GRENADA'S SECURITY FORCES

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85M00363R000200370064-4
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RIPPUB
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S
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Sequence Number: 
64
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REPORT
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Approved For Release 2008/02/20: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200370064-4 People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) 1,000-1,200 AK-47s, RPGs, heavy machine guns, mortars, recoilless rifles, BTR-60 and BRDM armored personnel carriers, three ZU-23 AA batteries, and possibly some field artillery Headquarters at Ft. Rupert with camps near St. Georges and at Calivigny. Groups of junior officers NCOs trained in Cuba. Some Cuban advisers on island provide basic training. Officer Corps probably loyal to Austin. People's Revolutionary Militia (PRM) 2,000-4,000 AK-47s, small arms, possibly heavy machine guns and light artillery. Created by Bishop as his personnel security force. Several hundred members reportedly trained in Cuba. The Militia reportedly was disarmed last week by PRA with Bullen subse- quently executed. Loyalties unknown. Commander: Major Ian St. Bernard 300-500 Small arms. Coast Guard has three small British patrol boats provided by Libya. Consists of Prison Service, Immigration Service, and Coast Guard. Some police received training, including political indoctrination, in Cuba. 25X1 cF.rRFT Approved For Release 2008/02/20: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200370064-4 Approved For Release 2008/02/20: CIA-RDP85MOO363ROO0200370064-4 25X1 SECRET Construction Workers 350 Medical Personnel 25 Diplomats 15 Military Advisers 10-12 *Excludes personnel on Cuban ship "Vietnam Heroico" which recently returned to St. George's. Civilian Advisers 15 Diplomats 10-15 Of the approximately 400 Cubans present in Grenada, most are construction workers and technicians involved with the Port Salines Airport project. --Many of these civilian personnel are Cuban Army reservists or combat veterans, and have had at least some military training. --We estimate that there are less than a dozen Cuban military officers providing training for the Grenadian Army and People's Militia. --The Cubans undoubtedly have access to the ample stores of weapons and ammunition on the island, and could be quickly armed in an emergency. We believe that if US forces began a military operation in Grenada, the Castro regime would be highly unlikely to intervene with its own forces. Havana recognizes that it would lose in a military clash with the US and Castro does not want to provide Washington with an excuse to attack Cuba directly. If US forces were not involved, the Cubans would be most likely to intervene militarily if Havana perceived that Cuban personnel on the island were in danger. It is less likely, but possible that Havana would respond positively to a request by the leftist military council for Cuban assistance to repel an attack by Grenadian exiles. Such an action is less likely in the near term because of Havana's concern over US intentions and the serious impact 25X1 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/02/20: CIA-RDP85MOO363ROO0200370064-4 Approved For Release 2008/02/20: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200370064-4 it would have on Cuba's image in the region. If Castro did decide to undertake such an action he probably would try to use Cuban personnel already on the island and refrain from the more provocative step of sending in combat troops. Havana has the airlift and sealift capabilities to allow it to respond rapidly to a deteriorating situation or reinforce its position on Grenada. --Cuban AN-26 transport aircraft capable of carrying up to 38 combat- ready troops have sufficient range to reach Grenada, as do larger transports such as IL-62s and TU-154s, that can transport up to 200 troops. --MIG-23 fighter aircraft, when equipped with external fuel tanks, would have the ferry range to reach Grenada, but would have to land and refuel before engaging in combat. --Some of Cuba's naval combatants, such as the F-class submarines, Koni frigate, Osa-II missile boats, and Polnocny landing craft have sufficient range, although the voyage to Grenada could require up to three days. We rate our current intelligence collection capabilities on Grenada as being barely adequate to satisfy the increasing demands for up-to- date information on the situation there. --Our greatest need is for specific information on the status of of US citizens, the disposition of Grenada's military forces, and the location and types of Cuban personnel on the island. In addition, we need increased coverage of Soviet Bloc maritime shipping and naval activity in the area to provide information on arms deliveries or troop introductions. --The recent difficulty in determining the whereabouts of the Cuban cargo/troop ship "Vietnam Heroico" that called at 25X1 SECRETI Approved For Release 2008/02/20: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200370064-4 Approved For Release 2008/02/20: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200370064-4 SECRET St. Georges Port illustrates this need. --This could be accomplished by a heightened naval surveillance effort by US Navy assets SECRETI Approved For Release 2008/02/20: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200370064-4 Approved For Release 2008/02/20: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200370064-4 Port Facilities in Grenada The commercial port of St. Georges on Grenada's west coast is currently the only facility that could accommodate Soviet naval vessels or Cuban ships. It is a natural deep harbor and has been used by Soviet cruise ships as well as by Cuban merchant ships to ferry arms and personnel to shipboard electricity or bunkering at St. Georges, which has only a limited storage area, and the port is usually congested. Rumors about an alleged secret submarine base in Egmont Harbor adjacent to the new military camp at Calivigny are unfounded. In late 1981, a US company involved in landfill-operations at the Point Salines Airport did some dredging at Egmont. The channel entrance reportedly was deepened to a maximum of 18 feet and widened to 600 feet. Despite these improvements, larger Soviet vessels such as a Soviet diesel submarine-- with a length of 300 feet and a 17 foot draft--would probably not be able to enter the harbor because of the shallow channel entrance. A submarine would have only about a foot of clearance and the Soviets reportedly prefer 7 to 10 feet as a minimum. In addition, even if a submarine were to risk entering, tugs or tender would probably be required to turn it in the narrow confines of the inner harbor. Also there are no shore facilities presently available or under construction to provide support. US naval experts believe that only small cargo ships as well as small coastal patrol boats and landing craft such as Cuba's OSA guided-missile patrol boats and Polnocy-class landing ships would use the harbor. The Soviets have reportedly offered to do a feasibility study for the construction of a deepwater port in the Grenville area on Grenada's east coast. the offer was made to Bishop during his July 1982 visit to the Soviet Union with the alleged proviso that Soviet warships be granted the right to visit the new port facility, as well at St. Georges, for recreational purposes. Bishop reportedly agreed in principle to Soviet ships using the facilities, provided advance notice of their arrival was given. Although Soviet experts were to arrive in Grenada early this year to begin feasibility studies for construction of the new port facility, their arrival has not yet been confirmed. The Soviets and Grenadians might see an advantage to having a port facility in addition to St. Georges. For example, they might consider the more isolated Grenville to be more secure for the servicing of naval ships. Nevertheless, the construction of a major port would clearly be both costly and prbtracted. Grenville is a small town 20 kilometers from St. Georges, separated by mountains and rugged terrain. However, a small functioning airfield--Pearls--is nearby. Construction of a deepwater port there would be a long and difficult task--a large reef lies off the coast and the shoreline is littered with large boulders. The labor force, technical support and equipment would have to be imported. Approved For Release 2008/02/20: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200370064-4 Approved For Release 2008/02/20: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200370064-4 Air Facilities in Grenada The new international airport at Point Salines on Grenada's southern coast is scheduled for completion by early 1984. We are unaware of any direct Soviet involvement in the project; Cuba has provided the bulk of the labor and equipment for the construction of the $80 million facility. More than 90 percent of the approximately 9,000-foot runway has already been surfaced and the remainder is expected to be finished this year. Construction of the airport terminal building, fuel storage area, and other support facilities is also under way. According to a variety of sources, navigational aides, including lighting and communication equipment obtained from British and Finnish firms, are reportedly scheduled for installation in mid-1983. A new housing area is being built near the airport that will reportedly accommodate some 300 Cuban workers who are scheduled to remain after the airport project is completed to work on other construction projects. The new airport is intended to provide a boost to Grenada's sagging tourist industry by enabling direct flights from overseas points. Although ostensibly designed for commercial use, the airport will also be able to accommodate most of the military aircraft in the Cuban and Soviet inventories. MIG-21 and MIG-23 fighters as well as AN-26 short-range transports even now would be capable of operating from the approximately Grenadian officials have generally denied that the aiport will be used for military purposes and Andropov has publicly referred to it as a civil airport, but the heavy Cuban involvement in the project suggests Havana sees strategic advantages in it. The Cubans probably will want to use it as a stopover point for Cubana Airlines IL-62 transports that regularly ferry Cuban troops to and from Africa. The Cubans might also want to be able to deploy some military fighter aircraft to the island, particularly in case of the New Jewel Movement's hold on power came under seious threat. 5,000 feet of completed runway. Approved For Release 2008/02/20: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200370064-4 Vir 25X1 b t" Approved For Release 2008/02/20: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200370064-4 Assessment of Reaction to Evacuation of US Citizens from Grenada The US Government, with the assistance of its allies in the Caribbean, would need a sizeable task force to conduct an evacuation of the estimated 800 to 1,000 US citizens on Grenada. --Such an evacuation plan would require that an airfield and landing beaches on Grenada be secured in advance of the operation, and would almost certainly be interpreted as preparations for an invasion. --Most of the US citizens on Grenada are students at the US medical school adjacent to the new Point Salines Airport on the southern coast. Grenadian Army and militia forces, possibly with the assistance of Cuban personnel on the island, would probably react forcibly to US air or naval operations involved in the evacuation. --There are an estimated 400 to 600 Cuban construction workers at the airport site, most with at least some type of previous military training or experience, in addition to less than a dozen Cuban military advisors. --The 1,200 mar. Grenadian Army is garrisoned at several. camps in the St. Georges area, and at the Calivigny military camp east of the new airport. --Some 2,000 to'4,000 members of Grenada's militia could also be brought into action in an emergency. 25X1 & Approved For Release 2008/02/20: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200370064-4 13 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/02/20: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200370064-4 SECRET Grenada's Army and Militia have been trained by the Cubans and are equipped with a variety of Soviet weapons, including artillery, light antiaircraft guns, and armored vehicles. --There are at least three batteries of quad-barreled ZU-23 antiair- craft guns on the island, probably located in the St. Georges area and at the Calivigny camp. --Some six BTR-60 armored personnel carriers and two BRDM-2 armored scout cars, and a number of trucks have been seen in Grenadian Army garrisons. --The Coast Guard is equipped with three small British-built patrol --Most of the 9,000-foot runway at the Point Salines airport is paved with four layers of asphalt, but numerous oil drums and other obstacles have been placed along its length. --The smaller airfield at Pearls is approximately 5,000 feet long, however, it is far removed from the locations of the US citizens on the island. --In an emergency, antiaircraft guns and other light artillery units could quickly be deployed to these airfields. Last April, the Grenadian Armed Forces and militia conducted a major defensive exercise (Defense of the Homeland), the scenario Approved For Release 2008/02/20: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200370064-4 t 25X1 V E-0 0 0 4." r 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/02/20: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200370064-4 SECRET of which involved a reaction to an air and naval invasion by US forces. --Thousands of militia reportedly participated in the exercise throughout the island, repelling mock landings on the beaches and paradrops, and airfield defense. Approved For Release 2008/02/20: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200370064-4