MATERIAL YOU REQUESTED FOR THE SSCI BRIEFING OF 25 MAY 1983
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85M00363R000902060040-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 26, 2007
Sequence Number:
40
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 24, 1983
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP85M00363R000902060040-5.pdf | 88.03 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85M00363R000902060040-5
SECRET
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
NIC 3789
24 May 1983
THROUGH: Special Assistant to the Director for Interdepartmental
Affairs
FROM: Constantine C. Menges
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: Material You Requested for the SSCI Briefing of 25 May 1983
r 1. Attached is the contribution you requested for the evaluative part of
you,,presentation tomorrow along with a list of all intelligence estimates
produced during my 20 months as NIO/LA.
2. Please note that this statement is consistent with the response the
NIC gave the SSCI staff to questions about analysis and production in mid-
March 1983.
Constantine C. Menges
Attachments:
As stated
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85M00363R000902060040-5
Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85M00363R000902060040-5
NI0/LA
24 May 1983
SECRET
Predictive Record of Intelligence Community Estimates on
Central America/Mexico: September 1981 to May 1983
Since September 1981, sixteen Intelligence Community coordinated analyses
on Latin American issues have been written and nine of these dealt with the
Central America/Mexico region. On the whole the predictive performance has
been very good: the main trends and warnings of the Central American national
intelligence estimates of September 1981, June 1982 and December 1982 were
validated by events; the March 1982 estimate on the Salvadoran elections
correctly predicted the massive guerrilla military and propaganda effort to
disrupt them, the government's capacity'to carry out the elections and came
close in predicting the results by party though the 80% voter participation
was a surprise; the November 1982 Intelligence Assessment of Cuban hostile
international actions correctly identified Cuban subversive and clandestine
actions in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East; the November 1982
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on the Caribbean correctly pointed to the
dangerous movement of the Suriname military regime-closer to Cuba--an event
which became publicly visible with the December 1982 murder of virtually the
entire democratic leadership by Bouterse.
The December 1982 SNIE on "Prospects for Hostilities Between Nicaragua
and Honduras" summarized the intelligence on Nicaraguan/Cuban efforts since
1980 to use-Honduras as a transit point for weapons shipments to El Salvadoran
guerrillas, and to use terrorism to pressure Honduras into neutralism; it
correctly predicted that the Nicaraguan/Cuban response to expanded anti-
Sandinista activities would be to step,up their three year effort to e-Lnd and
unify the Honduran extreme left.
Predictions not fulfilled include warnings about possible assasinations
of moderate Central American leaders, US nationals and the possible
introduction of MIG jet fighters into Nicaragua--though public statements by
US leaders in reaction to the intelligence data may have deterred this last
action.
Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85M00363R000902060040-5
Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85M00363R000902060040-5
Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85M00363R000902060040-5