REQUEST OF UNITED NATIONS AMBASSADOR FOR ASSESSMENT REGARDING SIGNIFICANCE OF CURRENT MILITARY INFIGHTING IN EL SALVADOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R001502580073-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 73
• Publication Date: January 31, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/01/18: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01502580073-4 z
5 SECRET
National Intelligence Council
NIC 850-83
31 January 1983
te 0~'S9-
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Constantine C. Menges
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: Request of United Nations Ambassador for Assessment
Regarding Significance of Current Military Infighting
in El Salvador*
1. Despite the agreements reached with Defense Minister Garcia and rebel
Army Commander Ochoa earlier this month, the power struggle within the
military has yet to be resolved. There is about a 30 percent chance that the
conflict could get out of hand resulting in a coup by military officers or a
standoff between rival government military units. On balance, the judgment is
that the dispute will be resolved in such a way that the government's
counterinsurgency effort and reform program will not be seriously impaired.
2. Earlier this month, the military high command sought to reduce
tensions by giving Ochoa a choice assignment in Washington and by gaining
Garcia's promise to retire in two or three months. Some military units are
concerned that Garcia might renege on his promise, but we believe he lacks the
military and political support to extend his stay in office. Opposition to
Garcia stems from ideological differences, the belief of many younger officers
that Garcia and his generation of officers should retire, opening the way for
their advancement, and frustration over Garcia's reluctance to adopt a more
aggressive war strategy.
3. Extreme right Assembly leader D'Aubuisson has increasingly tried to
exploit military dissatisfaction with Garcia, and some of his ultrarightist
supporters may try to block the appointment of General Vides Casanova, a
relative moderate, who is next in line for Garcia's post. Vides Casanova
probably shares Garcia's commitment to the government's reform program, but
lacks a strong base of support in the armed forces. If the
ultraconservatives, who probably represent about 15 percent of the armed
forces officers, emerge from the succession struggle in a dominant position,
the viability of the government and its programs will be undermined.
*bI7ALA and DDO have seen and coordinated this memorandum.
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS
DOCUMENT ARE CLASSIFIED: SECRET
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President Magana, who in recent months has been increasingly assertive in
standing up to the far right, would lose a critical base of support, thus
opening the way for the ultraconservatives to roll back most of the reforms
that had been implemented since October 1979. Most military leaders, however,
are center-right in political orientation and pragmatic; they recognize the
key role such reforms have played in obtaining and sustaining international
and popular support for the government, and they probably would move
successfully to block any attempted "takeover" by ultraconservative forces.
4. In the wake of the bombing of ARENA party headquarters last week, the
potential for some escalation in political violence also should be noted. If
the bitter rivalry between Garcia and D'Aubuisson intensifies, more bombings,
shootings and assassinations could result from the actions of their
supporters. Deceptive violence could also be initiated by the extreme left.*
Impact on the Guerrilla War
5. The military power struggle has damaged unity within the armed
forces, and the guerrillas will continue to exploit it for maximum progaganda
and tactical effect. In recent weeks the insurgents have stepped up their
attacks throughout the country while launching what is developing into a major
offensive in northeastern El Salvador. They have long planned an offensive
for early this year and may have advanced the timetable to take advantage of
the military rebellion.
6. The military has responded with a large counteroffensive -- in part
to show that the political bickering in San Salvador has not diminished its
ability to carry out the war. It probably will be able to retake the province
in the next few weeks, although heavy losses could be incurred. If the
guerrillas inflict a major tactical defeat on the Army, the far right in both
the military and the civilian government likely would gain strength and the
chances for a coup would increase significantly.
Constantine C. Menges
*This judgment is the NI0/LA's.
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Approved For Release 2008/01/18: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01502580073-4