HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION ON SOVIET SUCCESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 86
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 29, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

SOVIET SUCCESSION
C ~'.
HEARING
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
of SS C1 131M a'f*~J!'L
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
U.B. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
11-466 0 WASHINGTON : 1982
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84BOO274R000
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Bess.]
BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona, Chairman
DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, New York, Vice Chairman
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON
JAKE GARN, Utah
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.. De
JOHN H. CHAFES, Rhode Island
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawa
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
HENRY M. JACKSON, Wash
MALCOLM WALLOP, Wyoming
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Verm
DAVID DURENBERGER, Minnesota
LLOYD BENTSEN, Texas
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., Delaware
HARRISON H. SCHMITT, New Mexico
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee, Ex officio Member
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Ex Officio Member
ROBERT R. SIMMONS, Staff Director
GARY J. SCHMITT, Minority Staff Director
DORTHEA RoBERSON, Chief Clerk
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
, Kentucky
laware
ii
ington
ont
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
On September 28 and 29, 1982, the Select Committee on Intelligence
held a set of hearings on the topic of Soviet succession. The first day
was devoted to receiving classified testimony from analysts from the
Central Intelligence Agency. On the second day, we heard from four
leading scholars in Soviet Studies : Prof. Jerry Hough, Prof. Myron
Rush, Dr. Robert Conquest, and Mr. William Hyland. The testimony
of these scholars, a summary thereof, and a declassified version of the
closed proceeding with the CIA is printed in this volume. We have
also included a short statement by the Vice Chairman on this subject.
Needless to say, recent events make this volume especially important.
We commend its reading to our colleagues and to the American public.
BARRY GOLDWATER,
Chairman.
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN,
Vice Chairman.
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
CONTENTS
Preface--------------------------------------------------------------
Page
III
Opening statement of Vice Chairman Moynihan-------------------------
1
Opening statement of committee Chairman Goldwater-------------------
1
Statement of Dr. Jerry F. Hough, professor of political science at Duke
University, staff member, Brookings Institution----------------------
2
Article "Soviet Succession-Issues and Personalities" from Problems
of Communism, September-October 1982-------------------------
49
Historic succession-----------------------------------------------
3
Collective leadership---------------------------------------------
3
Foreign policy----------------------------------------------------
3
Economic reform-------------------------------------------------
4
China ----------------------------------------------------------
5
Succeeding candidates--------------------------------------------
5
Conclusion ------------------------------------------------------
6
Statement of Dr. Myron Rush, professor of government, Cornell Univer-
sity --------------------------------------------------------------
7
Brezhnev succession---------------------------------------------
8
Soviet policies---------------------------------------------------
8
Crisis -----------------------------------------------------------
9
Kremlinology ---------------------------------------------------
10
Statement of Dr. Robert Conquest, senior research fellow, Hoover Institu-
tion on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University---------------
11
New faces-------------------------------------------------------
11
Politics ---------------------------------------------------------
12
Next generation--------------------------------------------------
13
Detente ---------------------------------------------------------
14
Statement of Mr. William Hyland, senior associate, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, and adjunct professor, Georgetown University
School of Foreign Service------------------------------------------
16
Soviet politics-power--------------------------------------------
17
Succession period------------------------------------------------
17
Article "Kto Kogo in the Kremlin" from Problems of Communism,
January-February 1982-----------------------------------------
69
Historical succession---------------------------------------------
20
New generation--------------------------------------------------
21
Leadership, detente----------------------------------------------
22
Military power--------------------------------------------------
23
Arms agreement-------------------------------------------------
24
Soviet studies endowment-----------------------------------------
26
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1982
Declassified version of closed committee hearing-Testimony of Central
Intelligence Agency-------------------------------------------------
27
Statement of:
Douglas B. Diamond, Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Analysis ;
Barry Stevenson, Chief, Current Support Division, Office of Soviet
Analysis ; Kay Oliver, Office of Soviet Analysis ; James Barry, Chief,
Policy Analysis Division, Office of Soviet Analysis ; accompanied by
Mary Brown, Legislative Liaison--------------------------------
28
STATEMENT FOR RECORD
Statement of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan------------------------
44
(v)
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84BOO274R000
Article of Dr. Jerry F. Hough-----------------------------------------
Article of Mr. William Hyland ----------------------------------
List of members of Communist Party Socialist Union Politburo and
Secretariat---------------------------------------------------------
Biography of Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov---------------------------
Summary of Testimony in September 29, 1982 hearing------------------
Page
49
69
77
77
78
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
 pproved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
SOVIET SUCCESSION
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1982
U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:12 a.m., in room 6226,
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon Daniel Patrick Moynihan (vice
chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF VICE CHAIRMAN MOYNIHAN
Senator MOYNIHAN. A very good morning to our guests, to the mem-
bers of the press present, to the members of the committee staff.
This is the public half of a set of hearings that the Select Committee
on Intelligence decided to hold on the subject of the Soviet succession.
There is scarcely a more important international event that is now
taking place. Whereas in the West we are used to regular and rather
recurrent elections, the choice of Soviet leaders comes irregularly
and at such great distances that practically represent political genera-
tions. The changes that come about are important, and it seemed impor-
tant for us to think about them.
The chairman, Senator Goldwater, in these days of the last week of
this session, is holding hearings downstairs and will not be up for a
little bit. He asked me to make an opening statement for him at the
beginning of the hearing.
OPENING STATEMENT OF COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN GOLDWATER
Chairman GOLDWATER. The purpose of today's hearing of the
full committee is to receive testimony on the issue of Soviet succes-
sion. When the vice chairman wrote to me last month and suggested
that this committee hold hearings on the topic of the Soviet succession,
I was doubtful that they would be helpful. This is because I remem-
bered Winston Churchill's radio broadcast on October 1, 1939, in which
he stated : "I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle
wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."
Yesterday our committee heard from some intelligence analysts from
the Central Intelligence Agency on the issue of Soviet succession, and
I was pleasantly surprised with what they had to say. Now, it is cer-
tainly true that our intelligence analysts have a lot of trouble finding
out what is going on inside the Soviet Union today, and I do not want
to say that they were able to predict with 100 percent of certainty what
the Soviet succession is going to look like in the future. This is a very
difficult issue to deal with. But I was pleased with their grasp of the
issue and with their understanding of its complexity.
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP
Today we will be hearing from four experts on the Soviet Union who
are selected from the academic community as opposed to from the
intelligence community. I want to welcome them here before this com-
mittee today. Because my colleague Senator Moynihan, called these
hearings, I will 'leave it to him to introduce our witnesses. But I want
to thank him for calling these hearings on the Soviet succession. Al-
though questions on Soviet succession may be hard to answer, they are
questions that American policymakers need to have answered if they
are to make the right decisions for the future of our Nation.
Senator MOYNIHAN. And I will not add a thing to the chairman's
remarks, save to express my personal appreciation to the gentlemen
who are here. Mr. Hyland is coming. He is delayed en route and will
speak fourth. So while you have all been very collegial and come for-
ward as a group, we will begin the schedule by asking Prof. Jerry
Hough to begin, if you would.
Dr. Hough is professor of political science at Duke University and
is affiliated with the Brookings Institution.
Mr. HOUGH. Staff member at Brookings.
Senator MOYNIHAN. And he is the author of a major book entitled
"How the Soviet Union is Governed." Such a book could not be written
about our country because, as everybody knows, we are not governed.
But the Soviets evidently are, and Dr. Hough, we welcome you, sir.
And if you would proceed, then we will go to Dr. Rush and to Dr.
Conquest.
STATEMENT OF JERRY F. HOUGH, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE AT DUKE UNIVERSITY, STAFF MEMBER, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION
Mr. HOUGH. Thank you very much, Senator.
Perhaps if one knew more about the Soviet Union one would dis-
cover that it was not governed either, but at least our ignorance helps
us in that respect.
I have an article coming out in a week in the journal "Problems of
Communism," which lays out at great length my views about the
issues of the succession, the policy views of the various candidates and
the likely outcome, and I would like to submit that to the committee
as my basic statement.
Senator MOYNIHAN. It will be part of the record.
Mr. HOUGH. Essentially, that is my written statement.
[The article by Jerry F. Hough appears in the appendix, p. 49.]
Mr. HOUGH. In the little time that I have here
Senator MOYNIHAN. You take what time you need, sir. This is an
important matter to us. The record will be made available to the entire
committee and will then be printed, so you can just do as you wish.
Mr. HOUGH. Well, it is still a relatively limited time for a relatively
large subject. What I thought I would do is hit some high points, and
particularly some high points that I think will be different from the
views that the other witnesses are likely to present. That is, it seems
to me if I tried to have a comprehensive and balanced position of all
the scenarios, I would have to be relatively general. So let me be
essentially provocative.
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
The first point that I make, which I admit is not very provocative,
which is really quite conventional, is that we are facing an absolutely
historic succession. The Brezhnev generation has been near the top for
40 years. Gromyko was Ambassador to the United States in World
War II. Ustinov was a minister of the defense industry in 1941.
Brezhnev was, if you will, a Governor of an important State at the
time that Tom Dewey was Governor of New York.
We are talking about people who come from deep in the past, and I
think the attitudes of these men reflect old realities. The new genera-
tion it seems to me is likely to be different. So we have an historic
change of generations, coming at a time when Brezhnev has been put-
ting off decisions for half a dozen years. The problems have piled up
and so we are going to get a change of generation at a time when there
are very important decisions, very important kinds of decisions to
be made.
The second point I would like to make-and this is far more
controversial-is that in my opinion the change in Soviet policy is
likely to come quite quickly. At first there will surely be a collective
leadership of some sort, but it seems to me a mistake to think that
there's going to be a no-change collective leadership for 4 or 5 years,
perhaps followed by an important change toward the end of the
decade.
It seems to me that there are several types of collective leadership.
It we go back to the succession after Stalin's death in 1953, we find a
collective leadership with great divisions in it, divisions between the
reformers, such as Khrushchev and Malenkov, but also divisions be-
tween that group and conservatives such as Molotov.
Yet the period from 1953 to 1957, when Khrushchev finally consoli-
dated his power, featured enormous change, actually more change than
in the period after 1957. My guess is that the coming succession will be
of that type rather than the post-1964 succession, which was far more
moderate in its results.
FOREIGN POLICY
The third point that I would like to make is that in my opinion
change in foreign policy and defense policy, is easier than change in
domestic policy, and for that reason is perhaps more likely to occur.
Again, if you go back to 1953, the new regime had launched a peace
offensive almost immediately and in 4 months it had ended the Korean
war.
In 2 years the Soviet leadership had for the first time gone abroad to
meet foreign leaders, that is, with Eisenhower in Geneva. They had
left Austria, they had given territory back to Finland. They had re-
versed Third World policies toward countries such as Egypt and
India. The size of the army had been reduced and substantial resources
had been diverted from heavy industry to agriculture and consumer
goods.
It seems to me this is a period that should always be kept in mind
when one hears, as one sometimes does, that the role of the military is
always particularly strong, inevitably strong, in a period of transition.
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274
The military did not prevent the change in priorities from heavy
industry to agriculture and consumer goods in 1953. If one goes back
to the 1920's, the head of the military was Trotsky and he was the first
to be defeated. Even when Stalin increased heavy industry investment
in 1929, there was major opposition from the military, from
Tukhachevsky, who wanted more for military. The military began
being built up only after 1931, when Japan had seized Manchuria.
It is only in 1964 that the military did rather well, and that in large
part in my opinion was because the new General Secretary, Leonid
Brezhnev, had been the chief representative for the defense industry in
the Politburo and because the American buildup in Vietnam and the
growing tension with China were providing fuel for the hawkish
position.
Thus the military can be strong or weak depending on circumstances.
The final point that I-the major point that I would like to make-
is that I think that not only can change come quickly, but that there is
an excellent chance that rather significant change will come fairly
quickly.
I think there will be some effort at economic reform, with more
emphasis on market mechanisms, as a halting step to try to move
toward the Hungarian reform.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Did you say Hungarian, sir?
Mr. HOUGH. Hungarian. More in the direction of the Hungarian
model.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Andropov was Ambassador to Hungary, was he
not?
Mr. HOUGH. That is right, and then Secretary of the Central Com-
mittee handling bloc relations during the time of the changes.
I think there will probably be some more unleashing of private initia-
tive on the farm. Now, both of these changes require very hard deci-
sions. They almost surely require a major raising of meat prices, as
occurred in Poland. And for that reason I am far less optimistic, if you
will, that there is going to be any significant change for the better in the
political realm.
That is, I think a new leadership that is taking hard decisions on
economic reform will want to prevent any KOR-like organizations, and
so any new leadership reforming economically is likely to be quite hard
on the dissidents.
And finally, I think there is a real chance for a leveling off, perhaps
even a cutback, in military expenditures, a reduction in the size of the
conventional army, coupled with a real peace offensive. I think there
are several reasons.
Senator MOYNIHAN. A peace offensive?
Mr. HOUGH. A peace offensive.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Which has not always been accompanied by re-
duction of the armed forces' size.
Mr. HOUGH. I mean a real peace offensive. I mean, I think they have
been extremely wooden in the way they have conducted them in the
past.
There are several reasons that I think that some change in Soviet
defense and foreign policy is likely. The first is the logic of the situa-
tion. Internally, the labor shortage is going to reduce the number of
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
18-year-olds by 25 percent in 1985 in comparison with what it was in
1980, and this is creating shortages for the economy. If the number of
draftees remained the same, maintenance of the present size of the army
is likely to present particular difficulties.
With economic reform going to require a major rise in key food
prices, the problem of compensatory wage increases and the like is
going to be a serious one. They have lust promised a huge new increase
in the food budget, and they are already starving heavy industry invest-
ment. It is very difficult to see how they are going to meet all their re-
quirements without cutting in the military.
Another part of the logic of the situation, it seems to me, is found in
the foreign policy realm. We can talk about a Soviet drive for superi-
ority-and heaven knows exactly what is in their mind-but if they
think they can be militarily superior, they are crazy. They have got 60
percent of the GNP of the United States, maybe 25 percent of the GNP
of the United States and Western Europe, let alone Japan, combined.
If they think they are going to be able to achieve convincing superi-
ority, they are just wrong. If they are going to get in an arms race they
are going to lose it, and that, it seems to me, is a compelling reason for
them to change what they are doing to some extent.
The other foreign policy situation which it seems to me has changed
is the relationship with China, which has undergone a radical change
since Mao's death. The increase in the size of the Soviet Army occurred
in the late 1960's, the early 1970's-I speak not of the strategic buildup,
but there was a substantial increase in the number of troops in that
period-came at the time when there were the border incidents with
China, when the Soviet Union was leaking semithreats that it might
invade China or the like. The situation was very tense.
Whatever else one wants to say about the present relationship with
China, the kind of border incidents, the kind of tension that existed in
the late sixties, is not there. And it seems to me to be very easy for them
to go back closer to the size of army of the mid-1960's.
So it seems to me in many ways the logic of the situation, the sever-
ity of the economic situation, the changing relationship with China,
makes a change of defense policy a likelihood.
Second, the evidence is that the candidates who seem to be the
reform candidates are doing rather well. The question, of course, of
who is going to succeed is very difficult, all the more so since we do not
know when the succession is going to take place, who is even going to
be be alive there, who is going to be in good health.
The fortunes of candidates fluctuate in the Soviet Union, as they
do in the United States, over time. But the conservative Suslov has
died. Kirilenko, who seemed to be the heir apparent 4 or 5 years ago,
has been declining. Another moderate conservative, Grishin, seems
to be making no progress, and some of his supporters seem to be
declining.
The two leading candidates seem to be Andropov and Chernenko. In
fact, the evidence is very strong, I think, that they are the two leading
candidates. What is unclear is whether they are a tandem who might
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
well work together for 4 or 5 years, or whether they are engaged in a
struggle between them in which one will be defeated relatively quickly.
But the interesting fact, it seems to me, is that in their foreign policy
statements, of course in highly censored speeches, both of them make
speeches which are quite distinct from those of virtually all the other
members of the Politburo. Since 1975 Andropov has been the con-
tender who has been by far the more urgent in the pursuit of detente.
In 1975, which was still a good year in Soviet-American relations,
Suslov was expressing worry about ultrareactionary forces in the
West. The Ukrainian leader Shcherbitsky was emphasizing that the
nature of imperialism had not changed. But at this time Andropov
was insisting :
A relaxation of international tension does not occur by itself. It is necessary
to actively struggle for it. There cannot be any pause or breathing space, since
detente is a continuous process which demands constant movement forward.
In 1979 he asserted : "It is impossible to estimate the danger of re-
tarding the course of detente." In 1980 he was the only Politburo
member to suggest that detente was in serious danger.
Unlike other Politburo members, Andropov has coupled his support
for peace and detente with a call for negotiations, even in 1980, in the
wake of the American sanctions against the Soviet invasion of Afghan-
istan. In 1976 he was very explicit in stating :
The policy of peaceful coexistence, as is well known, presupposes negotiations
and the seeking of mutually acceptable decisions, sometimes of a compromise
nature.
Chernenko in his speeches about detente has been somewhat more
general, but he has also been fervent in the extreme in supporting
detente. And indeed, in one of the most remarkable of his speeches in
February 1980, a few months after Afghanistan and a time when
everybody else was saying how wonderful the Afghan invasion was,
how necessary it was, Chernenko only made an extremely small men-
tion of Afghanistan and did not support this venture. He obviously
didn't say it was bad, but he did not say it was good. In the version
published in Pravda he did not even mention Afghanistan at all-
a kind of behavior in the Soviet Union which usually connotes
opposition.
So my impression is that the realm of foreign policy, while there may
well be nuances of difference between the two, and of course when hard
decisions come there may be major differences between the two, both of
them seem to be strongly on the prodetente side. The fact that they are
moving to the fore now suggests to me that the sociopolitical forces
within the Central Committee, within the Politburo, are supporting
that kind of action.
In conclusion, as I said at the beginning of this brief talk, I have not
presented a fully balanced set of scenarios, and clearly there are many
scenarios that one could draft, some of them quite different. I have
focused on the development I think most likely, and I have highlighted
the most controversial and foreign policy-relevant of my predictions.
I do this partly because I assume you want to be presented with a
range of views, but also I think because I think that the United States
is really ill-prepared for a real Soviet peace offensive. We know what
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
we do not want the Soviet Union to do. We know we would like the
Soviet Union to act in foreign policy like a Denmark. But we know
that is not going to happen.
We have done relatively little, so far as I understand it, in prepar-
ing a real fallback position in the arms control realm. We have not
really thought through what is a reasonable code of detente for great
powers in the Third World or what it is, what the rules of the game
should be.
It may well be that if the Soviet Union changes quickly that we
are going to find ourselves really not having thought out our posi-
tion, and we may find that the problems with our allies may not be
reduced but even multiplied.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Well, that surely is a fine statement-not for
nothing are you well regarded, sir. I gave a commencement address
up in New York in June in which I took just the opposite view, which
was to say that, given the pattern of Soviet succession- the collective
leadership and the slow emergence of new persons-that there would
be relatively little chance to get a major arms agreement, and that
we must be prepared to live with this. If we are serious, we have got
to be patient and enduring about it.
Can you stay for just a few more moments, because now you are
going to see how the United States is governed. We are in the last
3 days of the fiscal year. It ends Friday. And we have not got any
money to pay our Army as of Friday. So we are going to spend the
day dealing with resolutions that have to do with public lands and
things like that, and we still will not have provided for the Army to
be paid by the end of the day.
I think that violates the first principle of prudent government, do
you not all think, "Always pay the Army."
Mr. HOUGH. Since my son is in the Air Force
Senator MOYNIHAN. And the Air Force.
I have to run and vote. The turnaround time is about 6 minutes
and I will be right back, and I will try to bring the chairman with me.
[Recess.]
Senator MOYNIHAN. Professor Hough, now having heard your
extraordinarily valuable opening statement, I would like to turn if I
may to Myron Rush, who is a distinguished professor at Cornell Uni-
versity and one of the world's leading authorities on a thing we call
high Soviet politics; is that not the term? Low goings on in high
places.
We welcome you, sir. Proceed as you wish.
STATEMENT OF DR. MYRON RUSH, PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT,
CORNELL UNIVERSITY
Mr. RusH. Thank you, Senator.
In the time allotted me, I will try to characterize the historical junc-
ture at which the Soviet Union now stands, indicate the choices that
will confront the successor leadership, and suggest what this implies for
the U.S. policy in the years just ahead.
Beginning in the early 1970's, Brezhnev provided the Soviet Union
with a decade of coherent and stable leadership. This has now ended.
In recent months, Brezhnev's position has come under challenge. The
present political instability will probably continue for a time and then
worsen after Brezhnev leaves the scene.
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/
In the first phase of the succession, the contending leaders are likely
to turn inward. While marking time in their conduct of difficult, on-
going negotiations, they will probably seek detente with the West, at
least in the short term.
This might be an advantageous time for the United States to present
proposals for negotiations on major questions at issue between the two
sides, assuming that agreement could be reached within the American
Government. The divided Soviet leadership would find it difficult to
respond, however, and apart from complicating the succession the most
to be hoped for from this ploy might be to establish an agenda for
future negotiations on favorable terms.
The contending Soviet leaders are likely to reach an early consensus
to reject or curtail major Brezhnev programs, as a means of freeing
resources at a time when priority sectors, such as civilian heavy indus-
try, have been experiencing severe shortages. Such ventures of the late
Brezhnev period as the food program and perhaps even the Afghan-
istan war are possible targets for Brezhnev's heirs.
Resources taken from Brezhnev's favorite programs, however, will
not go far to narrow the widening gap between a virtually stagnant
economy and the rapidly increasing expenditures required for the
Soviet welfare state and for the maintenance and extension of the
troubled Soviet Empire.
This gap poses an overarching problem that will aggravate all the
other questions that Brezhnev's heirs will have to deal with. They will
find it necessary to curtail expenditures, fitting them to the resources
available. Taking more and more from civilian investment to support
the Soviet Empire, especially its massive military machine, as Brezhnev
has been doing for the past half dozen years, cannot be continued indefi-
nitely, for it deprives the Soviet Union of badly needed future national
income. Brezhnev has favored guns over growth. He has postponed the
reckoning, but it begins to draw near.
Besides the gap between economic resources and imperial require-
ments, the Soviet Empire suffers from a second gap-between the re-
sources available to itself and the resources available to the states
arrayed against it. This second gap, too, will probably widen in the
1980's, all the more so if the Soviet Union continues diverting funds
from civilian investment to the military.
If Soviet policies continue on their present course and the opposing
coalition of industrial democracies is not gravely weakened by devel-
opments internal to it-for example, by a world depression or a split
in the alliance-the Soviet Union seems headed for a crisis by the late
1980's. This crisis would not be a purely economic crisis, it would be
an economic-political crisis brought on by the failure of the economy
to provide the resources required to sustain the empire in competition
with the West.
By its own efforts, the Soviet Union can avert such a crisis chiefly
in two ways :
First, domestically, by reordering its economic priorities, shifting
large funds from defense to civilian investment in order to improve
 economic growth, thereby increasing the resources available in the
late 1980's. A limited accommodation with the United States to abate
the global competition will have an attraction for Brezhnev's heirs,
particularly if they decide to transfer funds from defense to invest-
ment.
A second way to avert the impending imperial crisis is by sharply
improving the Soviet geopolitical position at the expense of the
United States, thereby enabling a reduction to be made in the burdens
of empire. Such an improved strategic position might be sought by
imperial expansion-for example, in the Persian Gulf region-al-
though this might risk setting off a new arms race.
Alternatively, Brezhnev's heirs might try to improve the Soviet
Union's geopolitical position by such major diplomatic maneuvers as:
rapprochement with the Chinese People's Republic, a peace treaty
with Japan, tempting offers to West Germany for confederation with
East Germany, or a campaign of threats and inducements to split
much of West Europe from alliance with the United States.
Success in imperial expansion or in major diplomatic maneuvers, by
shifting the global balance in the Soviet Union's favor, might enable
the U.S.S.R. subsequently to reduce military spending-for Soviet
forces in the Far East, for example-even while maintaining or fur-
ther strengthening its security position.
While changed domestic and foreign policy strategies could supple-
ment each other, the successor leadership seems likely to concentrate
its efforts chiefly on one or the other, on domestic reform or on im-
proving the Soviet security position at the expense of the United
States. Both ways of averting economic-political crisis in the 1980's
would be facilitated by the massive Soviet defense military buildup
of the past decade, which itself, of course, is an important cause of the
impending crisis.
The Soviet Union might be able to freeze defense spending at the
present level for several years without seriously impairing the favor-
able regional and strategic military balances that can be employed in
diplomatic maneuver and imperial expansion.
Major initiatives to avert a crisis in this decade could, of course, best
be accomplished by a strong and united leadership, but none is likely
to emerge for some time after onset of the Brezhnev succession. Even a
fractious leadership might feel obliged to seek solutions to the coun-
try's economic problems in order to avert the looming economic-
political crisis, although divisions in the leadership would make it
hard to hold a steady course. Just as in the Stalin succession, the
U.S.S.R. may show the world the spectacle of a large empire attempt-
ing to change course in difficult circumstances, its politics unstable, its
policies fluid.
Let me sum up my understanding of where the Soviet union now
stands. At present it is not especially weak, certainly not as weak rela-
tive to the United States as it was in the Stalin succession or the
Khrushchev succession. It is not now in crisis, although it is heading
toward a crisis of empire by the late 1980's.
 Approved For Release 2007/05
Incidentally, note that the term "crisis" means a turning point. It
does not necessarily mean a turn for the worse ; it can bring a favorable
resolution, that is a turn for the better.
Granted that the successor leadership will be compelled to make
fateful decisions, does the United States possess strong leverage to
directly influence those decisions? I personally doubt this. Our experi-
ence since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan certainly raises questions
about our capacity to inflict large costs on the Soviet Union in order to
weaken it or compel restraint. Our experience during the heyday of
detente in the early 1970's raises similar questions about our capacity
to offer large economic inducements.
In the realm of arms control, we can offer not to deploy weapons that
would impose additional costs on the U.S.S.R., but the contribution
this could make to alleviating the Soviet economic situation would be
limited. In the past, when the Soviet Union has decided to reduce
defense spending, as after Stalin's death, it has done so unilaterally.
This could well happen again in the 1980's.
Our influence on Soviet decisionmaking is limited not only by inade-
quate leverage, but also by inadequate knowledge of what is going on
in the Kremlin. As a long-time practitioner of Kremlinology, I do not
want to depreciate my profession. But the fact is that our limited
information about elite politics sometimes leaves us open to Soviet
manipulation.
As part of the current power struggle in Moscow, Andropov's people
for some months have propagated the notion that Brezhnev is finished
politically and medically and that Andropov is an intelligent liberal
whom the United States should welcome as he prepares to assume the
leadership from Brezhnev. Now, the fact that Andropov headed the
KGB for 15 years and brutally destroyed the dissident movement in
the U.S.S.R. did not prevent elements of the Western media from
publicizing this line.
Professional Kremlinologists are far more capable than the people
responsible for the recent cover of Newsweek magazine that an-
nounced "Brezhnev's Last Days"; still, we strongly disagree among
ourselves.
This is not an argument for spurning Kremlinology. On the con-
trary, it is essential that we devote more resources to Kremlinology so
that we improve our understanding of what the Politburo is up to,
especially as we enter the period of succession when Politburo poli-
tics will be unstable and its policies fluid.
In planning foreign policy the United States must try to anticipate
possible developments in the succession and follow its course closely
in efforts to understand the forces released by the succession. U.S.
policies assuredly will affect developments in the Soviet succession,
and we should try to anticipate what their effects will be.
Our policies and actions, however, should be determined by our di-
rectly perceived interests and those of our alliances, not by expectations
of how they will influence the Soviet succession. Our knowledge at pres-
ent and in the foreseeable future simply does not enable us to fine-
tune U.S. policy according to a particular interpretation of what is
going on in the Kremlin.
 pprove or Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
11
Rather than acting directly on the Soviet Union in order to exert a
decisive influence on it-whether with the aim of moderating or weak-
ening the Soviet regime-our greatest efforts should be directed to
strengthening ourselves and our alliances, and to denying the U.S.S.R.
opportunities for imperial aggrandizement or major diplomatic gains
at our expense. Thank you.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Well, Professor Rush, it is we who thank you.
I found some important divergence, it seems to me, between what
you and Professor Hough had to say. I think your point about know-
ing what one does not know is a mark of good discipline. Mr. Andro-
pov's people could simply be presenting him, as you say, as an intelli-
gent liberal and a leading proponent of detente, lie who really was
quite brutal about the dissidents and has chosen as his successor,
Fedorchuk, a man of no squeamish persuasion. And it is Andropov's
successor-chosen successor, we gather-who closed down the last of
the Helsinki watch groups.
Well, you also have trouble figuring out what our Presidents would
do from what they say during their campaigns.
But, if you can stay for a bit of general conversation before we are
through, we would like now to turn to Dr. Robert Conquest, who we
very much welcome to this hearing. There is not a more distinguished
student of the subject in the Western World.
Dr. Conquest, of course, is the author of "The Great Terror" and
many other books. He is a warrior as well as a scholar. And you are
now a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institute, are you? You
are welcome, sir, and would you please proceed.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT CONQUEST, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW,
HOOVER INSTITUTION ON WAR, REVOLUTION, AND PEACE, STAN-
FORD UNIVERSITY
Dr. CONQUEST. Well, thank you. But however distinguished any of us
are, we first have to admit our ignorance, as both of my predecessors
have done, and I hasten to do so too. We are not adequately informed
and a lot of what we say must be general, as Professor Rush has par-
ticularly pointed out.
I would like to start off, if I may, by agreeing with both of them that
in the near future during the long, as I imagine, succession crisis, the
Soviet leaders will be turned inward. They will not, in my view, as is
sometimes said, tend toward outward adventures. Historically, they
have always turned inward during succession crises; that is how I
would see it.
I believe Professor Rush is right on the whole in seeing little change
in the immediate future. I mean, during a phase which may last a
couple of years, there will not be new faces. Anything can happen, but
there is no sign there will be these new faces.
One or two of the present leadership will take over, and the first man
to take over may not hold it. He will concentrate enmity against him-
self. But in any case, we will have the present Stalin generation for at
least some time.
Approvetlror Release 2007/05/16: IA-RDP84Rno274Rnnn' nnl1nnn'I_
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP8
Senator MOYNIHAN. Could I just interject to say that I think what
you say puts you at some divergence from Professor Hough. Maybe
you can take that up.
Dr. CONQUEST. It certainly does as far as the timing is concerned.
But after all, they are not as old as all that, and we can tell from the
Chinese example that in Communist countries, there is always an older
generation knocking at the door. It is not impossible for the present
leadership to sustain itself for quite a long time.
And, as Dr. Hough pointed out, they are very much from the Stalin
generation. Every one of them-I think all but 1 of the top 30-got
well into their political careers in Stalin's time, and indeed 8 of the
present leadership were actually personally selected members of Sta-
lin's Central Committee.
Therefore, in my view, they are not going to make any important
changes. And the question, a slight side issue, of what policies they now
put forward, is not very, very relevant, as you suggested about cam-
paign speeches in this country. In the Soviet Union, in the previous
succession crises, both Stalin and Khrushchev put forward policies
which they reversed when they got into power. Stalin attacked the left,
got into power, and attacked the right. Khrushchev put himself for-
ward as a hardliner against Malenkov in internal affairs. As soon as he
got in, he switched to attack the other side.
So how they appear now does not necessarily reflect how they will act
when they get in.
I think where we go wrong very often is when we use such words
as "reasonable expectation," "the logic of the situation is that they
must" improve their agriculture, that they "cannot" spend so much on
armaments, and so forth. That is our logic; it is not their logic
necessarily.
I am sure the central problem of the whole of Western understand-
ing of the Soviet Union is that we do not make the effort-it is not so
much an effort of the intellect as of the imagination-to see these peo-
ple as they are, as a different political species. They are as different
from us as the Ayatollah is, and we do not make that mistake about
him because he wears clothes which differentiate him from us a good
deal and he uses words like "great ratan" instead of "imperialism."
But when a Soviet leader says "imperialism," the tone of it, the
whole feel of it, is not a nice little political science word, as we may
think. It is "great Satan" that he is saying to the United States. And
the fact that he wears a Western suit and uses Western political dialect
does not really make much difference.
I do not think it is a matter of belief. We talk about "believ-
ing in" Marxism-Leninism. But you can be argued out of an intellec-
tual conviction. They have it soaked into their bones. And when one
says Marxism-Leninism, I am not thinking so much in terms of the
whole formal structure, of Marxism, but the central points of Lenin-
ism, which I suppose could be briefly summarized as : First, politics
comes first, above everything; second, you are in possession of a closed
set of ideas which is correct and cannot be argued about; third, which
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84BOO274ROO0300110001-7
 pprove or Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
of course follows, this applies on a world scale : All other regimes,
including Communist regimes of a different type, are illegitimate, as
we have seen in Czechoslovakia and of course in the attacks on China.
And more important still is the Leninist principle : "Kto Kogo" "Who-
whom?" There is always a winner and a loser. Everything is struggle.
Their whole attitude is of a different species of political animal
from ourselves, and every time we assume that they are going to do
what we think is the logical thing, we must cross that out and start
again. They are not necessarily going to do that sort of thing.
And that is the present generation. I would foresee a longish, as I
say, period of adjustment during a struggle between the various lead-
ers who are now putting themselves forward. And if one goes into
detail, I would agree with Professor Rush that a lot of the running
for Andropov is leaks by friends of his. I do not mean his policies,
but the notion that he is now in a commanding position. Everything
is possible in the Soviet Union and it is perfectly possible that Andro-
pov will emerge as the next General Secretary or First Secretary.
But we must remember at least one point of weakness in his case;
the Politburo consists of people who want to continue what they are
doing and in their posts. So you would imagine a majority does not
want to vote for the new man who offers change. And that at least is
one argument against an immediate Andropov victory, one which I do
not think has been put forward very much.
We then go on to the question of the next generation. Now, this is an
awkward one, it seems to me, because unlike both Stalin and Khrush-
chev, they have simply not built up a next generation. Both Stalin and
Khrushchev had men who were clearly intended as their successors,
10, 12, and in fact in one case 25 years younger than themselves.
Every young man who has come forward since Brezhnev got into
power has been purged pretty rapidly. And that they have not been
able to agree, I think, is the answer. Everybody, every young man who
has been nominated, has had objections from others of the leadership.
So they are in an awkward position for renewing the leadership
from newer people. But on the question of what the newer people will
be like-I would argue that the next generation, the people who are
now perhaps 55 or 60, are very much the same. I can see practically
no difference.
When we get to the people of 45 or 50, then I think a difference does
seem to emerge. I would like to quote Academician Sakharov, and the
impression given is that they are more cynical
!Senator MOYNIHAN. I am sorry, sir. You were quoting?
Dr. CONQUEST. Academician Sakharov.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Sakharov, yes.
Dr. CONQUEST. And he is a very close observer, and I may say his
views are, roughly speaking, the same as those expressed by all wings
of the dissidence, including Roy Medvedev, the Leninist; Nadezhda
Mandelstam; Andrei Sinyavski; Ginsburg. They all have roughly the
same view.
What he says is :
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-
I like this new layer of leaders coming to the top even less than its predecessors.
The people of Brezhnev's generation laid the basis for their careers in the worst
years of the Stalinist terror. That put the mark of Cain on them.... The new
generation is coming without that mark. It is more flexible, but there is a dread-
ful cynicism, careerism, and complete indifference to ideals in international
affairs. As far as internal matters go, they only care about the trough they swill
from, and what matters is that the trough be full.
And elsewhere he speaks of "total unaccountability toward their
own people and to the whole world, this dual irresponsibility being
interrelated."
One needs to make an effort of the imagination to envisage these
Soviet leaders. A suggestion I made to a State Department conference
the other day, making it vivid, was to envisage J. R. Ewing or rather
worse as typical of this generation. You can, if you think of the Soviet
leaders as mere names, mere people called General Secretary and
Minister, get a false impression.
You are faced with the problem of negotiating. If you were negoti-
ating with J. R. Ewing, you would not think he would necessarily do
the thing that you would regard as reasonable and good. And after all
he was brought up in a society which to some extent disapproves of
him, whereas theirs does not. They are brought up in a society, the
society they move in, which thoroughly approves of them, and the
more like Ewing the better, you might say.
So I see a generation coming up-this is, as I say, perhaps in 10 or 15
years-which is not very promising. One sometimes hears it said that
there is a new elite in the Soviet Union-you get this from Western
diplomats and others-a new elite which is smooth, educated, western-
ized. But that is not the political elite, nor the forthcoming political
elite.
The political elite, if we go back to the 55- to 60-year-olds, are tradi-
tionally the secretaries, the present secretaries of the Provincial Com-
mittees of the Communist Party, in the Russian Republic generally,
but not entirely. Two-thirds of them started their careers in Stalin's
time.
And I think if we get on to foreign policy, we are going to face a
difficulty in that they have no experience whatever. They get weekly or
whatever it is-I am not sure how often these papers go out-the
Central Committee issues, as you can imagine, a foreign policy guid-
ance newsletter, a couple of pages, once or twice a week, and it is pretty
misinformative anyway.
But these provincial secretaries do not have time to read it. They are
ignorant even of the misinformation. You may think that is perhaps to
the good, if they do not know, they could all come in fresh. But there is
a danger in this isolation into which they are stuck.
The question of detente and peace offensives is a very interesting
one. I would be inclined to say that a really complete, what we would
call a logical peace offensive-I would agree Professor Rush-this
does not really sound likely. The West is always thinking the Soviet
Union is going to be liberal and peaceful, if not now some other time
soon. That has been going on for a very long time these predictions of
a more peaceful Soviet Union.
 But I think more important is that detente was officially defined by
the U.S.S.R., as you know, as a method of struggle, and it was never
incompatible at its height with the most expansionist foreign policy
and a heavy armaments policy. In fact, detente came in at precisely
the time they were building up.
One can argue about some intercontinental ballistic missiles and say
they need them for a balance with the West and so on, but building up
the blue-water fleet, which got really started just at that period, was
pure expansionism. It was Kaiser William the Second come again.
They did not need it for any defensive purpose whatever. It is entirely
an expansionist weapon.
So I do not see these hard and soft, pro and anti detente attitudes,
in the Politburo, because it is difficult to understand what advantage
the hardliner could claim that the Soviet Union has lost by practicing
detente. It has gained everything a hardliner could possibly want.
It is perfectly true, as Professor Hough has rightly said, that we do
underestimate-or people are inclined to underestimate-the differ-
ences between the Khrushchev regime and its predecessors. But Khru-
shchev was in a rather special position. He has made himself not quite
dictator, but he was in a much stronger position than Brezhnev ever
quite managed to get, except toward the last year or two of his career.
So Khrushchev was in a position to do things contrary to the wishes
of the apparat, until they got tired of him and threw him out. So he had
a certain amount of more freedom, if more in internal affairs than
external.
I do not think one wants to coordinate this knowing something is
wrong internally, this very limited sense of "liberalization."
I mean, it was Khrushchev who provoked the Cuban crisis, and a
"harderliner" internally, or in principle, like Molotov, would not have
done so. A reformer at home may be an adventurer abroad as well.
It is very difficult to see what the next man can do, assuming he does
not make himself dictator, which I would say is almost impossible,
because they are all watching each other like hawks and will go on
doing so. . . . Yet Russia has had all its reforms through dictators,
through despots ordering their apparats to do the opposite of what
they want in Peter the Great's time, Alexander the Second's time-
to some extent Stolypin's and Khrushchev's time.
So we have a rather indeterminate future, but one in which no seri-
ous change, in my view, is likely to take place, in spite of the immense
pressures. On the face of it some changes they must make, even in their
agricultural system. But only when we see them actually beginning to
decollectivize, we may say to ourselves, their minds are gradually
opening a little crack toward reality. Until then, no.
Senator MOYNIHAN. That's extraordinary. I think we are going to
have the makings of some exchanges here.
But am I not correct that-I think it was Brezhnev who at one
point propounded a kind of second law of thermodynamics about
detente? He said any lessening of tension in one area automatically
increases it in another area ; sort of a constant level of conflict at all
times, and if you diminish it here you just have more resources to in-
crease it somewhere else. Detente was described in terms of struggle.
We fought differently than they, I think.
Dr. CONQUEST. He made two speeches in 1965 saying that the bal-
ance of forces has changed, we are going over to the offensive against
 imperialism. You can go over to the offensive against imperialism and
still have "detente."
Senator MOYNIHAN. It is useful to read their speeches.
You are agreeing, I think, with your two colleagues who have said
that-the term I guess is Professor Bialer's, but you have all used it-
a stable oligarchy is likely--or not so stable but nonetheless an oli-
garchy-as against a dictatorship.
Mr. RUSH. I would have some reservations.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Well, why do we not hear from Mr. Hyland, and
then we can hear what you think about each other's comments.
There is not a more distinguished American public official in this
field. I do not know what it is you have not done. But Mr. Hyland has
been adviser, of course, in the Central Intelligence Agency. He has been
on the National Security Council. He has been Deputy Assistant to the
President of the United States for National Security. He is now a
senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment and an adjunct professor
at the School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University.
It is a distinction for this committee to have you back in your once-
familiar role. But you did not have to testify when you were in the
White House. You may wish you were back, though I am not entirely
sure.
We welcome you, sir.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM HYLAND, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, AND ADJUNCT PRO-
FESSOR, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF FOREIGN
SERVICE
Mr. HYLAND. Thank you, Senator.
I defer to my colleagues on their knowledge of the Soviet leadership.
I have not for some years tried to follow it in the detail they have.
I have somewhat of a different viewpoint, because I have seen the
Soviet leaders on a more operational level when I was in the NSC and
the White House during the Nixon and Ford period, when we had
what was called detente. And we had many negotiations with Brezhnev
and Kosygin and the other leaders.
My prejudices about the leadership are fairly easy to list. First of all,
I hold the view that men make history, that it is important who rules in
the Soviet Union, that institutions, as strong as they are in totalitarian
countries, have inevitably been overcome by the leaders, both by Stalin
and Khrushchev and to a lesser extent by Brezhnev, certainly by Mao
Tse-tung and even Tito.
It is important for all of us, including congressional committees, to
know more about these new people. We heard this morning that there
was a certain viewpoint about Andropov. There are certainly other
views, radically different ones, about Andropov. But once we get down
from that somewhat Olympian level of Politburo members, it is rather
difficult to know about some of the candidate members or some of the
secretaries who inevitably in the next decade will be important people.
The Brezhnevs of the nineties are around and are undoubtedly iden-
tifiable. No Soviet leader has been a dark horse emerging suddenly
from the galleries. This is not the age of Wendell Wilkie. No one sets
up a chant in the Soviet Union, "We want Andropov." They come to
power, I think as Robert Conquest has demonstrated in his many writ-
ings, through a struggle for power.
Approved For Release 7nn71fFi11A ? C`IA-RDP84Rnn774Rnnn2nO1
 pprove or Release - 00300110001-7
The second point therefore is that Soviet politics remains a struggle
for power-if you understand that you have a better notion of how the
system works.
Senator MoYNIHAN. If I could interject, we do not always under-
stand the degree to which it is a struggle for personal power or at some
point an ideological struggle, do we?
Mr. HYLAND. It is very difficult to disentangle the various elements
of the struggle. As someone just said, Stalin began by being a leftist
and he then became a rightist, or was it the other way around?
Senator MoYNiHAN. The other way around.
Mr. HYLAND. I remember Khrushchev after Stalin's death was a
great loyal Stalinist, complaining about how people were abandoning
Stalinism. Within 3 years he had made the secret speech denouncing
Stalin.
So it is very tricky to say that so and so has a certain position, but
we also forget that what matters in the Soviet Union first of all is to
get power, once you have power you can adopt the policies that you
prefer. And I think that has been the history of the Soviet leadership.
It is well to keep that in mind when we think about "liberals and con-
servatives." We also should recognize that personal power is still very
important.
1 do not think a collective leadership can work for long in the Soviet
Union. The system requires a central point of decision, which inevita-
bly comes down to one very strong man. Collective leadership might
work in a country like Yugoslavia, where there are problems of recon-
ciling nationalities and various classes.
This is true in the Soviet Union to some extent, but the whole history
of Russia and of the Soviet Union points to one man emerging from
the field. I do not know how long it will take, but I am fairly confident
that there will be another Khrushchev, Brezhnev, or Stalin.
The degree of power that they have is interesting to compare, but
the power is there. We are witnessing it even today, when Brezhnev in
his old age, near the end of his career, has been able to pack the whole
government and many of the upper reaches of the power structure
with old cronies from the 1930's, with friends, with former aides, and
to do it with relative ease. He must have a great deal of power, it
seems to me, in order to accomplish that.
My third point is that, on the succession period itself, is that it will
be a period of great turmoil and change. It is bound to be. You cannot
go from one leadership that has occupied 18 years to another without
a great deal of upheaval.
How serious it will be is very hard to say. I come down on the side
that change will be greater than continuity. I understand those who
argue that there is a basic continuity in the Leninist system, there is a
basic continuity even within Soviet policy. But I think the eighties are
going to be a period of much greater change in Soviet policy than
almost any period thus far.
Myron Rush has listed some of the reasons. They cannot simply do
business as usual. The tactic of what is now called "muddling down"
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R00
does not work very well in a major great power as the Soviet Union.
They have to make some more serious decisions.
Therefore, I am inclined to think the eighties are a period of great
opportunity for the United States, perhaps the greatest period we
have had since the death of Stalin. At that time, you may remember,
Churchill advocated a very active policy. He sensed, I think, that the
Soviet Union was nervous, upset, weakened, even afraid, and he ad-
vocated a vigorous effort to meet with them and to put new proposals
to them and so forth.
Our administration under Eisenhower and Dulles were very cau-
tious. Dulles had the view that we should build up our strength and
then we could negotiate. I think that happened to be a mistake, but
that is for the historians to decide.
But I think we should be aware that we may be entering a parallel
period. There is a tendency in Washington to wait for Brezhnev's
successor, to wait until we are stronger. History suggests that our
relative strength is not going to grow that greatly, there will not be a
decisive change in the balance of power, though I think later we will be
stronger than the Soviet Union.
But I think we should take advantage of the eighties to aggressively
pursue our policies in negotiation with the Soviet Union, as well as
in unilateral action. Building up our defense budget and building up
our defense forces is I think a prerequisite, and I certainly think that
impresses any leadership, whether it is Brezhnev or his successor.
But I do think this other track should not be neglected, that is a
rather active diplomacy, even if it is exploratory and experimental in
nature. I think putting certain proposals before the present leadership
so they are on the table when Brezhnev leaves is a very good idea. Wait-
ing to size up the situation is probably not a good idea, because we will
be back at this table, or some of us will be back at this table, some years
hence, saying we really do not know whether Aiidropov is slightly
stronger than Chernenko, whether Gorbachev has moved up three
notches or down, or whether he is really a liberal, et cetera.
We will never be able to sort out totally this mystery of the Soviet
leadership. But by the time they sort themselves out it could be rather
late for the United States, and it may be that they will get through this
"time of troubles" by keeping us at arm's length. So I favor a rather
active policy for the United States during this succession period, and
even now.
Finally, let me just add one thing from my own experience. I think it
is worthwhile doing whatever we can to improve the analytical capa-
bilities of our own Government, especially the intelligence agencies and
the Department of State, in the field of Soviet affairs. I think it has
been weakened over the years, partly by neglect, partly because it was
not as interesting as other areas of the world, and partly because intelli-
gence as such grew to have a bad reputation and therefore it was more
difficult to recruit.
My own experience in the Department of State is that there still are
very strong assets in the analytical capabilities of the intelligence com-
munity, but that they are wearing thin. They need to be renewed, just
as any other institution. And anything, I think that the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence can do in that direction would pay off as we
move into this period where the demand for knowledge and the demand
for analysis about the Soviet situation is bound, to grow.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
Thank you.
[The article of Mr. William G. Hyland appears in the appendix,
p. 69.]
Senator MOYNIHAN. Thank you, sir. And concerning your last point
may I say on the committee's behalf that this is one of the reasons we
are having you and the other witnesses, that is to understand our cur-
rent intelligence analytical capabilities.
After our beginning, in which there was a sense of an adversarial re-
lationship between this committee and the intelligence community
(and that may have been warranted), I think it has settled down to
one that is supportive of just the sort of thing you talked about. Start-
ing in 1979, the resources of the intelligence community again began to
grow. We are very interested in the whole analytic side, the intelli-
gent side of intelligence, the kind of thing in which Dr. Rush, as a
scholar in residence, has participated; that is, an effort to make an
assessment of what do we know about this huge question.
Mind you, no one knows-here we are in the United States and we
have been studying these things for a long time-how many seats the
Democrats are going to win or lose in the House of Representatives in
4 weeks' time. So we do not expect miracles out of you. But there is a
range of information, and knowing something is a lot better than
knowing nothing.
Now, may I raise just three questions and then ask you gentlemen
to take a few minutes to comment on one another's remarks. One thing
Professor Hough said was that he thought there would really be a new
generation of leaders, an historical succession coming up. Yet, sir, if
I am not mistaken, Mr. Conquest would not hold to that.
There are only two people in the Politburo that are under 60, and
Mr. Conquest says there is a large number of people who go back to
Stalin's regime who will be around for some years. That is one point
you might want to talk about.
A second point-one of the things that this commitee is interested
in, can we seriously look forward to something successful in the way
of arms negotiations with a Soviet government in transition, given
that phenomenon of the weakness of individuals when they first come
to office? It is the opposite of our system. Our Presidents come to office
at the peak of their power and leave just ahead of the sheriff in most
circumstances. And it usually is just the other way in the experiences
we have had, with three significant transitions in the Soviet Union.
I would also like to say something concerning U.S. policy with re-
spect to the succession. I have heard you say that our ability to influ-
ence Soviet behavior is limited and in this context, note the importance
of maintaining our alliances. That is something which we can do and
since it is something we can do, it ought to be of a higher priority.
I wonder what your comments about the Trans-Siberian gas pipeline
and what our policy might be, if you want to offer them and then any-
thing else that you would want to say.
I will start out by asking Professor Hough if he discerns a disagree-
ment with his colleagues on the question of the nature of the succes-
sion-why will this be an historic succession if it is another 70-year-
old?
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16
HISTORICAL SUCCESSION
Mr. HOUGH. Well, to start with, I suspect I do disagree with Dr.
Conquest, maybe not so much with the others. When I began I was
talking in the longer term, that at some time in the eighties an his-
torical succession would take place. I think there is general agree-
ment on that.
The question is where the important breaking line is-that is at
60 years old, at 50, or 40. That you might have disagreement on. But
the historic generation is passing is the generation which came to
power in the purge, and which rose to extremely high levels in the
thirties, like Ustinov, who has been a minister since 1941.
That is very different than if you had a low level job in 1941.
Senator MOYNIHAN. You have people like Ponomarev still there.
Mr. HOUGH. Yes; he is a man who had a leading post in the Comin-
tern in 1935. Now, his First Deputy, Zagladin, was born in 1928.
So I think the fact that the generation which benefited enormously
in the purge is passing, and that that is important, even leaving aside
the age question. I agree totally with Professor Rush that, of course,
it is also a historic change because they are facing a differing set of
circumstances. If you quote Brezhnev from 1965, remember that 1965
was a different kind of period. They were not under the kind of eco-
nomic pressures. They then had the baby boom coming of age, and
had a huge labor surplus. And if you read even the Brezhnev speech
of 1976 at the Party Congress and then 1980, there is a night and day's
difference between the optimism of the first and the pessimism of the
second.
Let me say one thing about the 55-year-olds. It seems to me that this
is a very different generation than the others. That is, whether the
68-year-olds are different from the 77-year-olds is perhaps more con-
troversial. But when you get down to the 55-year-olds, these are peo-
ple with very differing experience.
You can say that some of them worked in the Stalin era, but they
worked as very young men, and basically this is the generation which
came of age during the denunciation of Stalin. As young men they
had learned the Stalin rhetoric in school and then suddenly in their
early twenties, suddenly they are told that all of this was a lie to them.
It happened at an early enough age that I think that it had a real
impact.
It is wrong to speak of these men as people who have a fanatic
acceptance of a closed set of ideas, who are like the Ayatollah. The
evidence is that there is a major generational change on that. I. of
course, have not talked with Central Committee members, but I have
talked with maybe 150 scholars who are policy intellectuals, men who
are advising these people and know them. I read their debates on the
third world, on Europe, on the United States, I talk with them.
When you read a 70-year-old, I mean, he often reads like an old
dogmatist. But when you read a 50-year-old, they write in different
terms. You meet them and they talk in different terms.
It seems to me that it is dangerous to assume a priori that that
which existed in the early stages of the revolution is going to last for-
ever. The people who are rising now are people who, as Professor
Brzezinski has rinhtly recognized, have risen through bureaucracies.
They have been able to meet a plan, they have been able to function in
bureaucratic committee politics. That is a hard environment to thrive
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
in if you are a total ideologue. If you are a total J. R. Ewing, somebody
is going to cut your throat before you get to the top.
The disagreement is on whether the historic change occurs in 1982
or 1986. We should maintain an open mind on that.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Mr. Conquest, you would not agree?
Dr. CONQUEST. I think I was meaning that the present generation
will go on for a few years. I do not think we are in any disagreement
about that. Eventually it will be replaced. I was of course saying that
the next generation were different. But I do not think that the differ-
ence is necessarily a favorable one.
I was quoting Sakharov and others who are extremely well
informed on this matter. Nadezhda Mandelstam, who died a year or
two ago and who knew a great deal of what went on in Moscow, takes
the view that they might be worse internally for, in a sense, the op-
posite reason : That Brezhnev and his generation do not want, have
shown that they do not want, a big purge of the old type, because they
remember, she points out, that the party leadership got purged, too.
But she says the younger generation, as usual, have not learned
from history. People do not learn from the history they have not been
through. She regards them as perfectly capable of starting a new
Stalinist terror.
So the fact that they are different and that they speak more smooth-
ly, does not necesarily mean they are greater humanists. The leading
man described as the greatest English humanist in the late 15th cen-
tury. Tiptoft, Earl of Worcester, was also the man who introduced
impaling and the killing of babies.
So I do not think language is quite what matters. It is what we
know, or what people who know them know, of what their general
attitudes and intentions are. I am not sure that they will or necessarily
will be as tough, perhaps, as Mrs. Mandelstam thought, but I do not
think we can judge-just on our hopes-that they will be better.
But the other point is I think that it is true that things are dif-
ferent now from what they were before the agricultural question got
worse and worse. But the solution, the traditional solution of the
party, the raison d'etre of the whole apparatus, is to contain the
social-economic forces. It was built in order to force the country, if
necessary, to suffer starvation.
High officials have said-and you have probably had this said to
you by other people-have said to American officials : We are going
to maintain the arms race even if we have to reintroduce a tough dic-
tatorship and starve our people. Now, that is putting it very crudely
and far out, but I think one wants to keep those possibilities in mind
and, let us say, not be too optimistic.
The other thing is-I think that I would agree with Professor
Hough that anything can happen in the Soviet Union. If we were sit-
ting here in 1952, I do not think that we would have predicted any-
thing that was to happen in the Communist world. Far stranger
things and more unpredictable things happened than in the West :
the split with China, the Hungarian revolution, de-Stalinization.
I would agree that anything is possible. We are only discussing
what seems to us, on the limited data we have, probably the tendencies.
 Senator MOYNIHAN. On the other hand, in 1952 you would have
forecast a continuation of the Soviet state in much the manner that
it is-recognizably the same institution?
Dr. CONQUEST. Yes, sir.
Senator MOYNIHAN. What about the other question about a new gen-
eration? It is incorrect to fancy that the leaders of the Stalin era,
whatever else their qualities, nonetheless know that war can be a dev-
astating experience in the Soviet Union. One had the feeling that
there was a sense that arms control at some level was important to
them, because it was personally important to them, as opposed to im-
portant in a bureaucratic sense?
That might well vanish. The urgency of it would not be present in
the wholly bureaucratized leadership that is coming on, with no expe-
rience in the world except the experience of the party, an elite more
cut off from people than any czarist aristocracy ever was.
Does that make any sense to you?
Mr. HOUGH. Well, if you are asking me, it seems to me you have
to ask what generation you are talking about. Brezhnev and his gen-
eration was born in 1906. That meant they were 35 years old at the
time of the beginning of the war. While Brezhnev was at the front,
the normal thing that a 35 or a 40-year-old does in a war is to have
bureaucratic jobs, as Gromyko, Ustinov, and Conomarev did.
The people who really get bloodied in a war are those who are 20,
and the people who were 20 were those who were born around 1920
or 1925. That is why if you look at the demographics you suddenly
see a huge drop in the number of men born from 1918 to 1926.
The one person who in the Politburo was too young to fight was
Gorbachev, born in 1931. But his home area, Stavropol, was occupied
by the Germans. I do not know what he did in the war and my guess
is he was evacuated, like most children were. Still, he came back
after the war to a homeland that had been devastated.
There may be people who were born in 1910 or so who do not know
the war, but that is a generation that is not going to come to power
until the nineties.
Senator MOYNIHAN. So that would not have any bearing on arms
negotiations?
Mr. HOUGH. I would not have thought that was a factor.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Is there likely to be a Soviet leader, whether
a dictator or simply the General Secretary, who has enough author-
ity to agree to a significant reduction in Soviet nuclear weaponry
and have that accepted by the military?
LEADERSHIP, DETENTE
Mr. RUSH. If I could speak to that and to the point you raised
earlier about a collective leadership, I would want to emphasize that
there is very unlikely to be a stable oligarchy, and I would agree with
Bill Hyland that the system calls for a one-man leadership. I think
there is a great difference between Stalin's power and Brezhnev's,
but Brezhnev has had a great deal of power and it has been under-
estimated, and his power
Senator MOYNIHAN. Oligarchic in the sense that his power is not
unlimited?
A rri vnrl Fnr Qoln@ca onn7!OO1t1 e : C
 Approved For Release 2007/05116 (IA-RUP54B002 -
23
Mr. RusH. It is not unlimited, but there is a great difference be-
tween his power in 1965 and 1966 and his power in 1980, for example.
I would say he more than anyone else, and certainly more than the
military as an institution, is responsible for the fact that the Soviets
have sacrificed growth and investment to defense.
The defense buildup is a terrible problem that we should confront,
not simply in terms of the military power that their spending has
created, but also the question of the motive. That tends to be dis-
regarded. It is a tough question, but we have to ask ourselves, it
seems to me, why have they done it. Why have they sacrificed the
growth of the economy, which is creating this crisis that lies ahead,
in order to keep building up power, military power, when there were
opportunities in the early and mid-seventies to slow the growth of
military spending.
We are cutting back on real spending on defense. There was detente.
There were all these good things happening, Helsinki and so forth.
Nevertheless, the spending went relentlessly forward. When they
found they could not do that simultaneously with big increases in
civilian investment, they sharply reduced civilian investment growth.
This has had a lot to do with the slowing of the economy.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Mr. Hyland, what do you think that they built
up all those armed forces for?
Mr. HYLAND. Well, I think they did it for a variety of reasons. One
was, do not forget, they were catching up. They wanted equality at
least, if not superiority. So for much of this period, even into the late
seventies, they were still behind the United States in raw strategic
weaponry.
In addition, I think these Soviet leaders, and all previous Soviet
leaders, and probably all to come believe greatly in the value of mili-
tary power. Military power has saved this country from total devasta-
tion in defeat in the 1940's and in previous centuries, and I think they
believe that those problems that are solved by military power, such as
the defeat of Germany or Japan, tend to stay solved: those that are
solved politically can always be reversed and come unravelled.
So they believe greatly in having an enormous amount of military
power. No leader is likely to come to power in the Soviet Union
advocating unilateral disarmament and pacifism. I think we can be
fairly confident of that.
I would like to add, however, I think the chances of getting an
agreement with the Soviet Union on arms control are fairly good.
They do not look so good right now, but I think they are improving,
because if the United States carries out the programs it now envisages,
by around 1986 the balance of power is going to begin to change. It is
going to begin to change radically in the favor of the United States.
There is not much the Soviet Union can do about this because of the
lead times on weapons and so forth. I think that is already clear to
Brezhnev, who has begun to worry about this. I think it will be crystal
clear to his successors that to maintain this equilibrium or to maintain
whatever edges they have will be an enormous strain on the Soviet
economy at a time when they cannot really afford it.
After all, Brezhnev's buildup came at a time when the economy was
still growing around 4 and 5 percent, so that the two curves were
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-
about the same. It has only been in the last 5 years that the gap has
come up, and that is going to increase. If we play our cards correctly,
and especially because of the problem of China, which I think is the
predominant problem for the next generation of Soviet leaders, I
think we can get a relatively favorable agreement.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Could I just ask the panel to comment. Mr.
Hyland has put a proposition.
Mr. HOUGH. Well, obviously the question is what kind of arms
agreement you are talking about. There is already an arms agreement
in place in SALT II. Getting such an agreement with a few baubles
added poses no problems whatsoever, I would think, with almost any
leadership.
If one is talking about a more significant agreement, there is clearly
the problem of the cruise missile. As both sides get a large number of
unverifiable cruise missiles, it is unclear what almost any arms con-
trol agreement means. So I think some of the crucial questions are
what we are willing to do, not the Soviets.
I guess in conclusion, though, I would say that we focus too much
on arms control agreements. The striking thing about the major
Reagan buildup, and indeed the buildup of the last couple of years
of the Carter administration, is that it all takes place within SALT
II. What it suggests is that the agreements we are talking about now
would have very little economic impact.
The real question of economic savings takes place within the cate-
gory of arms control : Is one going to go ahead with Trident, or the
Soviet equivalent ; is one going to have two new bombers, et cetera.
In many cases it is within the existing arms control framework,
rather than in signing new arms control agreements, that I think the
important decisions are going to have to be taken on both sides.
Senator MOYNIHAN. You make the point that we can offer them, in
arms control, certain relief from their economic problems.
Mr. HOUGH. All I am saying is, SALT II did not limit our military
expenditures. It does not, by the same token, limit their military ex-
penditures significantly. So the decisions are, what you spend with-
in the limits.
Senator MOYNIHAN. But you could process an arms control agree-
ment that would limit expenditures?
Mr. HOUGH. They are not on the table. I am just suggesting that the
big economic decisions involve level of military expenditures, rather
than this or that agreement. I think agreements and negotiations are
important in order to maintain good relations with our allies. I can see
where they can solve certain types of insecurity with respect to first
strike fears on both sides.
But it seems to me the thing that is radicalizing the third world
now is high American interest rates and their inability to pay them on
their loans and the low level of commodity prices, SALT II will not
solve that. There are other decisions that have to be made that deal
with what seem to be more crucial questions.
Senator MOYNIHAN. I wish I could get some of my colleagues to hear
you say that what is radicalizing the third world is the high American
interest rates.
Professor Rush?
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
Mr. RUSH. I think there are good possibilities for arms control
agreements, but I do not think they will go far to alleviate the par-
ticular Soviet problems that 1 emphasized in my talk. I think there is
some agreement on this around the table. The point is that there has
been such a massive military buildup.
I would disagree with bill Hyiand that in the next 4 or 5 years
there is going to be a major shift in the overall military balance. I
think that is unlikely.
The big question for them, and it is an urgent question is, can they
begin cutting back on military spending unilaterally? I did not say
unilateral disarmament. I said unilateral cutbacks in spending. They
have this massive military machine they have created. They are in a
good position to cut back. I am not predicting they will. I think the
odds are against it, but I think this is a live option.
Freezing military spending does not solve this crisis that they are
heading for. Substantial cutbacks, particularly if made in order to
influence American military policy or possibly an agreement with us,
could make a beginning in solving the economic growth.
If I could say one further thing, I think there might be very rapid
movement toward a concentration of power in the next couple of years
if Andropov is able to succeed. I think he is already using the KGB to
try to grab power. I think he would try to use it more extensively. I
think there might be military encouragement for establishing a com-
mander in chief for the armed forces, which would mean a Politburo
leader with a great deal of power.
I think it is quite possible that the generational change could come
more quickly; considerable turnover in the Politburo and possibly
substantial concentration of power in one man within 2 or 3 years.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Now to you, sir.
Dr. CONQUEST. On the last point, I am not sure that Fedorchuk is a
protege of Andropov. He seems to be much more closely associated
with the Brezhnev machine, the Shcherbitsky regime in the Ukraine.
I agree with my colleagues that the immediate solution of Soviet
economic problems by even a fair measure of disarmament is not
going to happen tomorrow. It is very difficult to beat intercontinental
missiles into plowshares in less than 10 or 15 years. It is not going to
solve their immediate problems very quickly.
But I do also think that there is a very good case for us to build
up our strength and alliances and so forth for what has been described
as an activist policy in attempting to get arms control. Not, as Profes-
sor Hough rightly said, not limited to the SALT type of thing, but all
around the board.
That is regardless of whether a single ruler comes in or there is a
temporary oligarchy for a short period of time or a longer period
of time. Obviously there will be a number one eventually. But who-
ever is at the top-we need to exert a pressure. It adds to their own
economic pressures. It gives them the carrot as well as the stick, and
an extremely active policy of suggesting disarmament is certainly
essential.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Well, this is a lot for us to absorb. We are
going to have to produce a summary of your views for the committee.
Are there any questions which the staff has?
Mr. SIMMONS. I have one question on behalf of Senator Goldwater.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Senator Goldwater asked this question:
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
On September 16, Senator Richard Lugar, who is a member of our Commit-
tee, introduced a bill to help ensure the nation's independent analysis of Soviet
bloc countries. The bill, entitled "A Soviet Bloc Research and Training Act" is
designed to help maintain a national capability to advance research and train-
ing on Soviet bloc countries and provide partial financial support for national
programs.
The bill would set aside a $50 million endowment to support advanced Soviet
studies in this country, and would improve our capacity to analyze our views
of the Soviet Union.
I wonder if I could ask our witnesses what they think of this approach, to
basically set up an endowment which would provide funds to institutions and
centers of that kind.
Mr. Hyland, I think you anticipated the question.
Mr. HYLAND. I favor it greatly. I think it is a fine idea. I would
be a little uneasy about Government controls over such an endowment
as the years go by. This is a very controversial field, Soviet studies.
Some people have quite different views than others, and I would
hope that the bill or the provisions would come out in a way that
would provide for a wide variety of views.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Well, exactly. You would like to see it go to
universities on terms such that universities could accept it?
Mr. HYLAND. Not only to universities.
Senator MOYNIHAN. But to other institutions.
Mr. HYLAND. To other institutions.
Senator MOYNIHAN. But with peer review. And I take it we would
all be in favor.
Mr. HOUGH. You are asking members of the interest group whether
Congress should give them money.
One thing that might be said is that there are alternatives here.
The present funding for Soviet studies is provided by the National
Council, which is financed directly out of Defense Department, and
Central Intelligence money. This is far from ideal. To the extent
that one could get the funds out of a congressional appropriation
that ends the danger of Defense Department control over who is
getting the money and reduces the danger that we look to the out-
side world as CIA agents. For these reasons, congressional appro-
priation have certain advantages.
Senator MOYNIHAN. I take your point. I never got, a word out of any
of you on the subject of the pipeline. Let it be noted that you can
keep your confidences or your viewpoints very closely. Maybe it is
that long life of watching the Soviets be very careful. They are very
careful about what they say. I gather you all are as well.
I thank you very much, and Senator Goldwater asked me on the
floor to express his regret that he wasn't able to join us. Normally
all of us would be here. But we are going to report a summary of
your views to the committee, and the transcripts will be printed.
We are very much in your debt. This is one of the most interesting
and important hearings that we have had in a long time. We thank
you.
[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to re-
convene upon the call of the Chair.]
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
 TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1982
(Declassified version of closed committee hearing-testimony of
Central Intelligence Agency)
U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9 :56 a.m., in room S-407,
the Capitol, Hon. Barry Goldwater (chairman of the committee)
presiding.
Present: Senators Goldwater (presiding) and Moynihan (vice
chairman).
Also present : Gary Schmitt,,minority staff director; Victoria Toen-
sing, majority counsel; Peter Sullivan, minority counsel; Dorthea
Roberson, clerk of the committee ; and Sam Bouchard, Jean Evans, Lot
Cooke, Stephen Flanagan, John Elliff, Ben Marshall, and Ed Levine,
staff members.
The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order now. We will not
have many members in attendance this morning. This is the final week
before the recess of the Senate and those who are here are busy with
different projects on the floor. So we will start and hope that others
get here shortly.
The purpose of today's closed hearing is to receive classified testi-
mony on the issue of Soviet succession. When the vice chairman wrote
to me last month and suggested this committee hold hearings on the
topic of Soviet succession, I was doubtful that they would be helpful,
and this is because I remembered Winston Churchill's radio broadcast
back in 1939 in which he stated : "I cannot forecast to you the action of
Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."
It seems to me that our intelligence analysts have enough trouble
finding out what is going on inside the Soviet Union on a current basis
without having to speculate on what might take place in that country
in the future. And yet, this is exactly the type of difficult question that
our intelligence community must attempt. These are the hard ques-
tions. These are the questions that the American policymaker needs
to have answered.
I want to thank my colleague, Senator Moynihan, for calling for
these hearings. The fact is, we need to know about the Soviet succes-
sion. If we do not know what is going to happen in the Soviet Union
in the future, we cannot make intelligent decisions about our relations
with that country. So intelligence analysis in the area is vitally
important.
(27)
 Approved For Release
STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS B. DIAMOND, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE
OF SOVIET ANALYSIS; BARRY STEVENSON, CHIEF, CURRENT
SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SOVIET ANALYSIS; KAY OLIVER,
OFFICE OF SOVIET ANALYSIS; JAMES BARRY, CHIEF, POLICY
ANALYSIS DIVISION, OFFICE OF SOVIET ANALYSIS; ACCOM-
PANIED BY MARY BROWN, LEGISLATIVE LIAISON
Mr. DIAMOND. Thank you, Senator.
It is a pleasure to appear before this committee on the subject of
Soviet succession. I am Douglas Diamond, the Office of Soviet Anal-
ysis, and I have with me several colleagues who are expert on various
related topics to the succession issues.
Mr. Barry Stevenson will lead oft' with a presentation that will
run close to probably a half hour. Of course, he and others stand
ready to respond to questions at any time.
Mr. STEVENSON. Before I begin, I will just drop a copy of the Polit-
buro apparatus in front of people since at times it is hard to tell the
players without a program.
A quick glance at the top of the list. will give you the rundown of the
current Politburo, although I think it still has Suslov on it. He died
recently, so it hasn't been changed since.
We understand that there is some interest in how a succession ac-
tually takes place in the Soviet Union and who plays the major role.
I will therefore begin with an assessment of Mr. Brezhnev's political
fortunes as we see them at the moment, and the informal rules that
govern the succession process. From there, I will touch on the role of
the various institutions in a succession environment, the attitudes of a
couple of men who we see as the likely successors to Brezhnev, and
conclude with a few comments on what we see as the major policy
issues confronting the new Soviet leaders and what we know about
their attitudes.
On the surface, Brezhnev is still the preeminent party and state
leader, and it would probably still be very risky for anyone to mount
an open challenge against him. But for the first time since be consoli-
dated his power, well over a decade ago, we believe there are indica-
tions of a substantial disparity between his formal authority and
power and the amount of power he really wields behind the scenes.
We believe his health is deteriorating over time, that he is more vul-
nerable politically than ever before, and that his Politburo colleagues
have begun individually and probably even collectively to prepare for
a future without him.
We believe, in short, that the political succession is underway in
the Soviet Union, even if Brezlnev is still in power, and we would
not have said that 1 year ago.
We believe there are several reasons for this. The first is the state
of his health. When he was alert and active, his consensual style of
leadership provided a piece of the political action and job security for
the colleagues he came into power with. With his stamina failing and
his mortality increasingly evident, it becomes prudent for these same
colleagues to begin to make preparations for their futures without
him. Available evidence indicates that this is exactly what they are
doing.
 Second, the passing of the old guard has begun to crack the facade
of leadership unity that we have seen for a long time. If you think
back to the past decade of the senior Soviet leaders, you tend to think
of Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorniy, Suslov. The only one of these that
is left is Brezhnev.
The most important recent event was the passing of the senior party
ideologist-in some senses the conscience of the Soviet party-Mikhail
Suslov, last January. His removal took a pivotal figure out of the
core of the Soviet leadership and it necessitated personnel moves to
take over his duties that opened up political maneuvering that we see
continuing today.
Brezhnev's role in decisionmaking has apparently lessened to some
extent recently. The roles of several other of his Politburo colleagues
have expanded. We now have derogatory rumors floating around-the
Soviet Union and getting to foreigners about Brezhnev's children,
about corruption in Brezhnev's family. There is indirect public
criticism of Brezhnev himself. And all of these things suggest some
breakdown in party discipline, and particularly, an erosion of
Brezhnev's image within the country.
More importantly-and this is where this sort of thing translates
into action-we believe that Brezhnev has been unable to dictate
some very key personnel decisions lately. Some examples : Yuriy
Andropov, the former head of the KGB, has moved out of the KGB
into the powerful Party Secretariat where he is able to challenge
Brezhnev's very close ally and protege, Konstantin Chernenko. His
replacement as head of the KGB could easily have been the First Dep-
uty Chairman of the KGB, whom we know to have been a longtime
Brezhnev ally, but it wasn't. They pulled a regional official out of the
Ukraine who, we are getting increasing reporting, has career ties to
Andropov, and made him the KGB chief. His name is Fedorchuk.
As a consequence of these and other personnel changes, we believe
that Brezhnev's control of the KGB, which is essential to any Soviet
leader's security, no longer seems to be assured. There have been in-
dications, as well, of opposition to some of Brezhnev's domestic pol-
icies recently, and perhaps of leadership conflict or indecision on sev-
eral areas of foreign policy as well.
Now, in recounting this, I don't mean to imply that Brezhnev is
now only a figurehead or even that he is a negligible factor in Soviet
policy. This is clearly not so.
What we are seeing is that, for the first time, Brezhnev's political
vulnerability is on the increase, and his influence is waning, and we
do not expect either of these trends to change.
Now, regarding the succession itself, as you are undoubtedly aware,
when the time comes for a change at the top in the Soviet Union, one
of the basic flaws and weaknesses of their system is a lack of any con-
stitutional procedure for the transfer of power. In effect, once you
get power in the Soviet Union, you hold onto it until you can't any-
more and someone takes it away from you. That can create a lot of
problems at the time that taking away occurs.
It doesn't mean, however, that anything can happen. There are
limits to what can happen. There are a number of collectively shared
understandings that govern the behavior of Soviet leaders in a suc-
cession environment and define the limits of politically possible suc-
cession outcomes.
 Approved For Release
In the first place, the Politburo will choose the new leader from
among its own. No member can seize power and make himself the
leader as such although, of course, by adroit political maneuvering,
he can help shape the outcome. In their selection of a successor, the
top leadership is influenced by various organizations and institutional
groups, including their own party and government constituencies and
the military hierarchy.
The potential consequences of backing a loser are no longer what
they once were in the Soviet environment. If you back a loser, you
can lose your perquisites of office, but you are not going to lose your
life in the current environment, which does create a bit more order
to the process.
Competition among contenders, therefore, takes place among a cer-
tain amount of self-imposed constraints. The leaders have a collective
interest in seeing that the arena for debate is confined to the Polit-
buro, I mean, just for sheer self-interest and for increasing their own
political advantage and in keeping the process from seeping out into
the public or among other elite groups.
So while there are no constitutional procedures for changing, there
still are informal agreements that will be in effect and will influence
what happens.
Now, if Brezhnev should die in office, an inner core of leaders on
the Politburo will meet immediately and it will be shortly followed by
a meeting of the whole 13-member Politburo. The chart you have has
14 members because we haven't put a new chart out since Suslov died.
Brezhnev's death, arrangements for his funeral would be publicly
announced, probably by the Central Committee, which would meet
a few days to ratify the Politburo's choice of a successor.
The Stalin precedent, which was near-panic among the remaining
leaders, is simply not relevant today. The suddenness of Stalin's death,
his dictatorial style, made the event much more traumatic than it will
be today. Brezhnev's consensual approach to decisionmaking and his
long-deteriorating health have given his colleagues plenty of time to
prepare.
If Brezhnev were to be-yes, sir.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Mr. Stevenson, the Politburo doesn't have a
Chairman as such, but it does have a General Secretary.
Mr. STEVENSON. That's correct. He acts as Chairman.
Senator MOYNr IAN. So the real choice is for General Secretary.
Mr. STEVENSON. That's right. That's what they are choosing.
Senator MOYNIHAAN. But in effect, the Politburo will make that
choice as the Secretariat is subsidiary to it.
Mr. STEVENSON. As the Secretariat is the administrative arm, so the
Politburo indeed will make that choice.
Senator MOYNIHAN. And the General Secretary presides at the
Politburo.
Mr. STEVENSON. That's correct, that's correct. And as in any organi-
zation, if you can chair it, you can certainly go a long way in affect-
ing what it does, as witness-if his colleagues decided to remove
Brezhnev, if he did not die in office, any maneuvering to build support
for this action would have to be done covertly. The party rules pro-
hibit factionalism, which gives the leader the advantage of moving
 against anyone who tries to put a cabal together against him. Pre-
mature exposure of any such maneuvering would enable Brezhnev,
using his powers as Chairman, in all likelihood to defeat it.
But once the Politburo reached a decision as a whole, covertly, to
remove Brezhnev, it would be too late for him to reverse the verdict,
providing his opponents had made some arrangement to control his
ability or his ability to communicate with others.
They failed to do that in 1957 when they tried to remove Khrush-
chev. Even though there was a majority on the Politburo to remove
him, he was able to appeal to the Central Committee as a whole where
he had greater support, where he had majority support, and he suc-
ceeded and saved himself. That's the only time that has ever occurred,
and I am sure the lesson was well learned by any who are on the Polit-
buro today and would want to remove Brezhnev.
But it is just such a situation that makes firm control of the KGB
and its warning apparatus essential. And as I noted a couple minutes
ago, we have reason to believe that Brezhnev's control of this organi-
zation is not as tight as it once was. And that is one of the reasons
why we feel he is more politically vulnerable today than previously.
Now, it is unlikely that Brezhnev would step down of his own voli-
tion. In over 20 successions in the Communist regime since 1917, there
has not been a single one that was-a single case in which a party head
had relinquished power on his own, and we are quite doubtful that
they would begin with Brezhnev.
It is possible, though, that his colleagues, if he became so infirm
that he couldn't carry on, would choose to remove him, and would
give him the option of stepping down with honors and making it look
like it was his own retirement. There is a chance he would acquiesce
in this. He is a very vain and proud man and very conscious of his
place in history. So we could have a situation that looked as though
he retired voluntarily. We doubt that he would do so.
As far as the institutions that have an influence in the succession
period, the Secretariat, which you have just made reference to, Mr.
Senator, does not play a direct role in the process, as you had sug-
gested, but the succession contenders on the Politburo who are sec-
retaries have a significant advantage, and that is that the Secretariat
is responsible for the appointment and removal of party regional and
central officials, and therefore, the members who are on the Secretariat
have a strong power base and a lot of patronage, and it is for this
reason that we think that the secretaries on the Politburo have the
signal advantage over the others, and this has proven to be the case
in past Soviet successions.
Senator MOYNIIHAN. And yet when Andropov moved up, he dropped
out.
Mr. STEVENSON. No: he dropped his chairmanship of the KGB,
which is a state organization, and became a secretary.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Became a secretary. I see. We don't have this.
Mr. STEVENSON. I'm sorry. This is a chart that has not been brought
up to date.
Ms. OLIVER. Senators, the way it usually works-not to zet, too much
into detail-is that there are three, four, or five senior secretaries who
hold membership on the Politburo as well. They supervise the work
roved F or Release -
 of a group of junior secretaries who have more specific responsibilities,
so that Suslov, for example, supervised several junior secretaries, one
of whom dealt with domestic ideology and propaganda. Another dealt
with relations with foreign Communist parties in countries outside of
Eastern Europe, non-ruling Communist parties, in other words. That
is Ponomarev. Another who dealt with relations with Communist
parties in Eastern Europe.
Mr. STEVEN sox. As for nonparty institutions in the succession, in
differing ways, the government, the KGB, and the military all have
influence in the succession outcome. But none of these three groups
pose any credible alternative to party rule at this time.
There are strong limitations on the KGB's influence, for instance.
The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned military and KGB. May I ask
you, is there any indication which of those two groups have the most
power?
Mr. STEVENSON. I guess, without putting too fine an edge on it,
one would almost have to say how you would define power. The mili-
tary certainly has-well, to give a simple answer, my answer would
be the military, and I could go into a number of different reasons
for giving that answer, and one or another of my colleagues might
even disagree with me, but I would say the military, for a lot of
different reasons.
The CHAIRMAN. Does the fact that their old military leaders have
been dying off, and they haven't been engaged in military actions
enough to develop new ones, had any effect on this?
Mr. STEVENSON. I will pass that question to my colleague here who
can speak very well to that.
Mr. BARRY. Thank you.
Senator, the military has done a somewhat better job than the party
hierarchy of rejuvenating its own ranks. There are a number of
younger and very vigorous military officers who seem to have gotten
themselves into good positions, not only in terms of upholding their
own professional interests, but in terms of good relations with the
Politburo and party rulers.
The Minister of Defense, Dmitriy Ustinov, who is about a year
younger than Brezhnev, is not a professional military man. He is a
former party secretary, and he came up through the supervision of
defense industries. Below Ustinov, there are a number of senior
officials in the Ministry of Defense itself that have moved into their
positions relatively recently. There are a number of hangers-on,
people who have hung on for some time, but there are a few more
recent entrants.
I suppose that the most prominent of these has been Ogarkov, the
Chief of the General Staff, who has been a rather vocal proponent
of Soviet military power, rather prolific writer, and we think con-
tinues to enjoy high level political support as well as staunch support
from the military establishment.
Mr. STEVENSON. And was a member of the first Soviet SALT dele-
gation, too, I might add.
Excuse me.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Just a question. Does the military command
in the Soviet Union begin with the Minister of Defense?
Mr. BARRY. We usually define the military high command to begin
with the Minister of Defense. Unlike the organization for military
 Approvee or Release - -
34
it was in part reaction to that, that we have seen Andropov moving
ahead.
We believe that Andropov and Chernenko are the two prime con-
tenders right now. They are both secretaries, central secretaries. They
are both on the Politburo. Romanov suffers from the problem that he is
still out of town. He is still over in Leningrad. He is not at the center
where he can elbow and jockey and gouge and fight his own interests
better.
I will finish up with a few comments on that, just as far as the roles
of the organizations in the succession. I think Kay put her finger on
the KGB's primary role. Its influence expands at the time of a suc-
cession because of what it does control. That doesn't necessarily hold.
Soviet leaders learned their lesson from Beria's use of the KGB in
1953, and after they executed him, they moved an awful lot of
Komsomal and party officials into the KGB and put them in positions
of power and not just KGB official career operatives, and they have
been very careful to maintgin that situation since.
The now head of the KGB is out of the Ukraine. He is not a Polit-
buro member. He is not even a member of the Central Committee.
Senator MOYNIHAN. What is his name?
Mr. STEVENSON. His name is Fedorchuk. It is F-e-d-o-r-c-h-u-k.
We cannot see him playing an independent role in the succession.
As for the military, it is not likely to act unilaterally in a succession
environment. It has no tradition of Bonapartism in the Soviet Union.
Marshall Zhukov's flirtation with power in 1957 was an exception, not
at all the rule, but it can play an important facilitating role in a tran-
sition period, either if Brezhnev is ousted or if he dies. In 1957, when
the cabal against Khrushehev almost succeeded, Khrushchev was able
to get Zhnkov to have the military to fly Central Committee members
in from all over the Soviet Union and assemble them for the vote which
saved him.
Now, certainly everyone remembers that precedent, and that would
be guarded against in any attempt to remove Brezhnev now.
But the military's influence is largely due, I would say, to the sub-
stantial congruence of outlooks and objectives between it and the top
political leaders in the Soviet Union. Ustinov is held in very high
regard by his Politburo peers, and he is also, of course, the Minister
of Defense.
As Kay mentioned, by defining national security interests--with
acccess to information that allows him to do that-the military, it is
not hard to imagine at all putting up an objection to one of the con-
tenders' platforms.
So it has grown in prestige under Brezhnev. I mean, it has grown in
funding under Brezhnev. The heightened Soviet international role and
so on, we would expect, would give the military considerable influence
in a succession environment, but not control and not as a challenger to
the party for power.
Now, regarding the players which I just mentioned a little earlier
on, there are a couple of interesting things about the current cast of
characters. For one thing, there is no one to play the role of senior
executive and statesman that Suslov apparently played in 1964. That
removes a bit of a moderating influence on the struggle for succession.
There is also no really well qualified candidate to replace Brezhnev.
 pprove or Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
operations in this country, I believe the Minister of Defense generally
is considered to be an integral part of the high command.
I think basically in response to your earlier question, the Soviet
military does indeed face a challenge of rejuvenating its leadership.
There is a prospect of impending generational change, but the mili-
tary establishment itself seems to have been somewhat better rejuve-
nated in recent years than the political establishment.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me inject a thought here. It has been my feeling
for some time that the younger element in the Soviet Union are begin-
ning to move up, and to me that is encouraging. Are you encouraged
in any way to think that a new leader, whoever that might be, would
be a younger man? I am speaking of someone below 70, someone in
his 50's, possibly.
Mr. STEVENSON. We do not see a new leader right now in his 50's.
Almost certainly, the new leader to replace Brezhnev is going to come
out of the inner core of older men now in the Politburo.
Now, it is conceivable you could get into a real deadlock in the
fighting for the job and there could be a younger, compromise candi-
date somewhere. But we would feel that at this point, that is a long
shot, a very long shot. Brezhnev was very cautious in his personnel
policies. He regulated Soviet cadre policy very carefully, in reaction,
in part, to the wild swings in policy under Khrushchev, which made
an awful lot of party officials very nervous about their security, and
for the most part you could say that in the hard-core cadre, Soviet
party jobs, right down through the party, for the last 15 ears or so,
no one has been leapfrogging anyone else. Someone who' is a party
secretary, when he dies, his first subordinate moves up one notch,
and his subordinate moves up one notch. The result is that the age
of the Soviet elite organs-the Central Committee, the Central Audit-
ing Commission, and so on-are far the highest they have ever been.
Senator MOYNIHAN. The only member of the Politburo under 60 is
Romanov.
Mr. STEVENSON. Gorbachev now, since Gorbachev has moved up.
Gorbachev is in his 50's.
Senator MOYNixAN. I want to claim right now my candidate for
General Secretary is Romanov. The fact that his first name happens
to be Aleksandr is
Mr. STEvExsoN. Well, people have opined that having a Romanov
back in charge of the Soviet Union would be a refreshing thing, but
he has got some powerful hurdles in front of him.
In a couple of minutes, we pretty much have believed that at the
moment there are two clear front runners, and these two are Andropov
and Chernenko. For the last decade, Andre Kirilenko, who, you will
note on your chart, is the secretary in charge of heavy industry, has
acted as Brezhnev's deputy in effect.
For the last year or so, we have seen a lot of indications, in fact,
over a year, that Kirilenko's political stature has been slipping. He
has had severe health problems for the first time. Politically, it has
become pretty apparent that Brezhnev has been moving Chernenko,
who has been close to him for a long, long time, into the fore, and
Kirilenke has been slipping out of sight.
At the time that Suslov died, there was a lot of evidence that Brezh-
nev attempted to move Chernenko forward very quickly. We feel that
 If we look at previous Soviet leaders, they have been rich in party
organizational experience. They have run-they have had line party
duties. They have run significant party organizations. They have had
experience in the economic area as well. Nobody on the scene now in
the Politburo has the breadth of experience that Khruschev had in
1953 or that Brezhnev had in 1964, not the kind of experience that
traditionally we feel makes for a Soviet leader.
Precedent nevertheless suggests that the successor will be one of
the senior secretaries in the center, and at this particular time, that is
Andropov, Ohernenko, Kirilenko, Gorbachev, and each of these men
has significant liabilities.
As I mentioned earlier, evidence indicates that at the moment, only
Andropov and Chernenko are the really serious contenders, so I will
just discuss the two of them specifically at the moment. If you have
any questions about any of the others, we will be happy to try to
answer them.
Andropov's KGB background could work either for or against
him. Nothing is ever neat and clean in politics, as we all know. It de-
pends on how he is able to play it.
In past years, we said that Andropov could not be a serious con-
tender for power until he left the KGB role, in effect, until he had
been laundered out of his KGB role. Well, that of course has now
happened. He has left it; he is on the Secretariat. But memories of
the purge years still run strong in the Soviet Union. You know the age
of the senior people. We all know about the violence of the purge
eras, and there is no question that they remember this. Some might
remember it enough to make Andropov's ascendancy distasteful.
On the other hand, right now we have a situation in the Soviet Union
when there is a heightened concern over popular discontent, over lack
of ideological preparation. You hear a lot of Soviets saying, "what
this country needs is another good boss, you know, good old Joe
Stalin. By God, when we had him, we had someone in charge."
Well, Andropov's KGB background could benefit him in that kind
of an environment. So on balance, I think we come down believing
that his KGB background probably won't really hurt him, and it could
help him.
Chernenko originally was seen by a lot of people, and apparently
is still seen by a lot of Soviets as just Brezhnev's creature. He has
provided him his staff support throughout his chairmanship. but he
has also been involved in a pretty wide range of party activities in
recent years which have necessitated a good deal of responsibility.
All the other contenders, we think, have more serious handicaps.
Now, whoever does take over after Brezhnev, and at some future
time, if Brezhnev lives longer, some other contender might move
further forward than he is now, we doubt that-he won't come in
with all the power that Brezhnev has acquired himself over a period
of time.
Senator MOYNIHAN. None does.
Mr. S'rEvrNsoN. That's right, that's right. It just isn't going to be
that way. The fact that none of them has a really strong, clear claim
to succeed him probably also is going to work against him. They might
have to strike a lot of compromises.
Approved or Release -
 pprove o
Senator MOYNIHAN. None of them does. It is a characteristic of the
system.
Ms. OLIVER. But we think this successor will have less power than
any previous successor at the time he succeeded.
Mr. STEVENSON. Both Brezhnev and Khrushchev had a lot more
experience and a lot more patronage and people accountable to them
out there on which they could build support than we see any of the
people right now who are positioned to replace Brezhnev having.
We figure it takes at least 5 years, and it has been in every case for
any leader .to really pull it all together. But in addition, it might be
tougher for any leader to freewheel than previously. Brezhnev, as I
indicated earlier, institutionalized an awful lot of cadre policies. De-
bate and handling of issues was much more formalized under Brezhnev
than under any other leader. By putting restraints on the most blatant
kinds of patronage, he probably made it more difficult for a new
leader quickly to hand out a lot of plums and build support.
So we think that the contender probably has a tougher row for this
variety of reasons to build his support fast and take charge quickly
than either Brezhnev or Khrushchev did.
Now, there's a number of problems that Brezhnev iLS leaving behind
that are probably going to make it pretty tough for him to handle
without being able to accrue a lot of power pretty quickly. Brezhnev's
chief legacy, I would say, certainly as we see it from the West, and
I think probably as they see it from the Soviet Union. is an ambitious
policy of military spending that made the Soviet Union a genuine
world power and world factor but which is increasingly difficult for
the Soviet Union to support economically.
With the removal of the terror and the waning of the influence of
ideology domestically, he also tried to buy popular quiescence and
support through incremental improvements in the population's well-
being, and when we look at the Soviet Union's economic problems
today, we have got to remember that for most of his period in power-
and this goes back to 1964-Brezhnev succeeded in providing a Soviet
version of guns for the state and butter for the populace. The stand-
ard of living in the Soviet Union increased significantly in Brezhnev's
era, along with that significant buildup that we are all so well aware
of.
The problem is that with the slowing in economic growth over the
last several years and the consequent near stagnation of per capita
income and consumption has translated into what we see as a general
malaise in Soviet society, and one that shows.
It is manifest in a lot of ways, the growing consumption of alcohol,
the severe alcohol problem in the country, increasing labor turnover.
We are getting reports of sporadic strike activity, I mean, nothing
like Poland. We can't jump to that, but nevertheless, in flourishing
black-market corruption and cynicism. You talk to Soviets, and it is
amazing how consistent the reports are that, well, things were getting
better for a long time, but they sure don't seem to have gotten better
recently. And many, in fact, think that they have slipped.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you a question at this point.
Mr. STEVENSON. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any indications that the depressed state
of their economy could have an effect on what we are discussing?
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
Could it give any increased power to the younger element who
always are the least happy group in any society when the economy
is bad?
Mr. STEVENSON. My answer to that-and I will then pass the
response over to Kay, who is more of an expert in that area than I
am-is that given the current power structure, in the immediate
term, and the concentration of power in the hands of the older cadre,
I doubt that the attitudes of the younger people could make them-
selves felt in this environment we are talking about right now-but
I don't know, Kay, if you have got any different view on that.
Ms. OLIVER. Well, two points. One, an extension of what Barry
was saying. I think that the cadre policies of not removing officials
for political reasons but only if they violate party discipline or in
cases of just gross incompetence, this creates or makes it more difficult
to bring in large numbers of young people.
On the other hand, as a result of these very cadre policies and the
near stagnation of turnover, there are a lot of officials that are going
to die or retire in the next few years. There is a bulge at the top. And
as this happens, of course, younger people will be coming in.
The other point is that I am not sure that-well, I gather, Senator
Goldwater, that you feel that the younger generation is sort of the
hope of the future, and I guess we hope that it is the hope of the
future, but we are not entirely confident that that generation's out-
look will be significantly different from the generation they will be
replacing, or at least that the outlook, although somewhat different.
may not be particularly better from a U.S. national interest point of
view.
The generation that will be moving into some of these jobs certainly
is more sophisticated; it knows more about the outside world. Officials
at that level or at that age group have traveled more to the West.
They know a lot more. Whether or not this makes them more liberal
or more interested in accommodation with the West is, I think, an
open question. There are some indications that some of these people,
who are below age 60, actually have a keener feeling of resentment to
the West than some of the older people.
Another thing is, you don't know exactly how to weigh the fact
that these people have not gone through World War IT. There may
be a tendency on the part of many younger officials who came of age
in a period when the Soviet Union was building its international
power, to have a great deal more, a greater feeling of confidence and
a desire to cut a figure on the world stage and assert Soviet power
globally than some of the older generation who went through all of
the horrors of World War II and saw what war can do. And although
we certainly don't think that Brezhnev is incapable of-well, even
Brezhnev probably had some sort of, or has some sort of, emotional
response and revulsion to the experiences of World War II and a
desire, a strong desire, to prevent that sort of thing from happening
to his country again. The younger generation might not have those
same views.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am prompted to ask the question, because
I worked with the younger Russians during part of World War IT.
Now, of course, that was 40 years ago. I found them to be very knowl-
edgeable about the Communist Party, about the Politburo and about
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP8
how their government operated. They always maintained the historic
Russian attitude that they would protect the homeland.
Now, since that time, I have sensed a change in. the thinking of
the younger generation of the Soviets, as we are sensing a change in
our own. I do not like to use the word "revolution," but I think it has
been the world's experience that if you don't change an economic
system to satisfy the majority of people so they can live better, you
will have problems.
Ms. OLIVER. One thing to remember is that the group of people in
the younger generation who will be in important positions are not at
all typical of their generation. I mean, the party grooms its own.
They have come up in an environment and have been imbued and
indoctrinated, if you will-not to put too fine a point on it-with an
outlook that is much more akin to that of the generation they will be
replacing than it is to that of their peers in the broader population.
Mr. STEVENSON. I might add, though, Senator, the concern you have
just expressed-I wouldn't say concern, but the situation you have
just sketched out that if you don't meet, if you don't change the system
somehow or other to meet aspirations, you are going to have trouble
is an issue that is worrying, that is on the mind of the Soviet leader-
ship today. The Soviet leadership is worried about the political im-
plications, I mean, as any Marxist would be; he is worried about the
political implications of any event, is concerned about the growth of
cynicism and a lowering of the growth of labor productivity and so
on which are in part reactions to a growing unhappiness with well-
being.
Certainly we would estimate that it has a long way to go before
it could come out into open, blatant political pressure on the leader-
ship, but it is an issue that is concerning to the Soviet leadership
today. I mean, the vigilance campaigns that they are running, com-
mentary and warning against religious influence in the wake of what
happened in Poland, anticorruption campaigns on a vast scale, run
right out of the Politburo, all suggest that these things are bothering
them. They are worried about the implications.
The CHAIRMAN. Of course, there is a great difference between the
political thinking of the Soviets and the political thinking of the
United States. We want it to happen yesterday. They don't give a
damn when it happens. Someday it could. That is what I am looking
at, the long-range implication of the younger people knowing and
increasingly knowing that their hard work will not produce for them
what lesser work in our country produces for our people.
Mr. STEVENSON. And that is on their minds.
The CHAIRMAN. How long will they stand still for it?
Mr. STEVENSON. The ability of the Soviets to hunker down and put
up with something that is pretty bad for a long, long time is some-
thing that is just no part of the Western experience.
The CHAIRMAN. I'll grant you that.
Ms. OLIVER. Although, of course, the Soviet Union is not made up
merely of Russians; there are a lot of non-Russian groups who don't
identify with the regime, and where consumer problems or economic
grievances coincide with nationality grievances, the resentment of
Russian domination, then there is a 'much greater potential for prob-
lems that could be viewed as very serious in terms of societal demands.
The CHAIRMAN. The Russian is actually in the minority.
 Ms. OLIVER. Well, their statistics still indicate they are slightly in
the majority, but of course, you know, we don't want to get too hung
up with majority and minority because the Russian empire throughout
most of the 19th century contained a minority of Russians. You know,
as long as we are not talking about a democratic country, the numeri-
cal majority may not matter that much, but it is true that the demo-
graphic trends overall pose a major problem.
Mr. STEVENSON. However, the Slavs are still considerably in the
majority, if you are talking Ukrainians and Byelorussians, and so on.
Let me-I'll just say a few words about what we know about the
positions of the two major contenders on some of these policy issues
which I have just laid out. For the present, Chernenko appears to
champion increased spending in the consumer sector in an effort to
raise worker productivity, while most of the rest of the inner core of
the leadership seems to advocate continued concentration in heavy in-
dustry investment.
Chernenko, as I mentioned earlier, has espoused a somewhat populist
image, stressing the need to keep in touch with the masses and be
sensitive to worker concerns and well-being. In fact, Chernenko has
in part explained the problems in Poland to the fact that the regime
got out of touch with the masses.
Other leaders, however, are stressing the need for increased ideologi-
cal and propaganda work to counteract worker malaise and dissatis-
faction.
Andropov, not surprisingly, has been concerned with Western
ideological penetration and the question of internal discipline. In fact,
as I have just noted, the harshest domestic crackdown on dissidents
that we have seen in a long time is now underway and while you can-
not prove anything conclusively by this, it appears to coincide with
Andropov's rise in prominence.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Mr. Stevenson, our problem is that each of us
has party caucuses. The chairman had to go, but my party caucus is
of much less consequence than his.
Mr. STEVENSON. I have about 5 more minutes of prepared presenta-
tion, so we can do what ever you will.
I would mention, as I think the last point may have gotten lost,
that we do believe this crackdown seems to have coincided with Andro-
pov's rise in prominence. We can't say it is therefore because of it, but
some Soviet dissidents tend to say to themselves, well, it is all because
of the head of the KGB, but he would not be acting on his own.
Senator MOYNIEHAN. Yes, yes, that is-we have assumed that Andro-
pov put his own man in to succeed him.
Mr. STEVENSON. Yes, not certain, but it is looking that way.
Senator MOYNTHAN. What do You mean by the crackdown? Do you
mean the closing down of the Helsinki Watch?
Mr. STEVENSON. That's right, and much rougher tactics than we
have seen in a long time, physical beating up of people, not just Soviet
citizens but foreigners. I mean, there was the Canadian group who
were roughed up and beaten by what were almost certainly KGB thugs
several weeks ago, much harsher intimidation of the Jewish refuse-
niks, just simply the squeezing down almost completely of Jewish
emigration right now.
Approved or e eas U17717_70 1-0- 11,
 Senator MOYNIHAN. Jewish emigration has just about trickled off?
Mr. STEVENSON. Yes, it is down. It is peanuts now.
Senator MOYNIHAN. If I could ask, what does that mean? I have
never quite understood why they don't want to allow emigration of
people whom they perceive to be a problem. What does it mean when
they close down Jewish migration? What do they think we are doing?
Mr. STEVENSON. Well, Jewish emigration, I mean, one of the prin-
ciples of Soviet control, odd as this may sound because what you said
is completely logical, is the fact that you just can't get up and leave
when you like it. This is true for every group. It suggests to the lead-
ership some loss of real control of the population at large. You have
got--once you allow people to start to leave, among other things, it
means that more and more are encouraged to agitate to leave, and that
agitation in what is essentially a totalitarian regime
Senator MOYNIHAN. This policy is pointed toward the masses as
opposed to.the odd troublemaker.
Mr. STEVENSON. The odd troublemaker, throwing out the odd trou-
blemaker, that's right. So I mean this has implications, and of course,
once the Jews started to leave, the Germans and the Armenians also
wanted to leave.
Ms. OLIVER. Fundamentalist Christians.
Mr. STEVENSON. Fundamentalist Christians wanted to leave. And
to that kind of society, it is disturbing, and of course, with all the rest
of this, of course, there is also the cutting down of the telephone com-
munication links to the West. I mean, the main weapon of the refuse-
niks and those who wanted to emigrate and so on was publicity in the
West that could come to their aid, but if you could cut down their
links, you could cut down their publicity. So we see it pretty much as
all of a piece.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Has that continued?
Mr. STEVENSON. Yes, yes.
Senator MOYNIHAN. So that looks like a policy in place.
Mr. STEVENSON. Yes, sir.
Ms. OLIVER. They are saying it is a technical problem, but it may
take several years to straighten it out.
Mr. STEVENSON. We axe dubious.
Senator MOYNIHAN. How would you quantify what happened?
Mr. STEVENSON. What they have done is cut down the ability for
Soviet citizens to direct-dial to the West or for anybody to direct-dial
from the West into the Soviet Union, except in a few cases. Our Em-
bassy can still direct-dial in and out.'So, into certain organizations, you
can still direct-dial, but that is it. Naturally, that closes down a terriffic
means of communication.
In the area of foreign policy, certainly to be another place of in-
tense concern the Soviets have not gotten the payoff from Brezhnev's
policies of relaxation of tensions of the West and arms control that
they clearly hoped would be the case a decade ago. Chernenko, right
now, stands out as the main spokesman for these aspects of Brezhnev's
foreign policies. He is significantly publicly ahead of the rest of his
colleagues.
Andropov speaks out far less on foreign policy issues, although
when he has spoken, he has strongly supported the intervention in
Afghanistan, and not surprisingly, because of his KGB connection,
 spoken out strongly for firm ideological control of foreign Communist
parties and the general world Communist movement.
The final point I would note, and that is prospects for policy change
in a succession environment. We think the complexity of problems
that they now face are going to make this pretty difficult to unify
on a common approach to significant departures. In previous succes-
sions, we have had a lot of significant changes, even during the succes-
sion years. After Stalin's death, the new leadership did a lot. It
purged the KGB, it ended the political terror-remember the virgin
lands' efforts in Kazakhstan? It ended the Korean war. It mended
things with the Yugoslavs. All of this you would say was before
Khrushchev really had fully consolidated his power.
Brezhnev did a number of things. Khrushchev had made an enor-
mous change in party domestic policy, bifurcated the party, in effect,
into a portion responsible for industry and a portion responsible for
agriculture. Brezhnev swept all of this aside, put the party back
together, sharply raised investment in agriculture, began the heavy
military buildup opposite China, which we tend to lose sight of here
in the West but which was a significant undertaking, and actively
supported North Vietnam's effort to take over the South which
Khrushchev had Just washed his hands of.
This time we believe the policy choices are more difficult and the
options somewhat more limited. With the economic slowdown in large
part due to past low rates of capital renewal, and due to resource
and manpower shortages, it is uncertain that a significant economic
reform, even if wholeheartedly implemented, could really move gross
national product growth ahead. This lack of slack in the economy
reduces the leadership's leeway in dealing with the various distress
sectors of the economy, transportation, agriculture, and so on. It is
difficult to have the real capital for tradeoffs without severely hurting
someone else in the current environment.
Cuts in the military budget, of course, would probably be seen as
jeopardizing two decades of terrible, effort to become a legitimate
world actor and pull evert with the United States, and cuts in con-
sumption would further lower the growth in labor productivity and
thus threaten to erode the regime's legitimacy, as Brezhnev tried to
make it.
I think both as Kay has mentioned, military and civilian leaders
have growing confidence in the U.S.S.R.'s ability to compete in the
world in at least selected areas. I think they will find it hard to forgo
opportunities. They have built themselves a very sophisticated foreign
policy apparatus that will provide continuity between the group that
leaves and the group that takes over.
If they really would try to pour a lot more into the military, they
would, of course; have to cut consumer sectors even more.
We cannot exclude the possibility that a mover and shaker like
Khrushchev would enter the stare. No one expected him to do what
he did. At the moment, I would say that we find it unlikely. We
think that the interlocking nature of a lot of their problems makes
really bold initiatives difficult, particularly for someone who won't
have Brezhnev's amount of power for probably the next 5 years
or so.
We also should remember that economic reform doesn't automati-
cally mean political reform or political liberalism, even if it were
Approved or e ease -
 undertaken. There are a lot of efforts at economic reform that could
in fact require the leadership to tighten political screws in that coun-
try. As they started to squeeze out excess labor and poor performers
and all of this sort of thing, you could have political repression
increase as economic measures, reforms, take place.
Precedent might hold, but in previous successions, the contender
with the most conservative policy or program has triumphed over the
one with more liberal tendencies. But as I mentioned before, he then
has tended to modify his program once in power. Khrushchev took
over a number of liberal elements of Malenkov's program. Brezhnev
coopted a number of the things that Kosygin tended to speak out for
when they first took power.
So, in a succession environment, it will be necessary to avoid any
hasty judgments as the new political leadership takes hold, or over
what we think we hear them saying when they initially take office.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Well, this has been informative. One other
question-and this is almost a personal question, but I thought the
committee would be interested in an answer for the record. I have
been arguing-and either everybody agrees with me or no one has
noticed-that, with the succession process underway in the Soviet
Union and the 5-year period of adjustment and consolidation that
is likely, it will probably not be possible to reach a serious arms reduc-
tion agreement during this period. Am I right that Brezhnev did
not move into Stalin's office until 1972?
Ms. OLIVER. That's right.
'Senator MOYNIHAN. Well, that's like waiting 8 years to go into
the Oval Office.
Does this leave any prospect for a serious arms reduction agree-
ment? It would have to be well into the end of this decade. I mean,
what newly emerged, confirmed General Secretary is going to go
off to Geneva and sign an agreement with President Bush to dismantle
all of the SS-18's and come back and tell that to the Minister of
Defense?
Mr. STEVENSON. I will let my colleague have the first crack.
Mr. BARRY. This is, as you said, largely personal.
First of all. I think that the Soviets are very tough negotiators on
these issues. They are hanging tough now, and that there is little
prospect that this leadership or any immediate successor leadership
will feel enough economic pressure or political pressure internally to
want to make major concessions in arms negotiations beyond what they
are already putting forward. I think there will be. an increasing
squeeze on them
Senator MOYNIHAN. But suppose they wanted to? There is an addi-
tional problem that a person newly come to leadership has less ability
to do that.
Mr. BARRY. Certainly has less ability to drive through any kind
of unpopular decision. So it would be necessary that there be a gen-
eral consensus which could conceivably rise out of economic pressure.
Senator MOYNIHAN. And then my second point is: the generation
of the Second World War has genuinely feared war, and at some level
wanted arms limitation, nuclear arms limitation, and this has certainly
not been a marginal ideological thing. It is possible that the new
Romanovs will not have that fear. They never knew Stalingrad-it is
48000300110001-7
 not a real memory for them. I am saying that the next generation, that
new generation might be more difficult to negotiate arms agreements
with than the present one.
Mr. BARRY. Well, there certainly is a lot of room to speculate on the
attitudes of succeeding generations. I have heard that argument run
both ways. I have heard it both ways. There is certainly no intelligence
information that helps you decide between them.
Mr. STEVENSON. I would make one other comment, and that is,
there is no question but what they are very tough negotiators. They
know how to negotiate. There is no question about that, that it would
be tough, as Jim said, for a new leader to ram through an unpopular
agreement. On the other hand, they do have an incentive now they
didn't have a dozen years ago, and that is an economy that is making
it more difficult.
Senator MOYNIHAx. This might be-
Mr. STEVENSON. That's right, and also I would say it depends on
what kind of a deal they think they can strike. I mean, after all,
Marshal Ogarkov helped negotiate the SALT I agreement, and that
sure didn't hurt his career. He became Chief of Staff afterward.
Senator MoYNIHAN. Well, I just make the point that the Russians
don't know how to negotiate. I don't think they have ever negotiated
anything.
Mr. STEVENSON. You mean they have sat tight until they got what
they wanted.
Senator MoYxIIAN. Yes. SALT I was their 5-year plan, wasn't it,
except for the ABM?
Mr. STEVENSON. I was going to say the ABM Treaty, I think, was a
legitimate arms control treaty.
Certainly people would argue that neither side ever gave up any-
thing they didn't intend to do anyhow with the interim agreement on
offensive weapons.
Senator MOYNIHAN. I don't see that the Soviets have negotiated a
damned thing.
Well, now, that is a long and a different subject altogether, but in
any event, a newly arrived leader isrfiot likely to negotiate something
different.
Ms. OLIVER. Well, let me make one point here. The long laundry
list of changes that Barry mentioned, there have been fairly major
policy changes during the last two successions before the leadership
question was fully resolved. That does indicate that consensus can
develop for a policy, a major policy initiative. It is not inconceivable,
and they may agree, and there has been postponement of some major
decisions, domestically particularly, and we might see some real new
policy directions.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Thank you very much. We appreciate this very
much.
[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee recessed subject to the
call of the Chair.]
Approved For Release -
 STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
OF
SENATOR DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN
In December of 1981, the Leningrad literary journal. "Avrora" (Aurora)
dedicated an issue to commemorating the 75th birthday of Leonid Brezhnev.
Yet there appeared within its pages (on page 75 no less) a one page satiric
piece aimed directly at Brezhnev.
In the voice of a young writer musing about the seeming immortality of a
famous old author, the satirist wrote:
"It is hard to imagine that this wonderful writer is still living.... It seems
as though he should have died. He has written so many books ! Any other per-
son who had written so many books would have been in the grave long ago.. .
Yet here he sits in front of me, red-checked and stout. It Is hard to believe that
he will die. And he himself probably doesn't believe it. . The day before
yesterday I heard that he had passed away. My daughter, fond of a joke, in-
formed me of this. I will not conceal the fact that I felt joy and pride for our
friend and comrade. . . . 'At last,' I exclaimed, `he will find his place in the
literature.' My joy was premature. But I don't think we will have to wait long.
He won't disappoint us."
And indeed he didn't ; on November 10, Brezhnev died.
There is scarcely a more important international event than a change in
power in the Soviet Union. Whereas in the West we are used to regular elec-
tions, the choice of a Soviet leader comes irregularly and so seldom that we ac-
curately refer to this event as a "succession crisis." As with any crisis, danger
is inherent. But opportunities may also exist. We must be clear, as far as it
is possible, about what those dangers and opportunities may be.
So it seemed important to think about these issues and to encourage general
discussion about them. In particular, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
recognized that these matters represent a major challenge for our intelligence
analysts, as well as scholars outside of the government. Early this fall seemed
an auspicious time to consider their views on the implications of the Soviet
succession crisis. The Committee did so.
On September 28, the Committee. in a closed session, received classified testi-
mony from Central Intelligence Agency analysts. On the following day, four
distinguished scholars testified in a public session.
It is important to emphasize the difficulties of making accurate predictions
in these matters. Results of elections in democracies are difficult enough to
predict, but at least the procedural rules are fixed by law and trends are discern-
able from history and public opinion polls. Not so in the Soviet Union. The only
rule of real consequence is that there is no fixed rule.
The Inner workings of the selection process and the formulation of domestic
and foreign policies are known to few outside the circle of the Politburo. Thus,
those in Soviet Studies are left to draw their inferences from such indicators
as vague precedents, rumors, censored and esoteric public speeches and, above
all, that most exacting of scientific exercises, studying where Politburo mem-
bers stand during the annual Bolshevik Revolution parade.
New leaders struggle to power, and the struggle appears at times to have as
much a personal character as it does an ideological one. Moreover, things can
change rapidly in these struggles. Today's front runner can be replaced over-
night, just as Khrushchev replaced Malenkov as General Secretary within a few
days after the latter's appointment. Similarly, a policy position taken by the new
leadership may come as a complete surprise. Who would have predicted that the
Stalinist Khrushchev would denounce Stalinism three years after the death of his
mentor?
274R000300110001-7
 Thus, judgments in these matters must bear the label, caveat emptor. As little
is known, the need for sound judgment is all the greater. In this connection, the
witnesses before the Committee displayed such a capacity. That they did so in
spite of the limited resources and information available to them is no small
credit to their profession. If the succcession crisis does nothing else it should
point up the need in this country to monitor and support Soviet Studies in an
even more concerted fashion.'
As it turned out, Brezhnev passed from the scene sooner than some might have
expected in September. On November 12, two days after his death, Yuri Andropov
was selected to fill the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, de facto head of State. However, this is only the formal point
of departure for the succession process. This process, it is clear now, had been
underway for several months and will likely continue for several years. So the
major questions remain. Who will lead? Will major changes in domestic and
foreign policies occur? And what are the implications for United States policy
toward the Soviet Union?
The selection of former KGB Chief Yuri Andropov to succceed Brezhnev could
not be considered a surprise, for at the time of our hearings it was evident that
he was one of the two persons most likely to succeed. Nevertheless, this was a most
unusual event in Soviet political history.
No director or former director of the KGB has ever been appointed General
Secretary. The only previous secret police chief to come close was Lavrenti
Beria, who was arrested and shot during the power struggle that followed
Stalin's death. Similar fates befell Beria's two predecessors. Andropov's unprece-
dented tenure as the head of the KGB and his ascendency to the position of
General Secretary indicate that he is a most extraordinary man? He has demon-
strated exceptional Machiavellian skill in having risen to the top and now is
apparently proceeding with dispatch to consolidate powers It took Stalin some
seven years before he rid himself of the Trotskyite and other factions. It took
Khrushchev about five years to neutralize his opposition. Brezhnev did not feel
confident enough to move into Stalin's former office for eight years. So far,
Andropov has succeeded in having his major competitor, Chernenko, nominate
him to be General Secretary, as well as denying Chernenko the not so symbolic
honor of delivering one of the eulogies at Brezhnev's funeral.
Yet one wonders how long Andropov can last. (No sooner had he been named
head of the Communist Party then rumors impugning his Russian blood-sug-
gesting a possible Jewish forebear-began to surface.) Even if he is not feared
by the political elite because of the "special knowledge," hence power, his asso-
ciation with the KGB apparently affords him, he suffers at least the liability of
age. Stalin became General Secretary in his early forties, while Brezhnev and
Khrushchev were under 60. In contrast, Andropov will be 69 in June of next
year and there is some question about his health.
It is virtually impossible for his tenure to approach Brezhnev's 18 years. He
would be extremely fortunate to match even Khrushchev's ten. Andropov will
be presiding over the passing of a generation of leaders. Indeed, most of his
comrades on the Politburo are older than he, and few members or candidate
members are much younger. If he is lucky, he will attend their funerals.
At the hearings, there was some discussion of this phenomenon. The sense was
that little is known about who will move into the Politburo in the near term or
what views they will hold. Assuming the seniority system now in effect con-
tinues, it is likely that they will be sexagenarians whose politics probably will
not be materially different from those they replace.
Looking a bit further down the road, one school of thought sees a new gen-
eration moving into the ranks of the Soviet ruling elite, a group less Ideological
and more pragmatic then its elders. Those who hold this opinion tend to look
1 To this effect, Senator Lugar, a Member of our Committee as well as the Committee
on Foreign Relations, has introduced a bill (S. 2919) which would provide financial sup-
port for advanced research and training in Soviet and East European affairs. I have
joined Senators Jackson and Biden of our Committee, along with several other colleagues
in the Senate, in sponsoring this bill.
2 Beria was officially head of the state security apparatus in its various manifestations
and forms from 1938 to 1946. However, from 1946 to his death in 1953 he continued to
dominate security matters from his position in the Politburo.
3 During the hearings Professor Myron Rush made the rather prescient remark that, in
contrast to past successions, "there might be very rapid movement toward a concentration
of power in the next couple of years if Andropov is able to succeed." However, Professor
Rush also has indicated that such a move on Andropov's part will not go unchallenged.
 favorably upon this development. Others, however, offer a considerably less
sanguine assessment. They suggest that this group's pragmatism is better labelled
cynicism, a view expressed by Andrei Sakharov :
"I like this new layer of leaders coming to the top even less than its predeces-
sors. The people of Brezhnev's generation laid the basis for their careers in the
worst years of the Stalinist terror. That put the mark of Cain on them. . . . The
new generation is coming without that mark. It is more flexible, but there is a
dreadful cynicism, careerism, and complete indifference to ideals in international
affairs. As far as internal matters go, they only care about the trough they swill
from and what matters is that the trough is full."
This is a problem for the future. For the present, we have Andropov to deal
with.
ANDROPOV
It seems as though Mr. Andropov would like us to view him as an understand-
ing and conciliatory, if not liberal, man who is fluent in English and speaks well
of detente. His record, however, belies this.
Perhaps the most carefully guarded secret in the Soviet Union at the moment
is how well Mr. Andropov speaks and understands English, if at all. No one
has as yet stepped forward to claim that he has had a significant conversation
with him in recent years. While in Moscow for the Brezhnev funeral, Vice Presi-
dent Bush and Secretary of State Shultz met Andropov. However, the new Gen-
eral Secretary spoke in Russian through a translator to Mr. Bush. But, we are
told, Andropov seemed to have given a nod in response to a comment by Mr.
Shultz, thereby lending continuing credence to the belief held by some that he
comprehends our native tongue after all. Not for nothing did Andropov earn his
reputation as a master of disinformation.
To say Mr. Andropov is "understanding" Is ironic ; as head of the KGB for
over a decade he had spies in every country and understands more about some
of them than do their heads of state.
To say Mr. Andropov is "conciliatory" is not based on any known facts.
He was head of the Soviet delegation in Budapest when the Hungarian revolt
of 1956 was crushed by Soviet tanks. In recent years, it was Andropov's KGB
which so efficiently and brutally repressed the dissident movement in the Soviet
Union and which culminated this year in the destruction of the Helsinki Watch
Committee. It was Andropov who exiled to Gorki the Soviet Union's most
eminent citizen, Andrei Sakharov. And it was Andropov who apparently named
Vitaly Fedorchuk, a reputed thug, to take his place as head of the KGB.
If this analysis of Andropov is accurate, his appointment is indeed ominous
for the West.
However, we should also remember that the problems facing the Soviet empire
are such that excesses of personality may be held in check by political and
economic necessities. Troubles in Afghanistan and Poland, a stagnant economy
and unpromising demographic trends all point to a nation under great stress.
This state of affairs indicates that major changes in Soviet domestic and/or
foreign policy are likely to occur. Brezhnev has left a legacy of deferred
decisions.
In the short term, major policy changes may not come rapidly because of
the need for the new Soviet leadership to consolidate its power. This undoubtedly
will be compounded by a failure of imagination existing in the gerontocracy that
makes up the current Politburo. Yet the decisions cannot be postponed forever,
and our response to their policy changes should be based as much on the hard
necessities of the Soviet situation as on our apprehensions regarding the person
of thb General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party.
At the beginning of our hearings, our distinguished Chairman, Senator Gold-
water, recalled Churchill's classic comment in 1939 about the Soviet Union : "I
cannot forecast to you the action of Russia : It is a riddle wrapped inside a
mystery inside an enigma."
This is an apt description 43 years later. There is little that we can confidently
predict about the new leadership of the Soviet Union. We are given to under-
stand--correctly I think-that the Soviets are now experiencing grave problems,
which could become a full fledged crisis of empire. We can hope that the Soviets
will make dramatic reductions in military spending in order to alleviate these
problems, but it is equally possible that Moscow will embark upon a bellicose
 course Involving an expansion of its empire. Fateful decisions will be made as
to who will govern, and how.
The leaders of the Western democracies, therefore, confront great uncertainty
in matters where misjudgments can have profound consequences for the security
of their nations. The times call for neither pessimism nor optimism. Rather,
they demand prudence. We must keep a watchful eye on the evolving succession
so that we may come to a better understanding of the new Soviet leaders and
their policies. We must strengthen ourselves and our alliances in order to
respond promptly and effectively to signs of danger. But we also must be alert
to opportunities for improvement in relations with the Soviet Union.
This is essentially the advice offered by Churchill on how to deal with the
Soviet Union. In i996, in what has become known as the "Iron Curtain Speech,"
he spoke of the need of the Western democracies to stand together, warning
that there is nothing that the Soviets admire so much as strength and nothing
for which they have less respect than weakness. But Churchill said more in that
address, which he himself called "The Sinews of Peace." He affirmed his belief
that Soviet Russia does not desire war, but the fruits of war and indefinite
expansion of its power and doctrines. But to prevent war, as the speech's title
implies, a resilient strength is required-not merely strength of arms, but a
prudent flexibility to seek an understanding with the Russians on all points at
issue. He affirmed the urgency of the situation in characteristically simple, but
eloquent, words :
"Our difficulties and dangers will not be removed by closing our eyes to them.
They will not be removed by a mere waiting to see what happens, nor will they
be removed by a policy of appeasement. Wbat is needed is a settlement, and the
longer this is delayed, the more difficult it will be and the greater our dangers
will become."
U.S.-Soviet relations deteriorated in the years that followed. Not one to give
up easily, Churchill saw hope after Stalin died and, in a speech to the House
of Commons in May 1953, proposed that the leading Western powers launch a
new initiative, to begin with a conference of the leading powers. He stated :
"If there is not at the summit of the Nations the will to win the greatest
prize and the greatest honor ever offered to mankind, doom-laden responsibility
will fall upon those who now possess the power to decide. At the worst the par-
ticipants in the meeting would have established more intimate contacts. At
the best we might have a generation of peace."
Now more than ever is the time to give effect to Churchill's advice. Now is
the time to say to the Soviets "We understand who you are, but more impor-
tantly, we understand your problems and we can offer you a way to solve them.
Reduce your arsenals and we will do the same."
Approved For Release
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
APPENDIX
[This article appeared in Problems of Communism, September-October 1982.]
SOVIET SUCCESSION-ISSUES AND PERSONALITIES
(By Jerry F. Hough)
EDITOR'S NOTE.-The important question of who will succeed Leonid Brezhnev
as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union remains an
open one. Mr. Hough traces the personal background and policy stances of his
"candidates" in the context of the complex policy agenda facing any successor
leadership.
Once again, Leonid Brezhnev's health seems to have deteriorated, and specula-
tion about the Soviet succession is rising. This time, however, the situation is sub-
stantially different from what it was several years ago. Two of the Inner core of
the Politburo, Aleksey Kosygin and Mikhail Suslov, have died, and the position of
a third, Andrey Kirilenko, appears to have slipped badly. Brezhnev's long-time
personal assistant, Konstantin Chernenko, has continued to gain greater status
and now seems to be the number two man in the political system. Most recently,
the long-time chairman of the KGB, Yurly Andropov, has been moved into the
Central Committee (CC) Secretariat and into the inner leadership core.
In a recent article in Problems of Communism,' William Hyland lamented the
decline of Kremlinology in the West, and with good reason. There have been only
four leaders in Soviet history (five, if one includes Georgly Malenkov's short inter-
regnum), and each has been associated with major changes in policy and even in
the way the political system functions. The succession to Brezhnev will come at a
time of critical policy choices. It will probably involve the disappearance of a
historic generation from the scene. If not immediately, then over three or four
years, it will almost surely produce substantial change of some kind. Yet, clues
about leadership politics have been much scarcer over the last 15 years than in
the past.
Despite the uncertainty of the evidence, Hyland is correct in insisting that we
give attention to this important subject. This article will attempt to assemble the
bits of information that are available about the leading contenders and about the
issues that will lie at the heart of the struggle for power. Even if events prove our
current thinking wrong, our mistakes may nonetheless indicate where we have to
rethink our underlying assumptions about the Soviet political system.
Issues have always been important in Soviet successions. In the past, even if
the emerging leader rose to power primarily through control of personnel selec-
tion, he was careful to identify himself with strong currents of opinion within
the party. In this succession, issues will very likely be even more important.
There is today no logical successor in the sense of a man of the right age and
background serving as the general secretary's chief assistant for personnel selec-
tion. Indeed, since personnel turnover in recent years has been slow, it is not
clear that anyone has had an opportunity to build a political machine at all. In
addition, since the mid-1970's, Brezhnev has steadfastly refused to face up to a
growing number of problems, and his successors will not be able to avoid them.
The problems are so contentious that there are certain to be leadership differ-
ences of opinion about them, and the struggle for power in the succession will
surely involve a struggle over issues as well.
The policy issues in this succession will not, however, be simple and clear-cut.
1 "Kto Kogo in the Kremlin," Problems of Communism (Washington, DC), Januars-
February 1982, pp. 17-26, appears on page 47.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
Westerners often define the political struggle in the Soviet Union in terms of
"reform" or "liberalization" versus "conservatism" or even "neo-Stalinism."'
There is a strong element of truth in this view, but the situation should not be
oversimplified. Issues that are important for most reformers at one time can
become unimportant only a short time later. Reforms that are instituted can
provide the basis for a new conservative consensus and become in turn the target
of a new reform movement. Key values held by reformers (or conservatives) can
come into conflict with each other and force difficult choices on specific issues
This last question is particularly crucial now, for the reforms introduced under
Khrushchev and Brezhnev have become the essence of the status quo that needs
to be attacked if the programs of the contemporary economic reformers are to be
realized.
There are many significant issues confronting the Soviet Union. First, the
Soviet Union is, of course, a multinational state, with some 20 major peoples
with their own language, culture, and territorial base. In particular, the growing
number of those with a Muslim background raises new problems. The question
of what to do with the Central Asians, which has been the center of great, and
probably exaggerated, attention in the West, may not be urgent, but it must be
faced sometime in the decade. Moreover, the nationality factor is never far be-
neath the surface on any policy question that arises-for example, the distribu-
tion of investment, demographic policy, economic decentralization, or political
liberalization.
Second, a series of questions concerning political reform are on the agenda
of discussion. Brezhnev has essentially continued Khrushchev's social reforms
that favored workers and peasants. But he has moved away from Khrushchev's
more extreme antibureaucratic tendencies and populist notions of mass partici-
pation. The key phrases of the Brezhnev era have been "scientific decision-mak-
ing," "the administration of society," and "the scientific-technical revolution," all
of which connote the flow of influence in decision-making to those with specialized
knowledge-administrators, scholars, and educated people in general. As a
present-day critic, Anatoliy Butenko, has expressed it, "one of the widespread
prejudices is that 'power by the workers' is unrealizable and utopian, since the
administration of public affairs has become extremely complex and demands deep
specalized knowledge, as a result of which the time will never come when 'each
cook will rule.' " 3
Criticism of this Brezhnev policy, however muted, is not difficult to discern in
the Soviet media and among Soviet officials and scholars. On the one hand, a
number of leading intellectuals inside the party establishment have appealed
with increasing frequency for greater democratization. Butenko has published a
forceful call for workers' self-management and has suggested-without being
specific-substantial changes in the representative institutions as well' Fedor
Burlatskiy, head of the philosophy department of the Institute of Social Sciences
of the Central Committee, has made a similar appeal, speaking out for a withering
away of the state in the form of a transfer of more functions to the public organs.'
Together with Georgiy Shakhnazarov, a deputy head of the Central Committee's
Socialist Countries Department, he has also called for the establishment of
political science and of a political science institute, one of whose purposes would
be to work toward the improvement of the political system.? Shakhnazarov him-
self is more cautious in speaking about any withering away of the state but has
advocated a democratization of the process by which candidates are nominated
as well as a loosening of information policy.'
On the other hand, there have been indirect cautions against democratization.
No one in the Soviet Union can come out publicly against further democratization.
It is quite possible, however, to discuss the importance of professionalization or to
hint about the need for continuing repression by speaking of the dictatorship of
2 Stephen F. Cohen, "The Friends and Foes of Change: Reformism and Conservatism in
the Soviet Union, ' Slavic Review (Urbana, I11.), June 1979, pp. 197-202.
3 A. P. Butenko, "Politiche8kaya organizatsiya obshchestya pri sotsializme" (The Political
Organization of Society Under Socialism), Moscow, Mysl', 1981, p. 178.
4 Ibid., esp. pp. 160-90. Butenko is head of the Department of Political and Ideological
Problems of the Economy of the World Socialist System Institute (IEMSS)-the leading
Soviet Institute on Eastern Europe.
5 F. Burlatskiv. "Tl?e I olitical System of Developed Socialism," Kommunist (Moscow),
No. 12, August 1979, pp. 62-73.
? G. Kh. Shakhnazarov and F. M. Burlatskiy, "On the Development of Marxist-Leninist
Political Science, ' Voprosy F.losofii (Voscow), No. 12. 1980, pp. 10-23.
7 G. Kh. Shakhnazarov, "Sotsialistioheskaya sud'ba chelovechestva" (The Socialist Fate
of Mankind), Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, pp. 187, 191, 197, 212-13.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
the proletariat in contemporary conditions.' Moreover, there is no reason to doubt
the accuracy of Chernenko's report that "at times one hears the question-don't
we have too much democracy? Doesn't it lead to a weakening of discipline?"
Third, the relationship of the Soviet Union with the outside world and the level
of military spending have become the subjects of intense public debate. The world
situation has changed radically in recent years ; military parity has been achieved
with the West ; the relationship with the United States has become confronta-
tional ; NATO is under severe strain ; the internal changes in China since the
death of Mao Zedong raise the possibility of a change in Chinese foreign policy ;
and the Soviet involvement in the Third World has had little payoff, and none of
the major Third World countries have proved revolutionary. Major differences of
opinion on how the Soviet Union should respond to each of these changes can be
found in Soviet books, journals, and newspapers, and increasingly even on Soviet
television.10
On the basic question of relations with the West, for example, Vadim Zagladin,
the first deputy head of the Central Committee's International Department, has
testified that there are two "extreme views" :
There are people who say that the situation is so complex and difficult
that there is no way out, that only the worst can be expected, that we are on
the very threshold of war. . . . On the oher hand, there are some people
who say that there have been all kinds of crises, this will pass too. We are
strong, we have the strength of the Soviet Union ; it will all pass of its own
accord.u
Although he does not spell out the alternative to these two "mistaken"
views, it clearly involves an active diplomatic effort to improve the situation.
Nevertheless, it is the fourth issue-that of economic reform-that will surely
be the central issue of the succession, in part because everyone recognizes that the
economy is not functioning well. The rate of increase in Soviet industrial growth
is declining, and the reduction in the share of GNP allocated to industrial invest-
ment in recent years does not bode well for the future. Agriculture is such a con-
cern that three times in the last four years Brezhnev has told the Central Com-
mittee that the food shortage is a political problem as well as an economic one.
The refusal of the leadership even to publish the size of the 1981 harvest is dra-
matic evidence of the sensitivity of the question. And the poor performance of
the service sector is universally conceded. In all these spheres, East European
countries have developed a number of reforms, and the question before the Soviet
leadership is which, if any, of these innovations to adopt.
Westerners often treat economic reform in the Soviet Union as an obvious
good, which has been thwarted only by ideological rigidity and bureaucratic self-
interest. Without any question, there are people in the Soviet Union who see the
introduction of market mechanisms as an ideological abomination, 12 and many
officials in Gosplan, the ministries, and even the provincial apparatus (notably its
agricultural components fear reform as a threat to their power or even to their
jobs. Nevertheless, the rigid ideologues are found mainly in the older generation
that is passing from the scene. Moreover, Khrushchev was able to scatter the
ministerial personnel to new regional economic councils (sovnarkhozy) in 1957.
If it wanted, the party leadership could hit just as hard at bureaucratic privilege
today.
Those with dogmatic ideological views and bureaucratic self-interest cer-
tainly oppose reform, but the reasons why reforms have not been instituted
8 See, e.g., M. I. Sushchnost' i osnovnyye funktsii sotsialisticheskogo gosudarstva (The
Essence and Basic Functions of the Socialist State), Saratov, Izdatel'stvo Saratovskogo
Universiteta, 1979; and Yu. A. Krasin, "Worker Participation in Management and Pro-
fessionalism, ' Voproay Filosfii, No. 4, 1932, pp. 3-14. Krasin is prorector of the Academy
of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee.
9 K. Cherneko, "The Vanguard Role of the Party of Communists : An Important Condi-
tion of Growth,' Kommunist, No. 6, April 1982, p. 41.
10 For a survey of the major published debates related to foreign policy, see Jerry F.
Hough, "The World as Viewed from Moscow," International Journal (Toronto), Spring
1952, pp. 183-97. For debates related to Latin America, see idem, "The Evolving Soviet
Debate on Latin America," Latin American Research Review (Chapel Hill, NC), No. 1,
1981, pp. 124-41.
11 Interview on Prague radio. Translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily
Report: Soviet Union (Washington, DC), Aug. 4, 19.,2. CC/11.
12 Sometimes views of this type can be expressed more easily in discussions about China
than in those about the USSR. See, for example, V. I. Lazarev, Kassovaya bor'ba v KNR
(Class Struggle in the PRC). Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, pp. 12, 20. 311-16; and Ye. A.
Konovalov. "On the Evolution of Socioeconomic Structures in the PRC," Problemy Dal'nego
Vostoka (Moscow), No. 2, 1980, p. 10.
11-463 0 - 83 - 4
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R00n30n11nnn1-
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
so far lie elsewhere. In recent years, one overwhelming obstacle to reform has
been Brezhnev himself. As his health has declined, he seems not to have been
well enough to run the government on a day-to-day basis, and power in that
sense has flowed to others. Although the same can be said of Mao in his last
years, it is absolutely clear in retrospect that Mao retained the power to block
actions that a majority of the leadership wanted to undertake. Similarly,
Brezhnev's ability in the last few years to advance two old cronies, Chernenko
and Nikolay Tikhonov, as key men in the political system demonstrates that
his position in this respect is not unlike Mao's.
There are also major conceptual and political obstacles to economic reform
that will surely outlive Brezhnev. There is no precise blueprint for a successful
economic reform in the Soviet Union. The evidence suggests that the various
parts of a meaningful reform are interrelated and, therefore, difficult to intro-
duce in a piecemeal manner. While it is easy enough to say that more power
should be delegated to local levels, the question of controls in crucial. One of the
primary sources of the rapid expansion in inflationary purchasing power in
Poland in the 1970's, for example, was a relaxation of centralized controls over
managers before strict market controls were introduced." It is also easy to say
that the profit criterion should be used to judge managers. But if prices are de-
termined essentially on the basis of costs, managers have an incentive to keep
their costs high. Cost-plus contracts are scarcely regarded as the key to efficiency
in the United States, and the situation is little different in a socialist system.
The logic of using the profit criterion is that prices should be controlled by the
market.
On a more theoretical level, it is easy to say that the Soviets should move
toward a more market-oriented economy. However, it is no simple matter to
establish a system that yields prices close to market prices while maintaining
its planned character and avoiding the more serious types of unemployment
and inflation found in the West. After all, some prices-particularly commodity
prices-fluctuate widely in the West.` Is market socialism to have the same fluc-
tuation in prices? Is it to feature the same increases and decreases in production
associated with such fluctuation in the West, with marginal producers operat-
ing only at times of high prices and eventually closing down?
The task of finding an acceptable model of economic reform is complicated,
also, by the fact that even educated persons in the Soviet Union often have
great difficulty thinking in market or even economic terms.
In the labor sphere, for example, Soviet economists seem torn between the
contradictory desires of reducing labor turnover and of giving managers the
incentive to economize on labor. The enormous attention devoted by Soviet
officials and scholars to the problem of labor turnover comes at a time when
Soviet turnover rates are well below those in the West 1?
Similarly, in Soviet agriculture, a strong case can be made that the long-
term secret to agricultural abundance is to turn the terms of trade against the
peasant and create structural conditions In which the more productive can
mechanize and increase ef&ciency.' Otherwise, marginal producers will never
be forced off the farm. Yet the Brezhnev regime has raised the subsidy to agri-
culture-from about 2 billion rubles in 1965 to 35 billion in 1980---by raising
procurement prices paid to the peasants while holding consumer food prices and
the prices of industrial goods sold to agriculture essentially steady."B Brezlnev
13 An East European joke hints at the problem by reporting the result of a dispute over
whether to change to the British practice of driving on the left side of the road ; they
decided to do so incrementally, with trucks adopting it first and the cars only some months
later.
1* Jerry F. Hough, The Polish Crisis: American Policy Options, Washington, DC, The
Brookings Institution, 1982, pp. 13-14.
11 For example, the January 1 market price for copper rose from 59 cents a pound In
1978 to 69 cents in 1979 to $1.03 in 1980 and then fell to 85 cents in 1981 and 73 cents
in 1982. These prices are the January futures price for bulk contracts. They are printed
In any major newspaper with a major financial section, including The New York Times.
1e The question of labor turnover is discussed In a soon-to-be completed dissertation
for the University of Michigan by Peter A. Hauslohner, "Managing the Soviet Labor
Market: Policy-making and Political Learning I'nder Brezhnev." Professor Hauslohner,
now at Yale University, emphasizes the conceptual barriers to reform.
17 See the discussion by James It. Millar in James it. Millar and Alex Nove, "A Debate
on Collectivization : Was Stalin Really Necessary?" Problems of Communism, July-August
1976, pp. 52-53.
19 Vladimir G. Tremi, "Subsidies in Soviet Agriculture: Record and Prospects," prepared
for the forthcoming compendium of the US Congress Joint Economic Commitetee, Soviet
Economy in the 1980's: Problems and Prospects.
Approved For RPIPaGP 2flfl7ffc11F : CIA-RDP84B0027
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84BOO274ROO0300110001-7
has announced that the subsidy will be raised another 16 billion rubles in 1983.19
Although the consumer price policy can be explained by political considerations,
the continual raising of procurement prices seems motivated by a general belief
that this is the key to more production.
Even if the Soviet leaders resolve the conceptual problem and decide what
kind of reform they want, they still face a political problem. Some of the prereq-
uisites for a thoroughgoing reform are already quite clear, and they are po-
litically unpalatable.
First, while the precise point of price equilibrium may be difficult to ascertain,
it is absolutely certain that many key prices are now far from that point. As in
Poland, the price of meat is politically the most serious problem. The retail price
for meat is about one half the price paid to peasants for it, resulting in continual
shortage in the stores, even though per capita meat consumption is not far from
the British level.'J0 Poland had a per capita meat production well above the British
level before the strikes of 1980,21 and nevertheless had severe shortages. The new
Soviet food program projects a rise in annual per capita meat consumption to 70
kilograms in 1990-the level the Poles had achieved in the late 1970's. This
strongly suggests that even if the Soviet Union fulfills its ambitious plan for meat
production, it still will have severe shortages so long as present meat prices are
maintained.
Many other politically sensitive prices are also set well below market levels.
Some, such as those for mass transportation, pose no problem, for the demand for
these items is finite. Where the demand is high, however, the problems can be
severe. The price of bread is lower than the procurement price of grain, and it is
economically rational for farmers to feed their livestock bread instead of grain.
Books are priced so low that a best seller is one that sells out in a single day.
Tickets to good plays are unobtainable through regular channels. The number of
hospital beds per 100,000 population is double the American level (1,249 vs. 630 In
1980), and the Soviet figure is still going up, although American health economists
consider even the American number excessive."
Second, apart from some rationalization in prices, economic reform also requires
some change in policy regarding labor and wages. The existing incentive system
tends to reward managers who hoard labor, and the major new performance indi-
cator now being introduced ("normed value-added production"-normativnaya
chistaya produktsiya) encourages managers to produce more labor-intensive goods
than the old gross output target did." As a result, there is an overutilization of
labor, and labor productivity has increased more slowly than it should. Moreover,
even if a manager wants to get rid of a worker, the existing trade union and legal
protections make it difficult for him to do so.
10 Pravda (Moscow), May 25, 1982, p. 2.
20 In 1980, the annual per capita consumption of meat in the USSR was stated to be
58 kilograms. The per capita British meat consumption was 46.2 kilograms in 1975, down
from 50.4 kilograms in 1970. ibid., p. 2 ; and P. G. Hare and P. T. Wanless, "Polish and
Hungarian Economic Reforms-A Comparison," Soviet Studies (Glasgow), October 1951.
p. 492. The precise Soviet statistics need to be treated with great caution, but the exag-
gerations are surely not enough to drop Soviet consumption significantly below the 1975
British level.
There are several reasons why such a level of consumption is not inconsistent with
shortages in the state stores. First, of course, some meat is sold through the collective
farm markets. Second, if goods are priced too low, they may sell out very quickly, but the
actual quantity sold in a brief period may be quite substantial-even more so than if prices
are so high that the goods do not move and remain on the shelves. Third, Soviet citizens
eat their main meal (obed) in the middle of the day. Hence they eat most of their meat at
the cafeterias at work. In recent years, when I have often observed an absence of meat In
Moscow stores. I have always found it in street cafeterias, as well as at those in the Lenin
Library and the Academy of Sciences Institutes, and it has been priced very reasonably.
(On one day a week, fish is offered instead of meat.) In light of other preferences given to
industrial workers, the same situation must prevail in factory cafeterias.
21 Polish per capita consumption of meat rose from 49.2 kilograms in 1965 to 53.0 kilo-
grams in 1970, to 70.3 kilograms in 1975, and remained roughly at the last level through
1979. See Hare and Wanness, loc. cit., p. 492. The authors state that the British and Polish
definitions of meat and meat products are identical.
22 The World Almanac and Book of Facts of 1982, New York, NY, Newspaper Enterprise
Association, 1951, p. 592 ; and Narodnope khozyaltstro SSSR v 1980 g. (National Economy
of the USSR in 1980), Moscow, Finansy I statistika, 1981, p. 499. To be sure, the problem
is not all one of demand unrestrained by cost. For example, the figure for the United
Kingdom, which has a comprehensive state medical program, was 894 in 1977 (World
Almanac, p. 588). In the Soviet Union. the hospital bed figure is the basis for budget de-
cisions, and the Ministry of Iiealth deliberately prolongs hospital stays in order to increase
its budget. For example, a woman giving birth without complications Is forced to stay In
the hospital for 13 days before returning home. even though the possibility of contagion
there probably increases the dangers for the new-born and may even be a factor in Soviet
infant mortality figures.
a9 The validity of this charge is acknowledged by A. Bachurin, deputy chairman of Gas-
plan in charge of labor questions. Pravda, July 16, 1982, p. 3.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
In addition, virtually all Soviet economists contend that wage policy does not
provide sufficient incentive to encourage economic growth.24 During most of the
Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods, a marked tendency toward egalitarianism
was observable in wage policy.26 For all wage-earners, the gap between the top
tenth and bottom tenth widened a bit in the early 1970's, but those at the bottom
of the scale are largely service personnel.2" In economic terms, the crucial wage
differential is that between blue-collar workers and engineering-technical per-
sonnel (ITR), for it determines whether workers have the incentive to become
foremen and engineers and reflects the extent to which managers are rewarded
for performance. Table 1 shows trends in this differential for industry, construc-
tion, and agriculture throughout the Brezhnev years. The figures for the second
half of the 1970's are little short of astonishing, especially given the counter-
vailing consensus among Soviet economists. In industry, engineering-technical
personnel received a average monthly wage increase of 13.3 rubles, while workers
received 24.6 rubles. In construction, the respective figures were 5.9 rubles and
27.6 rubles. In agriculture, the wages of the technical personnel rose by only 5.5
rubles (they actually declined between 1977 and 1980), and those of farm workers
by 23.7 rubles.
TABLE 1.-AVERAGE MONTHLY WAGES IN SOVIET INDUSTRY, CONSTRUCTION, AND STATE
AGRICULTURE, 1965-80
[In rubles]
Industry:
Engineering-technical workers (ITR) ' ...........................................................
148.4
178.0
199.2
212.5
Workers ..........................................................................................................
101.7
130.6
160.9
185.5
Ratio of ITR wages to worker wages .............................................................
1.46:1.00
1.36:1.00
1.24:1.00
1.15:1.00
Construction:
fTR' ...............................................................................................................
160.7
200.0
207.0
212.9
Workers ..........................................................................................................
108.4
148.5
180.3
207.9
Ratio of ITR wages to worker wages .............................................................
1.48:1.00
1.35:1.00
1.15:1.00
1.02:1.00
State agriculture:
Agricultural-technical personnel 2 ...................................................................
136.3
162.5
180.2
185.7
Workers ..........................................................................................................
72.5
98.8
125.3
149.0
Ratio of agricultural-technical worker wages to worker wages .......................
1.88:1.00
1.64:1.00
1.44:1.00
1.25:1.00
This category includes line managers as well as rank-and-file engineers and technicians.
2 This category includes agricultural specialists (such as agronomists and veterinarians) as well as engineers and technicians involved with
equipment and repair.
Source: Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1980 g. (The U.S.S.R. National Economy in 1980), Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1981, pp. 364-65.
As a result, the fifth issue of the succession must be the nature of Soviet social
policy. The policy pursued by Khrushchev and especially Brezhnev has, in a way,
represented a gesture toward the Marxist ideal, "To each according to his needs."
Everyone has a guarantee to a job-which is secured by giving managers an
incentive to retain excess labor force. Everyone can afford the basic necessities
(subsidies keep prices low, sometimes below cost), and if only corruption and
the black market could be eliminated, these necessities would be rationed by
willingness to stand in line rather than by amount of income. Income differen-
tials between managers on the one hand, and workers and peasants on the other,
have been reduced.27
24 See the discussion in Jerry F. Hough, "Policy-Making and the Worker," in Arcadius
Kahan and Blair Ruble, Eus., Industrial Labor in the U.S.S.R., New York, N.Y., Pergamon
Press, 1979, pp. 380, 390-91.
25 Janet G. Chapman, "Recent Trends in the Soviet Industrial Wage Structure," in ibid.,
pp. 151-83; Alistar McAuley, Econom,c Welfare in the Soviet Union, London, George Then
& Unwin, 1979; and David Lane, The End of Social Inequality: Class, Status, and Power
Under State Socialism, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1982, pp. 54-66.
21 Michael Ellman, "A Note on the Distribution of Earnings in the USSR Under Brezhnev."
Slavic Review, December 19.0. pp. 669-71. Professor Elliman concludes that the trend to-
ward egalitarianism ended in 1968. But his evidence does not go beyond 1974. Moreover, the
particular indicator used is very sensitive to changes In the minimum wage, and the intro-
duction of a large increase in the minimum wage In 1968 makes that a very atypical year
for comparison.
27 As Hedrick Smith has documented in The Russians (New York, N.Y., Quadrangle,
1976), the topmost elite has been given a number of nonmonetary privileges, but these
are provided only to a very narrow sector of the managerial elite. Moreover, even the scale
of the privileges to the high officials can be exaggeated in comparative terms. For a case
in which one of the country's top 25 publishing officials was unable, despite the support of
two Central Committee members, to get his three-room apartment enlarged to four, see
Vladimir Voinovich. The Ivankiad or The Tale of the Writer Voinovich's Installation in His
New Apartment, New York, N.Y., Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1976.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
The egalitarian ideal has, of course, not been reached by any stretch of the
imagination. Many-including many scholars-argue that the policy of egali-
tarianism should be pushed still further : the minimum wage, the earnings of
collective farmers, and pensions should be increased ; the income supplements for
children of poor families should be raised; more money should be pumped into
the countryside to reduce migration to the city ; privileges for the well-to-do and
powerful should be reduced ; more of the country's resources should go into
"collective income" (e.g., free day-care centers, subsidized resorts, better free
hospital care, and so forth) 28
Market-oriented reforms, on the other hand, would move away from the egali-
tarian ideals. If more money were to go to the productive and the innovative,
income differentiation would widen. If meat, theater tickets, books, and the like
were priced at the supply-and-demand equilibrium point, then low-income people
would not be able to afford as much as they can today. If the peasants were un-
fettered, the old bugaboo of the kulak would reappear, for some peasants would
be more productive than others and would have to be encouraged to increase
their investment and acreage.
Hence, as new Soviet leaders enter the succession period, they will face many
dilemmas. Chernenko has called for a "radical (korennyy) improvement of the
economic mechanism, a removal of class differentiation, and a further widening
of participation," YB and it is highly likely that the new leadership will enunciate
some such program. Ultimately, however, choices will have to be made. In
addition to the trade-off between economic growth and social justice as tradition-
ally defined in the Soviet Union, there can be a conflict between workers' self-
management or increased trade union power on the one hand and economic
reform on the other. A stronger role for the trade unions could limit the regime's
ability to widen wage differentials. More workers' self-management could affect
both the level of workers' wages and the ability of managers to fire unproductive
workers or to reduce the work force.
These dilemmas facing the Soviet leaders involve conflicts between central
values that all contenders ostensibly hold dear and judgments about the stability
of the political system. Throughout the 1970's, the Polish leadership feared-and
with good reason-what they knew had to be done. Is there a similar fear among
the Soviet leadership? Those major American specialists who privately predict
a military dictatorship in the Soviet Union believe that there is. If Soviet leaders
were to go ahead with price increases, the resulting political explosion would
require martial law in their view.30 And it is certainly possible that there are
Soviet leaders who say or think that, ultimately, martial law is the only way to
institute economic reform (or who at least believe that "after me, the deluge").
Otherwise, the inaction to date is inexplicable. There are likely to be other
leaders who think that action must be taken soon or the situation will get out of
hand.
These dilemmas also involve foreign and defense policy. Economic reform is
likely to be expensive in the short run. The artificially low prices are, of course,
reflected in subsidies in the state budget. If prices were raised, this money could
be saved and transferred to the wage fund. Gross wages could be raised roughly
as much as food prices without any other financial consequences. The problem
however, is that those who need the compensatory wage increases are those with
lower and middle incomes (or pensioners), not those who can already afford the
prices on the collective farm market. If economic reform requires more incentives
for the most productive and a widening of the income gap between engineering-
technical personnel and workers, the upper-income sector will need to receive
even greater increases than will the middle and lower sectors. If the consumer
sector is going to function better, it will require some capital expenditures. More-
over, the enormous new budgetary commitments for the food program will be
difficult to repudiate. When these various types of expenditures are added to-
gether, they do produce a financial strain.
28 Given the finite amount of funds available, every appeal for a collective good, income
and such me ablee-is in practice, an appeal thatmfunds be di er'ted from other goals. In addition,
many scholars write articles and books that advocate movement to greater egalitarianism
in more general terms. For example, see A. A. Amvrosov, Ot klaasovov diferentsiatsil k
aotaial'nov odnorodnoati obshchestaa (From Class Differentiation to Social Homogencity),
2nd ed., Moscow. Mysl', 1978 ;and T. P. Butenko, Sotsialistieeheskiy obraz zhizni; problemy
i auxhdeniya (The Socialist Way of Life: Problems and Judgments), Moscow, Nauka, 1978.
8? Chernenko, loc. cit.. p. 29.
s^ For a surfacing of this argument in print, see L. H. Gann and M. S. Bernstam, "Soviet
Vulnerabilities," National Review (New York, N.Y.), Aug. 20, 1982, p. 1021.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
Some of the strain of economic reform could conceivably be relieved by concen-
trating on price reform, by shifting some of the burden of improving services to
an enlarged private sector, and by postponing the increase of rewards to the
most productive. Nevertheless, since industrial investment is already being
severely restricted and needs to be expanded," the only reasonable source of
money to reduce the problems caused by price increases is the defense sphere.
While some Soviet leaders do speak about the need both to strengthen defense
further and to institute some kind of economic reform-notably, Vladimir
Shcherbitskiy, the Ukrainian party leader `-significant economic reform is
generally dependent on political and military detente, and advocacy of the two
tends to go together.
With the politics of internal reform thus intertwined with the politics of
foreign and defense policy, the problems for contenders trying to build a win-
ning coalition are complicated even more. It is almost certain that different
contenders will choose different trade-offs and will therefore have to base them-
selves on different social and bureaucratic forces.
Leonid Brezhnev undoubtedly remembers well that when Nikita Khrushchev
placed a man of the right age and experience in a post that positioned him to
become the successor, that man took advantage of the situation to succeed "pre-
maturely." Determined to prevent anyone from doing to him what he did to
Khrushchev, Brezhnev has consistently avoided appointing someone with the
proper qualifications to a post that would make him the obvious heir apparent.
For this reason, the question of who will succeed Brezhnev has always re-
mained quite difficult to answer, perhaps even for members of the Politburo
itself.
Today, there are at least five men who have or have had at least a reasonable
chance to become general secretary, and several others with at least an outside
chance. The five are Andrey Kirilenko, Konstantin Chernenko, Yuriy Andropov,
Viktor Grishin, and Mikhail Gorbachey.
Andrey Kirilenko. For years, Western Sovietologists have pointed to Kirilenko
as the likely heir apparent.' They have assumed that he has been de facto second
secretary (that is, the secretary providing overall supervision of personnel
selection and economic management) of the CPSU Central Committee (CC)
and that he has therefore been in a good position to build a winning political
machine. In addition, his background is as extensive as that of any of the other
candidates, not only because of the breadth of his responsibilities in the Brezh-
nev period, but because of his years of experience as an obkom (oblast party
committee) first secretary both in the Ukraine and in the RSFSR.
One thing is certain-Kirilenko has been associated with Brezhnev for a long
time. Born several months before Brezhnev in 1906, Kirilenko actually rose
faster than Brezhnev in the wake of the purges of the 1930's. He was named
second secretary of the Zaporozh'ye obkom in 1939, when Brezhnev was only
one of the junior obkom secretaries in Dnepropetrovsk. The two men first
crossed paths early in the war, when Kirilenko served as the (political) mem-
ber of the Military Council of the 18th Army of the Southern Front (from
November 1941 until April 1942), and Brezhnev was deputy head of the Political
Administration of the Southern Front (which supervised the 18th Army) or
perhaps head of the Political Department of the 18th Army (a post which would
have Been subordinate to the member of the Military Council)'
The two men's association has continued almost uninterrupted since the close
of the war. Kirilenko returned to civilian work, resuming his post of obkom
3' Seweryn Bialer, Stalin's Successors, New York, N.Y., Cambridge University Press, 1980,
p. 300. See Boris Romer. "Soviet Investment Policy: Unresolved Problems," Problems of
Communism, September-October 1982. pp. 53-68, for a fuller discussion of this problem.
32 For example, see his speech in Pravda, June 7, 1975, p. 2. See also Christian Duevel,
"Similarities and Differences in the Soviet Leaders' Recent Report Approach to Some
Issues of Foreign Policy." Radio Liberty Research Reports (Munich), RL 211/78, Sept. 28,
1978. which compares Andropov and Shcherhitskiv.
3' See. e.g., Richard Coffman and Michael Klecheski, "The 26th Party 'Congress : The
Soviet Union in a Time of Uncertainty." in Seweryn Bialer and Thane Gustafson. Eds.,
Russia at the Crossroads: The 26th Congress of the CPSU, London, George Allen & Unwin,
1982 pp. 200-01.
34 kovetskava voyennaya entsiklopediya (Soviet Military Encyclopedia). 8 vols.. Moscow,
Voyenizdat. 1976-80, Vol. 4, p. 182. This source provides a good comprehensive biography
of Kirilenko. Brezhnev's biographies do not make clear when Brezhnev moved from the
Southern Front to the 18th Army, but since he held the latter post for "more than two
years," it is likely to have been after Kirilenko left. Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 586, and Vol. 2, p. 367.
The first post also was lower in status than Kirilenko's.
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
second secretary in Zaporozh'ye when it was liberated in 1944. In August 1946,
Brezhnev became obkom first secretary in Zaporozh'ye and, consequently, Kiri-
lenko's boss. In November 1947, Brezhnev was named obkom first secretary in
Dnepropetrovsk. When he moved on to Moldavia in 1950, Kirilenko succeeded
him in Dnepropetrovsk, most likely on Brezhnev's recommendation. From 1955
to 1961, Kirilenko served as obkom first secretary in Sverdlovsk, and from
1961 to 1966 as deputy chairman of the Bureau of the Central Committee for
the RSFSR. When the Bureau was abolished in 1966, Kirilenko became, to-
gether with Suslov, one of the two CC senior secretaries under Brezhnev. In
1976, when Kirilenko received a medal on his 70th birthday, President Nikolay
Podgornyy presented the award, but Kirilenko directed his answer primarily to
Brezhnev, using the familiar form of "you" (ty) to emphasize the closeness
of the relationship. Kirilenko is the only Politburo member to have used this
form of address in such a public forum''
The exact nature of Kirilenko's responsibilities during the Brezhnev era should
be considered more of an open question than it usually is. For most of the Khrush-
chev period, there was a senior CC secretary-Aleksey Kirichenko from 1957 to
1960, Frol Kozlov from 1960 to 1963, and Brezhnev from 1963 to 1964-who pro-
vided overall supervision of the central state apparatus and personnel selection in
at least the non-Russian republics. (It is probable that none of the three had
authority over the Bureau of the Central Committee for the RSFSR.) Although it
is generally assumed that Kirilenko stepped into this role for Brezhnev, this inter-
pretation should not be accepted without reservations, especially for the period
since 1976.
There are, it should be understood, ways of dividing the work of the senior CC
secretaries other than the Khrushchev pattern. In the last years of the Stalin
period (1950-53), for example, the responsibility of supervising the lower party
apparatus and the central state machinery was split between Khrushchev and
Malenkov. It is quite possible that something similar happened in the Brezhnev
period, probably at the time of Chernenko's elevation to the Politburo. At least
until very recently, Kirilenko clearly has fulfilled much of the Malenkov role of
supervising central governmental policy and economic planning, although he seems
not to have Malenkov's responsibility for foreign policy and agriculture.3e What is
lacking is evidence that Kirilenko has continued to have responsibility for the
party organs at lower levels.
The crucial question in this respect is the subordination of Ivan Kapitonov, the
head of the Organizational Party Work Department of the Central Committee.
Kapitonov has direct supervision over personnel selection, and he has placed long-
time associates in several posts in this realm. Thus, the first deputy head of the
Organizational Party Work Department, Nikolay Petrovichev, worked as head of
the propaganda-agitation department of the Moscow obkom under Kapitonov in
the late 1950's, and the editor of Partiynaya Zhizn', Mikhail Khaldeyev, was
Komsomol secretary under Kapitonov in the early 1950's.37 The assumption has
been that Kapitonov, who is not a member of the Politburo, must be subordinate
to one of the CC secretaries, namely Kirilenko. It is, however, within the realm of
possibility that Kapitonov always reported to Brezhnev directly, and within the
realm of high probability that sometime in recent years-probably in October 1977,
when Chernenko became a candidate member of the Politburo-Kapitonov began
reporting to Chernenko. Since the mid-1970's, all of Kirilenko's articles have dealt
solely with the economy, while Chernenkos' have often centered on questions that
35 Pravda, Oct. 15, 1976, p. 1. Even men as close to Brezhnev as Suslov and Chernenko,
both of whom Brezhnev addressed in public as "ty" spoke to him in the polite form "vy."
Ibid., Sept. 25. 1982, p. 1: and Dec. 20, 1981, p. 1.
3" In practical terms, Kirilenko supervised Boris Gostev, head of the Planning and Finan-
cial Organs Department of the Central Committee (and himself was almost certainly head
of the department until September 1975) as well as the heads of the various industrial, con-
struction, transportation, and trade departments of the Central Committee (some indirectly,
through Vladimir Dolgikh and Yakov Ryabov). However, Dolgikh's election to candidate
membership in the Politburo in May 1982 seems to have been accompanied by his assump-
tion of responsibility for the Planning and Financial Organs Department. On July 2, 1982,
Pravda reported two July 1 meetings : a perfunctory one honoring the day of the rural co-
operative workers and a CC conference on economic planning. Kirilenko attended the former,
but not the latter, (although both Gostev and a high Gosplan official were there). Mikhail
Gorbachev and Dolgikh re' resented the Politburo.
37 U.S. Department of State, Directory of Soviet Officials, Washington, D.C., U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office. August 1960, Vol. 1, p. 154; 1981 Yezhegodnik bol'ahoy sovetakoy
enlsiklopedii (Yearbook of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia), Moscow, Sovetskaya ent8iklo-
pediya, 1981, p. 594, 607.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
are the responsibility of the personnel secretary98 In 1982, it was Chernenko and
Kapitonov who attended the trade union session that removed Aleksey Shibayev
as chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions, while in 1976 it had been
Kirilenko and Kapitonov at the session that had installed him30
The height of Kirilenko's power seems to have come in September 1976. when
an apparent protege, Yakov Ryabov, the first secretary of the Sverdlovsk obkom,
became the CC secretary in charge of the security forces, the military, and the
defense industry. In February 1979, however, Ryabov was removed (he was
named first deputy chairman of Gosplan, with responsibilities largely for labor
planning). At the same time, a number of signs began suggesting that Kirilenko's
status was falling.40 In 1982, there have been rumors that his health is failing, but
his political health is surely worse. (While Suslov's health had been poor for
years, his status in the press never fell.)
In the unlikely event that Kirilenko does become general secretary, it is prob-
able that relatively little would change. In his speeches, he comes across as a
rather traditional bread-and-butter Communist, who emphasizes industrial growth
and the increase in living standards that comes from it. He says little about
shortcomings and little about changes in the planning process that he has super-
vised. Some of his articles can be incredibly detailed and narrow in their focus
on industrial problems.91 Except in 1974 when he showed enthusiasm about
Soviet-American summit meetings,42 he manifests relatively little interest in
international relations. He certainly expresses more support of detente and less
alarm about the Western threat than some of his colleagues, but he seems to
take the ebbs and flows of detente for granted, as if on the assumption that
relations cannot get too bad .41 Perhaps he was the target of Zagladin's earlier-
mentioned jibe about extreme views in this respect.
Konstantin Chernenko. The great mystery man among the contenders is 71-
year-old Chernenko. Most indicators of status place him in the number two posi-
tion in the Soviet political system, even after Andropov was elected CC secre-
tary in May 1982. It is quite possible that on a day-to-day basis Chernenko has
already been serving as the transitional general secretary.
One can argue that Chernenko has accumulated an extraordinary number of
levers of power in his hands. Since 1965, he has been head of the Central Commit-
tee's General Department, which handles the flow of classified documents within
the party apparatus and until recently supervised the disposition of letters sent
by the public to the Central Committee" According to Arkadiy Shevchenko, a
former assistant to Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko. Chernenko has used this
role to serve in effect as secretary to the Politburo 45 In addition, his attendance
at recent army and border guard meetings indicates that he, rather than Andro-
pov, supervises the Central Committee's Administrative Organs Department,
'B For example, see A. Kirilenko, "The CPSU's Economic Policy in Action," Kommunist,
No. 4, April 1975, pp. 15-32; idem, "Comprehensive Program of Planning and Management
Improvement." Partiynaya Zhizn' (Moscow), No. 18, September 1979, pp. 6-16: and K.
Chernenko, "The Great Unity of Party and Nation," Kommuniat, No. 17, November 1980,
pp. 10-26.
39 Pravda, Mar. 6, 1982. p. 2. and Nov. 24. 1976, p. 2. Moreover. Shibayev was a man out
of the Kirilenko mold-an aviation industry engineer who had become a plant manager
before becoming an obkom first secretary in the RSFSR ; the new trade union chief, Stepan
Shalayev, despite a managerial background, also had worked for 17 years in the central
trade unions. 1981 Yezhegodnik, pp. 609-10.
40 In May 1979, Kirilenko was cut out of a Politburo picture in a Moscow newspaper, and
even if the omission was accidental, the editor was not removed. In October, East German
Communist party leader Erich Honecker called Cherenko Brezhnev's nearest comrade-in-
arms. Through 1981, Kirilenko received a number of slights in comparison with Chernenko.
In January 1982, he suffered the most remarkable snub of all. In the listing of the mem-
bers of Suslov's funeral commission, Kirilenko was listed out of alphabetical order behind
two other Politburo members. The New York Times, May 28, 1979, p. 2; Terry McNeill,
The Brezhnev Succession : Taking Stock of the Candidates," Radio Liberty Research Re-
ports, RL 323/79, Oct. 29. 1974; Boris Meissner. "The 26th Party 'Congress and Soviet
Domestic Politics." Problems of Communism, May-June 1981, p. 5; Elizabeth Teague,
"Kirilenko at 75, Chernenko at 70: What Chances Does Either Have of Succeeding Brezh-
nevl" Radio Liberty Research Reports, RL 356/81, Sept. 9, 1981: Pravda, Jan. 27, 1982,
p. 1.
41 See, for example, A. Kirilenko, "An Important Factor in Raising the Effectiveness of
the Economy," Kommunist, No. 7, May 1978, pp. 23-37.
42 Pravda, Tune 12. 19 4. p. 3.
43 For example, in 1975 he treated d4tente as something that the changing correlation of
forces required the West to adapt. Lenin yradskaya Pravda (Leningra;.), June 11, 1975.
p. 2. This line was not included in the shortened version in Pravada.
44 In the past, the department was called the spetsotdel (Special Department). For a
diccnssion of its work, see Leonard Schapiro. "The General Department of the CC of the
CPSU," Survey (London), Summer 1975, pp. 55-65.
45 The Washington Post, June 6, 1982, p. 29.
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
which in turn oversees the police and the military 4? And finally, as has just been
discussed, Chernenko has by all indications come to oversee the Organizational
Party Work Department apd personnel selection.
Nevertheless, despite the enormous apparent strength of Chernenko's position,
he is difficult to visualize as a general secretary. Since 1960, his main role has
been head of Brezhnev's personal secretariat-his Aleksandr Poskrebyshev-and
such people rarely are chosen to succeed their masters in any system. They find
it difficult to establish an independent image, and their proximity to power and
their service as the leader's "no man" have usually made them many enemies.
Chernenko's background is also most unimpressive. After three years in the
border guards from 1930 to 1933, Chernenko spent eight years in low-level
ideological work in his native Krasnoyarsk Kray, where, at the age of 31, he
became a kraykom secretary (presumably the secretary for ideological work) 4T
His performance must not have been distinguished, however, for in 1943, at the
height of the war, he was sent for two years to college-the Higher School of
Party Organizers. In 1945, he was again made an obkom secretary for ideology,
but in a less important oblast, Penza48 In 1948, he was moved to a still lower
job, head of the propaganda agitation department of the Moldavian Central
Committee, although as a Russian outsider he, rather than the Moldavian who
held the title, may have been serving as the real ideological secretary.
The major event in Chernenko's life occurred in 1950, when Brezhnev arrived
in Kishinev to become the first secretary of the Moldavian Central Committee.
Brezhnev worked in Moldavia only until 1952, and Chernenko until 1956. But
when Brezhnev became CC secretary for heavy industry and the defense industry
in 1956, Chernenko was named head of the mass political work section of the
Central Committee's Propaganda-Agitation Department. (It is fairly common
for the associates of one CC secretary to be named as the subordinates of others ;
the practice seems to serve the functions either of political control or of solidify-
ing alliances among secretaries-in the Chernenko case, the alliance between
Brezhnev and Suslov.) When Brezhnev became chairman of the Presidium of
the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1960, and again when he became first (and then
general) secretary of the CPSU in 1964, he selected Chernenko to head his
personal secretariat.
Thus, Chernenko has been exposed to a wide range of decisions as a personal
assistant but has no significant experience of his own outside the ideological
sphere. He has not run a major economic unit or party organization, he has had
almost no direct responsibility in the foreign policy realm, and he has not even
been one of Brezhnev's policy assistants. His education-even if one counts a
correspondence degree he received at Kishinev Pedagogical Institute-is not the
sort usually considered appropriate for top posts in the Soviet Union. And,
finally, he is not even a good public speaker.
Even today, it is possible that Chernenko's seeming power may be largely
illusory. He first came to prominence in 1975 at a time when Brezhnev's health
was quite poor, appearing in foreign policy settings (e.g., the Helsinki Conference
of Chiefs of State), in which he served largely as an aide-de-camp.`a The following
year, when Brezhnev's health was much improved,'" Chernenko did not figure
as a member of Soviet delegations. But he publicly returned to Brezhnev's side
when the latter's health deteriorated once more. Conceivably, Chernenko has
been functioning more as Brezhnev's eyes and ears-and even as his memory-
than as a real policymaker.' If he is serving as personnel secretary, he has not
built much of a local machine-only 15 of 71 RSFSR obkom first secretaries have
18 Pravda, May 12, 1982, p. 2, and May 28, 1982, p. 2. In January, the obituary of
Semen Tsvigun, the first deputy chairman of the KGB, was signed by only two Politburo
members-Chernenko and Gorbachev. Since Chernenko worked with Tsvigan in Moldavia,
Gorbachev's name would seem to imply his responsibility for the Administrative Organs
Department at that time, ibid., Jan. 21, 1982, p. 2.
sT Most of 'Chernenko's biographies give little information about his early career. It is
described, however, in Sovetskaya roennaya entsiklopediya, Vol. 8, pp. 452-53.
'8Kul'tura i Zhizn' (Moscow), Mar. 11, 1948, p. 1. While Chernenko was in Penza, the
head of the agriculture department of the obkom and later the head of the agriculture ad-
ministration of the oblast government executive committee was Fedor Kulakov. the CC
secretary for agriculture during most of the Brezhnev era. Kulakov in turn was Gor-
bachev s patron in Stavi opel'. It w ,ulol be fascinating to know whether this combina-
tion of circumstances created a political link between Chernenko and Gorbachev.
For Brezhnev's health, see The New York Times, June 14, 1975, p. 1; July 31. 1975,
p. 2; Aug. 1, 1975. p. 2; and Jan 25, 1976, p. 1. For Chernenko, see Pravda, June 11, 1975,
p. 1, and July 29 1975 p. 1.
so The New York Times, Jan. 25, 1976, p. 1, and Sept. 23, 1976, p. 7.
51 Arkadiy Shevchenko. the former Soviet diplomat, says that when he attended meetings
in 1977 at which Brezhnev was present, the latter's memory functioned very badly. The
Washington Post, June 6, 1982, p. 28.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
been changed in the last five years, and some give every appearance of being
allied with other contenders."Z
Chernenko's best chance would seem to be as a transitional leader with rela-
tively little power. But it is dangerous to judge a new leader by his background.
Who could have predicted that President Harry Truman, President Anwar Sadat,
or Pope John XXIII would turn out to be historic figures?
If Chernenko is purely a transitional leader, his policy preferences might not
be very important. Nevertheless, if he does become general secretary the coalition
that he has put together (this will be discussed in the conclusion) and the content
of his speeches and articles suggest that he is a strong supporter of detente and of
some kinds of reform." When Brezhnev presented Chernenko with awards on his
70th birthday, he praised his assistant for being "restless" in the good sense of
the term, a man with "a creative, daring approach." In response, Chernenko ac-
knowledged that he sometimes makes "nonstandard decisions." `
Sometimes Chernenko's words seem extraordinarily bold. In his 1980 election
speech he did not speak out in support of the recent invasion of Afghanistan (nor
did the slightly abbreviated version published in Pravda even mention the sub-
ject) 55 In a recent article in Kommunist, he explicitly indicated that discussion of
the balance between the organizational and ideological roles of the party could in-
dicate the extent to which the party should dominate society (with the revisionist
position being that the party should limit itself to ideological work). He then went
on to say that, of course, the balance between organizational and ideological work
was not fixed once and for all, discussing the issue in a manner which indicated
a commitment to a less obtrusive involvement .6
Yet, Chernenko's speeches often combine formulations that have been advanced
by strong reformers with examples from the past that suggest little change.
Hence, they give the impression of skillful efforts to reassure both his boss and a
prospective reform coalition. It is not clear who would be disappointed if Cher-
nenko became the new leader.
Judging by his speeches, Chernenko seems to fall more within the Khrushchev
tradition than into the camp of economic modernizers. He has written often of
the need for "further perfection of the political system" 0' and frequently ex-
presses what sound like antibureaucratic, and proparticipatory views. (Indeed,
when he spoke at a conference on rural ideological work in 1948, he, unlike the
other speakers, is reported to have attacked the Ministry of Agriculture and the
Committee for Radio for insufficient installation of radios in the countryside).'
He has stated that "some forms and methods of economic administration which
arose in preceding stages of socialist construction and which were progressive and
effective in their own time cease to be such," ' and it is easy to imagine him lead-
ing an attack on Gosplan and the ministries. Nevertheless, his language suggests
a greater attraction to popular participation than to the use of economic levers,
and it is hard to imagine him pushing for a change in social policy in order to pro-
vide greater economic rewards to managers.
Yuriy Andropov. If the Central Committee selects the best-qualified major con-
tender as Brezhnev's successor, then it surely will select Andropov. The most
urgent problems of the Soviet leadership are handling relations with the United
States and China, maintaining control over Eastern Europe, and deciding which,
if any, of the East European reforms to adopt in the Soviet Union. Andropov is
the only man in the leadership with real expertise on all these questions.
Andropov was born in 1914 and graduated from the Rybinsk Water Transporta-
tion Technicum in 1936.80 (He apparently overlapped for a year in Rybinsk with
Kirilenko, who graduated in 1935 from the city's premier institute, the Rybinsk
Aviation Institute.) From 1938 until 1951, Andropov served in Komsomol and
party posts in Yaroslavl' and the Karelo-Finnish Republic, working under the
present Minister of Foreign Trade, Nikolay Patolichev, who was obkom first secre-
tary in Yaroslavl'. He worked under (or at least with) Otto Kuusinen, who was
6' For example, P. A. Leonov, shifted from Sakhalin to Kalinin, had been bead of the party
organs department under Grishin and Kapitonov ; B. F. Murav'yev, the new first secretary
in Kuibyshev, graduated in 1952 from Karelo-Finnish University, i.e., an institution in an
area where Andropov had been active from 1940 to 1951.
5' See Hyland, loc. cit., p. 23.
es Pravda, Sept. 25, 1981, p. 1.
"Moskovskaya Pravda (Moscow), Feb. 16. 1980, p. 2, and Pravda. Feb. 16, 1980, p. 2.
68 Chernenko, "Vanguard Role of the Party," loc. cit., p. 26.
57 See, for example, Pravda, Feb. 27, 1979, p. 3.
55 Kul'tura i Zhizn', Mar. 11, 1948, p. 1.
" K. U. Chernenko, Vopro8y raboty partiynogo i gosudarstvennogo apparata (Questions
of the Work of the Party and State Apparatus), Moscow. Politizdat, 1980, p. 317.
80Andropov's biography can be found in Bol'shaya sovetskaya entsiklopediva (Great
Soviet Encyclopedia), 3rd ed., Moscow, Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, Vol. 2, p. 23.
1
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
61
chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in the Karelo-Finnish Republic.
By the time that Andropov was made head of a CC subdepartment (podotdel)
in 1951, he had accumulated five years of college education at Petrozavodsk Uni-
versity and the Higher Party School, through part-time study.
Andropov then moved into the foreign policy sphere, in 1953 becoming counselor
and charge d'affairs in Hungary and in 1954 moving up to be ambassador."' He
was stationed in Budapest both during the evolutionary process that led to the
1956 revolution and during the Soviet invasion itself. In May 1957-just before
Khrushchev elevated Kuusinen into the party Secretariat and Presidium (as the
Politburo was then called)-Andropov was named head of the newly created
Socialist Countries Department of the Central Committee. He retained this posi-
tion until May 1967. In 1961, he was given the title of CC secretary.
Although little direct evidence is available on Andropov's policy orientation
during this period, his personal connections were extremely suggestive. He almost
surely was a protege of Kuusinen, who as CC secretary acted as a progressive
counterweight to Suslov in the ideological-foreign policy realm. (Kuusinen's pro-
pensities were indicated in his selection of Fedar Burlatskiy, probably the most
vocal proponent of de-Stalinization in the Soviet media between 1954 and 1957,
to head his full-time "group of consultants"-his main staff."' When Kuusinen
died in 1964, Andropov inherited his group of consultants. He soon chose a new
leader for it-Georgiy Arbatov, who had been writing pro-detente articles since
the mid-1950's.63
In May 1967, Andropov was appointed chairman of the KGB. While the KGB
is best known for its secret police activities, it also performs foreign intelligence
functions, and Andropov was the first secret police head in Soviet history with
substantial preparation for these latter responsibilities. The KGB's three major
deputy chairmen for internal security-Semen Tsvigun, Georgiy Tsinev, and
Viktor Chebrikov-had been associated with Brezhnev in Dnepropetrovsk or
Moldavia," and one suspects that Andropov had only partial control over them
at best. For both these reasons, it is likely that Andropov gave considerable
attention to the foreign policy responsibilities of the KGB. In fact, he was
promoted to full membership in the Politburo at a 1973 CC plenary session that
ratified detente and simultaneously named the ministers of foreign affairs
(Gromkyo) and defense (Dmitriy Ustinov) to the Politburo.
In May 1982, only three months after the death of Suslov, Andropov was elected
a CC secretary 63 All the evidence suggests that Andropov assumed Suslov'sn re-
sponsibility for supervising two CC secretaries in the ideological-foreign policy
realm-Boris Ponomarev and Mikhail Zimyanin.6 It is not clear, however,
whether Andropov also supervises Konstantin Rusakov, head of the Socialist
Countries Department of the Central Committee. In general, he has maintained
a fairly low profile. However, in one ceremonial meeting, Andpropov did speak
for the Politburo, and he was the Central Committee secretary to walk with
Brezhnev from the plane when the latter returned from vacation in late August,
even though Chernenko was also present both times.6'
Since 1975, Andropov has been much more urgent in his support for detente
than any of the other major contenders. In 1975, when Suslov was expressing wor-
ry about ultrareactionary forces in the West and Shcherbitskiy was emphasizing
that the nature of imperialism had not changed,6' Andropov was insisting that the
"relaxation of international tension does not occur by itself.... It is necessary
to actively struggle for it. There cannot be any pause or breathing space since
ddtent is a continuous process which demands constant movement forward." 8D
In 1979, he asserted that "it is impossible to underestimate the danger of a course
11 This assumes that he was not already in this sphere in the CC apparatus from 1951 to
1953. His post is an extremely unusual one. I have seen only several references to a podotdel
(subdepartment). One turned out to be the group of consultants under Kuusinen in the
early 1960's (Pravda, Mar. 3, 1964, p. 2). Another was headed by V. M. Churayev in the
early 1950's and apparently was in the Party Organs Department (ibid., Mar. 2, 1982, p. 6).
Andropov is likely to have been in the same department.
62 For a description of Burlatskiys meeting with Kuusinen, see F. M. Burlatskly, "0. V.
Kuusinen-Marxist-Leninist Sctolar and Theorist," Rabochiy klass i eovremennyy mir
(Moscow), No. 6. 1979, pp. 99-104.
a For Arbatov's relationship to Kuusinen, see Georgly Arbatov, "Otto Kuusinen : Marxist
Theoretician," New Times (1loscow), No. 42, October 1981, pp. 18-20.
"* Their biograpnies can be found in the 1981 Yezhegodnik, p. 608.
"^ Pravda, May 25, 1982, p. 1.
"" He has attended many sessions with visiting foreign Communists from the Communist
world (but not the non-Communist world), and he has signed the one obituary of a cultural
figure where the ideological secretary's signature was appropriate. Ibid., June 29. 1982, V. 6.
87 Ibid., June 25, 1982, p. 2; FBIS. Daily Report: Soviet Union, Sept. 1, 1982, p. R/1.
88 Pravda, June 7, 19,5. p. 2, and June 10, 1975, p. 2.
61 Ibid., June 10, 1975, p. 2.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84BOO274ROO0300110001-7
of retarding detente," '0 and in 1980, he was the only Politburo member to warn
that detente was in serious danger.'' Unlike many other Politburo members,
Andropov has coupled his support for peace and detente with a call for negotia-
tions, even in 1980 in the wake of the US sanctions after the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. As early as 1976, he was quite explicit in stating that "the policy
of peaceful coexistence, as is well known, presupposes negotiations and the
seeking of mutually acceptable decisions, sometimes of a compromise nature." 72
Andropov has not expressed his domestic views as clearly as his foreign policy
views. As chairman of the KGB, he naturally has spoken out against ideological
subversion (although not in his two most recent speeches, one during the 1980
RSFSR Supreme Soviet elections and the other on the 1982 anniversary of Lenin's
birthday)." But he has also alluded repeatedly to "unsolved problems" and,
especially this last April, to the need to solve them through internal resources.'
Andropov is likely to favor making the hard choices that economic reform re-
quires (that probably is the meaning of his call to solve problems by internal
means). The first ideological decrees issued after he became CC secretary called
for a major expansion of economic education and for a fuller discussion in
literary journals of contemporary socioeconomic problems.' And since he is the
Politburo's specialist on Hungary, it is difficult to believe that the Soviet Union
would have been as tolerant of Hungarian economic reform-indeed, quite
favorable toward it in the last few years-had Andropov not supported it.
Viktor Grishin. Like Andropov born in 1914, Grishin has spent his entire
career in Moscow and in Serpukhov, 60 miles to the south. He graduated from
two Moscow technicums-one for soil analysis and the other for locomotive
service and repair-and worked for several years at a locomotive depot. He
then entered party work in Serpukhov, where he became gorkom first, secretary
in 1948.'? Soon after Khrushchev became Moscow obkom first secretary in late
1949, he named Grishin to head the machine-building department (which in large
part was apparently also the defense industry department). In 1952, less than
four years after he had been a mere gorkom second secretary in Serpukhov,
Grishin was named second secretary of the Moscow obkom. In those years, the
Moscow obkom supervised the city of Moscow in addition to the outlying region
(it does not do so now). With Moscow first secretary Khrushchev simultaneously
serving as CC secretary in charge of personnel selection, the second secretary
was an important figure. Grishin served in this capacity until 1956, when he was
named chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions In 1967, he became
first secretary of the Moscow gorkom, by now a post independent of the obkom.
From a contemporary perspective, the crucial question about Grishin's early
years in Moscow is his relationship with two other men who worked in the
city in the early 1950's-Kapitonov and Gorbachev. Kapitonov preceded Grishin
as obkom second secretary ; and from 1954 to 1956, as obkom first secretary, he
supervised Grishin directly. Gorbachev, as Komsomol secretary of Moscow Uni-
versity in 1954-55, was ultimately subordinated, although at several levels Te-
moved, to Grishin's obkom. If the two are Grishin supporters, Kapitonov has been
in a position to build a political machine for him, and Gorbachev, to gain support
among the younger obkom secretaries. The connections could be crucial-if they
are friendly."
7? Ibid., Feb. 23, 1979, p. 2.
n Ibid., Feb. 18. 1980, p. 2.
72 Ibid., Apr. 23, 1976, p. 2. For further analysis of Andropov's earlier pro-d6tente
speeches, see Christian Duevel, "Andropov's Lenin Anniversary Speech." Radio Liberty
Research Reports, RL 262/76, May 19, 1976; idem. "Some Aspects and Implications of
Honecker's Revision of `The Dictatorship of the Proletariat,' " ibid., RL 295/76, June 4,
1976; and Idem, "Similarities and Differences in the Soviet Leaders' Recent Approach to
Some Issues of Foreign Policy," ibid., RL 211/78, Sept. 28, 1978.
72 Pravda, Feb. 12, 1980, p. 2, and Apr. 23, 1982, pp. 1-2.
7' Ibid., June 10, 1975. p. 2, and Apr. 23, 1982, p. 2.
75 Ibid., June 27, 1982, p. 1, and July 30, 1982, p. 1.
7e The exact date is not known. He was not first secretary in November 1947 but was in
the post as of February 1949. He probably assumed the job in December 1948, when the
former first secretary was named ('eputy chairman of the Moscow oblast trade union
organization. See Moskovsk,y Bol'shevik (Moscow). Nov. 28, 1947, p. 2. Dec. 28, 1948,
p. 1, Feb. 2, 1949. p. 1, and Aug. 3 1949 p. 2. For further biographical information about
Grishin, see Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya, Vol. 3, pp. 53-54.
77 One should never forget that familiarity sometimes breeds contempt and enmity instead
of friendship, and the Moscow party organization clearly has had fissures. Kapitonov
himself was demoted as Moscow obkom first secretary in 1959 and sent to Ivanovo, re-
portedly because he could not get along with the chairman of the oblast government execu-
tive committee. Nikolay Ignatov. See "To Educate Cadres in the Spirit of Excellence,"
Partiynaya Zhizn', No. 8, April 1959, pp. 10-11. From the late 1950 s to the mid-1960's.
three obkom and gorkom fi-st secretaries-G. G. Abramov, N. G. Yegorichev, and V. I.
Ustinov-quickly fell into disrepute.
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84BOO274ROO0300110001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
Because of Grishin's long tenure in Moscow, many in the city claim to have
some sense of him as a person. The popular impression seems to be quite uniform.
He is usually described as cautious, moderate, and judicious, as a man who is in-
clined to serve more as a chairman of the board and less as an innovator. Some
say that he is of only average intelligence.
Judging by his speeches, Grishin holds rather old-fashioned views. Indeed,
while Kirilenko in 1976 spoke of himself, at age 70, as "middle-aged," Grishin
in 1975 spoke of himself, at age 61, as part of the "older generation." 48 To the
extent that he ventures beyond discussions of Moscow, he tends to raise tradi-
tional themes : the working class, collectivism, and the evils of the private-
property psychology. The most striking feature of his speeches is the great
emphasis he gives to ideological work, especially in contexts in which it would
not necessarily be expected." Unlike many of Chernenko's speeches, Grishin's
speeches give no hint that he is speaking about this subject in Aesopian fashion.
The foreign policy sections of his election speeches are little more than an
endorsement of Brezhnev and his policies, and he supports the existing level of
military expenditures.80 While Grishin might be willing to be a neutral general
secretary who presides over change initiated by his colleagues, it is difficult to
imagine him leading an attack on Brezhnev's social policy and on the preroga-
tives of the Moscow ministries. He seems more disposed toward ideological
exhortation of the worker than toward radical change in the incentive system, let
alone toward a widening of the private sector.
Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev is by eight years the youngest man in the
Politburo. Born in 1931, he is part of an important new generation moving
toward the top in the Soviet Union. Too young to have fought in World War II
and to have its college education disrupted by the war (although not too young
to have been affected by it),81 this "postwar generation" went through Soviet
colleges when the standards of admission and instruction were at their highest,
and went to work as the Stalin period ended.'2 Gorbachev attended Moscow
University, where, as noted, he was Komsomol secretary. He graduated with a
law degree in 1955. Although his biographers depict him as a combine operator
in his youth, a local newspaper reports that this was a summer job .83
Gorbachev has spent most of his career in his native region of Stavropol'. After
graduation, he returned home as a Komsomol official, soon becoming the first
secretary of the Komsomol gorkom. In 1961, after several years as second secre-
tary of the Komsomol kraykom, he was named first secretary. Judging by the
local press, he concentrated his attention at this time on such questions as
agriculture and rural youth rather than education " In March 1962, he was trans-
ferred to party work as party organizer of the kraykom in the kolkhozsovkhoz
administration in the district surrounding the city of Stavropol'. In December
1962, when the party apparatus was bifurcated by Khrushchev, Gorbachev was
named head of the party organs department of the rural kraykom. From 1960 to
1964, he worked under Fedor Kulakov, the first secretary of the party kraykom
and then the rural party kraykom, and later to become the CC secretary for
agriculture (1965) and a Politburo member (1971) 85 In 1966, Gorbachev was
named the first secretary of the Stavropol' party gorkom. While working in this
capacity, he also completed a second college degree-this time through part-
time work at the Stavropol' Agricultural Institute. In 1968, he became second
secretary of the party kraykom, and in 1970, first secretary, a job he held until
1978.
As kraykom first secretary, Gorbachev had a major responsibility for the de-
velopment of irrigation in the Stavropol' region, historically one of the Soviet
Union's major grain producers. The Central Committee and Council of Ministers
76 Pravda, Oct. 15, 1976, p. 1, and June 7, 1975, p. 2. M09-
cow, V. V. Grishin, Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i (Selected Speeches and Writings).
cow, Politizdat, 1979, pp. 488, 590, and 641.
80 Pravda, June 7, 1975, p. 2, Feb. 15, 1969, p. 2, and Feb. 6, 1980, p. 2.
81 For example, Stavropol' Kray, where Gorbachev grew up, was occupied by the Germans.
Suslov served as head of the partisans there.
81 For a discussion of this generation, see Jerry P. Hough, "The Generation 16Ga8 and 1dehhe
Brezhnev Succession," Problems of Communism, July-August 1979, pp.
Soviet Leadership in Transition, Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1980.
8,Stavropol'skya Pravda (Stavropol'). Feb. 1979, p. 1. For further biographical infor-
mation on Gorbachev, see Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: Desyatyy sozyv (Deputies
of the USSR Supreme' Soviet: Tenth Convocation), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo sovetov narodnykh
deputatov, 1979, p. 119.
84 Stavropol'skaya Pravda, May 12, 1961, p. 1, June 24, 1961, p. 2, Sept. 26, 1961, pp. 2;
and Jan. 19, 1962, p. 2.
N The association was quite close, for Gorbachev was a candidate member of the kray
of the bureau committee's
of the rural kraykom. Ibid., Sept. 26, 1961, p. and ands Dec. 28, 19621pmtmbar
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
decided in 1971 to speed construction of the Great Stavropol' Canal and to
bring a second link into operation by November 1, 1974. Despite an unexpected
encountering of sand instead of clay in the construction of the tunnels, the canal
was completed on schedule. The total number of irrigated hectares in the region
rose from 192,000 in 1970 to 370,000 in 1977.80
When Kulakov died in 1978, Gorbachev was selected to replace him. In October
1980, he was elected a full member of the Politburo. His current responsibilities
seem to extend well beyond agriculture to include the entire agro-industrial com-
plex-a sector of the economy reported to contribute 46 percent of the country's
added value 91 Since the organization of the CC apparatus links the food industry
with light industry, Gorbachev's supervision of the relevant department also
makes him the leading Politburo member for consumer goods.88 Finally, un-
doubtedly because of his law degree, Gorbachev was also elected chairman of the
Legislative Proposals Commission of the Council of the Union of the Supreme
Soviet. This committee takes part in the drafting of all Supreme Soviet legislation
and exercises special oversight over law-and-order questions.
Gorbachev is young enough and new enough to the leadership that his policy
views remain largely unknown. On some questions, such as foreign policy, those
views may not even be completely firm. His 1979 election speech expressed
fervent support for detente, while his 1981 speech was just as fervent in its sup-
port for the Soviet right to intervene in Afghanistan." His published speeches
and articles naturally concentrate on agriculture, on which he takes a generally
pro-reform position.80 If the May 1982 CC decision on agriculture is any indica-
tion, he is an extremely timid reformer indeed, but it is likely that that decision
reflected the judgment of older colleagues. A man of Gorbachev's age and re-
sponsibilities would almost surely adopt a strong position in favor of economic
reform as a way of gaining support from the younger obkom secretaries against
the central government and of giving himself an excuse to remove old officials
and build his own machine.
If the succession takes place quickly, Gorbachev's youth and relative inexperi-
ence with the non-Russian nationalities and with foreign policy will count against
him. It should be noted, however, that he has a most striking range of political
connections. As already discussed, his patron, Kulakov, was associated with Cher-
nenko in Penza. Kulakov's election as CC secretary in 1965 was quite likely on
Chernenko's recommendation. The head of the organizational party work depart-
ment, and subsequently the organizational secretary of the Stavropol' kraykom
under Gorbachev, A. K. Vedernikov, has since served as the head of the section of
the Central Committee's Organizational Party Work Department in charge of
Moldavia and the western Ukraine.81 This, too, may have solidified the tie with
Chernenko. In addition, Gorbachev's post as Komsomol secretary in Moscow Uni-
versity placed him under the supervision of Grishin and Kapitonov. His work in
Stavropol' was in a kray where Suslov had once been first secretary, and at Sus-
lov's funeral, he was the only Politburo member to stop and talk with each member
of Suslov's family 92 Finally, Richard Kosolapov, the chief editor of Konlmunist,
was in Komsomol work with Gorbachev at Moscow University.9$
Speculation about the outcome of the struggle for power is fraught with danger.
We tend simply to focus on the question of who will be the general secretary, but
it should not be forgotten that the real leader-the real strongman-may hold a
different post. In the Soviet Union, both Lenin and Malenkov were head of govern-
ment (rather than head of the party), and in China, Deng Xiaoping chose to rule
89 Stavropoi'skaya Pravda, Mar. 26, 1971, p. 1 ; Jan. 22, 1972, p. 2 ; Oct. 7, 1972, p. 1 ;
Oct. 10, 1972, p. 2; Dec. 31, 1973, p. 1 ; Nov. 1, 1974, p. 1, and Jan. 27, 1978, p. 3. The
number of hectares of mechanized irrigation which is reported in the statistical handbooks,
is much less, but also showed considerable growth.
84 Pravda, June 17, 1982, p. 2.
88 For example, he has been the Politburo member who attends light industry meetings.
Ibid.. June 13. 1981, p. 1, and July 3. 1981. p. 2.
89 Stavropol'8kaya Pravda, Feb. 3, 1979, p. 2; and Altayskaya Pravda (Barnaul') Feb.
1, 1980, p. 2. These long foreign policy discussions were not included in the versions of the
speeches printed in Pravda.
90 For example, M. Gorbachev, "Current Questions of Agriculture and Its Effectiveness,"
Kommuni8t, No. 11, July 1980, on. 10-26.
91 Stavropol'8kaya Pravda, Feb. 21, 1971, p. 1, and Feb. 23, 1974, p. 1; Sovetskaya
Moldaviya (Kishinev), Jan. 30, 1976, p. 1 ; anu L'vovskaya Pravda (L vov), Dec. 23, 1978,
p. 1.
92 I am indebted to Mark Zlotnik for this point.
93 Kosolapov's biography states only that he entered Komosomoi work immediately after
graduation in 1955 (1981 Yezhegodnik, p. 584). That would not have occurred, however,
if he had not been active in it in the university, 1981 Yezhegodnik, p. 584.
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
from a less lofty post. Moreover, the arrangements made immediately after the
succession may fall apart quickly. Malenkov was removed as party secretary in a
week, the "gang of four" lasted a month, and Lavrentiy Beria was arrested in four
months. These events, in turn, were only the first steps in a political struggle that
lasted for some years.
We also do not know the time of the succession, the health of the various con-
tenders at that time (or even which ones will be alive), the personal relationships
among the Politburo members, and their opinions of each other's abilities and
judgment. Are, for example, Chernenko and Andropov major adversaries, or have
they reached an agreement on the succession? Is Andropov, who looks frail on
television, willing to accept the less demanding Suslov portfolio? Is Grishin ill
enough that he would be satisfied with Arvid Pel'she's post of chairman of the
Party Control Committee (a post for which he would seem well suited by tempera-
ment and reputation) ? How antagonistic are the Moldavian and Dnepropetrovsk
factions of the Brezhnev group? We should not pretend that we have the answers
to these and many similar questions.
Events will also affect the succession in ways difficult to foresee. The perform-
ance of the economy may absolutely require reform or may permit reform to be
postponed. There may be foreign policy crises. The Polish crisis, for example, has
no doubt already affected the Soviet succession. It dramatically pointed up the
dangers of Soviet pricing policy and of excessive reliance on foreign credits.
It surely posed severe dilemmas for Soviet policymakers ; some Politburo members
probably panicked and counseled invasion, and others advised patience. In the
process, the position of some contenders must have been strengthened, and the
position of others weakened. Even the Middle East crisis may have had an impact.
Besides events, the process of "cabinet-building" may have a major effect on the
final outcome. One of the striking facts about this succession is the number of key
posts that it is likely to open. If Andropov, Grishin, or Gorbachev became general
secretary, it is highly likely that Tikhonov, Kirilenko, and Chernenko would soon
be replaced or moved into more ceremonial positions. Gromyko and Ustinov are
also candidates for retirement in the relatively near future, and the new chairman
of the KGB, Vitally Fedorchuk, could easily be a transitional figure. All these jobs,
as well as the former job of the new general secretary, could become open.
Other key posts could be created or strengthened. The post of chairman of the
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet could be filled again by a man other than
the general secretary. The chairmanship of Gosplan might well be upgraded in a
time of economic reform, perhaps even to the level it had under Nikolay Voznesen-
skiy or Mikhail Saburov. Normally, of course, the post of first deputy chairman of
the Council of Ministers has been a highly important one, with several such offi-
cials represented on the Politburo. (Today there is only one first deputy chairman,
the 75-year-old Ivan Arkhipov, an old Brezhnev crony who is not even a candidate
member of the Politburo and who almost certainly will disappear with Brezhnev.)
And the system badly needs a national security adviser to coordinate foreign and
defense policy.
A key to the struggle for power, then, will be the ability to distribute these posts
to powerful figures within the Central Committee in a way that will build a win-
ning coalition. Any such exercise now is deeply threatening to Brezhnev, unless he
has decided to retire, for a coalition in place has little incentive to wait until his
death. Unless Brezhnev has permitted Chernenko to build a coalition, the contend-
ers may be avoiding cabinet-building lest Brezhnev get wind of it and move against
them. If so, the succession would have to take place in a great hurry under difficult
circumstances.
Even if past experience did not point in such a direction,' the present situation
within the Politburo suggests that the immediate post-Brezhnev leadership will be
a collective one. The crucial question, however, is what type of collective leader-
ship will it be? Will it be a status quo collective leadership in which, as has been
the case in recent years, the major interests are able to prevent policies that would
do them serious harm? Or will it be a collective leadership on the 1953-57 model-
a leadership that, while beset with conflict, permits and even encourages individ-
ual members to carry out major policy initiatives in their own spheres of responsi-
bility?
It is easy to make a strong case for either of these options. Even excluding
Brezhnev, 7 of the 12 Politburo voting members are 70 years of age or older. Forty
percent of the voting members of the Central Committee will be 65 or older by the
TM For the argument that successions tend to follow the same pattern, including early col-
lective leadership, see George W. Breslauer, "Political Succession and the Soviet Policy
Agenda," Problems of Communism, May-June 1980, pp. 34-52.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
end of 1982 (more than half of them 70 or older, and one fifth 75 or older). Seventy
percent of the Council of Ministers members who are voting members of the Cen-
tral Committee will be 65 or older.'" Most of these older men must sense that re-
form means retirement in the relatively near future and would surely prefer a
leader such as Grishin (at least if he is described correctly here), who would not
challenge the status quo seriously and who might not retire them too quickly.
It seems to me, however, that while this scenario is quite possible, it underesti-
mates the probabilities of near-term reform. Domestically, there is a pressure for
change, a frustration at the weakness and indecision of Brezhnev, a desire for a
strong leader and some action, and an impatience on the part of younger (really
middle-aged) leaders to have their chance. Abroad, there is the threat of an all-out
arms race and the disarray in the Western alliance, which give the Soviet leader-
ship an added incentive to go beyond their usual peace offensive and take really
meaningful steps toward arms control. Finaly, there is the shock over the events
in Poland, whose year-and-a-half of turmoil is likely to make the other peoples of
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union more willing to forego radical action in
favor of evolution and more willing to accept price rises in the framework of the
promise of reform."
A reformist collective leadership is also politically quite possible. The Politburo
has been changed significantly in the last few years through the deaths of Kosygin
and Suslov, the decline of Kirilenko, and the selection of a basically nonpolitical
transition figure (Tikhonov) as chairman of the Council of Ministers. As a result,
the Politburo members who will most likely be the key figures in the brokering-
Andropov, Chernenko, Gorbachev, Grishin. Gromyko, Dinmukhamed Kunayev,
Grigoriy Romanov, Shcherbitskiy, and Ustinov-average only 66 years of age, a
situation quite different from what it would have been three years ago. In the
Central Committee, 60 percent are younger than 65, and a coalition needs only 51
percent for victory. In addition, at least a few of the older CC members are either
anticipating retirement in any case or hoping to be one of those who will benefit
from the succession.
If there is to be a reformist collective leadership, it may not matter too much
who will occupy precisely which posts. Regardless of his exact position, Gorbachev
would probably concentrate on agriculture and the services sector (that is, on a
partial return to the New Economic Policy). Andropov would probably have major
responsibility for foreign policy and ideology. Vladimir Dolgikh, the new member
of the Politburo, would very likely handle industrial reorganization. Chernenko
(if he is included) would concentrate on political reforms.
If one is to speculate about actual posts, I have had the sense that Andropov
has the best chance to be general secretary or at least the strongman behind a
weak general secretary. As chairman of the KGB, Andropov has been ruthless
enough to reassure the conservatives that he would not let reform get out of hand
(in fact, he probably would be quite harsh on dissident activity even as he loos-
ened some of the controls on acceptable political activity). That same ruthless-
ness might reassure the reformers that he has the strength to handle the minis-
tries. I suspect that Andropov has excellent relations with the Army Chief of
Staff Nikolay Ogarkov, who fought on the Karelian front in World War II near
the area where Andropov was associated with the partisans.7 Ogarkov's appoint-
ment as minister of defense might complete the needed coalition.
As I read the Soviet media of the last few months, however, my instinct sug-
gest that the coalition may already be in place. In April, the most sophisticated of
the Soviet political observers, Fedor Burlatskiy, wrote about the "interregnum"
(mezhdutsarstviye) and "time of troubles" (smutnoye vremya) in China and
included some generalizations that had obvious relevance for the Soviet Union :
In the history of interregnums it often turns out this way: after the death of
a sovereign, emperor, or leader who did not leave a successor, a time of trouble
ensues, in which different groups compete in a struggle for power until a new
leader appears who is capable of ending the political confusion and reestablish-
ing a firm order. Moreover, in the first stage, as a rule, a completely inconspicuous
person is advanced. He succeeds in using the favorable sitaution while the basic
rivals have a mortal grip on each other.
9" These and later statistics on Soviet officials are drawn from the biographies of Central
Committee members, all of which were nublished at the end of the 1!+8] Yezhegodnik.
" For the opposite case, see Seweryn Bialer, "The International and Internal 'Contexts of
the 26th Party Congress." in Bialer and Gustafson. op. cit., esp. pp. 33-38.
17 In a 1942 article that Andropov chose to have republished in his 1979 selected works,
he emphasized the closeness to the front and the help that the Komsomol was giving it
through the making and collecting of supplies. Yu. V. Andropov, Izbrannyye rechi i 8tat'i
(Selected Speeches and Writings), Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, pp. 24-25. For a discussion
of Andropov's work at this time, see Za liniyey Karel'skogo (Behind the Lines of the
Karelian Front), 2nd ed., Petrozavodsk, Kareliya, 1979, pp. 62, 78-79, 214, and 289.
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
Perhaps Mao Zedong calculated on establishing collective leadership after his
death? Then he should have stated this and worried about the creation of polit-
ical mechanisms inside the party and the state which would have made this pos-
sible.... And, thus, as has often happened in periods of interregnums, the suc-
cessor at first turned out to be one of the least-known figures-the man in whom
no one had turned any attention beforehand, Hua Guofeng.?B
Whether by coincidence or not, the weeks after this article was published saw
a series of events that suggested the major rivals-or perhaps Brezhnev him-
self-were introducing some order into the situation. In the wake of Kirilenko's
two-month disappearance from public view, Dolgikh was elevated to candidate
membership in the Politburo, apparently with Kirilenko's long-time responsibility
for the Planning and Financial Organs Department.' Kapitonov suffered a sig-
nificant reduction of status.100 While this may have been part of a campaign
against Kirilenko, it was also a sign that one of Grishin's main hopes was not
going to be of any help and that he, Grishin, was one of the "inconspicuous" can-
didates who was not likely to make it.
If the immediate succession is more or less in place, and enjoys Brezhnev's
approval, then Chernenko must be a big part of it-most likely, either as the
general secretary or chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet
(if the two jobs are to be separated). Indeed, if Gorbachev is linked to Chernenko
through Kulakov and if Dolgikh is likewise linked to Chernenko through his long
years of work in Chernenko's home region of Krasnoyarsk, it is easy to put to-
gether hypothetical "cabinets," with Chernenko as general secretary. If Gorbachev
is politically trustworthy, he would make an excellent personnel secretary, both
because of his experience with organizational work and because of his supervision
of agriculture. Dolgikh could assume either Kirilenko's post in the CC Secretariat
or a high post in the Council of Ministers. Andropov is a natural occupant of the
Suslov slot, perhaps even expanded to become "national security adviser." The
chairmanship of the Council of Ministers is a problem, because the other men are
Russians (although Chernenko's name is Ukrainian) and because it usually
has had foreign policy responsibilities (if the general secretary has not assumed
them). As a Ukrainian, Tikhonov might well be kept on for a while, despite his
age ; however, non-Russians such as Shcherbitskiy and Eduard Shevardnadze are
obvious candidates for promotion.
To repeat, however, the critical question-especially for the outside world-
is the basic policy orientation of the majority in any new collective leadership.
The Brezhnev regime has lasted for nearly 20 years, and the Brezhnev generation
has been near the top for more than 40 years. As a consequence, it has become
very difficult for us to judge which features of Soviet politics and policies are
inherent in the system and which really reflect more the values of this historic
generation. There are enormous differences between Communist systems such as
North Korea and Yugoslavia-or even Hungary and Romania-and it is at least
conceivable that many aspects of the Soviet Union which we have ascribed either
to the essence of the system or the Russian national character will turn out to
be less permanent than we have assumed.
It seems to me that a new collective leadership is likely to make significant
changes-perhaps even quite significant changes-fairly quickly. The Khrush-
chev-Brezhnev social policy has come to a political dead end. By basing their
legitimacy so heavily on egalitarianism, the leaders have set an impossible goal
for themselves and will always be judged by their failures rather than their
achievements. Indeed, by overrewarding the industrial proletariat, they do not
even serve the cause of social justice, for they neglect the truly underprivileged
in Soviet society-the lower white-collar and service personnel. By permitting
the gap between prices and the supply-and-demand equilibrium point to widen,
they create inexorable pressures for the broadening of a black market that strikes
at the moral fiber of the system, and they create a growing privileged group
among those willing to function outside the law. The leading theorists who speak
es Fedor Burlatskiy, "Interregnum, or Chronicle of the Years of Deng Xiaoping," Novyyi
Mir (Moscow), No. 4, 1982, pp. 210-11.
?B See fn. 36.
100 In recent years, Kapitonov always signed obituaries out of alphabetical order as the
first of the CC secretaries not on the Politburo. That is, he signed in front of Dolgikh and
Mikhail Zimyanin ("Z" comes before "K" in the Russian alphabet). In addition, be almost
always signed minor cultural obituaries with Zimyanin in cases where only the latter seemed
appropriate. However, beginning with an obituary published in Pravda, Anr. 28, 1982, p. G.
Kapitonov no longer signed the obituaries of minor cultural figures ; and beginning with an
obituary printed in ibid., June 9, 1982, p. 3, Kapitonov's name was listed in alphabetical
order after Zimyanin. Cf. ibid., June 1, 1982, p. 3, the last obituary signed in the old way.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84BOO274ROO0300110001-7
out on this subject say that all means should be used to liquidate this problem,
and this seems to indicate-and certainly should indicate-price reform and a
partial legalization of private activity in trade and the services.'0' For these rea-
sons the social policy is likely to be modified in the interests of economic growth.
To be sure, policy changes may be halting and uneven, especially if Brezhnev
retires with honor rather than dies or is removed. The Soviet Union would cer-
tainly not move quickly toward anything approaching Yugoslavia's market so-
cialism, and even movement toward the Hungarian model would be slow. Near-
term reforms would conceivably be movement toward meaningful price adjust-
ments, legalization of parts of the second economy, and greater independence
for the farms and individual peasants. As in Hungary, a selective importation by
key Western consumer goods would symbolize change and absorb excess pur-
chasing power (an importation of 100 million hand calculators would cost only
US$500 million-far less than is spent on grain). As in 1953 and 1954, some of
the simplest changes are in the foreign and defense policy realms. If there is to
be reform, it may come there first. The most severe conflicts between economic
growth and social policy are likely to be the center of the second phase of the
succession, several years hence.
If, of course, no change takes place in the wake of succession, if the new Soviet
leadership pushes forward as blindly as the Polish leadership did in the 1970's,
then serious thought has to be given to the question of the stability of the system.
Becaue of the identification of communism with Russian nationalism, one would
anticipate that the first riots would be directed against the leadership rather than
against the system as a whole. If so, the disturbances could be quieted by reform.
However, if troops refuse to fire on rioters-as occurred in March 1917-there
will be no threat of outside intervention (as in the Polish case) to save the sys-
tem. It is precisely the recognition of this fact that is likely to persuade the new
Soviet leaders that they cannot wait until later in the decade to begin reform.
101 R. Kosolapov, "Contribution of the 24th, 25th, and 26th CPSU Congresses Toward
the Solution of Theoretical and Political Problems of Developed Socialism and the Transi-
tion to Communism." Kommuntst, No. 5, March 1982, pp. 66-67; and V. Pechenov, "On the
Firm Ground of Socioeconomic Policy," Ibid., No. 11, July 1982, pp. 41-42.
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84BOO274ROO0300110001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
(This article appeared in Problems of Communism, January-February 19821
KTO KOGO IN THE KREMLIN*
(By William G. Hyland)
One of the casualties of the prolongation of the Brezhnev era has been a
decline in the art of Kremlinology. Faced with what seemed to be a fairly stable
Soviet leadership, students of the Soviet scene have gradually strayed off into the
more alluring fields of behavioral sciences, generational change, nationality prob-
lems, military doctrine, etc. The game of Kremlin politics has increasingly been
ignored.
Yet the deaths of two major Soviet leaders-Aleksey Kosygin in December
1980 and Mikhail Suslov in January 1982-are sharp reminders not only that
personalities are important elements of Soviet politics but that the constellation
of political power is an increasingly fragile one. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
a Soviet leadership without Suslov, who seemed a permanent fixture bridging the
Stalin period and the present. His presence somehow conferred a legitimacy on
both Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev. The succession to Brezhnev has
to be quite a different process without the participation of Kosygin and Suslov.
Who replaces Suslov-not merely in name or title, but who performs the function
of guardian of orthodoxy, who becomes the senior arbiter of high-level disputes?
How will domestic policy be affected? Has Brezhnev become suddenly more
vulnerable?
Speculation about political personalities in the Soviet system is difficult and
too often fruitless, and speculation about the relationship between personalities
and policy questions is even more hazardous. But Western governments simply
want to know: (1) who will rule the USSR in the 1980's, and (2) what will
Soviet policy be?
These questions are not as shallow as they may sound. Sovietologists surely
know that there there is a revisionist school of history which views the course
of East-West relations as a record of missed opportunities. While revisionist
theories are always greeted with skepticism, it is nevertheless true that there
have been turning points when one side or the other has made a crucial decision
based on a guess about the other's intensions (e.g., NCS-68) ' Sovietologists
would do well to bear this fact in mind.
What follows is a deliberately semi-provocative review of some of the issues
which need to be addressed in this context. Let us begin with the question of the
Soviet leadership.
The Marxists are wrong. Individuals and their personalities do matter. They
do shape history. And they certainly have shaped Soviet history.
It is unfortunate that Western Sovietology has come under the sway of a
school of analysis that has subconsciously accepted some key premises of Marx-
ist determinism. These analysts argue that only the system counts. It has a
massive momentum and its own laws, institutions, and dynamics. Since Stalin's
death, leaders come and go ; it does not matter who is on top. Soviet policy will
turn out to be about the same.
This is nonsense. Leonid Brezhnev is not Nikita Khrushchev, nor was
Krushchev losif Stalin. It is inconceivable. for example, that Brezhnev could
carry out the ruthless bloody purges of the 1930's, even if he had the power and
opportunity. Or, to look at things from a different standpoint, let us suppose that
Khrushchev had started the coup of October 1964 and had remained in office
until his death. How would be have handled the Vietnam war, the Czechoslavak
crisis, or O8tnolitik? The same as Brezhnev? Would Khrushchev have invaded
Czechoslovakia on the eve of a summit meeting with President Lyndon John-
?"Kto kogo?" Is colloquial R>ssian for "Who wins? Who loses?"-Ede.
I NSC-68 was a document delineating a U.S. policy response to the perceived Soviet
threat in 1950 In light of the U.S.S.R.'s new nuclear capabilities and its presumed inten-
tions. See, for example, Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "Soundng the Tocsin. NCS 68 and the Soviet
Threat." Internatonal Security (Cambridge MA), Fall 1979, pp. 116-58.
(69)
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
son? Suppose Brezhnev had not survived when he was ill in 1975. Would Andrey
Kirilenko have prevailed? Would Cuban troops now be in Angola or Ethiopia?
Would there be a strategic arms limitation treaty?
True, analysis of personalities from afar is a dubious art. It inevitably lapses
into an analysis of career patterns. Thus, so and so is a "survivor," because he
has, in fact, survived. The "formative experience" of so and so was his rapid rise
during the purges, or during Stalin's last days, or under Khrushchev, or even
under Brezhnev. This is useful but limited, and for a policymaker it is normally
frustrating.
Every recent American president has asked, "What is Brezhnev really like?"
Before the first Nixon-Brezhnev summit in 1972, a large package of papers was
prepared, drawing on mountains of public sources. But probably the most valu-
able briefing paper was that by Henry Kissinger, who had seen Brezhnev at close
quarters for several days just a month before. Since then, a growing number of
officials have dealt with Brezhnev, and he is no longer such a mystery. But what
about the other Soviet leaders?
There is the rub. The Soviet system conspires to shield a large number of offi-
cials from non-Communist observers. How many diplomats or other observers
have had much contact with, let us say, Viktor Grishin, who could conceivably
become the next General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU) ? Or, if you prefer, Kirilenko or Konstantin Chernenko? Yet, some day
President Reagan or his successor is certain to ask the same question : What is
X really like?
All of this is to suggest that the succession needs to be analyzed and discussed
in terms of leading personalities, rather than sociological groups or institutions.
It is important to distinguish between a Grishin and, say, a Yuriy Andropov.
It must take a peculiar personality to preside over the grisly work of the Com-
mittee for State Security, the KGB. Picture a man who moves from the Central
Committee apparatus to the Foreign Ministry, ultimately receiving an ambas-
sadorial assignment (Hungary, 1954-57) ; subsequently returns to the Central
Committee ; and then, suddenly, at age 52. becomes the Chairman of the KGB.
On the one hand, the Politburo members must have regarded him as sufficiently
manageable to pose no threat to the collective ; on the other hand, they must
have deemed him to be sufficiently ruthless to perform the dreaded work of the
KGB. Surely, if Andropov were to become General Secretary of the CPSU, he
would be a different leader from Grishin, who has spent his entire career in the
environs of Moscow on economic and party assignments.
Beyond the idiosyncrasies of this or that individual, there is the question of
interaction. No guarantee exists that several men thrown together by politics
will automatically be supportive. Nevertheless, over time cliques do form, and
friendships as well. Moreover, even in more calculating relationships there is
a certain supportiveness in common decisions. For instance, one finds it plausi-
ble that when Brezhnev, Aleksey Kosygin, and Nikolay Podgornyy-once the
heads of party, government, and state were in agreement, this was a power-
ful bloc, and few would have dared to challenge it.
It thus may be of some interest that in recent years Brezhnev has stood more
and more alone, surrounded more by cronies than by equals. Only a few Polit-
buro members who were active at the time of the Soviet invasion of Czecho-
slovakia in 1968 are still on Brezhnev's Politburo! One can only wonder how
this state of affairs has affected his decisions, let us say, in the Afghanistan and
Polish crises.
In any case, Brezhnev does now stand apart from most of his colleagues. In-
deed, the story of Soviet politics over the last five years is largely narrative of
Brezhnev's accumulation of ever greater power.
He began in 1977 by focusing on two institutions, the Secretariat of the CPSU's
Central Committee and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The first
step was the removal of K. F. Katushev from the Secretariat in March 1977
and his eventual replacement by one of Brezhnev's close personal aides, Kon-
stantin Rusakov. It really does not matter why this shift was made ; the net
result is that Brezhnev placed a close protege in an important position in the
central party apparatus, to work with foreign Communist parties (and thus con-
stitute a potential replacement for Boris Ponomarev as head of the Interna-
tional Department). Of related interest was the promotion of Vasiliy Kuznetsov
' Of the 13 full members of the Politburo in February 1982, only Brezhnev, Kirilenko,
and A. Pel'she held this position in 1968.
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
to First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium, thus weakening somewhat the For-
eign Ministry apparatus. Kuznetsov's replacement as First Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs was Georgiy Korniyenko, a man of undoubted ability, but
without the prestige of Kuznetsov. Another of Brezhnev's close personal pro-
teges, Ye. M. Tyazhelnikov, left the post of head of the Komsomol to take over
the Central Committee's Propaganda Department. Most important, of course,
Brezhnev forced out his longtime comrade Podgornyy from the chairmanship of
the Presidium and himself assumed the post of head of state. At first, it seemed
somewhat surprising that he would want this largely ceremonial office, but, on
reflection, it made sense. Why not take the ceremonial office, so as to represent
the Soviet state as well as the party? To strengthen Brezhnev's hold on foreign
policy, the foreign Ministry press spokesman, Leonid Zamyatin, was transferred
to head a newly created Central Committee Department of International In-
formation. Gradually, this department has begun to overshadow the conven-
tional Foreign Ministry apparatus. Finally, Brezhnev's hold on the party ap-
paratus was further enhanced by the promotion to candidate membership in the
Politburo of Chernenko, one of his oldest cronies.
The next major target was the governmental apparatus, the USSR Council
of Ministers and Prime Minister Kosygin himself. In November-December 1978,
Konstantin Mazurov was removed from the Politburo and as first Deputy Prime
Minister, although he had served for more than a decade in the latter position.
Obviously, in light of Kosygin's health and age, the post of First Deputy Prime
Minister was a crucial one, so the installation of Nikolay Tikhonov, Brezhnev's
old friend,' in this job and his promotion to candidate membership in the Polit-
buro was another sign of the times. The implications of the promotion were
further underlined by the fact that Chernenko at the same time attained full
membership in the Politburo, after only 19 months as a candidate. Soon Kosygin
became ill. Although he reappeared for a while, his retirement was announced
in the fall of 1980,` and his replacement was, of course, Tikhonov, who also
became a full Politburo member. Tikhonov's new first deputy is still another
Brezhnev protege from Dnepropetrovsk, Ivan Arkhipov. In December 1980,
Ivan Bodyul, an old associate of Brezhnev from the 1950's in Moldavia, was
appointed a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers.
In the space of three years, then, the Brezhnevites have greatly strengthened
their hold on the Secretariat, the Politburo, and the government, including the
KGB. The importance of this fact lies not in Brezhnev's decision to take such
a step. His decision is quite understandable if one bears in mind that Soviet
politics remains fundamentally a struggle for power. Why should Brezhnev
not surround himself with old and trusted friends, proteges, and cronies? Given
what happened to Khrushchev, it is simple prudence.
Rather, the significance of these developments stems from the degree to which
it increases the probability that once Brezhnev disappears, the upheaval at
the top will be severe. After all, why would Brezhnev's successors want to re-
main dependent on the coterie of his old political friends, even if these succes-
sors do share a common background with them, from the old days in Dnepro-
petrovsk or Moldavia?
The result of these shifts, therefore, has been a sort of political paralysis. At
the 26th CPSU Congress, for example, no change whatsoever was made in lead-
ing personnel. Probably no one other than Brezhnev was prepared to propose
even a minor shift in the correlation of political forces lest the entire situation
come apart. Replacement of any leader because of age would open some sensitive
political questions.
In such circumstances, the outlook is for a struggle for power among Brezh-
nev's epigones. Although the Brezhnevites have a lock on certain key positions,
their hold has to be only tentative, for it is derivative of Brezhnev's power. By
promoting proteges who have no special base of their own, except perhaps for
Chernenko,' Brezhnev has deprived them of the chance to survive the bloody
politics of the succession. Meanwhile, it is worth keeping in mind, as Myron
Rush has wisely pointed out' that Brezhnev remains a dominant figure, still
a N. Tikhonov, who is a year and a half older than Brezhnev, has known the General
Secretary since their student days in 1920's.
' Kosygin died in December 1980.
5 Chernenko might have some base in the Central Committee apparatus, where he served
for many years.
Myron Rush, "Understanding Brezhnev's Political Strength," The Wall Street Journal
(New York, NY), Aug. 20, 1981.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
capable of rearranging the Soviet power structure and even of engaging in
some daring forays abroad at a time of supposed political stagnation.
This brings us to the most important issues. What are the foreign and defense
policies of the USSR likely to be (keeping in mind that there will be a struggle
for Brezhnev's mantle) ?
It is tempting to draw on previous succession periods-1953-57 and 1964-66-
as analogues. In both periods, there was a tendency toward relieving foreign
pressures by conciliatory policies while the internal power situation was sorted
out.
But two things are lacking now that were present then. First, the successors
in the 1950's and 1960's were younger. Second, in both cases, the successors
were initially intent on some internal change-halting the Stalinist terror after
1953 and rebuilding a divided party after 1964.
One can envisage a post-Brezhnev Politburo of more sharply differing fac-
tions: the Brezhnevites, deeply entrenched but without the ultimate power of
the patron, will undoubtedly want to preserve the status quo ; some of the old
guard-such as Andrey Gromyko or Dmitriy Ustinov-could still be powerful
and prestigious figures to be reckoned with; and a somewhat amorphous group
of younger men in the Secretariat and on the Politburo may be building pres-
sure against the old guard. It will be tempting to inject into this situation the
professional military and the KGB as decisive factors. Indeed, their influence
in partisan politics could be significant, as perhaps it may have been in the
past when towering heroes such as Marshal Georgiy Zhukov were engaged in
politics.
But some skepticism is in order on this score. Nikolay Ogarkov, the present
Chief of We General staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, does not strike one as
much of a political actor, and certainly neither does Marshal Viktor Kulikov, the
head of the Warsaw Pact forces. The KGB under Andropov, of course, is a differ-
ent matter, because of his political status and because the KGB has technical
capabilities-security, and leadership transportation and communication. Never-
theless, the posssibility of a threat of force by the KGB seems remote. Further-
more, some of the old antagonism between the professional officer corps and the
KGB must still exist.
To be sure, the military certainly will not gracefully accept a cut in its forces
or resources, and the KGB presumably will resist any liberalization of the inter-
nal order. Thus, they are both likely to be strong forces favoring the status quo.
At the same time, they will in all probability also be political targets. A new
General Secretary will eventually want control over the KGB and the General
Staff. Brezhnev's record in this regard is a case in point.
Despite a strong inclination toward conservative policies, the new leaders will
be under pressure to innovate. It is the consensus among outside observers that
the objective situation requires new directions, especially in internal economic
policy.'
But crucial questions remain. Who, precisely, will be in the vanguard of those
arguing for new directions? Certainly not the older men who have comfortably
settled in for the duration. Nor the General Staff, nor the KGB. Probably not
the Central Committee apparatus. Who, then? Perhaps the provincial secretaries,
in Leningrad, Kiev, and elsewhere. Or it is possible that earlier patterns will be
repeated. That is, one major figure may fight for power on one platform-almost
certainly a conservative one-but after eliminating his rivals and securing his
position, he may then adopt a different, more effective and realistic program.
Again, such speculation cries out for names and faces.
One reason why names and faces are important is that few in the Soviet Union
are qualified to take over the conduct of foreign policy. The bulk of the Soviet
leadership concern themselves with internal policies. Even though Brezhnev had
served as chief of state before the anti-Khrushchev coup, he had not been
involved in the operation of Soviet global policy. That was largely Kosygin's
preserve, on which Brezhnev encroached only gradually. But since taking over
the reins of Soviet foreign policy in the early 1970's, Brezhnev has dominated
it-so much so that no one else has had much experience. Except for Gromyko,
only those in the Secretariat of the Central Committee who deal with foreign
Communists have much background in foreign affairs. In this context, the emer-
gence of Zamyatin's new department is of some significance.
T Seweryn Bialer, "The Harsh Decade : Soviet Policies in the 1980s," Foreign Affairs
(New-York; NY),'Summer 1981, pp. 999 if.
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
If Gromyko survives, then, he will be the major voice in mundane foreign
affairs, but the strategic line will still have to be set by the General Secretary.
Recall the struggles in 1953-57 between Khrushchev, the neophyte, and Vyache-
slav Molotov, the old professional.'
For Western observers there are two areas of greatest concern: (1) whether
the buildup in Soviet military forces will continue, and (2) whether Soviet for-
eign policy will have an aggressive character, or begin to moderate.
It is likely that several members of the present Politburo aside from Brezhnev
have been involved in defense policy : obviously Ustinov, as Defense Minister ;
Gromyko, because of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks : probably Kirilenko,
because he is the "second" Secretary ; Chernenko, who has some responsibilities
in the defense field; probably some in the Secretariat who are involved with
defense industries ; and the head of the KGB. Moreover, in contrast to foreign
policy, defense policy-because of its widespread repercussions in the economy-
must be generally familiar to all in the Politburo (not in terms of a knowledge
of esoteric weapons, but in terms of the number of workers, the amount of steel,
etc., required).
By background and by inclination, Brezhnev is promilitary. Indeed, no one
would argue that he has not been more than kind to the defense establishment.
But, except for Ustinov, the others have no such long background or emotional
attachment. Thus, it is very unlikely that a new leader would have the where-
withal to challenge the military immediately.
But can this situation last? If the military proves to be untouchable and keeps
its share of the national economy, and if the economy slows down as much as
Western observers predict," then the military share of the national product will
grow absolutely and relatively and become a tempting target for reductions. All
of this probably means that after the first phase of the struggle in which the
successor enlists the tacit support of the military, he will eventually turn on his
supporters, if he wants to pursue a successful economic policy.
It may be somewhat easier for Brezhnev's successor to confront the military
problem because, strangely enough, Brezhnev seems to be laying the groundwork
to reduce the military's claims to priority in national policy. He has done so by
assaulting one of its sacred preserves : military doctrine. For years, the Soviet
military were permitted to write that nuclear war was winnable. They did not
do so in crude terms, but this was certainly the import of their writings. Just
when it seemed to Westerners that they had a firm fix on Soviet military doctrine
and policy, however, Brezhnev has confused the issue. To appreciate what has
happened, one needs to trace his statements over time.
In the early 1970's, with the advent of parity, Brezhnev declared : "We have
created strategic forces which constitute a reliable means of deferring aggres-
sors." Nevertheless, a reliable Soviet deterrent was still considered precarious
and subject to Western attempts to regain strategic superiority. Thus, Brezhnev
repeatedly warned that the USSR would "respond to any and all attempts from
any quarter to obtain military superiority over the USSR. 110
By 1975, however, Brezhnev had concluded that the new strategic balance was
firmly enough entrenched so that a return to Western strategic dominance was
increasingly unlikely and hence the West had accepted detente. As he put things :
"International detente has become possible because a new relation of forces has
been established in the world arena. Now the leaders of the bourgeois world can
no longer entertain serious intentions of resolving the historic dispute between
socialism and capitalism, by force of arms... .,Ill
Less than two years later, the General Secretary deemed that the increase in
all levels of Soviet forces had reached a point where it was no longer effective
politics (or policy) to trumpet this new balance of power, for it was creating
a backlash in the West, where Soviet statements about "superiority" or "victory"
were cited in support of Western rearmament 12 In January 1977, he began to
insist that the USSR did not seek strategic superiority and to rebut the allega-
tion that the USSR was intent on a first strike, which he dismissed as "absurd
"Robert Conquest, "Power and Policy in the USSR," London, Macmillan, 1962, pp. 263 if.
Bialer, loc. cit., pp. 1004-00.
10 Quoted in Raymond L. Garthoff. "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in
Soviet Policy," International Security, Summer 1978, p. 137.
31 Ibid.
22 Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War,"
Commentary (New York, NY), July 1977, p. 21.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
and utterly unfounded."' These denials, of course, were intended to counter
American apprehensions that the new Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBM's) would eventually achieve a capability of neutralizing the US Minute-
man ICBM force. By the end of 1971, Brezhnev had gone even further and was
insisting that the USSR "will not seek military superiority over the other side.
We do not want to upset the approximate equilibrium of military strength exist-
ing at present . . . between the USSR and the United States." 1'
This new line was echoed rather consistently until, in 1981, Brezhnev took
another step. He denounced aspiration for victory in nuclear war as "dangerous
madness." "
It may be significant that one of the more vigorous assaults on nuclear con-
frontation was carried out by Chernenko in April 1981 at the Lenin birthday
celebration. He introduced the Malenkov heresy-that nuclear war posed a
threat to "all civilization." Later in the same speech, he said that nuclear weap-
ons placed the "future of mankind in doubt." '" Chernenko has a unique record
in this area. On several occasions, he has seemed to be well ahead of others
in warnings about the consequences of nuclear war : for example, when he stated
in November 1976 that "mankind might be totally destroyed.! " Since he was
promoted during this very period, we have to assume his attack was endorsed,
if not encouraged, by Brezhnev. Indeed, as noted, Brezhnev finally entered the
arena with more graphic language-"madness"-and a Central Committee pam-
phlet. repeated the Malenkov deviation "
All of this occurred at a time when the military itself was engaging in a
spirited and rather amazing defense of itself, primarily through a July 1981
Kommunist article by Marshal Ogarkov.'9 In this article, Ogarkov vigorously
defended the legitimacy of Soviet military doctrine, duly cited Brezhnev on the
doctrine's "defensive" character, and repeated Brezhnev's formulation that the
use of nuclear weapons would mean that the "future of all mankind would be at
stake." But this obeisance was minor compared to some of Ogarkov's startling
claims.
First, the Chief of Staff bemoaned the fact that Soviet youth did not under-
stand that some wars are "good" and some are "bad," and he maintained that
they needed to be educated by the party. In this connection, he urged the party to
explain to all of the people "in a more profound and better reasoned form the
truth about the existing threat of the danger of war. It should not be over-
dramatized, but it is obligatory to show the seriousness of the contemporary
international situation." Such remarks seem to be a rather blatant pitch to pro-
tect his budget.
But perhaps more important than this special pleading (which suggested that
he still feared that economic stringencies would impinge on defense's share of
the country's resources), Ogarkov laid out a claim to even more resources. In
modern operations, he argued, the "system of rear and technical support should
acquire new content." Particular importance, he wrote, should be attached to the
country's rear services, which "must make good in a shorter space of time the
loss of high quantities of combat hardware and weapons, without which it is
virtually impossible to maintain the armed forces' combat capability at the
necessary level." This statement cannot be read except as a demand that the
economy supply not only operational equipment but more for stockpiles as well.
Indeed, he also reminded his readers that modern weapons change "every 10-12
years." In other words, cuts in defense in later years would also be dangerous.
This military claim is even more significant when we consider that for most of
1979 and 1980, Brezhnev was warning the heavy industry clique that they had to
make a greater contribution to consumer goods production, and that defense
industries in particular had to help out." Hence, Ogarkov may have been answer-
ing Brezhnev.
In any case, the stage is set for a struggle over defense policy after Brezhnev.
'8 Quoted in Gartnoff, loc. cit., pp. 139-40.
14 Ibid., p. 141. Emphasis added.
15 Dusko Doder, "Nuclear Flap," The Washington Post, Oct. 23, 1981, p. A26.
"'Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Trends in Communist Media" (Washington,
D.C.) May 6, 1981, pp. 6-9.
17 Ibid.
"Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, "The Soviet Threat to
Euro e," Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1981.
'? N. Ogar ov "Defending Peaceful Endeavor" Kommunist (Moscow), No. 10, July
1981, pp. 80-91.
20 Speeches to Central Committee plenum, as translated in Foreign Broadcast Informa-
tion Service, "Daily Report: Soviet Union" (Washington, DC-hereafter FBIS-SOV),
Oct. 22, 1980, p. R/1, and Nov. 29, 1979. p. R/1.
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
It could not really be otherwise if we consider that defense claims 12-].5 percent
of the Soviet national economic product 21
While there is an idea in the West that the Soviet military buildup is sacro-
sanct, it of course is not. What matters is how it fits into the internal struggle.
Khrushchev called in Zhukov to defeat Georgiy Melenkov and Molotov (who
incidentally had reputations as Stalinists but actually favored some soft poli-
cies)." But Khrushchev then threw out Zhukov and conducted a long attack on
the military, even though he also laid the groundwork for much of the strategic
buildup carried out by Brezhnev. So nothing is preordained in Soviet politics.
FOREIGN POLICY
Foreign policy is also in flux. Throughout the past two years, Soviet policy has
been trying to come to grips with the shifts in the West : the uproar over
Afghanistan and the sanctions against the USSR imposed by the Carter admin-
istration, the collapse of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and the election
of President Ronald Reagan, followed by plans for major increases in American
defense spending.
All of these developments, of course, could be laid at Brezhnev's door. His
defense has been interesting. At the Central Committee plenum in June 1980, he
took the position that the USSR had to act with restraint and should not let
itself be provoked by the West. He became almost nostalgic about the 1970's:
"We should continue to spare no effort to preserve detente, all the good things
that the seventies brought us. . . ." 23 Moreover, the plenum formally registered
approval of Brezhnev's performance. According to the plenum resolution, the
1970's had been an improvement in the international situation, and there was an
"obvious decline in the cold war." The CPSU, the plenum document went on, was
displaying "a truly Leninist restraint." In essence, thus, the resolution was a
holding operation. It called for strengthening defense, on the one hand, and for
mobilizing forces to prevent a "sliding down to a new cold war," on the other."
By the time of the 26th Congress of the CPSU in February 1981, however,
hopes that the cold war was not returning were fading. Before the congress, for
example, Ustinov maintained that the threat of war had increased ; Ogarkov
claimed that the forces of imperialism were striving to wreck the process of
relaxation and that therefore there were increased demands on "combat
readiness." 21
Nonetheless, there was still an inclination to try to 'retrieve the situation.
Dinmukhamed Kunayev contended that the USSR had to show firmness and not
permit the "torpedoing of detente." 21 Vladimir Shcherhitskiy warned against
permitting events to turn the world back to the "worst times of the cold war." 2T
Grishin called for "preserving detente." 28 Even Ustinov said that the Soviet
Union had enough self-control not to yield to provocations.29 At the congress,
Grigoriy Romanov expressed the same theme : that despite the severe test, the
US$1 was not being "driven from the course of normalization" of the situation H0
But after the congress the tone of comments became more ominous. Although
Pravda claimed that the struggle for peace was the leitmotif of the congress,
it then went on to mention strengthening defense three times.31 Izvestiya held
that implementation of the congress plans "depends directly on the country's
defense might." a2 In April, Chernenko warned that the "war danger, which
somewhat diminished in the middle of the last decade, has increased again." ai
The situation, however, remains rather confused. At the Central Committee
plenum finally called in late 1981 to adopt the five-year plan announced in
February, Brezhnev claimed : "In working out the plans we naturally also had
21 Abraham S. Beker, "The Burden of Soviet Defense," Report 2752-AF. Santa Monica,
CA, Rand Corporation, October 1981.
22 Conquest, op. cit., pp. 329 if.
23 FBIS-SOV, June 24, p. R/1. Emphasis added.
24 Ibid., pp R/4--6.
25 Ustinov, as translated in ibid., Dec. 11, 1980, p. V/1; Ogarkov, in Ibid., Jan. 16, 1981,
p. V/1.
28 Report to the 15th Kazakh Communst Party Congress, ibid., Feb. 18, 1981, p. R/3.
27 Report at the 26th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress on Feb. 10, 1981, ibid., Feb.
25, 1981, p. R/1.
28 "Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress, Vol. III," translated in FBIS-SOV, Feb. 26,
1981, Supplement, p. 44.
29 FBIS-SOV, Feb. 23, 1981, p. V/5.
30 "Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress, Vol. IV," FBIS-SOV, Feb. 27, 1981, Sup-
plement, p. 33.
a' FBIS-SOV, Mar. 11, 1981, p. P/1.
u Ibid., Mar. 12, 1981, p. P/1.
83 Ibid., Apr. 23, 1981, p. R/1.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84BOO274ROO0300110001-7
to take into account the worsening of the international situation." And in going
over the main features of the plan, he noted that "reliable" provision was being
made for the needs of defense." In presenting the 1982 budget, moreover, Minis-
ter of Finance Vasiliy Garbuzov said that while struggling for peace, "our party
and state evaluate soberly the international situation." ", Thus, Brezhnev seems
to have positioned the party to move either toward conciliation, thus justifying
"Leninist restraint," or toward confrontation. The ultimate decision may well be
made by his successors.
In conclusion, let me reiterate a basic theme. An eminent Sovietologist, Jerry
F. Hough, has written : ". . even if Westerners knew who the next general
secretary would be, the information would be of little use. There is almost no
Politburo figure of the Brezhnev period whose position in the Soviet political
spectrum has been agreed upon by Western specialists.. .
The most useful contribution that can be made beforehand to an understand-
ing of the succession is to analyze the problems and the most likely possible vari-
ants-both 'healthy' and 'pathological. "
Such an approach, in my opinion, concedes the field too easily. A diligent ef-
fort, which Hough himself has often demonstrated, should yield a great deal
more about Soviet power politics.
But it is not simply a question of analyzing changing generations. Rather, it
is a question of determining the principal actors and where they stand on major
policy issues. While it is true that the previous track record of Kremlinologists
is not enviable, the main rules continue to be valid. Soviet politics, at bottom, is
a struggle for power. And there is absolutely no basis to believe that it will not
continue to be so. What we have to do is to identify the players and their policies.
Full Politburo members:
Yuriy Andropov (68).... ----------- General Secretary 1. ------------- General Supervision (D and F), Defense, security
(D), General foreign relations (F).
Geydar Aliyev (59) .................. USSR First Deputy Premier. Economic admin,s,ra,ion ID).
Konstantin Chernenko (71) . Party Secretary 1......_....._.. Politburo staff work (D).
Mikhail Gorbachev (51)........ Party Secretary 1 ................ Agriculture (D).
Viktor Grishin (68) .............. Moscow City 1st Secretary Moscow Party supervision.
Andrey Gromyko (73) .............. Minister of Foreign Affairs General foreign relations (F).
Dinmukhamed Kunayev (70) Kazakh First Secretary Kazakh Party supervision (D).
Arvid Pelshe (83) .................. Chairman. Party Control Party discipline (D).
Committee.
Gregoriy Romanov (59).......... Leningrad Ublast First Leningrad Oblast Party supervision (D).
Secretary.
Vladimir Shcherbitsky (64).... Ukrainian First Secretary Ukranian Party supervision (D).
Nikolay Tikhonov (77)............ USSR Premier Economic administration, industry (D).
Dmitriy Ustinov (74) .............. Minister of Defense.............. Defense, space (0), Military aid, foreign military
support (F).
Candidate members:
Petr Demichev (64) ................ Minister of Culture ............. Culture (D).
Vladimir Dolgikh (58)............ Party Secretary' . Industrial management (D).
T. Ya. Kiselev (65) ........... Belorussian First Secretary Belorussian Party supervision (D).
Vasiliy Kuznetsov (81)........... First Deputy Chairman, Pre- Legislative agencies (D), General state relations
sidium of the Supreme (F).
Soviet.
Boris Ponomarev (77) ................. Party Secretary1 --------- Relations with non-ruling Communist parties (F).
Sharaf Rashidov (65) Uzbek First Secretary .......... Uzbek Party supervision (D).
Eduard Shevardnadze (54).... Georgian First Secretary _.... Georgian Party supervision (D).
Mikhail Solomenstev (69)...... RSFSR Premier ...... .... ..._.._. RSFSR Economic administration, Finance (D).
Secretaries who are not in
Politburo:
Ivan Kapitonov (67) ----- .._.. Party Secretary ._ .............._.. Party staffing (D).
Konstantin Rusakov (73)..._... Party Secretary ------------ .... Communist Bloc liaison (F).
Nikolay Ryzhkov (53) Party Secretary _................... Heavy Industry (D).
Mikhail Zimyanin (68).......... Party Secretary ---- .---------- ----- Culture (D).
1 Also member of Secretariat.
Source: CIA.
34 Pravda (Moscow), Nov. 17, 1981 ; FBIS-SOV, Nov. 17, 1981, p. R/1.
35FBIS-SOV, Nov. 17, 1981, pp. R/16-17.
as Jerry F. Hou h. "The Soviet Leadership in Transition," Washington, DC, The Brook-
Inge Institution, 180, p 151.
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84BOO274ROO0300110001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
June 14, 1914-Date of birth.
1940-44-First Secretary, Komsomol, Karelia ; worked behind German lines
organizing partisan bands.
1944-47-Second Secretary, Petrozavodsk City Party Committee (Karelia).
1947-51-Second Secretary, Central Committee, Communist Party of Karelia.
1953-Chief, Fourth European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
October 1953-57-Charge d'Affaires, Counselor of Embassy, and then Ambassa-
dor, Budapest.
July 1957-62-Chief, Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers'
Parties of Socialist Countries, CPSU Central Committee.
November 1962-67; May 24, 1982-Secretary, CPSU Central Committee.
May 1967 to May 26, 1982-Chairman, KGB.
June 1967-73-Candidate member, Politburo.
April 1973 to date-Member, Politburo.
November 12, 1982 to date-General Secretary, CPSU Central Committee.
The staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence prepared the follow-
ing summary of the major points made by each of the witnesses during the
hearing on Soviet Succession held by the Committee on September 29, 1982:
Nature of succession
Professor Hough believes we are facing an "absolutely historic succession,"
the passing of a political generation which has ruled in the Soviet Union for
40 years'
The attitudes of these men reflect old realities. Although the immediate suc-
cessor will likely be from the current Politburo membership, this will initiate
only a larger succession process, the full impact of which will be felt in the
late 80s. According to Professor Hough, the emerging political generation will
be less ideological and more pragmatic, having risen through the bureaucracy
and functioned in a committee political setting. This change will occur at a time
when important decisions-decisions Brezhnev put off for years-must be made.
Professor Hough believes that there is an "excellent chance that rather signif-
icant change in [Soviet policy] will come fairly quickly," including some effort
at economic reform, with more emphasis on market mechanisms similar to those
of the Hungarian model 2 These changes require difficult and unpopular decisions,
including almost surely a major increase in prices. Thus, he is "far less
optimistic" that there is going to be any significant change for the better in
the political realm.
There is also a "real chance" for a leveling, perhaps even a cut, in military
expenditures coupled with a "real peace offensive." Professor Hough believes
this is suggested by the "logic of the situation." He cites the following factors :
Demographics indicate a future labor shortage, including a substantial
reduction in the next few years of draftable 18-year-olds.
Economic reform will require increased food prices and increased heavy
industry investment.
The Soviet Union cannot realistically expect to achieve military superior-
ity since they have only 60 percent of the GNP of the United States and
about 25 percent of the combined GNP of the United States, Western Europe
and Japan.
Border incidents and tensions with the Chinese during the later 1960's
and early 1970's, which prompted an increase in troops on the border, have
abated.
The leading contenders to succeed Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko,
seem "reform" minded.
'As Professor Hough notes, even excluding Brezhnev, 7 of the 12 Politburo voting
members are 10 years of age or older. Forty percent of the voting members of the Central
Committee will be 65 or older by the end of 1982 (more than half of them 70 or older,
and one fifth 75 or older). Seventy percent of the Council of Ministers members who are
voting members of the Central Committee will be 65 or older.
2 Professor Hough points out that Yuri Andropov was Ambassador to Hungary and
then Secretary to Central Committee in charge of East Bloc relations during which time
substantial reforms were made in the Hungarian economy.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
Professor Hough sees a collective leadership emerging in the first stages of
the succession, but not one dedicated to the status quo. What is likely is a
succession similar to that which followed Stalin, which featured substantial
change in the period 1953 to 1957. Professor Hough points out that despite
divisions in the collective leadership in the 1953-57 period, there were more
policy initiatives of interest during these years than during the period after
Khruschev reached the height of his power. Among these were the following :
An agreement to withdraw the Red Army from Austria (May 1955), a meeting
between the Soviet leadership and President Eisenhower and other Western
leaders in Geneva (July 1955), the return by the Soviet Union of some territory
to Finland (September 1955), and finally, a reduction in the size of the Red
Army.
While predicting a genuine "peace offensive," Professor Hough nevertheless
observed that the extent of the military's influence in the Brezhnev succession
is an "extremely open question." He believes that this influence can be strong or
weak depending on circumstances, but that circumstances now appear ripe
for some significant constraints on military spending.
The candidates
At the time of the hearing, Professor Hough believed the evidence was strong
that Chernenko and Andropov were the leading candidates to succeed Brezhnev.
He thought it was unclear whether they might work well together during the
transition or whether a struggle between them was inevitable.
He believes foreign policy statements made by Andropov are noteworthy in
that they have been quite distinct from those of virtually all other members of
the Politboro. Since 1975, Andropov has been quite vocal in support of the policy
of detente, noting that even in 1980, in the wake of U.S. sanctions following
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, he supported detente and called for negotia-
tions with the United States.
Chernenko's speeches have been somewhat more general, but also fervent in
supporting detente. Professor Hough noted that in 1980, while other Soviet
officials praised the invasion of Afghanistan, Chernenko was virtually silent-
the kind of behavior which "usually connotes opposition."
While there may be differences between the two, both Andropov and Cher-
nenko seem to support detente. The fact that they are moving to the fore suggests,
in Professor Houghs view, that the forces within the Soviet Union in general
and the Central Committee and Politburo in particular are supportive of that
kind of action.
U.S. Policy
Professor Hough believes that the United States is "ill-prepared for a real
Soviet peace offensive." The United States does not have a "fall back position
in the arms control realm," nor has it thought through what a "reasonable code
of detente for great powers in the Third World or otherwise" might be.
Outlook for an arms control agreement
Of the prospects for an arms control agreement, Professor Hough said they
depend upon the kind of proposal put forward. SALT II or some variation there-
of would be acceptable to almost any new Soviet leadership, but any reductions
beyond that would be more difficult to negotiate.
Professor Hough also suggested that the Soviets might even be inclined to
forego modernization of their strategic forces. While he believes arms control
agreements are important in maintaining good relations with our allies and can
limit tensions between Washington and Moscow, the level of Soviet military
expenditures will be influenced as much by the economic situation facing the
Soviet leadership as by any other considerations.
Nature of succession
Professor Rush said that the U.S.S.R. new stands at an historic juncture. A
decade of "coherent and stable leadership" under Brezhnev has now ended. In
Professor Rush's view, the Soviet Union is in a stronger position relative to the
United States than it was during the succession periods following Stalin and
Khrushchev, but it is heading toward a "crisis of empire" in the late 1980s. The
new leadership will be compelled to make fateful decisions, decisions which
Brezhnev postponed.
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
In contrast to Professor Hough's prediction that major policy changes-in-
eluding important economic reforms-will come quickly. Professor Rush sees a
phased succession. In the early stages the contending factions are "likely to turn
inward" and "wilil probably seek detente with the West, at least in the short
term." He believes that contending Soviet leaders are "likely" to reach an early
consensus to reject or curtail major Brezhnev programs as a means of freeing
resources for sectors which have experienced severe shortages.
However, Professor Rush does not think the new leadership will be able to
address the "overarching problem" of the Soviet Union which is the widening gap
between a stagnant economy and the rapidly increasing expenditures required for
the Soviet welfare state and the maintenance and extension of the troubled
Soviet empire. Professor Rush's major thesis is that, if Soviet policies continue
on the present course and the Western coalition is not gravely weakened, the
Soviet Union seems headed for a crisis by the late 1980's. This would be an
economic and political crisis brought on by a failure of the economy to provide
the resources required to sustain the Soviet empire. He believes the U.S.S.R.
could avert such a crisis in one or more of the following ways :
First, domestically, by reordering its economic priorities, transferring funds
from the military to the civilian sector in order to improve economic growth. In
this connection, a "limited accommodation with the United States to abate global
competition" will have an attraction for Brezhnev's heirs.
Second, externally, by sharply improving Soviet geopolitical position at the
expense of the United States. This might be accomplished by imperial expan-
sion (e.g., in the Persian Gulf). Or the new leadership might employ diplomatic
maneuvers, such as rapprochement with China, a peace treaty with Japan, or
threats and inducement to split Western Europe, or parts of it, from alliance with
the United States.
While the new leadership could pursue domestic and foreign policy strategies
at the same time, Professor Rush believes they are likely to concentrate efforts
on one or the other. He adds that the Soviet Union might be able to freeze de-
fense spending at the current level for several years given the massive mili-
tary build-up of the last decade, without seriously impairing existing favorable
regional and strategic military balances.
Major initiatives to avert a crisis in this decade could best be accomplished by
a strong and united leadership, but Professor Rush considers this unlikely for
some time after Brezhnev's death. However, he added an important qualification :
If Andropov succeeds there could be a concentration of power in a relatively
short period of time. He thinks that Andropov had already been using the KGB to
consolidate his position and would use it more extensively. This process might be
further fueled by a more rapid turnover in the Politburo, likely, in view of the
current members' ages. Such a turnover could facilitate the concentration of
power in one man in a relatively short period of time.
Candidates and disinformation
Professor Rush did not discuss in any detail who the leading contenders to
succeed Brezhnev might be other than to say, as noted above, that one leading
candidate, Andropov, might be able to bring about a rapid concentration of
power if he succeeds Brezhnev. In this connection, he cautioned that the United
States had "inadequate knowledge of what is going on in the Kremlin," and this
"sometimes leaves us open to Soviet manipulation." For example, he noted
that there had been circulating in the press a view of Andropov as a "closet"
liberal, this despite the fact that Andropov headed the KGB for 15 years and
"brutally destroyed the dissident movement."
U.S. policy
Professor Rush suggested that the first phase of the succession might be an ad-
vantageous time for the United States to present proposals for negotiations at
issue between the two countries. However, he also believes that a divided Soviet
leadership would have difficulty responding to such proposals.
As to the larger decisions the new leadership must make, Professor Rush
doubts that the United States possesses sufficient leverage to decisively influence
those decisions. It is his judgment that our experience during the era of detente
raises questions about our capacity to offer sufficient economic inducements to
modify Soviet behavior. Similarly, events since the invasion of Afghanistan
raise questions about our ability to inflict large enough costs on the Soviets to
restrain their actions.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
Professor Rush would advise U.S. policymakers that American policies should
be determined by our directly perceived interests and those of our allies, not
by our expectations of how they will influence the Soviet succession. While it
is important to try to anticipate and understand developments in the succession
and the impact of our policies on Soviet decisions, our knowledge at present
and in the foreseeable future simply does not enable us to orchestrate U.S.
policy according to a particular interpretation of what is going on in the
Kremlin. Therefore, he concludes, our greatest efforts should be directed to
strengthening ourselves and our alliances and to denying the USSR opportuni-
ties for imperial aggrandizement or major diplomatic gains at our expense.
Motive for Soviet military buildup
In addition, Professor Rush believes it is important for the United States
to address not only the fact of the Soviet military buildup, but the underlying
motive. The question has to be asked why the Soviet Union has sacrificed its
economy and precipitated the impending domestic crisis for a military buildup
beyond, according to Professor Rush, any reasonable need.
Outlook for an arms control agreement
Professor Rush thinks there are good possibilities for arms control agree-
ments, but that they will not be very far-reaching. In order for the Soviets to
deal effectively with their long term economic problems, a freeze on military
spending will not be sufficient. More substantial cuts than a mere freeze would
be needed-and the odds of such cuts taking place are, in his view, small.
Nature of 8ucce88ion
Dr. Conquest foresees a long succession crisis, in which the Soviet leadership
will follow tradition and turn inward.
In addition, he anticipates no important change in policy in the immediate
future. He expects that in the first couple of years of the succession the new
General Secretary will be someone from the ranks of the Stalinist generation.
On the whole, he agrees with Professor Rush that there will be little change
in the short term, but that fateful policy issues will have to be addressed
certainly by the latter part of the decade.
Dr. Conquest does not consider the policies that contenders for Brezhnev's
position have advanced in the past to be very good predictors of what they
might do while In power, noting that, following their ascendancy, both Stalin
and Khrushchev reversed earlier positions they had taken.
He disagrees with Professor Rush's contention that the "logic of the situation"
relating to the Soviet's domestic problems gives basis for any reasonable expecta-
tions as to the policies they will adopt. This judgment, he believes, is based on
Western, not Soviet, values, stressing that an effort should be made "to see these
people as they are, as a different political species." 3 He suggested that U.S.
policymakers should think of a member of the Soviet leadership as a "J. R.
Ewing and rather worse."
Dr. Conquest referred to a colloquial Russian expression, "Kto, kgo?" (Who
wins? Who loses?) to illustrate another Leninist principle-everything is a
struggle. He said he foresees a long period of adjustment, of struggle among
the various succession contenders which will inevitably result in one person
emerging on top.
Next generation
The question of the character of the next generation of leaders is a difficult
one, said Dr. Conquest, because unlike Stalin and Khrushchev, Brezhnev did not
groom a younger group of people for leadership. However, he argued that the
generation of people who are now 55 or 60 are very much like the current leaders.
Additionally, he expressed concern that most of the presumed future leaders
in this age group have had little foreign policy experience.
s In an August 1978 article titled, "The Role of the Intellectual in International Mis-
understanding," Conquest wrote
"My central point is not so much that people misunderstand other people, or that
cultures misunderstand other cultures, but that they do not realize this to be the case.
They assume that the light of their own parochial common sense is enough. And they
frame policies based on illusions. Yet, how profound is this difference between political
cultures and between the motivations of different political traditions ; and how deep-
set and how persistent these attitudes are !"
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
81
He believes that a difference does emerge in the 45 to 50 age group and his
impression is that they are more cynical, a view he says is shared by most
dissidents. One of these, Andrei Sakharov, he quotes as saying :
"I like this new layer of leaders coming to the top even less than its predeces-
sors. The people of Brezhnev's generation laid the basis for their careers in the
worst years of the Stalinist terror. That put the mark of Cain on them.... The
new generation is coming without that mark. It is more flexible, but there is a
dreadful cynicism, careerism, and complete indifference to ideals in international
affairs. As far as internal matters go, they only care about the trough they
swill from and what matters is that the trough be full."'
As to the question of a "peace offensive" by the new Soviet leadership, Dr.
Conquest believes that a genuine initiative is unlikely. He noted that detente was
officially defined by the Soviets as a method of struggle and was never incom-
patible at its height with its foreign and military policies. He sees no anti-
detente attitudes in the Politburo because no one could claim that the Soviet
Union lost anything by practicing detente. In this respect, he differs from Pro-
fessor Hough who attached some importance to statements by Andropov and
Chernenko in support of detente.
In sum, Dr. Conquest sees a rather indeterminate future, but one in which
no serious change is likely, despite immense internal forces. He noted in this
connection that the Soviet system is designed to contain social and economic
pressures.
Dr. Conquest cautioned that this judgment reflects what seem, on the basis
of the limited data available, the probable tendencies. He agreed with Professor
Hough that "anything can happen" In the Soviet Union, acknowledging that he
would not have predicted the changes that occurred after Stalin's death such
as de-Stalinization, the split with China, and the Hungarian revolution.
Outlook for an arms control agreement
Regarding arms control, Dr. Conquest did not think it likely that the Soviets
would agree to the "fair measure of disarmament" that might alleviate some
of their economic problems. He concurred with Mr. Hyland's view that the
U.S. should build its strength and alliances while pursuing an activist policy
of negotiations on arms control.
Nature of 8ucee8aion
Mr. Hyland believes that the succession period will be a period of great
turmoil and change.
While uncertain how serious the change will be, he thinks that change in
Soviet policy will be greater than continuity. He agreed with Professor Rush's
view that the Soviets cannot continue for long doing business as usual. "Muddling
down" will not be a sufficient answer to their problems.
Mr. Hyland stressed his belief that men mare history and that it is important
who rules the Soviet Union and for the United States to know about these
people. In this connection, he agrees with Dr. Conquest that Soviet leaders
come to power through a struggle. He added, however, that the personal aspects
of this struggle are as important as the ideological ones, but noted that it is
difficult at times to determine which of the two is more determinative.
Mr. Hyland does not believe that collective leadership can work in the Soviet
Union, that the system requires a rule of one. Professor Rush agreed. Mr. Hyland
predicted that another Khrushchev, Brezhnev or Stalin is likely to emerge,
although he was unable to suggest how long this will take.
U.S. policy
Mr. Hyland thinks that the 1980's are a period of "great opportunity" for
the United States, perhaps the greatest since the death of Stalin. He recalled
that, at that time, Churchill advocated every active policy of putting new
proposals to the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower and Dulles were cautious
preferring to build up our strength before negotiating. This policy Hyland
considered to have been a mistake.
Mr. Hyland recommended that the United States pursue a policy of "active
diplomacy" immediately. Waiting to size up the Soviet succession situation is
' In a similar vein in 1976, Mr. Sakharov told an interviewer that he saw little hope
that the next generation of Soviet political leaders might allow more freedom. "In a
bureaucratic system," Sakharov observed, "every generation simply reproduces itself."
Christian Science Monitor, August 10, 1976.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7
not, Hyland thinks, likely to result in any insight into the ways of the Soviet
leadership.
Outlook for an arms control agreement
As to the prospects for an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union,
Mr. Hyland thinks they are "fairly good," especially if the United States carries
out the defense programs it now envisions. These, he said, are a "prerequisite"
to any successful negotiations since they will significantly change the balance
of power in favor of the United States. He believes that Brezhnev's successor
will realize that to maintain the current strategic balance in the face of the
American buildup will impose an enormous strain on the Soviet economy.
Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110001-7