastern front
by mid-1943.6 In many units the percentage of volunteers,- however, appears to have
considerably exceeded the guidelines. For example, the 134th Infantry division; which
apparently enlisted all of its POWs on an equal footing with the German soldiers from the
beginning of the war, is said to have consisted of almost 50-percent auxiliaries in late 1942,7
while the 18th Army counted 47,000 volunteers among its troops8 in early 1943.
The total number of military collaborators in The Wehrmacht is impossible to ascertain
with certainty. Estimates vary from a low of 600,000 to a high of 1.4 million.9 As the German
army on the Eastern front never exceeded 3.5 million, even the lowest estimate would
indicate that close to 20 percent of German troop strength consisted of former Soviet citizens.
It is even more difficult to determine the number of volunteers from the non-Russian
nationalities. There are, however, good reasons to believe that at least half, and probably
more, of the Hiwis were non-Russian. The bulk were recruited from the following three
groups: released POWs, stragglers left behind by the Red Army, and the indigenous popula-
2For details on the military and legal status of the auxiliaries in the Wehrmacht, see "Order #8000: Landesei-
gene Hilfskrafte im Osten," Oberkommando des Heeres, August 1942.
3Ibid., p. 7.-
4Wilfried Strik-Strikfeldt, Gegen Hitler and Stalin, Mainz, 1970, p. 80.
5The average German division had between 12,000 and 15,000 troops.
6See, for example, Thorwald, Die Illusion, p. 68, and "Einsatz der Freiwilligen aus dem Osten," Oberkommando
des Heeres (no date given).
7Cited in Dallin, German Rule, p. 537.
8Reinhard Gehlen, The Service, The World Publishing Co., New York, 1972.
9See Thorwald, Die Illusion, p. 12; Peter Kleist, Zwischen Hitler and Stalin, Bonn, 1950, p. 202; and Dallin,
German Rule, p. 536. Apart from the volunteers absorbed by the army, there were considerable numbers incorpo-
rated in the Luftwaffe who served primarily in air defense and other support functions. A May 1944 report gives
their number as 180,000. See "Vermerk betreffend Veranderungen beim General der Freiwilligenverbande," R6/70,
Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
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?
tion. The overwhelming majority of former POWs who were recruited were Ukrainian or
Belorussian, because of the German practice of releasing only those prisoners whose native
lands had already been occupied. The indigenous population of the occupied territories was, of
course, also overwhelmingly non-Russian because only comparatively small ethnically Rus-
sian lands were occupied for a long time. Thus, it stands to reason that because the majority
of the available pool of potential volunteers was non-Russian, so was the enlisted contingent.
INDIGENOUS UNITS
The second major form of military collaboration with the Germans was the formation of
indigenous military units designed either for deployment at the front or for service in the
rear. Two kinds of units were organized by the Germans to provide military security in the
occupied areas. The purpose of the first type was to combat communist partisans. Known as
indigenous security units (Landeseigene Sicherungsverbande), they were organized along
military lines and possessed considerable mobility.10 At first the occupation authorities were
strongly opposed to any indigenous armed formations, and many of the units that had been
formed spontaneously in the Baltic states and the Ukraine were ordered disbanded.
Attitudes, however, began to change iii. reaction to the increasing partisan threat and
decreasing numbers of German security personnel. As in the case of the auxiliaries, many of
the units were first authorized by local commanders and occupation officials without the
sanction or knowledge of central authority. By mid-1943 collaborator units were in evidence
throughout the Baltic states, Belorussia, and the Ukraine, and especially in the. Slavic areas
where they bore the brunt of the antipartisan campaign. In general, they were of battalion
size, and their troops were treated the same as auxiliaries in terms of pay and privileges.
Side by side with the larger native security forces there also existed local security units
that were generally known as Guard formations (Schutzmanschaften), or indigenous police
(Ordnungsdienst), depending on the area in which they were deployed. These units .were, as
a rule, based in a specific locality, and their members,. were recruited from volunteers native
to the area. Their functions included a variety of military-security duties such: as guarding
military installations and railroads and.preventing partisan infiltration. As partisan activi-
ties expanded in the later stages of the war, the guard formations were increasingly used in
direct antipartisan combat."
No reliable figures exist on the number of collaborators providing armed assistance to
the. Germans in the occupied areas. There is no question, however, that it must have been
considerable. German sources are fairly unanimous in reporting that indigenous units repre-
sented a clear majority of all rear security troops. One source estimates the combined total. of
auxiliaries and rear units as high as two million.12
Much better known and politically more important were the national units organized
explicitly for front-line combat. The formation of national combat units, of course, directly
loSee "Order #8000" for a description of the characteristics and functions of the different rear units.
11For an analysis of the role of the collaborators in the German antipartisan effort, see George Fischer, Soviet
Opposition to Stalin, Cambridge, Mass., 1952; and Armstrong (ed.), Soviet Partisans in World War II, pp. 227-249.
12Fischer, p. 45.
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contradicted both Nazi philosophy and official policy at the beginning of the war. Many top
Nazis, including Hitler, remained suspicious of such units and hindered their development in
various ways until the end of the war. Nonetheless, in contradiction to official policy, national
units were being organized as early as late 1941: By 1943 hundreds of thousands of Soviet
non-Russians were fighting at the front in, their respective national units. Several factors
contributed to this phenomenon. The rising German casualties and manpower shortages as
the war dragged on at first prompted many of the responsible field commanders and later
some of the political leaders to look for replacements from among the indigenous populations.
Further, it was in this specific area that the efforts of `the "realist" officials, within and
without the military, to promote the cause of the nationalities were most intensive and suc-
cessful. The last and decisive factor was the unquestioned willingness of huge numbers of
former Soviet citizens to take up arms against the Soviet regime.
The Baltic area was the first among the occupied territories in which national units were
formed and sent to the front. As already mentioned, the Nazis had fewer misgivings about-the
Baits, from a racial .point of view, than any of the other nationalities and were more willing
to accord them: the status of cobelligerents. The Baits, ,on the other hand, were, eager..to
establish their own indigenous armed forces, hoping that participation in the war would earn
them significant political concessions in their struggle for national sovereignty later on; Still,
for some time after. the occupation of the Baltic region, the Germans remained suspicious of
armed natives and disbanded the numerous local formations existing at the time of their
arrival. An exception was made in the case,of units destined for security work behind the
front and a number of security battalions (Schuzmanns-Bataillone) that were formed-from
Latvian and Estonian volunteers beginning July 31, 1941.19 Yet, despite an explicit order
from the political leadership not to use' the native formations in front-line combat;, the army
soon began forming its own volunteer battalions.14 The first eight battalions were organized
in Estonia and thrown into battle in- the most dfflicult sectors during the Soviet winter
counteroffensive of 1941-1942. Despite poor training and inadequate armament, the Estonian
units showed exemplary courage. Impressed by their first experience with the national units
and facing a critical situation on the Northern front, the German military commanders
apparently considered a massive emergency mobilization of national armies in the Baltic
states to stop the Soviet offensive.15 The idea was dropped once the immediate danger passed,
but additional battalions continued to be formed throughout the region. Although ostensibly
entrusted with internal policing functions, these battalions were deployed more often. than
not in front-line combat.
Encouraged by the demonstrated combat prowess and reliability of the Baltic units, na-
tive administrators pressed for political recognition of their military contribution. ]Primarily,
they demanded that their respective nations be allowed to form larger national forces under
13George H. Stein, The Waffen SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War, 1939-1945, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y.,
1966, p. 174.
14An order to that effect was issued to the Army Group North on November 25, 1941. See Joachim Hoffmann, Die
Ostlegionen 1941-1943, Verlag Rombach, Freiburg, 1976, p. 18.
15Stein, p. 174.
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indigenous leadership. These Baltic armies were to be recognized by the Germans as allied
forces and used in combat only for the defense of national territories.'6
Such essentially political demands ran counter to German designs for the Baltic area
even if they appealed to some in the military; hence, they were disregarded. Large Baltic
units were established, however, under the auspices of an unlikely sponsor-the SS. Engaged
primarily in policing and security functions in the occupied territories, the SS had become the
primary executor of the Nazis' repressive measures and the perpetrator of untold crimes
against the indigenous population. It also considered itself the guardian of the Nazi creed of
racial purity. Although these SS functions continued to be carried out until the end of the war
by the notorious SS Einsatzgruppen, the SS also had a military arm known as the Waffen SS
that engaged in front-line combat. The Waffen SS underwent a reorganization in 1943 that
brought about a major expansion of the SS forces. One of the results of the reorganization was
the tacit disregard of the heretofore strict racial and ethnic criteria for enlistment in these
elite units.17 This opened the door for the organization of Baltic units in the Waffen SS.
The recruitment of volunteers for the SS units, called legions, began in late 1942 and
apparently was fairly successful. In early 1943 some 15,000 Latvians and 6500 Estonians had
signed up for the legions, while the Lithuanians proclaimed their intention to organize a
legion of 30,000.18 The initial positive response to the legions did not last long, however, and
the increasingly oppressive German policies-in the Baltic states resulted in fewer volunteers.
Nazi authorities sought to resolve this problem by introducing compulsory military service in
early 1943. As could be expected, in view of intensifying public discontent, the success of the
call-ups was limited.'9
Despite these setbacks, the Germans were able to considerably enlarge the existing le-
gions, first into brigades and then into full-fledged divisions. Thus, by 1944, there were three
Baltic divisions of the Waffen SS alongside many other smaller units fighting against the Red
Army in the northern sector of the front.20 All of them fought until the end of the war.
In general, the Baltic national units amassed a distinguished combat record despite Ger-
man political. insensitivities and the less than equal status of their soldiers. To the over-
whelming majority of the Balts, fighting on the German-side was merely coincidental with
their real purpose and motivation-defending Baltic national interests?'
16See, for example, the proposal by the Latvian administration to the German authorities to set up a Latvian
army of 125,000 in December 1942, R6/65, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz. On Lithuanian and Estonian attitudes, see
"Denkschrift Ober die Moglichkeit die Bereitschaft des litauischen Volkes far den Kriegseinsatz zu steigern" (no date
given), R6/68, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, and "Moglichkeiten einer Autonomie Estlands im Kriege" (no date given),
R6/67, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
17The first SS formation to be recruited regardless of racial and ethnic factors was made up of Yugoslav Muslims
in Februai?9 1943. Stein, p. 180.
181bfd., p. 176. The Lithuanian figure is given in "Protokoll der Sitzung der Lettischen Selbstverwaltung and der
FOhrung des Generalkommissariats," January 29, 1943, R6/67, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
1sSee, for instance, " Ubersicht Ober den Verlauf der Musterungsaktion in Litauen" (no date given), R6/162, Bun-
desarchiv, Koblenz; and a letter by the Latvian self-government to the German authorities describing the reasons for
the failure of the call-up. "Abschrift," November 16, 1943, R6/165, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
20These divisions were the 15th Grenadierdivision der Waffen S (Latvian #1), 19th Grenadierdivision der Waffen
SS (Latvian #2), and 20th Grenadierdivision der Waffen SS (Estonian #1).
21There is considerable evidence that the Baltic soldiers and officers remained strongly nationalistic even in the
Waffen SS and were anything but "fascist mercenaries," as Soviet historians have traditionally portrayed them. One
representative report on the political attitudes of Latvian SS units characterizes the officer corps as "strongly chau-
vinistic" and notes "remarkably anti-German attitudes" on the part of both officers and troops. See "Politischer
Erfahrung mit lettischer Legion," October 26, 1943, R6/70, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
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The largest number of national units recruited from among the Soviet nationalities was
made up of Turkic and Caucasian volunteers, which came to be known collectively as the
East Legions. Most of them belonged to the Muslim nationalities from Central Asia and the
North Caucasus, but there were also sizable contingents of Caucasian Christians, especially
Georgians and Armenians.
There was little reason at the beginning of the war to suspect that hundreds of thousands
of these nationals would eventually end up fighting shoulder to shoulder with the Germans.
Many of them, especially those of Oriental origin, were considered by, the Germans to be
racially inferior even to the Slav "subhumans" and only a step above Jews and Gypsies. To
the extent that the Nazis were interested in them and their, territories at all, 4i&E was -for
economic exploitation, namely, Caucasus oil. Politically, they were considered inconsequen-
tial, and most Nazi leaders appear to have shared Hitler's total disinterest in "these primitive
tribes."22
Nazi racial prejudices exacted a heavy toll among these Soviet minorities during the first
few months of the war. Soviet Muslims suffered more than most. Tens of thousands of them
who had deserted or had been taken prisoner were shot summarily, many on the assumption
that they were Jewish because of circumcision. Of about 100,000 Turkestanians (Central
Asians) documented as present in POW. camps in the fall of. 1941, only?6000 survived the
winter.23 In the POW camp in Czestokowo, Poland, in which 30,000 Turkestanians were
detained, only 2000,left alive.24 The Christian peoples of Transcaucasia fared better, but even
there the losses due to the inhuman conditions and treatment in the POW camps were
staggering. Thus, less than 50 percent of all Georgian POWs survived the winter of
1941-1942.25
Yet even as thousands continued dying in the camps, the Nazi leadership in a remark-
able about-face began instituting policies that were to result in preferential treatment for the
Turkic-Muslim nationalities and for the Georgians and Armenians. Although what caused
this reorientation is not certain, there were several contributing factors. First, the "realists"
among the Ostministerium officials and intelligertce experts had pressed from the beginning
for a differentiated treatment, pointing to the much higher desertion rates of these nationali-
ties and their general anti-Soviet predisposition. Hitler himself, while inveighing against
"Mongols," is said to have believed that the Muslims were the most anti-Bolshevik among the
Soviet peoples and "by and large of good soldierly qualities."26 Evidently, some influence was
also exerted by two Turkish generals who, while on an official visit to Hitler in October 1941,
pleaded eloquently for more lenient treatment of their coreligionists.27
The first steps toward a differentiated approach were taken by the Ostministerium in
conjunction with the Wehrmacht when they set up special POW commissions, whose task was
to separate the prisoners by nationality and determine their potential use. The actual propos-
al to form national units from the Turkic and Caucasian nationalities was made by Rosen-
22Thorwald, Die Illusion, p. 36.
23This figure is given in a speech by Alfred Rosenberg (no date given), R6/52, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
24Thorwald, Die Illusion, p. 12.
25See the Memorandum to Reichsminister Rosenberg by the Georgian liaison staff, August 28, 1914, R6/143,
Bundesarchiv, Koblenz. A detailed recent account of German treatment of Soviet POWs is in Streit, Keine Kamarad-
en.
26Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, p. 25.
27See Dallin, German Rule, pp. 234, 539.
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berg and approved by Hitler in December 1942, at which time an order to this effect was
issued by the Army High Command.28
Even before the official order, however, two special-purpose national formations were
organized under the aegis of army intelligence. The first one consisted of seven companies
(six Turkestani, one Azerbaidzhani) and was known as "Operation Tiger B." Its commander,
Major Mayer-Mader, an expert on Central Asia who spoke several of its languages, intended
to use the unit to incite unrest and anti-Soviet uprisings behind the Soviet lines in Turke-
stan. The unit's members were trained in guerrilla warfare tactics, sabotage, and diversion.
Although it was never used for its original purpose, the unit saw action under the name
"Infantry battalion #450."29
The second unit was formed in October 1941 exclusively from members of the Caucasian
nationalities. It was commanded by another expert of the East, Professor Theodor Oberland-
er, and was intended to participate in special assignments in the campaign for the Caucasus.
The battalion strength-unit, known as "Special unit Bergmann" (Sonderverband Bergmann),
was deployed in the Caucasus in the summer of 1942 and distinguished itself in combat. It
also engaged in wide-ranging propaganda activities and managed to attract some 1500 de-
serters from among the Caucasian troops of Red Army units in its theater of action 30
Recruitment for the regular East Legions' battalions began in January 1942 in the POW
camps situated in Poland. POW commissions, including members of the respective nationali-
ties, toured the camps and asked for volunteers for the legions. Almost all responded, and
some 70 percent were deemed physically fit for enlistment 31 Following basic training the
volunteers were sent to one of the six national legions for additional training.32 Independent
of the training activity in Poland, the Army High Command ordered the organization and
training of additional legions in the Ukraine, based on the same organizational principles. As
a result of the legions' activities, by 1943 53 field battalions from training centers in Poland
and 25 from the Ukraine had been turned over to the German army.33 In addition to the field
battalions, a large number of transport and logistics units and military construction teams
were also organized from the same nationalities. The setting-up of new formations continued,
and by the end of 1943 the East Legions achieved their greatest expansion. In May 1943 the
army authorized establishing an independent Turkic division (162nd Infantry division) which
became the largest single unit in the legions. Independent of the legions, sizable collaborator
units were formed in the Crimean region by the Crimean Tatars. At least eight battalions are
known to have existed, and the total number of troops probably was close to 20,00034 'Also
operating independently was a Kalmyk cavalry corps of 5000.35 Beginning in 1944, the
Waffen SS, having finally discarded all racial criteria, began to form volunteer units from
Central' Asians and from the peoples of the Caucasus. Two such units were organized: East
Turkic Waffen Verband der SS and Caucasian Waffenverband der SS.36
The exact number of collaborators in the legions is subject to speculation but the avail-
28von zur Mtlhlen, p. 58.
For details, see Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, pp. 26-27.
30Ibid., pp. 28-29; and Oberlander to the author, interview, May 26, 1980.
31F. W. Seidler, "Oskar Ritter von Niedermayer im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Ostlegion-
en," Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, No. 3, 1970, pp. 168-174.
32The six legions were Turkestanian, Azerbaidzhanian, North Caucasian, Georgian, Armenian, and Volga-Tatar.
33Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, pp. 38-39, 76.
34See Edige M. Kirimal, Der Nationale Kamp' der Krimturken, Verlag Lechte, Emsdetten, 1952, p. 305; and
Hoffmann, Die Ostlegionen, p. 44.
35An exhaustive account on the Kalmyk role in the war, including detailed examination of military collaboration
with the Germans, is provided in Joachim Hoffmann, Deutsche and Kalmyken, 1942 bis 1945, Verlag Rombach,
Freiburg, 1974.
36Stein, p. 188.
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able evidence points to surprisingly large numbers. The lowest estimates begin at 250,000 37
A fairly reliable breakdown by nationality gives the following picture: Central Asians:
110,000 to 180,000; Caucasians: 110,000; Volga Tatars: 35,000 to 40,000; and. Crimean
Tatars: 20,000.38 These figures suggest a surprising conclusion: The possibility exists that at
least some of the Soviet nationalities may have been better represented in the German army
than in the Red Army.39
In fulfilling their military tasks, the legions had to surmount considerable difficulties.
More often than not they were poorly trained and inadequately equipped, which seriously
affected their combat capability. Moreover, the legionnaires were frequently treated as sec-
ond-class soldiers and discriminated against in and outside the barracks. The Germans also
failed to provide them with a political motivation and a sense of cause and viewed them
merely as mercenaries, or worse still as cannon fodder. Still, the majority of these units
performed adequately under extremely unfavorable conditions and, in most cases, justified
the hopes placed in them.
Overall, the examination of the military involvement of the Soviet nationalities in the
German war effort reveals a willingness to collaborate with the enemy on a truly unprece-
dented scale. The more than a million former Soviet citizens, organized in national forma-
tions, rear security units, or directly incorporated in the German army, provided up to a
quarter of German manpower on the Eastern front. Their contribution undoubtedly made it
possible for Germany to carry on the war as long as it did.
37Estimates are provided in Hoffmann, Deutsche and Kalmyken, p. 172; Gerhardt von Mende, "Erfahrungen mit
Ostfreiwilligen in der deutschen Wehrmacht wahrend des Zweiten Weltkrieges," in Auslandsforschung, No. 1, Viel-
volkerheere and Koalitionskriege, Darmstadt, 1952, p. 25; Burkhart MOller-Hillebrand, Das Heer 1933-1.945, Vol. III:
Der Zweifrontenkrieg, Das Heer vom Beginn des Feldzuges Gegen die Sowjetunion bis zum Kriegsende, Frankfurt,
1969, p. 70.
3svon zur MOhlen, p. 60.
39For example, German intelligence estimated the numbers of Red Army soldiers from Caucasian nationalities in
March 1942 to be between 60,000 and 75,000 (Buchbender, Das Tonende Erz, p. 191). After 1943 the representation
of the non-Slavic nationalities in the Soviet army decreased dramatically. See S. L. Curran and D. Ponomareff,
Managing the Ethnic Factor in the Russian and Soviet Armed Forces: An Historical Overview, R-2640/1, July 1982,
p. 28.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
This analysis of German policies toward the Soviet non-Russian nationalities during
World War II warrants several conclusions. First, under the impact of the German attack,
many of the non-Russian national groups of the USSR used the opportunity to break away
from Russian control. Although reactions differed in intensity and in size from region to
region, we can assume that the Baltic peoples, the Western Ukrainians, the North Cauca-
sians, large parts of the Georgian and Armenian populations, and substantial numbers of
Central Asians, Volga Tatars, and other Soviet Asians were prepared to support the invading
Germans, with their as-yet-unclear policies, rather than the Soviet regime, whose policies
and practices they knew well. As a result, rather than enhancing the internal cohesion and
unity of the Soviet Union, the formidable external threat facing the Soviet multinational
state caused significant ethnic fragmentation, which presented considerable military and
political exploitation opportunities for the. Germans.
Yet, from the very beginning, German policies toward the Soviet nationalities made it
very difficult, if not impossible, to take advantage of this critical' structural flaw in the Soviet
state. German authorities-conditioned by Nazi ideology preaching territorial aggrandize-
ment (Lebensraum), racial fanaticism, religious intolerance, and economic plunder-were in-
capable or unwilling to exploit such opportunities and failed to mount a large-scale political
warfare effort designed to undermine the Soviet state by encouraging and supporting ineluc-
table pressures from within. In the few cases where more enlightened policies were initiated
and pursued, such as in the Caucasus, they were uniformly successful in winning the alle-
giance and practical cooperation of indigenous populations.
Despite Nazi brutality and the generally dismal record of German occupation policies in
the non-Russian territories, Soviet non-Russians collaborated and fought with the Germans
in unprecedented numbers, suggesting that for many of them the Germans remained the
lesser of two evils. Soviet policies toward these nationalities after the war, characterized by
vicious purges and mass deportations, which in some cases assumed genocidal proportions,
indicate that the regime was.clearly aware of the ethnic issue as a key systemic vulnerabili-
ty. To what extent the events and policies described in this report may be relevant to the
Soviet multinational state of today depends on the regime's success in alleviating the griev-
ances of nationalities and ensuring their genuine allegiance to the Soviet state.
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