NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 6 MARCH 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000200010022-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2007
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: March 6, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of x V ~7CVret
W =; Central
Intelligence
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National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
6 March 1982
Top Secret
CO IVIL)
6 March 1982 25X1
Copy 252
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Contents
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Special Analysis
USSR-Afghanistan: Status of the Insurgency . . . . . . . 13
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March 1982
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SPECIAL ANALYSIS
USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Status of the Insurgency
The arrival of more Soviet troops in Afghanistan this past
winter has done little to reverse the deteriorating situation in
the countryside, although the Soviet military's dominance in key
areas remains unthreatened. To avoid further setbacks, Moscow
probably will make additional changes in forces and strategy over
the next six months and take on more of the combat burden from
the ineffective Afghan Army.
government
control of the countryside declined from 33 to 17 percent
over the past eight months, while insurgent control rose
to 68 percent. In the remaining districts the govern-
ment probab7 controls only the principal town.
armed forces. Recent efforts by press gangs in Kabul
and other cities failed to bring in enough new men to
The loss of control will make it difficult for the
government to conscript desperately needed men for its
offset discharges, casualties, and desertions.
Insurgent groups in recent months have maintained
their activities in the countryside and at times seized
major parts of Qandahar and Herat, Afghanistan's second
and third largest cities. The insurgents continue to
inflict major damage on convoys and occasionally cut
communication and supply lines.
The level of resistance is likely to increase
gradually in the coming months as the insurgents gain
added experience and obtain additional arms and ammuni-
tion. Increased tactical cooperation among different
ethnic groups and among tribes with longstanding blood
feuds also improves prospects for future insurgent suc-
cesses. The resistance nevertheless remains fragmented
and has failed to develop into a politically united
force that would attract broad international support.
TonTonSerr_e t
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Soviet Concerns and Responses
Although insurgent forces can outfight the Afghan
Army, they cannot defeat major Soviet units. The Soviets
have met their basic goals of occupying the cities and
keeping a Communist government in power but have had to
take on more of the fighting to do so.
The large sweep operations probably will not destroy
more than a few small insurgent groups or permanently
return territory to government control. Previous opera-
tions have temporarily restored government control to
some areas, but Soviet forces are too small in number to
secure the countryside.
Moscow probably will continue to follow a course
aimed at containing and gradually wearing down the in-
surgents. The decline of government control and the
j/gradual increase in insurgent capability, however, fore-
shadow a difficult year for the Soviets. They almost
certainly will experiment with new tactics and probably
will introduce additional small combat units to prevent
a further deterioration of the situation.
There is no indication that Moscow has become
alarmed enough to bear the costs of the massive rein-
forcements it would take for quick victory. A Soviet
withdrawal under cover of a political agreement seems
unlikely, given the USSR's already heavy commitment of
prestige and resources to Afghanistan and the inability
of the insurgents to win militarily.
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