REPORT ON 10-11 JUNE 1982 MEETING OF PMAP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00366R000100100012-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2007
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: July 8, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM:
Chairman, Political-Military Advisory Panel
SUBJECT: Report on 10-11 June 1982 Meeting of PMAP
Four members of the PMAP-Messrs -met 25X1
at CIA Headquarters on 10-11 June to consider several topics summarized below and
detailed at Tabs A through C. Attendance wasp limited owing to scheduling difficulties,
indicating the importance of planning full meetings far in advance.
1. As requested, the members reviewed the DDI's current production
plan and the NIC's program for estimates. The group concluded that
it is unable to give adequate advice on these plans as resource
management tools. It proposes that more useful service could be
rendered by reviewing the design, conduct, and findings of major
analyses and estimates of a political-military character.
Insufficient time was available for organizing such reviews at this
meeting. (TAB A)
2. The panel members discussed the on-going war in Lebanon at some
length with DDI and NIC personnel. There was a rough consensus
among us that: a) Israeli forces will remain in Lebanon for a
considerable time, b) both the US and the USSR were showing
themselves relatively impotent in influencing the crisis, and c) as of
11 June it appeared that Soviet interests would suffer significantly
greater damage than those of the US, at least in the short and
medium term, barring some new Soviet action. The members
differed sharply as to their prediction of likely Soviet responses.
(TAB B)
3. At the request of D/NESA, the panel members met with DDI and
DDO personnel to examine ways in which Soviet political action
efforts in Iran could be better understood. It was judged that the
Soviets are probably now engaged in a broad and long-term effort to
build political influence mechanisms inside Iran after a period in
which they may have expected more rapid development of the
Iranian revolution from Islamic into leftist directions. Some
methodological and topical suggestions for working this problem
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were made by the panel members. It is proposed that a specific
interdirectorate project be organized on this subject, which panel
members may advise from time to time over the next several
months. (TAB C)
Attachments:
as stated
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SUBJECT: Report on 10-11 June 1982 Meeting of PMAP
Distribution:
1- DDI
1- ADDI
1- Ch/NIC
1 - C/PES
1- D/NESA
1-
1-
1-
1-
1- IPC Staff/-Ch ono
1-IPC Staff/Subieet Fite
DDI/IPC
7 July 1982)
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TAB A: Production Plan Review
At the request of the DDI and the C/NIC the panel members spent several hours
reviewing the DDI production plan and the NIC estimates schedule. This led to the
following main observations from some or all of the participating members:
and fairly inclusive statement of the analytic priorities and
requirements of the DCI as seen by his directly controlled
analytical assets. On the whole the panel members found
little to quarrel with as regards these priorities. At the
highest level of aggregation, for example, the panel thought
Taken together these two production plans represent a broad
more attention among Latin American
priority #12, industrial competitiveness, might be dropped at
topics, and were told that it would, in fact, when necessary
talents were assembled. One member suggested that DDI
as not exercising the comparative
advantage of the Intelligence Community. We were told that
this is a special concern of the DCI and the Administration
which the Department of Commerce will not or cannot
analyze.
We noted that the structure of themes and projects in the DDI
seemed to reflect an intention under the old DDI organization
to get cross-office cooperation in regional topics. Under the
present regional organization of the DDI, cross-regional
analysis may suffer. For example, East Europe is now
coupled with West Europe and, although the problems posed
by East Europe for the USSR are a major DDI theme, we note
little attention to the subject of Soviet policy toward East
Europe.
We were told, and some of us know from experience, that
plans such as these are very hard to make prescriptive or
even reasonably descriptive of the future because all manner
of things intervene to force resources onto other, usually
time urgent topics. Some of us felt, however, that these
plans, as broad descriptions of what the analytical staffs
ought to be working on, coupled with reasoned statements of
manpower requirements, could be used to develop the case
for analysis personnel additions.
The panel members felt uniformly that our backgrounds and
roles made it much more appropriate for us to offer counsel
on the substance of major projects and groups of projects,
rather than on macro-management. Here two suggestions are
offered: First, we could help design clusters of projects
intended as building blocks toward larger thematic goals.
Here the help would be methodological. Second, the panel (or
selected members) could assist in a running critique of
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projects in areas likely to prove controversial as findings
emerge. Here the help would be quality-control before the
fact, and aid in defense of the work later on. We recalled
that the MEAP had been helpful in both respects over the
years. (The panel sought to arrange such project reviews for
SOYA and NESA, but time was too short for this session.)
The overall subject of the interrelationship of Soviet internal
developments and Soviet external behavior would appear to
be a good candidate in both respects.
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TAB B: Lebanon Crisis
Intermittently during the two-day meeting, and for the bulk of one afternoon, the
panel members discussed the on-going crisis in Lebanon with NIC and DDI personnel.
This discussion produced a number of observations about the crisis' future implications:
As of the middle of June the political consequences of the
crisis remain extremely uncertain despite the unambiguous
military victory of Israeli forces over the PLO and the
Syrians. The political outcome remains to be determined by
the development of an unusually large number of unusually
uncertain variables.
-The condition of the PLO as a political organization and
the state of the Palestinian movement in general.
-Reactions within Israel to the conflict and its costs;
physical, political, and moral.
-Impact on the Assad regime in Syria.
-Arab reaction to the relative impotence of all actors
other than Israel.
-Possible shifts in US attitudes and behavior toward
Israel.
-Soviet reaction to another demonstration of the USSR's
inability or unwillingness to help Middle East clients
directly attacked by Israel.
Probable Soviet actions were the subject of lengthy discussion
and sharp divergence of views. All agreed that the Soviets
are, as of this moment, a major loser in the crisis. Its arms,
training, political support, and resolve-and also the tactical
responsiveness of its leadership-have all been shown to be
deficient. This would seem to create an incentive on the
Soviet's part for a series of military and political moves
designed to recoup prestige and credibility. At one end of the
spectrum of views, it was judged that the Soviets will do
essentially nothing beyond declaratory posturing and resupply
of Syrian materiel losses. At the other extreme, it was
suggested that the Soviets would seek to establish a major
military presence in Syria, perhaps on the order of their
presence in Egypt in 1970-72, a dramatic political gesture
whose risks would be reduced by cease fires. A third
participant predicted a Soviet reaction somewhere between
the two extremes. How, how fast, and why the Soviets react
should in any case offer a meaningful gauge of how the
Soviets perceive their interests and room for maneuver in the
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strategic environment of the early 1980s. This must receive
the most careful analysis.
Subsequent to the panel meeting, as the Lebanon war continued,) made
the observation that, apart from Israeli arms, the big winner is likely to be the Khomeini
brand'of Islamic revolution, the one political force on the Muslim side of the equation
that can take action and win wars.
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TAB C: Soviet Political Actions Options in Iran
At the request of the Director of NESA, the panel members met with DDI and DDO
personnel to consider ways we could improve our understanding of Soviet political action
objectives and tactics in Iran. The following suggestions are intended for a sustained
project by several analysts over the course of 3-4 months to examine this subject.
First, we must keep in mind that our understanding of current internal politics in
Iran is shallow. The picture of the regime of mullahs steadily and despite all contrary
earlier expectations consolidating itself is probably correct. But this situation is almost
surely quite fragile even though potential opposition elements are finding it almost
impossible to mount a concerted attack on the regime. The main danger to the Islamic
revolutionary government would still appear to be an outbreak of severe factionalism
among the ruling clerics following Khomeini's death, allowing even disorganized
opposition to be more effective and perhaps increasing the chances that a Khadafi-like
figure emerges to form a regime less dependent on the mullahs.
From this assessment we derive two important conclusions: 1) Increasing our
knowledge about Iran's internal politics through improved collection and analysis has to
be a top priority; 2) the Soviets, although probably supplied with more voluminous and
detailed information, probably perceive the same fragile and confused Iranian picture,
with an enduring Islamic regime the most probable future, but dramatic alternatives still
possible.
Without question, improving relations with and influence in Iran has become a
paramount objective of Soviet policy in the region. In the first two years after the Shah's
fall, the Soviets probably expected a faster and more steady drift of Iranian politics to
the left. They now must bet predominantly, but not exclusively, on the endurance of the
Islamic regime. Their political objectives can be reasonably inferred: _
Encouragement of anti-US and anti-Western attitudes.
Promotion of "normal" relations between Iran and the USSR in
diplomatic, economic, and military areas.
Containment where possible of anti-Soviet actions, e.g.,
respecting Afghanistan.
Avoidance of pretexts for further suppression of Tudeh.
Development of bases and agents of political influence
throughout the spectrum of Iranian politics wherever they
can.
The question before us is how they are likely to pursue the last objective.
The mullah establishment itself is probably a Soviet target for penetration, albeit a
most difficult one. Because the mullahs inside Iran and the Khomeini entourage during
his exile represented threats to the Shah, the Soviets probably sought to infiltrate them
in the past, with unknown success. Avenues for influence with this group today might
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include the merchant class of the bazaar, students who have gone Islamic, and Shiites
outside Iran.
A whole class of targets would presumably be found among junior members of the
technical and professional elites on whom the mullahs must rely as they seek to build a
lasting and competent government. It would seem appropriate to Soviet longer-range
goals to assemble a stable of agents from this class of people while they are "down-and-
out." The junior members of the armed forces would seem to be particularly important
targets.
Minorities, especially those represented on the Soviet side of the border, are
probably the most readily accessible instruments of influence to the Soviets. They are
likely, however, to be the least effective with respect to power centers in Tehran, for
now at least.
For now one would expect that the Soviets are trying to work through minorities,
especially Azerbaijianis, and "sanitized" Tudeh affiliates. We are inclined to believe that
the Soviets are being very cautious about working with assets whose discovery would lead
fairly directly to anti-Soviet or anti-Tudeh reactions by the regime.
These obvious and general "first principles" do not lead to sudden new insight into
Soviet tactics in Iran, so far as we can see. At best they may guide a dogged effort to
build up understanding of the problem through detailed collection and analysis.
We repeat the previous admonition to assign a high priority to collection and
analysis on Iranian internal developments in general. It is high time to review the
pattern of US policies and contacts toward Iran that have constrained our information
and influence since the hostage crisis. Both from an intelligence and a policy
perspective, the US appears to be giving the Soviets an uncontested advantage in Iran.
Further, we suggest several specific projects of analysis, all of which involve
shaking out old sources and archives:
1. Perhaps through exploiting old Savak and other sources from
the Shah's day, we can construct some sort of base line on
Soviet influence and access in Iran at the time of the
revolution, and to judge what happened to that base line
subsequently.
2. Although they differ in important respects from the Iranian
case, two earlier cases of Soviet covert operations to
influence an evolving Third World political revolution are
presented by Egypt and Indonesia, where subsequent
developments allow access to sensitive data. An attempt
should be made to conduct these case studies.
3. Soviet propaganda, press, broadcast, and scholarly material
should be studied for insight into the level of knowledge and
sophistication they reveal on the part of Soviet authorities.
Much of this material is now being studied, we presume, but
more with a view to gauging the current Soviet line.
4. A systematic effort ought to be made to construct a "who's
who" of Soviet officials, diplomats, intelligence officers,
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military personnel, and academics who would constitute the
Soviet pool of expertise on Iran. This directory-constructed,
for example, from Soviet scholarly publications and
diplomatic lists-could be of help in collection as well as
tracking sources of influence on Soviet assessments and
policies.
Selected members of the panel are available to counsel on the conduct of these
projects and on the future steps that are suggested by their results.
A more fundamental policy question about Iran deserves to be raised: How can we
track, much less influence, political events in Iran given our current estrangement from
that country? Notwithstanding the risks in terms of our relations with other states in the
Gulf and the prospect of very tough going at best, the USG should try (or try more
energetically) to build contacts of many sorts with Iran, first through third parties and
then more directly. This could be done without appearing to seek a degree of amity in
US-Iranian relations that is likely to be impossible for many years.
One of the arguments for such an effort relates directly to our concern about
Soviet infuence there. Not only are we more or less gratuitously giving the Soviets an
uncontested run at Iran, it seems likely that we are communicating to the Soviets by our
behavior that we have already in some sense conceded Iran to the Soviet sphere of
influence in the long term. Their task is merely to pocket their winnings through patient
political actions. Although no analogy can be exact, the Soviets may see their prospects
in Iran as rather similar to those they developed over many years in Afghanistan. They
cannot be confused about the much greater importance of Iran to the US. But they
thought probably throughout the 1950s and 1960s that the US, and its allies, should in
their own interests have been paying much greater attention to Afghanistan. Now,
despite our pronouncements on Persian Gulf security, they observe that we are not
actually doing much to influence the future of Iran so vital to that concern. The manner
in which we are actually deploying our political resources and military efforts may
suggest to them a not-too-painful division of the region in which we continue to dominate
on the peninsula, while they consolidate influence in Syria, Iraq, and Iran over the long
term.
It may be worth a special study of the evolving pattern of events since say early
1978, and of the Soviet perception of them to determine whether such a Soviet
appreciation could be arising.
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