NEWS RELEASE OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200010-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: September 12, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

HOLD FOR RELEASE
UNTIL 6:00 PM (EDT)
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1983
REMARKS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY BY
THE HONORABLE FRED C. IKLE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
TO BALTIMORE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
BALTIMORE, MARY-LAND
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1983
NO. 450-83
697-5131 (Info.)
697-3189 (Copies)
I am delighted to be here this evening and to have the
oppcrtu.n ty,to speak to you.
Cent al America is closer to Baltimore than is California--
in terms c ceographic distance, that is. But he intellectual
distance iet.~een here and Central America is enormous. Most of
the American pr-ogle are not well informed about Central America;
many are misinformed; and some are outright disdainful about
;.he cultural and social importance of this region.
You all have an obligation to remedy this situation, so that
you and your representatives in Congress can engage in constructive
support--or constructive criticism--of the Administration's policy.
To begin with, you should know that the President's policy
for Central America has not yet been given a chance to work:
the blocking votes in Congress have denied the President the means
to succeed.
Indeed, members of Congress have involved themselves in the
management of US.policy for Central America more than for any
other region of the world.
- While Congress has quickly and easily approved some four
and a half billion dollars in Security Assistance for
nations in the Mediterranean region,-it slashed nearly
in half the much smaller allocation for nations in
the Caribbean region--so much closer to home.
- While Congress has been generally supportive of the deploy-
ment of some 1200 U.S. Marines to Lebanon, it fought fiercely
to limit the number of US trainers in El Salvador to 55.
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While Congress has not objected to large military
exercises in the faraway Indian ocean region, it many
members have heavily criticized the recent military
exercises in the nearby Caribbean region.
While Congress has for a long time supported Radio Free
Europe, the fine radio program that brings the truth to
the people of Eastern Europe, members of Congress have
delayed for two years President Reagan's request for
Radio Marti, a new radio station that would bring the
truth to the people in Cuba.
As we consult with members of Congress on these issues, we
are often told that,youu, their constituents,. are pressing such
positions on them. But as we review the public opinion polls, we
discover an extraordinary lack of information. For example, in
a recent New York Times/CBS poll; only 8 percent of the respondents
knew, both for El Salvador and Nicaragua, whether the US was
supporting the government of the insurgents.
You must help us overcome hot only a lack of information,
but also a great deal of misinformation. This misinformation is
not accidental; it is the result of a well=organized and well
orchestrated effort. A fabric of fiction has been tightly woven
to conceal the essential facts: Let me review with you some of
these fictions:
Fiction has it that US influence in Central and Latin
America has prevented democratic development, that the spread of
Leninist regimes is the tide of history; a titural process of
social reform that We_should not oppose. The fact is that the
trend toward democratization has continued: among the 32 indepen-
dent states.of Latin.Arierica and the Caribbean, 17 are now democratic.
Since 1978, five countries have made a peaceful transition from
military regimes to elected democratic governments.. It is the
much criticized military regimes that are often transformed into a
democracy; but there has never yet been a Marxist-Leninist regime
that was succeeded by democracy.
Another bit of fiction: that the Sandinista regime
in Nicaragua would have developed into a pluralistic democracy,
had it not been for the US.intetvention. The fact is that the Sandi-
nistas, onl a few weeks after they
y came into power, reneged on
their promise for early elections, began to attack the democratic
trade unions, and invited Cuban military arid security personnel
in steadily growing numbers. Yet, during the first 18 months of
the Sandinista regime, the United States prbvided more than $120
million in direct aid and endorsed over.$220 million in Inter-
American Development Bank aid -- more than the previous Somoza
regime in Nicaragua had received from tiie United States in twenty
years! Clearly,,it was not US interference that drove the
Sandinistas to link up with Fidel Castro -- unless economic aid
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is regarded as "interference."
Another piece of fiction is the charge that the Reagan Admin-
istration is "militarizing" the problems of Central America and
is bringing the East-West conflict to the region. Well, the East
is already here. The Soviets are giving ten times as much
military assistance to Cuba and Nicaragua as we are providing to
all of Latin America. And Soviet military advisors in Cuba and
Nicaragua outnumber US military advisors in the Caribbean region
twenty to one.
Since Congress is so deeply involved in our day-to-day policy
towards Central America, our key objectives need to be clear to the
American people. Moreover, Congress must share with the Administra-
tion an understanding of our basic strategy.
On one thing we can all- agree: We do not want the United
States to fail. We must succeed.
But what is it we would like. to see happen, and what do we
want to prevent? We have wide agreement, I believe, that the
United States favors a continuation and strengthening of the
trend toward open, genuine democracy. And we favor social and
economic betterment for the people in Central America, a region
so close to us.
Equally important is what we want to pr...ent. We want to.
prevent the expansion of totalitarian regimes -- particularly
Leninist ones, since they will import Stalinist police systems,
bring in Soviet arms, and even invite Soviet military bases.
There are two more reasons why Leninist regimes are particularly
dangerous: once entrenched, they tend to become irreversible,-
and they usually seek to export their totalitarianism to other
nations.
Given these objectives, what should be our strategy?
I.
First, we want to help build the road toward democracy and
economic development.. In the end, the people in each country
will have to make their own choices. They can succeed only through
their own dedicated effort'. But we can help, through advice and
influence, by facilitating trade,. and by giving aid. The Caribbean
Basin Initiative of the Reagan Administration (to which Congress
has now agreed) is right on target. So are our efforts in El
Salvador in behalf of elections and for improvements in the
judicial system.
Also, we are using diplomacy to help the government of El Salvador
win over those who are willing to abandon violence and compete in
elections,. provided they can be assured of safe and fair partici-
pation. But we must not underestimate our adversaries. The hard
core among the insurgents will never settle for a fair democratic
process. We can no more negotiate an acceptable political solution
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with these people then the social democrats in revolutionary
Russia could have talked Lenin into giving up totalitarian
Bolshevism.
This leads us to the second requirement. As Secretary Shultz
recently explained, the guerillas in El Salvador have used a
"rule or ruin" strategy: they seek to. destroy economic assets
faster than our aid can restore them. You cannot have economic
development in a nation, if guerilla forces keep blowing up
bridges, power lines, school buldings, buses ... You have to de-
feat these "rule or ruin" forces militarily.. This is the purpose
for .our military assistance.
Every so often the critics of the Administration
proclaim -- with accusatory connotation.-- that we seek a "military
solution" in El Salvador. If a "military solution" means putting
primary emphasis on military assistance and military means, then
it is more factual to accuse the Reagan Administration of
seeking an "economic solution," since three dollars out of four
in the requested assistance programs are for economic aid.
What we seek to do is to. open the doors to democracy and
close the doors to violence. But we have to use military means
against those who insist--till they have imposed their rule--
on using violence.
-- We do not seek a military defeat for our friends.
We do not seek a military stalemate.
-- We seek victory for the forces of democracy..
And that, victory has two components:
One: .Defeating militarily those organized forces of
violence that refuse to accept the democratic will of
the people.
Two:. establishing an adequate internal system for
justice and personal security.
At this point, let us recall our first agreed principle:
We do not want the United States to fail. Hence, we must
a. group in allocate sufficient means so that we can. succeed. As
long as Congress keeps. crippling the President's military assis-
tance program, we will have a policy always shy of success. We
will remalll, V
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This the American people should not tolerate. If we are
merely involved to fail, then we should not be.involved at all.
The resources needed to succeed are small compared to our
investment for security in other regions of the world. Once
those in Congress who are now blocking adequate assistance give us
the means to succeed, the capability and determination of the
United States will become clear. This will make the Soviet Union
more cautious, which in turn will help our success. On the other
hand, if we signal that we are afraid of victory over the forces of
violence, if we signal that %4e have opted for protracted failure,
we will only encourage the Soviets to redouble their effort. We
will be inviting ever-increasing difficulties.
The third requirement of US strategy for Central America is
least well understood. We should seek to prevent the partition
of Central America, a division of this region into two spheres,
one linked to the Soviet bloc and one linked to the United States.
Such a partition would inexorably lead to a hostile confrontation
of large military forces, a confrontation that could last for decades.
We can see how such a confrontation works, as we look at
Cuba. During the 24 years of the Castro dictatorship, while the
standard of living deteriorated and human rights were widely violated,
Cuba built up a large military establishment. It has the second
largest army in Latin America (second only to Brazil), it has some
200 MIG fighter aircraft, submarines, 6000 to 8000 Soviet advisors,
and several Soviet intelligence installations.. In addition,
Castro has sent some 30 to 40 thousand troops abroad to provide the
mercenary forces to protect the Soviet imperial outposts. As a result
of the militarization of Cuba, our sealines to NATO are now seriously
threatened.
The Sandinista regime in Nicaragua is determined to create
a "second Cuba" in Central America. Ever since they seized
power, the Sandinistas embarked on a major military buildup..
Today, they have a much larger army than Somoza ever had, and they
have expressed the intention to build the largest force in Central
America. Nicaragua is building new military airfields, and is
importing Soviet tanks, helicopters, armored vehicles, and other
equipment.
This "second Cuba" in Nicaragua would be more. dangerous
than Castro's Cuba since it shares hard to defend borders
with Honduras and Costa Rica. The Sandinistas have already
started terrorist activities in both these countries. In
addition, Nicaragua provides essential support for the insurgency
in El Salvador. .
Even after the insurgency in El Salvador has been brought
under control, Nicaragua--if it continued on its present course--
would be the bridgehead and arsenal for insurgency for Central
America. And once the Sandinistas have acquired the military
strength that'they have long been planning for, they might well
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use that strength for direct attacks on their neighbors to help
speed up the "revolution without frontiers" that they promised us.
At that time, the only way to help protect the democracies
might be for the United States to place forward deployed forces in
these countries, as in Korea or West Germany. Clearly, we must prevent
such a partition of Central America...
In the Democrats'-response to President Reagan's April 27
address on Central America to a Joint Session of Congress, Senator
Dodd said: "We will oppose the establishment of Marxist states in
Central America." Yet, a majority in the House of Representatives
has done exactly the opposite. It voted to oppose US assistance to
those who oppose the establishment of a Marxist state in Nicaragua.
That is to say, a blocking majority in the House, in effect, voted
to establish a sanctuary for the Sandinistas.
Congressional legislation to'deny US support to the
democratic resistance forces in Nicaragua would turn Nicaragua
into a sanctuary from which the nations of Central America could be
safely attacked, but in which US supported forces could not
operate. This would enable the promoters of totalitarianism-
while being supplied and replenished,by Cuba and the Soviet
bloc--to attack. neighboring countries indefinitely, and always
with impunity. Hence, it would deprive the Marxist groups in El
Salvador of-any incentive to compromise. Indeed, if such legislation'
were passed,-the Sandinistas and Cubans might well find it safe to
increase their assistance to the insurgents in El Salvador
and to step up the destablization of Honduras and Costa Rica.
This, after all, would be fully consistent withi'h-their presently
declared objectives; and the guaranteed sanctuary would render
such escalation almost risk-free.
The psychological impact from cutting off US assistance
to the Nicaraguan resistance forces fighting for democracy in their
native land wculd'be severe. Such a cut off would signal throughout
the region that the totalitarian Leninist forces represent the
winning side. The'democratic forces would have cause to despair.
They would see that terrorist and insurgent attacks against them
are being generously supported by Cuba and the Soviet bloc, and
that these attacks could be conducted from safe havens that would
be protected by the US Congress, in effect, from all counter-interference.
Conversely, the totalitarian Lenist force would know that as soon
as they seize control pf a country, they will be secure: Cuba and
the Soviet bloc will hfelp them maintain an efficient police machinery
to repress the people; and should any group arise to fight for .
freedom, the United States Congress would have denied it: all support.
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Let me recapitulate.
Our basic objectives for Central America are clear: we want
to strengthen democracy; we want to prevent in this hemisphere the
expansion of totalitarian regimes, especially those linked to the
Soviet Union.
To this end, we extend economic support and promote
democratic development. But given forces of violence that will
not accept the democratic will of the people, we also have to.
provide military assistance--enough to succeed. In addition, we
must prevent consolidation of a Sandinista regime in Nicaragua
that would become an arsenal for insurgency, a safe haven for the
export of violence.; If we cannot prevent that, we have to antici-
pate the partition of Central America. Such a development would
then force us to man a new military front-line of the East-West
conflict, right here on our continent.
To prevent such an outcome, the Administration and Congress
must work together with a strategy that can succeed.
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