UPDATE OF INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT: GRENADA: THE SECURITY THREAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R001502590028-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 28
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/01/29: CIA-RDP85MOO364RO01 502590028-3
SECRE1
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC 8581-83
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board Representatives
FROM: John Horton
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: Update of Interagency Intelligence'Assessment:
GRENADA: THE SECURITY THREAT
1. The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
requested an update of our 10 November Interagency Intelligence
Assessment on the Security Threat in Grenada. The paper. was prepared
under the auspices h ational Intelligence Officer for Latin
America, of DDI's Office of African and Latin
American..na ysis was a principal drafter.
2. NFIB representatives met on 29 November and coordinated
the assessment forwarded herewith.
J ,
John Horton
Attachment:
as stated
Approved For Release 2008/01/29: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01502590028-3
 Approved For Release 2008/01/29: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01502590028-3
Approved For Release 2008/01/29: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01502590028-3
 Approved For Release 2008/01/29: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01502590028-3
UPDATE OF INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
29 November 1983
GRENADA: THE SECURITY THREAT
I. KEY JUDGMENTS
-- The security situation in Grenada is stable. There have been
only a few isolated incidents since 10 November and there is no
evidence that any Cubans have eluded capture.
-- The Castro regime undoubtedly is reassessing its overall policy
in the eastern Caribbean and is likely to be more selective and
careful in its actions during the coming months.
-- There is an increasing anxiety among Grenadians over a
deterioration of the security situation after the departure of
US forces. Many citizens fear that radical elements still at
large will challenge the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force after the
US military personnel have departed.
-- The Caribbean security forces, however, are rated as reasonably
effective by US military personnel familiar with their
operations. Because of Grenada's small size and the disarray
among radical elements we believe these forces will be able to
maintain public order for the next six months. Given popular
anxieties, however, the security climate would be improved if a
small contingent of US military police remained on the island
for several months. Continued US military presence, however,
would have some adverse diplomatic and political side effects.
-- As US forces depart, political stability increasingly will
depend on the ability of the interim government to demonstrate
its competence. In order to gain the population's confidence
the Grenadian authorities would have to deal rapidly and
effectively with the imprisoned leaders of the Bishop regime and
should demonstrate that it is taking concrete steps toward
holding general elections.
-- Major economic problems also pose-obstacles to the maintenance
of political stability over the coming six months. These
difficulties includeunemolovment and filling a serious short-
term financial gap.
?FrRFTI
Approved For Release 2008/01/29: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01502590028-3
 Approved For Release 2008/01/29: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01502590028-3
SECRET)
II. Current Situation
The situation in Grenada remains calm. US forces are continuing to
withdraw and there have been only a few isolated incidents since 10
November. None of these appear to have been ambushes or deliberately
planned attacks, but have resulted from inadvertent encounters with armed
individuals. The most serious of these incidents occurred on Green
Island, northeast of Grenada, when a US military patrol was fired upon
after it challenged four or five people who were unloading a boat. The
general population, however, remains highly supportive of the US presence
and continues to cooperate with US and Caribbean forces in identifying
subversive elements. According to US officials in Grenada, the present
level of danger to US and Caribbean forces there is low. There is the
possibility of isolated terrorist or sniper activity but that threat is
low as long as US forces remain on the island.
III. The Security Outlook Over the Next Six Months
A. Cuban Stay Behinds
Although it is possible that a few Cubans have eluded capture, there
is no hard evidence that such is the case. As of mid-November, there was
no hard evidence of any clandestine communications activity. There has
been no confirmed visual sighting of Cuban stragglers. We believe that if
any Cuban stragglers remain, they would be few in number, and they would
be more intent on escaping the island than organizing a guerrilla or
terrorist force.
We do not discount the possibility of an isolated terrorist action,
but doubt that the Castro regime intends to sponsor covert infiltrations
or a terrorist campaign in Grenada over the next six months. Havana is
well aware that the disarray among Grenadian leftists would make such
attempts ineffective and highly vulnerable to disclosure. Revelation of
Cuban sponsorship could, in Cuba's view, provide a pretext for punitive
actions by the US.
Havana is undoubtedly reassessing its overall policy toward the
eastern Caribbean and its ties to leftist movements in the area. Cuba's
failure in Grenada, which President Castro has publicly blamed on serious
errors by Grenadian revolutionary leaders, probably will lead Havana to be
more selective and careful and to reemphasize to leftist groups the need
for organization. unity. training, and political and propaganda work.
c57roPTI
Approved For Release 2008/01/29: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01502590028-3
 Approved For Release 2008/01/29: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01502590028-3
SECRET
B. Perceptions of the Grenadian Population
A growing anxiety prevails among the Grenadians over a deterioration
of the security situation after the departure of US forces. Many fear
acts of terrorism by hard-core elements of the People's Revolutionary Army
(PRA) against those who helped US forces capture PRA soldiers who had gone.
into hiding. The popular perception among Grenadians is that some former
PRA members are hiding in St. Georges and the countryside with caches of
weapons and ammunition.* This anxiety of the populace is compounded by
their lack of confidence in the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force. Grenadians
fear that the PRA members still at large will challenge the Caribbean
forces after the US military personnel have departed. If the populace
feels threatened by a significant deterioration in the security situation
following the US military departure, they might accuse the US of
abandoning them.
C. Capabilities of Caribbean Forces
Reports by US military personnel in Grenada concerning the competence
of the Caribbean Peacekeeping Forces are mixed. Given Grenada's small
size and the current disorganization and lack of support for any potential
violent opposition, we believe these forces ought to be able to maintain
public order for the next six months. Because of popular concerns in
Grenada and lack of confidence in the CPF, however, the security climate
would be significantly improved if a small contingent of US military
police remained-on the island for several months. Nevertheless continued
presence of US forces could become politically controversial within
Grenada and would work against the interim government's efforts to achieve
domestic and international credibility
One of the two Jamaican companies of the CPF was rotated back home
and is scheduled to be replaced on 1 December. Prime Minister Seaga's
call for early elections in Jamaica could interfere with this
commitment. The Jamaican Defense Force is expecting violence, has called
up its reservists, and will not be able to return the company to Grenada
until after the December 15th election.
D. Capabilities of the Grenadian Government
As US forces depart, the population's perceptions of the security
situation will depend increasingly on the performance of the interim
government. So far, the Advisory Council appointed by Governor General
Scoon has been preoccupied with legal constitutional and administrative
problems and has not yet been able to assume all its responsibilities as
*According to US officials, there are approximately 70 PRA personnel
who have not been accounted for by the military. These individuals
are believed to be low level soldiers.
25X1
rrnn rr
Approved For Release 2008/01/29: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01502590028-3
 Approved For Release 2008/01/29: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01502590028-3
SECRET
an interim government. With no effective security force of its own, the
government is totally dependent on the US and Caribbean forces. The
formation and training of:a new Grenadian police force probably will take
at least a year, leaving ,a significant need in the medium.term for a
reliable security force.
The security of Grenada and the popular perception of the situation
will depend on the ability of the Advisory Council to demonstrate that it
is making progress in the. establishment of the country's own security
force and legal system. The inability of the Chairman-designate Alister
McIntyre to assume his position because of health problems has caused a
major setback for the Council and the development of an effective
leadership for the Council will be hampered by the paucity of
administrative talent. Moreover, Scoon reportedly regrets two of his
appointments whom he now views as undesirable because of their leftist
ties.
In order to gain the population's confidence, the government will
have to deal effectively -- within a legal framework -- with the remnants
of the Bishop regime currently imprisoned at Richmond Hill. Some of the
leaders--such as Bernard Coard--reportedly seem to believe that there is
insufficient evidence to convict them for Bishop's death. Their ability
to contest the charges has been enhanced by the reportedly lax conditions
of their imprisonment. Several of the detainees, such as Coard, Leon
James, and Hudson Austin, reportedly are able to communicate with each
other and to send political messages out through persons who are visiting
them. Although popular disgust with these individuals is strong, they
would pose problems for the new government should they be
released. i7o
Popular confidence in the government also will depend on its ability
to soon begin taking concrete and well-organized steps toward the holding
of general elections, and its ability to deal effectively with the
politically sen ' 've issues of participation by the New Jewel Movement
and Eric Gairy.
Severe economic difficulties threaten Grenadian security over the
next six months. We believe these problems can be reduced if new foreign
aid flows become available quickly and are effectively used. Although
labor-intensive public works projects -- funded by US grant aid -- eased
the immediate unemployment burden, hundreds more remain out of work. A
significant problem is that of the unemployed former members of the
People's Revolutionary Army. The cash-short government must meet November
payrolls, and other expenses incurred by the Bishop regime. Funds that
had been expected from the IMF have been withheld because of the uncertain
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/01/29: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01502590028-3
 Approved For Release 2008/01/29: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01502590028-3
SECRETI
political climate. Finally, the new government needs to obtain foreign
exchange quickly to keep imports of basic necessities near normal
levels. Unless sufficient new sources of foreign exchange are found, the
projected drop in tourism earnings over the next few months could lead to
cutbacks of essential agricultural inputs and other intermediate and
capital goods. Lack of visible progress in these areas will undermine
confidence in the Advisory Council which could lead to popular
dissatisfaction exploitable by extremist elements.
-6-
Approved For Release 2008/01/29: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01502590028-3
 Approved For Release 2008/01/29: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01502590028-3
Approved For Release 2008/01/29: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01502590028-3