THE NEW AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00366R000200050005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2007
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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NEWSLETTER
VOL. 5 - NO. 5 $2.00 A COPY
Professor Hans J. Morgenthau
Founder
NATIONAL COMMITTEE
ON AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY, INC.
The Empire State Building
(Suite 8008)
350 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10118
Telephone: [phone]
Professor George Schwab
Editor
The New American Foreign Policy Debate
by
men
The events that coincided with the new
American foreign policy debate, the seizure of the
American embassy in Teheran on November 4,
1979, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on
December 27, 1979, underscored the loss of a
critical American presence and the gain of a criti-
cal Soviet presence in the most volatile region in
the world-the Persian Gulf. The aborted attempt
to rescue the hostages underscored the decline in
American military power and the hesitancy to use
it after the Vietnam debacle; the Soviet invasion
underscored the greatly advanced Soviet military
capability and readiness to use it outside the
Soviet bloc. This situation led Robert W. Tucker to
remark that the security interests in the Persian
Gulf today are essentially the same as those that
were at stake in Europe in the immediate post-
World War II years.' A similar argument was ad-
vanced by Norman Podhoretz in his book, The
Present Danger: "Do We have the Will to Reverse
the Decline of American Power?," which under-
pinned the Reagan administration's foreign policy
by rejecting "the general idea that before Iran and
Afghanistan we had moved from 'cold war' to
'detente' and that the old political struggle be-
tween the `East' and the `West' was yielding in
importance to a new economic conflict between
`North' and `South."' Podhoretz supported his pro-
posal for the restoration of "containment" by
referring to George Kennan's 1947 Foreign Affairs
article that provided the rationale for the post-war
policy of containment. Recent calls for an "open-
society bloc" and the drawing of "lines of
demarcation" are also predicated on the assump-
tion that the cold war never ended and that the
"illusions of detente" are responsible for the pre-
sent decline of American military power. The
debate' raises fundamental questions: Are the
security interests of the United States in Europe
and the. Persian Gulf essentially the same as
those in 1947, or have present realities changed
those interests, requiring the reformulation of the
concept and the restructuring of the conduct of
United States foreign policy? Is detente in fact
responsible for the tilt in the balance of power
toward the Soviet Union, or has detente been
made the scapegoat for the refusal to recognize
realities and adjust United States foreign policy to
meet changed conditions?
When the debate was joined in 1980, it engaged
those who strongly criticized or rejected outright
the major preoccupations of United States foreign
policy since the 1960s-detente, the emphasis on
human rights, and the north-south agenda-and
those who attempted to justify these concerns in
whole or in part. Both sides recognized that there
had occurred a tilt in the balance of power toward
the Soviet Union and that the United States
needed to take measures to offset it. The debate
was not a clash between hawks and doves but a
ventilation of differences between proponents of
G. L. Ulmen is co-director of the Chinese
History Project and associate in the Univer-
sity Seminar on Tradition and Change in
South and Southeast Asia at Columbia Uni-
versity. He is executive director of GeoData,
Inc., and a member of the board of directors
of the National Committee on American For-
eign Policy. He has published articles and
books on history and social theory in the
United States and Europe. His political writ-
ings include the Introduction and the Con-
clusion to United States Foreign Policy at
the Crossroads, edited by George Schwab.
The views of G. L. Ulman do not neces-
sarily reflect those of the National Commit-
tee on American Foreign Policy.
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conflicting views of the natiar?ial interest. Em-
phasis was placed on American security and the
related question of energy, in particular oil and
the power vacuum in the Persian Gulf. Indicative
o1 the salience of the debate was a conference on
the goals of United States foreign policy held in
the fall of 1980. The conferees did not evince any
specific concern with Europe, the focal point of
the cold war and the policy of containment, or
with Southeast Asia, the focal point of American
military and political involvement in the years
when detente was being pursued vigorously.2 The
first omission can most likely be attributed to the
legitimation of postwar European borders in the
1975 Helsinki Agreements; the second, to the
conclusion of the Vietnam War. Other more funda-
mental issues, which have become sharper in
1982, were in evidence.
The emphasis has shifted to the security of the
whole "free world"; the related issue is riot con-
fined to energy and oil but encompasses the
gamut of economic relations among the allies and
between the allies and the Soviet Union. The rea-
sons for this shift have as much to do with the
growing awareness of the new realities confront-
ing the Western world as they do with those faced
by the Eastern world. Contributing to the growth
of awareness were the diverse reactions of the
Western allies to the Soviet invasion of Afghan-
istan, to the imposition of martial law in Poland
on December 13, 1981, to U. S. involvement in El
Salvador, and to President Reagan's opposition to
the Soviet-European natural gas pipeline and his
extension of sanctions in June 1982 to overseas
subsidiaries of American companies and non-
American firms producing equipment under
United States licenses, exacerbating problems in
trans-Atlantic relations. During the Falklands
crisis, the United States backed a European
power (Great Britain) against a hemisphere power
(Argentina) for the first time since the Monroe
Doctrine was enunciated in 1823, exacerbating
tensions in inter-American relations.
Implicit in the present debate is the question of
the future of the United States as a world power-
the whole spectrum of United States relations
with the world. Underscoring the importance of
the debate are recent United States actions that
have raised the essential political question of the
criterion for distinguishing between friends and
enemies and what follows or should follow
therefrom in light of the present realities.
The Decflhe W 4 he Superpowers
The reality that circumscribes all others is the
decline in influence of both the United States and
the Soviet Union - relatively with respect to their
blocs and absolutely with respect to the third
world - brouc about by the advent of nuclear
parity, the fact that the superpowers have lo: t
their statuses as model societies, the growth of
the European Economic Community, the growing
restiveness in Eastern Europe, and the fact that
the will to independence has become the
strongest political force in the third world.
The Reagan administration continues to equate
the decline of American influence with the
decline of American power and seeks to regain a
preponderance of influence by strengthening its
nuclear arsenal and its conventional military
forces as well. But its policymakers have not
demonstrated that they understand the reasors
for the present situation. With respect to the ad-
vent of nuclear parity, the blame has been laid to
detente rather than to the fact that American
predominance had to give way to parity once the
Soviet Union succeeded in creating a nuclear
arsenal after World War II. It would have been
economically and politically prohibitive for the
United States to attempt to maintain its nuclear
superiority had there been no detente. American
predominance was the result of historical circum-
stances following World War II. It formed no real
basis for a balance of power and it is ill-suited 10
the maintenance of peace and stability in the con-
temporary world. The failure of the United States
and its allies to maintain parity in conventional
forces reflects the illusions of nuclear predomi-
nance rather than the illusions of detente. The
decline of the United States in world affairs can
be laid to the shattering of the illusions of
predominance, nuclear as well as economic.
Nuclear parity has negated nuclear power as a
military option short of mutual annihilation, rei i-
forcing the central role of politics in international
relations. Because the Soviet challenge to
American and Western interests has always been
more political than military, the present Soviet
buildup serves to heighten the political factor.
The, antinuclear movement in Western Europe s
indicative of fundamental changes that have oc-
curred on the Continent, which in turn have af-
fected the respective influence of the super-
powers. The United States lost its predominance
in the Atlantic alliance primarily because of the
success of its policies, whereas the Soviet Union
is losing its ideological hold on Eastern Europe
primarily because of the failure of its policies.
The United States and the Soviet Union also
face problems associated with their declining in-
fluence in the third world, to which Helmut
Schmidt called attention last spring in Foreign Af-
fairs: "The troubled beginning of the 1980s has
made it apparent that the will for independence,
self-reliance and nonalignment has become the
strongest political force in the countries of the
third world - perhaps the only one unitirg
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 them."3 In his June 1982 Phi Beta9appa oration at
Harvard University John Kenneth Galbraith main-
tained that the superpowers must understand
that ". . . the age of imperialism, both old and new,
is indeed over" and that what we call weakness is
nothing more or less than accommodation to this
new reality.4 Galbraith concluded by suggesting
that the decline of the superpowers spells, or, it is
to be hoped, will spell the decline of the major
power blocs: "The image of the world divided into
spheres of influence - an American orbit, a
Soviet orbit - is strong. Strategists, telling
themselves of their hard-nosed realism, will con-
tinue to look at a map and assign countries to one
great power or the other. Let the rest of us agree
that, in the real world, anything that smacks of
domination is a two-edged sword that, sooner
rather than later, smites those who wield it....
Let us recognize and conclude, accordingly, that
we are not on a collision course with the Soviets
in the new lands, unless, in error, we will it so. The
commitment to independence is imposing with-
drawal on us both."
Recognizing one reality, Galbraith appears to
have ignored the others. He seems to have dis-
missed power as irrelevant to the will to indepen-
dence. History has changed but not to the extent
that Galbraith would have us believe. Power-
holders do not willingly accept the diminution of
power in the face of new realities. They can and
will adjust to new realities when they are con-
fronted with challenges posed by opposing
power. Whether in Europe or the third world, what
the Soviet Union euphemistically calls the "com-
petition between the two systems" will be accom-
modated to the "will to independence" only to the
extent that that will can be galvanized to meet
that competition. Precisely because of the "will to
independence," the United States should use its
power in partnership with its allies to bring to
reality the world of which Galbraith dreams.
New Prospects for Western Security
In February 1981 the directors of the Council on
Foreign Relations (New York), the Research Insti-
tute of the German Society of Foreign Relations
(Bonn), the French Institute of International Rela-
tions (Paris), and the Royal Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs (London), together with an advisory
group of international experts on foreign policy,
published a report, Western Security: What Has
Changed? What Should Be Done?.5 The questions
raised by the authors of the report reflect a con-
sensus that the challenges facing the Western na-
tions in the 1980s are formidable precisely
because of new realities. The statement of these
new realities is as significant as the proposals:
the enhancedlviet military capability in Europe
and the third world; the heightened importance of
the third world for Western security, that is, the
realization that Western security can no longer be
limited to events occurring in and threats posed
to the NATO countries, nor can security be iso-
lated from crises arising in other regions vital to
the West economically and militarily; the pro-
longed worldwide economic crisis that has sharp-
ened north-south tensions and increased com-
petition among the Western nations, exacerbat-
ing social tensions within the Western alliance;
the domestic political problems that are con-
straining the ability of Western European coun-
tries to devote more of their resources to defense
and other efforts needed to respond effectively to
external challenges and the discrepancy in
"burden sharing" that has triggered new strains
in_thealliance. The current trans-Atlantic crisis
encompasses issues ranging from economics to
defense to basic questions of foreign policy. It is
new in the sense that it has generated a great deal
of public disagreement and has contributed to
mutual suspicions, misperceptions, and mis-
understandings, resulting in accusations of "self-
neutralization" or "self-Finlandization" on one
side and policies of "incoherence" and "zig-zag"
on the other.
Because the report is focused on East-West
relations in Europe and in the third world and their
effects on European-American relations, it pro-
ceeds from a diagnosis of the current trans-
Atlantic crisis to Western relations with the Soviet
Union, Western security concerns in the third
world, and ways to improve the coordination of
policy inside and outside NATO. Notable is the
analysis of structural trends dividing Americans
and Europeans. There has occurred a gradual
evolution of the United States away from a
Europe-centered foreign policy to a more global
approach, reflecting the rise to power of new
political elites and--even more important, the-
development of a nationalistic mood associated
with the decline of America's stature in the world
as a result of Vietnam. This mood is reflected in a
growing impatience with and irritation at the third
world, Soviet behavior, and the European allies for
"not doing enough." The younger political elites
in Western Europe view the U.S. decline as the
result of the Vietnam debacle, the economic
power of Western Europe, and the concomitant
desire of Western European states to assert them-
selves in world affairs. But, as the authors of the
report note, the growth of European economic
power has not been accompanied by a change in
the security relationship between the allies. The
greatly increased Soviet military capability (nu-
clear and conventional) has increased Europe's
dependence on the United States, sharpening the
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contradiction in the trans-Atlantic relationship in
which "the protege has become as rich as the pro-
tector and more reluctant to follow its lead and
yet does not assume the political and military
responsibilities which come with its newly ac-
quired economic might." In short, the relative
decline in the capacity of the United States to
exert leadership has not been offset by a rise in
European leadership, thus weakening the struc-
tural basis of Western power. Moreover, increased
Soviet leverage in Western Europe as well as
Western European doubts about the United
States security guarantee have increased strains
among the allies.
The upshot of these international realities is
that neither the United States nor Europe can face
the challenges of the 1980s alone; a new "trans-
Atlantic bargain" must be struck. The authors of
the report seek to promote the establishment of
coresponsibility by defining common objectives.
They speak of "a political alliance of like-minded
states" and propose an approach centered on a
small number of "principal nations" wiilling and
able to take a direct role in dealing with a par-
ticular problem. The principal nations would vary
according to the issue at hand, but the "core
group" would consist of the United States, Bri-
tain, France, Germany, and Japan. Consultations
among these nations should encompass both
economic and political issues, which would serve
to coordinate East-West relations, as well as rela-
tions with the third world.
Another proposal for revitalizing the Western
alliance calls for an "open-society bloc" and
drawing "lines of demarcation." First advanced in
1980 by George Schwab in this Newsletter and
elsewhere" and expanded on by John H. Herz in
the August 1982 issue of this Newsletter,' its
similarities to and dissimilarities from the
Western Security Report are as significant as
those between Schwab and Herz in what they
reveal about the challenges confronting United
States foreign policymakers in the 1980s. There is
an apparent similarity between "a political alli-
ance of like-minded states" and an "open-society
bloc," for the authors of the report and Schwab
and Herz speak of "core countries"; but whereas
the concepts formulated in the report are based
mainly on an analysis of new realities, those of
Schwab and Herz also owe a debt to the German
political theorist Carl Schmitt, who can legiti-
mately be called the gray eminence of American
political realism because his ideas have influ-
enced Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger as
well as many other European emigre scholars and
political commentators on the American political
scene from the 1930s to the present."
In this Newsletter Schwab employed Schmitt's
concept of homogeneity, which refers to a histor-
ically developed community (in this case, states)
sharing a common heritage, tradition, and values.
In May 1982, shortly before his resignation,
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., put for-
ward his own concept of homogeneity.9 About the
same time, Helmut Rumpf, the leading German
authority on Schmitt, published "Ideological
Homogeneity in Alliances" in the journal
Aussenpolitik (Foreign Policy).10 It is clear that the
concept has wide implications-ideological as
well as historical.
Schwab has something quite specific in mind.
Because the United States alone can no longer
confront the Soviet Union and inasmuch as the
Soviet challenge is common to the non-Soviet
world in general and to the "free world" in particu-
lar, "the immediate overriding foreign policy goal
of the United States must be to forge an alliance
of the open-society countries that would be an-
chored in a loosely-knit but well-orchestrated
open-society bloc." Such a bloc would consist of
"core" countries sharing a fundamental commit-
ment to positive freedoms and human values. Its
members would determine which other "'margin-
al" countries (whose societies tend toward being
"open") should be included in security zones
defined by "lines of demarcation." Because
contention between the East and the West is
worldwide in scope, such lines would be drawn
accordingly. Unlike the boundaries proposed in
the Western Security Report, which are to be com-
prised of "core" countries within the Atlantic al li?-
ance, Schwab's "core" countries include all
"open societies" in the Western hemisphere,
Europe, the Middle East and the Far East.
Like Schwab, Herz credits Carl Schmitt with
having rediscovered the "amity lines" drawn by
the European states in the "age of discoveries" to
separate a European system based on the mutual
recognition of territorial status and the acquisi-
tion of land from the newly discovered world
"beyond the line." Although Herz notes that
Schmitt gave due recognition to the "power bloc"
defined by the Monroe Doctrine, he comments
that in a later work Schmitt "strangely ignored"
the attempts of Germany and Japan to establish
power blocs in the 1930s." But Nazi Germany's
acquisition of Lebensraum (living space) and
militarist Japan's East Asia Coprosperity Sphere
were manifestly not what Schmitt had in mind
when he formulated his concept of a Gross.
raumordnung-literally, a large-space order; ac-
tually, an extraterritorial order. The Axis blocs
were not defensive but aggressive in nature;
Schmitt's extraterritorial order was conceived to
be defensive in nature. The unique character of
the Monroe Doctrine, flowing from the geopolit-
ical position of the United States in the Western
Hemisphere, allowed the United States to draw a
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defensive line of demarcation around the New
World that did not depend on the consent of the
countries within or beyond this line.12 For Schmitt
the core of the Monroe Doctrine was "the union of
a politically awakened people, a political idea,
and the exclusion of foreign intervention from the
area [Grossraum] ruled politically by this idea."
Moreover, Schmitt averred, it was not the sub-
stance of the doctrine but the concept of Gross-
raumordnung in international law that was
transferrable to other areas, other situations, and
other "friend-enemy arrangements." Neverthe-
less, Schmitt rejected attempts to "universalize"
his concept-to extend the geopolitical principle
of an extraterritorial order to a global order.13
Schwab's and Herz's "open-society bloc,"
drawing on the concepts of homogeneity, extra-
territorial order, and amity lines, constitutes a
new .concept JL a_gh baL_order. Jjnli,ke S_chwab,.__
Herz conceives of both the Soviet bloc and the
"open-society bloc" as defensive in nature; but
like Schwab, Herz distinguishes an "open socie-
ty" as "characterized by cultural pluralism, the
free. competition of opinions and of groups pro-
moting them, and at least some social rights."
The common geopolitical denominator in their
conceptions appears to be the drawing of "lines
of demarcation" that would prevent Soviet or
other outside power intervention at the risk of
armed conflict. Implicit in the formulation is the
understanding that an "open-society bloc" would
refrain from intervening beyond similar lines of
demarcation drawn by the Soviet Union.
Despite differences in terminology and em-
phasis, the fundamental question raised in both
the Western Security Report and the proposals of
Schwab and Herz is whether like-mindedness or
the commitment to "open societies," historically
and/or ideologically understood, is sufficient in
the absence of agreement about -the nature and
___goals ofthe common enemy-to revitalize and sus-
tain the Western alliance.
From Containment to
Counteroffensive
Reviewing the conduct of United States foreign
policy at the end of 1981, Robert E. Osgood
characterized the main ideological thrust of the
Reagan administration as "the Revitalization of
Containment."14 Several leading members of the
Reagan administration either are or have been at-
tached to the Committee for the Free World,
founded by Podhoretz and a group of intellectuals
in the United States, Canada, England, France,
and Italy at the end of 1980. The original purpose
of the Committee was "to conduct a battle of
ideas in defense of Western values and institu-
0
tions," indeed to defend and preserve" the "free
world" against the rising menace of totalitarian
barbarism. On January 10, 1982, the committee
called on Americans "to seize the historic oppor-
tunity now presented by the Polish crisis" to at-
tempt to break the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe
by denying Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
"Western loans, Western grain and, above all,
Western technology." In so doing, the United
States could presumably "further the process of
disintegration from within that may mark the
beginning of the end of the Soviet Empire."15
President Reagan assumed a similarly, of fen-
sive stance in his address to Parliament on June
8, 1982.16 Noting the fact that since 1917 the
Soviet Union has given political training and
assistance to Marxist-Leninists in many coun-
tries, thereby promoting violence and subversion,
Reaan annQUn-ced_hi.s_intention_to_offer ?-`o n
assistance to fraternal, political, and social in-
stitutions to bring about peaceful and democratic
progress." He revealed that'-the chairmen and
other leadprs of both the Republican and Demo-
cratic party organizations were preparing to in-
itiate a study with the bipartisan American
Political Foundation "to determine how the
United States can contribute as a nation to the
global campaign for democracy now gathering
force." His message resembled the rhetoric of
"rollback" advanced by John Foster Dulles three
decades ago: "What I am describing now is a plan
and a hope for the long-term-the march of free-
dom and democracy, which will leave Marxism-
Leninism on the ash-heap of history as it has left
other tyrannies which stifled the freedom and
muzzled the self-expression of the people." In the
subsequent exchange of toasts, Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher characterized the speech as
"putting freedom on the offensive." She was soon
to learn, as were our other European allies, that
-the Reagan administration would do more to of-
fend the friends of freedom than its enemies.
The principal new element in President
Reagan's revised national security policy is "the
determination to prevail over the Soviet Union."
The key word prevail is defined as "turning back
the Soviet Union, reversing the geographic expan-
sion of Soviet political influence and military
presence but not winning in the World War II
sense of unconditional surrender."17 This concept
animates the strategic guidelines approved for
the armed forces and the administration's
strategy for protracted nuclear war. It also serves
to justify the use of economic pressures as a way
to persuade the Soviet Union to halt its military
expansion. But, as Steven Rattner noted, eco-
nomic pressures backfire: "Once again, economic
warfare with all its attendant bitterness seems to
have broken out. Only this time, the combatants
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are not political antagonists b~]?fraditional allies,
the United States and Europe. Last week tensions
of several months' standing over the Soviet
natural gas pipeline and European steel exports
to the American market developed into a breach
that appears unlikely to be healed quickly."18
George W. Ball recently noted that the opponents
of the pipeline "are motivated less by logic than
by a vindictive desire to discipline upstart Euro-
peans who challenge the President's diktat."19 In-
deed, questions beyond economics and law are at
issue: Far more critical questions can be raised
about the political sense of the Reagan ad-
ministration and the political unity of the Western
alliance. Jean-Pierre Chevenement, the French
minister of Research and Industry, characterized
his government's decision to reject the sanctions
as an "act of sovereignty,"20 and such a
characterization can also be applied to similar re-
jections made by Britain and West Germany.
Reassertions of sovereignty underlined the failure
of the United States to recognize new realities.
Helmut Schmidt captured the essence of the
changed relationship when he remarked that "we
Europeans are aware that only in its alliance with
Western Europe can the United States meet its
responsibility as a world power .... Only in close
cooperation, mobilizing each partner's potential
for the common cause, will Europeans and
Americans be able to make their contributions to
the world's political and economic balance.' 121
Toward a New "Year of Eur
pe99
When Nixon and Kissinger designated 1973 the
Year of Europe, both the Americans and the Euro-
peans were reluctant to deal with the implications
of projected nuclear parity and strains in
economic relations connected with the growing
power of the European Community. As Kissinger
observed, "for many years no attempt had been
made to define what was fundamental. Nor had
any American leader been required to live with the
reality of an assertive Europe.... Neither side of
the Atlantic had addressed seriously the issues
that would determine the West's future: How
much unity do we need? How much diversity can
we stand?"22 The questions were right on target,
even though the timing was wrong. Kissinger
revealed that his Year of Europe speech was
copied self-consciously from Secretary of State
George C. Marshall's announcement of the U.S.
plan for European recovery and reconstruction
and that both Nixon and he were "seduced by our
own nostalgia for historic initiative," which led
them to run afoul of "conditions that had changed
drastically since 1947." Whereas the Marshall
Plan provided massive American aid for the
reconstructio0of Europe, the Nixon-Kissinger
Atlantic Declaration offered no immediate tancJi-
ble benefits.
The European leaders of 1973 perceived a con-
flict between European identity and Atlantic uni-
ty. Although the conflict is still apparent today,
some of the impediments to unity, namely, Viet-
nam and Watergate, have been removed since
then. The tenth anniversary of the Year of Europe
offers new possibilities for tying the United States
and Europe into a coherent system to resolve both
economic and security questions. Japan was in-
cluded in the larger community of "industrial de-
mocracies" envisioned by the proponents of the
Year of Europe, even though its interest in the
defense and political issues wracking the "free
world" was minimal compared to its interest in
the economic disputes. The Western Security
Report takes economic relations into considera-
tion; the proposals for an "open-society bloc" do
not. But both include Japan in the Western securi-
ty system.
Because the original Year of Europe was pro-
posed during the heyday of detente-the issue
around which all the others turn in this new
debate-a new Year of Europe would necessarily
have to deal with the question of relations wi?h
the Soviet bloc. In 1973 the Soviet strategy of "d f-
ferential detente," setting the democracies
against one another and dividing Europe from
America, was elucidated by Nixon in his appeal i:o
the Europeans: "What I see, if we do not seize this
moment, is a race to Moscow-each country n
the West and in Europe going to Moscow i:o
negotiate and make deals. Of course there must
be individual meetings, but there must be some
underlying philosophy that animates us all. Other-
wise, those shrewd and determined men in the
Kremlin will eat us one by one. They cannot digest
us altogether, but they can pick at us one by on.
That is why it is so important that we maintain the
Atlantic Community. ..."23 The moment was not
seized, and the race to Moscow began, discredit-
ing detente.
Not detente but the lack of "some underlying
philosophy" to unite the Western alliance brought
East-West relations to the present crisis in
Europe and in the third world. If the past decade
has demonstrated that detente is unworkable
without some unifying philosophy or principle
underlying the Western alliance, whether it be the
commitment to open societies, Western security,
or other objectives, the events of the past fe'N
months have demonstrated that the economic
and political realities facing the West have ex-
acerbated differences about reducing tensions
between the East and the West. A realistic con-
cept of detente-in the context of deterrence-is
the basis for forging a new trans-Atlantic bargain.
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? Notes ?
1. Robert W. Tucker, "The Purposes of American Power," Voelkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum (Berlin, 1950,
Foreign Affairs, Winter 1980/81, p. 249. 1974).
2. See the author's "Introduction" and "Conclusion" to 12. Alejandro Alvarez, The Monroe Doctrine: Its Importance in
United States Foreign Policy at the Crossroads, edited by the International Life of the States of the New World,
George Schwab. Westport, Conn., 1982, pp. xix-xxvii, published for the Carnegie Endowment for International
217-238. Peace, Division of International Law (Washington) by Ox-
3. Helmut Schmidt, "A Policy of Reliable Partnership," ford University Press (New York, 1924), pp. 22 ff.
Foreign Affairs, Spring 1981, pp. 749 and 745. See also in 13. Schmitt, Grossraumordnung, pp. 17 ff.
the same issue David P. Calleo, "Inflation and American 14. Osgood's article appears in the special issue of Foreign
Power"; Pierre Lellouche, "Europe and Her Defense"; and Affairs, "America and the World, 1981," vol. 60, no. 3,
Josef Joffe, "European-American Relations: The Endur- 1982.
ing Crisis." 15. See "Poland: Choosing Sides," The New York Times,
4. John Kenneth Galbraith, "The Second Imperial Requiem," January 10, 1982.
Harvard Magazine, September-October 1982, pp. 29-33. 16. "Address of the President to Both Houses of Parliament,"
5. Karl Kaiser, Winston Lord, Thierry de Montbrial, and David the Palace of Westminster; and "Exchange of Toasts Be-
Watt, Western Security: What Has Changed? What tween the President and Prime Minister Margaret That-
Should Be Done? New York: Council on Foreign Rela- cher at Reception and Luncheon Honoring the President,"
tions, 1981. No. 10 Downing Street, both issued by the White House,
6. See George Schwab, "From Quantity and Heterogeneity Office of the Press Secretary (London, England), June
to Quality and Homogeneity: Toward a New Foreign 8, 1982.
Policy" in the August/October 1980 issue of this 17. "Revised U.S. Policy Said to Focus on 'Prevailing' over the
Newsletter; "American Foreign Politics at the Russians," The New York Times, June 17, 1982. See
Crossroads: Idealism versus Realism" in Innen- and Caspar Weinberger's letter to forty newspapers in Europe,
Aussenpolitik: Primat oder Interdependenz? Australia, and America concerning the Reagan ad-
(Bern/Stuttgart, 1980), pp. 223-228, and "Toward an Open- ministrations's nuclear strategy and one representative
Society Bloc" in United States Foreign Policy at the European reaction that touches on the wider issues of
-Cr"ossroa -relations between the United States and Caspar
7. See John H. Herz, "Foreign Policy in the Framework of an Weinberger, "Unsere Politik ist Frieden: Das Paradoxen
Open-Society Bloc," August 1982. der Abschreckung" (Our Policy is Peace: The Paradoxes
8. See George Schwab, The Challenge of the Exception: An of Deterrence), and Theo Sommer, "Frieden ja-aber
Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt be- wie?: Die Ungereimtheiten der US-Verteidigungs-
tween 1921 and 1936 (Berlin, 1970); and Joseph W. Bender- plannung" (Peace Yes-But at What Price?: The Absur-
sky, Constitutional Stability and Dictatorship: A Political dities of U.S. Defense Planning) in Die Zeit, no. 36-10,
Biography of Carl Schmitt, forthcoming later this year September 1982. See also Bernard Gwertzman, "Schultz
from Princeton University Press. The explicit link between Foresees Upsets in Communist Nations," The New York
Schmitt and Morgenthau was forged in the latter's criti- Times, October 19, 1982.
que [in La Notion de "politique" et /a Theorie des dif- 18. Steven Rattner, "Europeans Felt They Had Assurances on
ferends internationaux (Paris, 1933), pp. 35-37 and 44-64] Gas and Steel," The New York Times, Sunday, August 29,
of Schmitt's friend-enemy criterion elaborated in "Der 1982.
Begriff des Politischen," published in 1927 in Archiv fuer 19. George W. Ball, "The Case Against Sanctions," The New
Sozialwissenschaft and Sozialpolitik, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. York Times Magazine, Sunday, September 12, 1982. Harry
1-33, and further elaborated on in a book of the same title J. Gray, Chairman of United Technologies Corp., also op-
in 1932. See Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, posed U.S. sanctions against the pipeline. See his speech
Translation, Introduction, and Notes by George Schwab entitled "Technology, Trade, and Industrial Transition" of
(New Brunswick, N.J., 1976). Schmitt's influence is im- October6, 1982 presented at Convergence'82.
plicit in all the editions of Morgenthau's Politics Among 20. Quoted in Rattner, op. cit.
Nations and many of his other writings. In his review of 21. See Helmut Schmidt, "A Policy of Reliable Partnership,"
the first volume of Kissinger's memoirs White House Foreign Affairs, Spring 1981. See also Hans-Dietrich
Years, entitled "The Case of Dr. Kissinger," New York Genscher, "Toward an Overall Western Strategy for
Review of Books, December 6, 1979, pp. 22 ff., Stanley Peace, Freedom, and Progress," Foreign Affairs, Fall
Hoffmann drew attention to the influence of Schmitt's 1982, pp. 42-66.
friend-enemy criterion on Kissinger's notion of constant 22. See "The Year of Europe" in Henry Kissinger, Years of
and inevitable struggle. Upheaval (BostonlToronto, 1982), pp. 128-194.
9. See The New York Times, May 30, 1982. 23. Ibid.
10. See Aussenpolitik 33,2, 1982.
11. See Carl Schmitt, Voelkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung
mit Interventionsverbot fuer raumfremde Maechte ? Copyright by the National Committee on American Foreign
FOR THE RECORD
The National Committee on American Foreign Policy, concerned by the lack of definition of
American national interests, recommends that the United States act on the basis of clearly
established priorities:
1. The committee urges that the administration modify its behavior toward friends and allies
regarding the formulation of a common policy toward the Soviet Union. The committee therefore
suggests that the administration initiate a dialogue with America's friends and allies so that a
common approach to the problem can be formulated and pursued.
2. In the view of the committee, it is in the United States' interest that Central America
become politically and economically stable. The administration must endeavor to eliminate Soviet
influence there. The national interest dictates that in order to attain stability, peace, and progress
in Central America, the United States should promote the development of the political center that
is committed to achieving political pluralism and a mixed economy.
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?
f a1 o D COMMIJUSS News
RECENT EVENTS: On September 29, 1982, the Na-
tional Committee held its annual dinner meeting
at the Graduate Center of the City University of
New York. In the course of the evening the follow-
ing were elected officers for 1982-1983:
Ambassador Angier Biddle Duke, Honorary President
Ambassador Arnold Saltzman, Chairman of the Board and
Chairman of the Executive Committee
Ambassador Francis L. Kellogg, President
Albert Bildner, Vice President, Management and Administration
Dr. Mordecai Hacohen, Vice President, Academic Affairs
Prof. George Schwab, Vice President, Policy Issues and
Publications
Joan Peters, Secretary
The following were elected
to the executive committee
Morris Abram, Esq.
Floyd Abrams
Professor H. Adelson
Harold S. Ames
Joanne Cummings
Jeffrey Endervelt
Jac Friedgut
Mrs. Herbert Gussman
Frederick I. Haber
Hon. Ira Hirschman
Harriette Levine
Professor F. H. Littell
Jerome Lipper, Esq.
Hon. John Loeb, Jr.
Prof. Vojtech Mastny
William Pickens III
Hon. Maxwell Rabb
Prof. Fred Singer
Herbert Singer
Maurice Sonnenberg
The following were elected
to the board of directors for 1982-1983:
Prof. Gil Carl AiRoy
Cleveland Amory
Henry H. Arnold
Prof. Kenneth J. Arrow
Saul Bellow
Dr. Bruno Bettelheim
Prof. Albert P. Blaustein
Prof. Bernard E. Brown
Hon. Harland Cleveland
Hon. Guilford Dudley, Jr.
Dr. A. Roy Eckhardt
Sheldon H. Elsen, Esq.
Steven R. Fenster
Dr. J. S. Feynman
Prof. Seymor M. Finger
Lawrence P. Fraiberg
Maj. Gen. Robert N. Ginsburgh (Ret.)
Samuel Givelber
Fitzhugh Green
Prof. Franz B. Gross
Dean Edmund A. Gullion
Hon. Roger Hilsman
Dr. Rael Jean Isaac
Leon I. Jacobson, Esq.
Eric M. Javits
George L. Knox
Helen Lange
Albert List
Dean John M. Lowe
Winston McGuire
Robert Myers
Msgr. John M. Oesterreicher
Prof. Richard Pipes
Prof. John P. Roche
Dean Henry Flosovsky
Bayard Rustin
Robert W. Sarnoff
Prof. Paul Seabury
Prof. David Sidorsky
Alan Siegel
Dr. Arnold Soloway
Jacob Stein
Peggy Tishman
Terence Todrnan, Jr.
Prof. Robert W. Tucker
G. L. Ulmen
Jay Wells
Prof. Eugene P. Wigner
William Woodward
r
NWes on Members
Professor Bernard E. Brown is the author of
Socialism of a Different Kind, Reshaping, the Left
in France. The book is part of Professor George
.Schwab's series entitled Global Perspectives in
History and Politics, published by Greenwood
Press.
Viola Herms Drath is the author of "The Other
Helmut," which appeared in Handelsblatt on
September 20. Miss Drath has been invited to par-
ticipate in the fourth American-German E,;o-
nomic Conference of the Friedrich Ebert Founda-
tion in Reston, Virginia. It will be held in
November, and the topic to be considered is
"Free World Trade at Stake."
Professor Seymour Maxwell Finger was recer tly
interviewed on the ABC Television network's pro-
gram "The United Nations: Peacekeeping, Refu-
gees, and Human Rights."
Professor Stephanie Neuman has just com-
pleted a report for the Department of State on
rnilitary industries in the third world. Dr. Neuman
will participate in October in a UNESCO collo-
quium in Paris on "Armament - Development --
Human Rights - Disarmament."
FUTURE EVENTS: On November 1, 1982, Ambas-
sador Ahmed Esmat Abdel Meguid of the perma-
nent mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the
U.N. will speak on the latest developments in the
Middle East. The breakfast meeting will be held in
the Racquet and Tennis Club, 370 Park Avenue.
The National Committee is sponsoring a fact-
finding mission to Paris, Bonn, and Copenhagen.
For further information about the November 5-14
trip, please phone the office: [phone].
On November 23, 1982, Ambassador Sir John
Thomson of the permanent mission of Great Elri.?
tain to the U.N. will speak on "The U.N.--Does; It
work?" The breakfast meeting will be held at the
Racquet and Tennis Club.
NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
Hon. Angier Biddle Duke Hon. Arnold Saltzman Prof. George Schwab
Honorary President Chairman of the Board Vice President
Chairman of the Executive Policy Issues and
Hon. Francis L. Kellogg Committee Publications
President
Dr. Mordecai Hacohen Albert Bildner
Joan Peters Vice President Vice President
Secretary Academic Affairs Management and
Administration
Herbert D. Spivack
Executive Director
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY Newsletter A Bimonthly Publication
$2.00 a copy Subscription price $10.00
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