NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 26 APRIL 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000200010199-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 30, 2007
• Sequence Number: 199
• Publication Date: April 26, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

I
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Director of i op Secret
Central
Intelligence
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Top Secret
UK-Argentina: Clash at South Georgia . . . . . . . . . . 1
2 Middle East - Western Europe: Proposed Pipelines
Y Israel-Egypt: Withdrawal Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . 7
,5" Southeast Asia: UN Meeting on Refugees . . . . . . . . . 7
Chile: Cabinet Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Special Analyses
Egypt: The Next Foreign Policy objective . . . . . . . . 9
Mozambique: An Embattled Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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Iq
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Proposed Gas Pipelines from the Persian Gulf
Proposed LNG facility
Natural gasfield
Existing pipeline
Proposed pipeline
~` Turkey
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q) MIDDLE EAST - WESTERN EUROPE: Proposed Pipelines
The gas pipelines from the Middle East to Western Europe that
have been proposed recently probably are not politically or economi-
caZZy practical.
Pipelines from the Arabian Peninsula to Europe also
have been proposed. One alternative would go from Qatar,
the United Arab Emirates, and possibly Kuwait through
Iraq, Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia to European con-
sumers. Another would cross Saudi Arabia into Egypt via
such long pipelines range from $30-60 billion.
the Red Sea and then run north to the Mediterranean and
into Greece or Italy. Estimates of the cost of building
stable countries.
Comment: Financial, political, and technical ob-
stacles probably would prevent construction of such
pipelines before the early 1990s. The high cost of
financing is likely to make any of the schemes unprofit-
able unless the price of gas increases substantially.
Both producers and purchasers would be concerned about
the security of any pipeline that crosses several un-
26 April 1982
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Gulf of
Suez
N
Tahahn?
1p
Aqaba S1"`
International Boundary and Multinational Force Dispositions in the Sinai
(Effective 26 April 1982)
Boundry representation is
not neoessariy authoritative:
ash Shayk
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Mediterranean Sea
Mote: The Egyptian-israelii peace treaty stipulates that
Egypt can maintain nn ty one mechanized infantry division
andfou border guardbattalions intheSinai.
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ISRAEL-EGYPT: Withdrawal Procedure
Top Secret
Although Israel has withdrawn from the Sinai, the
complex border demarcation issue at Tabah has yet to
be resolved. Press reports indicate Israel has turned
the disputed area over to the Multinational Force Organ-
ization. Both sides have agreed on a ne otiating proc-
ess involving the US.
Comment: Despite the accord to arbitrate the prob-
lem, the issue threatens to strain relations between
Egypt and Israel and to divert attention from the auton-
omy negotiations.
S SOUTHEAST ASIA: UN Meeting on Refugees
On Thursday the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
urged Western resettlement countries to maintain their
commitment to the Indochinese refugee problem. The Com-
missioner seeks increased funding, priority resettlement
for Kampuchean refugees in Thailand, acceptance of refugees
with disabilities, and guarantees for boat people rescued
at sea. No government present at the meeting offered to
increase its efforts, and several announced more restric-
tive resettlement criteria. Western countries increasingly
are applying pressure to the UN to pursue repatriation
as an alternative to resettlement.
Comment: The UN High Commissioner for Refugees is
concerned about the declining interest in the refugee
problem among resettlement countries. The rate of Indo-
Chinese refugee arrivals has decreased, and many resettle-
ment nations feel they can relax their efforts--several
have reduced their acceptance quotas. These countries
hope that tightening acceptance criteria will discourage
refugees who would leave for economic reasons. At the
same time, UN and resettlement country officials want to
assure those Southeast Asian countries providing short-
term asylum that they will not be left with residual
refugee populations.
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U CHILE: Cabinet Changes
President Pinochet swore in eight new cabinet minis-
ters last Thursday and announced programs to ease the
effects of Chile's recession. Former central bank
president de la Cuadra was named to the key Finance
Ministry position and General Montero Marx was a ointed
1
Comment: Pinochet's moves are designed to regain
the political initiative and to halt the erosion of con-
fidence in his management of national affairs. Although
he reaffirmed the main lines of government policy, the
new programs are planned to provide more housing and
alleviate unemployment, and they suggest a more flexible
approach to socioeconomic problems. It will take time,
however, to judge whether his midcourse corrections will
ease Chile's problems significantly and restore public
and a willingness to attack specific problem areas.
lieve the new programs demonstrate greater flexibility
1
PP
Interior Minister. The cabinet shakeup increases the
military's presence in the government, and it now controls
10 of the 16 ministries--it previously held eight. Polit-
ical and labor groups generally have reacted to the
cabinet changes with caution, but economic spokesmen be-
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Autonomy Issues in Dispute
Size and structure of self- SGA should have 80 to 100 elected representatives Begin favors no more than 17 members, whose
governing authority (SGA) who would have legislative as well as administra- authority would be strictly administrative.
tive powers.
SGA should have strong role in internal security, Israel should have full responsibility for internal
with Israel's role limited. security.
Specified security locations for Israeli military to Specified security locations to be large, and Israel
be small cantonments. could, if it wished, establish new civilian settle-
ments within them.
East Jerusalem voting rights Arab residents of East Jerusalem should vote for Arab inhabitants of East Jerusalem should not
and participate in SGA. vote for SGA, nor are they eligible to be elected to
it.
No new settlements and no territorial expansion of Provision for new settlements and territorial ex-
existing ones. Jewish settlers should be subject to pansion of existing settlements would have to be
laws of SGA. made. Jewish settlements would remain under
Israeli control and not be under the jurisdiction of
SGA.
Aside from specified security locations and exist- Only privately owned Arab land would be fully
ing Israeli settlements, SGA should have full free of some measure of Israeli control. Public
jurisdiction. domain land would be subject to joint control of
authority and Israel.
Provision must be made to permit Palestinians to SGA and Israel would jointly allocate water
redress Israel's currently disproportionate use of rights. If agreement not reached, status quo
West Bank water. prevails.
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EGYPT: The Next Foreign Policy Objective
Israel's withdrawal from Sinai yesterday marks a fundamental
turning point for President Mubarak's foreign policy. His main ob-
jective now is to end Egypt's isolation in the Arab world. Mubarak
and his advisers are convinced that a return to the moderate Arab
camp will help maintain domestic stability, strengthen the countrr/'s
economy, and enable Egypt to reassume leadership in the region.
A return to the Arab camp would be popular with
almost all Egyptians. Although the Egyptians tend to
take a condescending view of their Arab neighbors, they
have become frustrated by their country's isolation from
the Arab world. Moreover, Egypt's economic problems--
caused mainly by the soft world oil market and declines
in tourism, Suez Canal revenues, and worker remittances--
have increased Mubarak's interest in closer ties with the
Saudis and other potential Arab sources of aid.
Growing Distrust of Israel
The longing for better relations with the Arabs
I coincides with a growing disillusionment with Israel.
Many Egyptians believe that Israel has not lived up to
the spirit of the Camp David agreements but has sought to
humiliate Egypt by annexing Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.
// Most are persuaded that Israel is onl
interested in
y
keeping Egypt isolated from the other Arab states in
order to enable Tel Aviv to impose its will on the West
Bank and Gaza without fear of serious reprisal.
To facilitate Cairo's rehabilitation in the Arab
world, Mubarak is prepared to take a tougher position
toward Israel and its policies. If there is no progress
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in the stalled autonomy negotiations this summer, Egypt
probably will seek justification for abandoning the talks
and will consider other negotiating proposals.
Mubarak also may allow elements of Egypt's normaliza-
tion of relations with Israel to wither, and he is likely
to become more critical of such controversial Israeli
actions as the recent airstrikes in Lebanon. The Egyp-
tians, however, will not violate the military provisions
of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.
Prospects for Reconciliation
Egypt's reconciliation with its Arab neighbors prob-
ably will be gradual. The resistance from radical Arab
countries like Syria and Libya will make it difficult to
improve relations rapidly. The Saudis and other moderates
also will move cautiously in order to avoid appearing
soften their opposition to the Camp David agreements.
The presence of an Israeli Ambassador in Cairo will
trouble some Arabs and hinder formal reconciliation.
Even the Egyptians favor gradual rapprochement in order
to avoid unduly alarming Israel and the US.
A more rapid reconciliation between Egypt and the
Arabs would be possible if Israel were to launch a full-
scale invasion of Lebanon or take other extremely forceful
steps. Mubarak would feel compelled to react strongly.
He could withdraw Egypt's Ambassador temporarily, but
he would not go to war.
An eventual reconciliation with the moderate Arabs
probably is inevitable, and it will have far-reaching
consequences for US-Egyptian relations. Egypt would be
less receptive to US influence, but at the same time, it
would be better able to deal with its critics and to
facilitate contacts between Israel and the Arabs.
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MOZAMBIQUE: An Embattled Regime
/, cial towns.
President MacheZ's uphill battle against the insurgency of the
replaced by them or--over the longer term--by the Movement.
South African - backed National Resistance Movement is aggravating
a host of longstanding domestic problems that could Zead to major
changes in the regime during the next year or two. Pro-Soviet
radicals probably will gain greater power, and MacheZ could even be
Machel's position seems secure at the moment, but
continued insurgent successes are causing heightened
frictions at the top levels of the government.
Troubles at Home
of operations.
The insurgency, meanwhile, is demoralizing the mili-
tary. The armed forces suffer from poor training and
leadership, a lack of working equipment, logistic de-
ficiencies, and a confused command structure that Machel
shuffles every few months. Despite repeated counterin-
surgency campaigns, the armed forces have failed to pre-
vent the guerrillas from gradually expanding their area
The guerrillas have moved close to Maputo and Beira
in recent months and have overrun several smaller provin-
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Guerrilla actions are having devastating effect on an
economy weakened by the departure of most Portuguese
technicians and by the costs of backing Robert Mugabe's
Zimbabwe African National Union during the civil war in
Rhodesia.
The intentions of South Africa are crucial to the
future of Machel's government. In supplanting the former
white Rhodesian regime two years ago as the National
Resistance Movement's primary patron, Pretoria's initial
objective was to put pressure on Machel to rein in the
African National Congress.
The South African Government apparently believes
that the Machel regime poses the most serious long-term
security threat to South Africa, and some military offi-
cers probably already advocate using the Movement to
topple it. Pretoria is unlikelv. however. to try to
replace Machel any time soon.
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Implications for the US
Western interests cbuld be damaged in a variety of
ways by a further entrenchment of the Soviets in Maputo.
Mozambique probably would move quickly to cut back its
recently established links with Western Europe. Talks
in recent months between senior Mozambican officials and
their Portuguese, Italian, British, and French counter-
parts indicate that prospects for expansion of these re-
lationships are promising. Machel is planning to visit
several West European capitals this summer.
In addition, Moscow also might succeed in persuading
Maputo to become uncooperative in negotiations on Namibia.
So far, Machel generally has refrained from playing an
obstructive role in the Western-sponsored talks. Over
the longer run, moreover, Mozambique would be likely to
ease its restrictions on ANC activities, the Soviets
probably would expand their support for the South African
insurgents in Mozambique, and the ANC might be able to
increase its operations into South Africa.
Faced with a more pro-Soviet government in Maputo,
the South Africans would become more intransigent toward
all their neighbors. They, too, would become less coopera-
tive in Western initiatives on Namibia.
The West's regional role would suffer as an increased
Soviet and Cuban presence in Mozambique gives the Commu-
nists greater leverage over Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi,
which use Mozambique's transportation network.
In addition, the Soviets and their allies might
acquire access rights to naval or air facilities in
Mozambique. Soviet naval craft now only make occasional
port calls. Regular Soviet access to airfields in Mozam-
bique would expand Moscow's reconnaissance capabilities
in the Indian Ocean, including surveillance of the
approaches to the US installation at Diego Garcia.
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