PREPARATION OF CIA PORTION OF DCI S ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP84B00148R000100240004-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
27
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 5, 2007
Sequence Number:
4
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 12, 1982
Content Type:
MEMO
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Body:
The Director of Central Intelligence
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DCI/ICS 82-4284
5 November 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Program Managers
SUBJECT: Preparation of the DCI's Annual Report to the Congress
1. It is time again to prepare the Annual Report to the Congress. I
believe that last year's report which began with a DCI overview of the
Community followed by separate reports from CIA, DIA, NSA, INR, and the FBI
was comprehensive and informative, and, therefore, quite successful. This
approach permitted us to address cooperatively and individually the progress
we made toward meeting the needs of national poTicymakers and departmental
intelligence consumers, and will be maintained this year. " 25X1
2. You will note from the attached Terms of Reference that I intend to
emphasize the theme of restoring balance to the NFIP as we rebuild. I am
focusing on three areas of interest identified by the President--HUMINT,
analysis, and counterintelligence--with particular attention to efforts in
1982 to achieve balance in our intelligence capabilities. I also plan to
address the support provided to policymakers of both a crisis and long-term
nature. Finally, I again intend to devote some attention to a look to the
future; this year I would like to address the challenges facing the Community
in recruiting, retaining, and tra'ning the highly skilled personnel we will
require in the coming years. 25X1
3. As in previous years, I invite you to take this opportunity to
address the Congress personally in your own report. We are required to
provide a review of US intelligence activities as well as the intelligence
activities of foreign countries directed against the US or its interests. I
would urge you, however, to devote some time to addressing those three key
issues of HUMINT analysis, as well as counterintelligence, where
appropriate. 25X1
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r aee~ s~m...
4. The preparation of the report is again being managed by the Office of
Planning of the I Please submit the na[p~ ~,0~f your
action officer t0 who also is nranared"t'oe?
Attachment:
Terms of Reference
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TERMS OF REFERENCE
DCI ANNUAL REPORT TO THE*CONGRE,
M L to the reacted favorably in the ypast three years totheformat eand contents of has
Annual Report, i.e., a DCI Overview and separate reports each from the CIA,
DIA, NSA, INR, and the FBI. The theme of the 1981 Report was rebuilding which
seemed appropriate for the first report by the DCI and several- '-agency
directors. This year, the theme will be that of restoring balance to the
overall US Intelligence capability as we rebuild, and will focus on efforts to
bring HUMINT into balance with the other INTS, analysis into balance with
collection, and counterintelligence activities to protect intr'5r1 into
balance with the total NFIP effort to generate intelligence. u
Format
The Annual Report will contain seven sections: a DCI Community Overview;
a report from the DDCI on CIA activities; and a report each from the directors
of DIA, the FBI, NSA, and INR. There will be a set of issues that the DCI
will address independent of what individual agency directors may choose to
discuss. There also will be a set of issues that the DCI will address in the
aggregate, and request that the individual agency directors discuss in greater
detail and from their individual perspectives. Finally, agency directors are
encouraged to address events and issues of particular significance to them.
The length of last year's agency reports ranged from six to ten pages in final
.nuhlichar1 fnrnl.t?
The theme of the DCI's overview this year will be that of balance; it
will tie US intelligence developments and world events in 1982 together with
last year's theme of rebuilding to provide a report on the progress made in
restoring balance to the NFIP. As has become tradition, the overview will
begin with a discussion of intelligence support to policy formulation. This
will be followed by a discussion of three programmatic areas identified by the
President as requiring emphasis in the rebuilding process: HUMINT; analysis;
and counterintelligence. Finally, there will 'be a section entitled "1983 and
Beyond" after last year's final section. .The look ahead this year will focus
on the Intelligence Community's need to compete successfully for thpZS billed
manpower it requires..
Introduction - The introduction will be used to restate the theme for the
1981 Annual Report, and discuss in broad terms the progress made during 1982;
it will be prepared by the Office of Planning/ICS. Organizational changes
will be addressed, as well as planning activities and budgetary initiatives in
response to those efforts 25X1
The DCI's Overview
Appr ved 4000 s section will be written
by the NIC as it was last year.. It will be divided into two parts: the
procedural and operational performance based on improvements to the tilE
7 process initiated in 1981; and a review of significant world events of both
crisis and long-term concern in 1982 25X1
Analysis - This section will be prepared by the DDI and will address the
Community's analytical strengths and weaknesses with respect to such factors
as manpower, skills, productivity, and tasking. The overriding theme will be
that of redressing the imbalance between collection and analysis, questions of
quality of analysis, and consumer relations. Several major events of 1982
will be contrasted with the 1985 Capabilities Study for an assessment of
collection strengths and weaknesses. Specific agency programs and initiat
will be left for agency directors to discuss in their respective recs.
Counterintelligence - This topic is the only one that is specifically
requested by Congress. This section will be written by the Community
Counterintelligence Staff/IC Staff, as it has been in the past years, in close
coordination with the FBI. Its emphasis will be on Community efforts to
promote coordinated activities and generate greater resources to address the
IC and CM issue as described in the NSSD-2 Study. The Technology Transfer
Intelligence Committee/ICS will be asked to discuss the counterintelligence
implications of the technology transfer issue during the year. 2 X1
1983 and Beyond - As a final variation on the balance theme, the Office
of Planning will address manpower as a resource whose particular needs will be
given special attention in the coming year to anticipate the consequences of
demographic trends. The task of recruiting, retaining, and training.the
highly skilled personnel the Community will require over the next decade will
become increasingly difficult, and imaginative, and farsighted responses will
be necessary if the Community is to compete successfully with the private
sector. Societal changes will influence present work force attitudes, and
will determine future 'relationships with work in general. The Community will
review the manpower issue in the coming year to determine the need for and
qualifications of our future specialists and generalists/managers, and what
steps need to be taken to encourage leadership to emerge from these two
groups. F-1 25X1
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1f`ykaeney Overviews
If the past is any guide to what can be expected in the individual agency
to'world events. The other area where the response can be predicted is that
of counterintelligence, where the CIA, DIA, and FBI traditionally have elected
to-address the subject. HUMINT and Analysis are being discussed in greater
detail this year than before; CIA and DIA are urged to address HUMINT
separately; CIA, DIA, NSA, and INR are requested to address the quality of
analysis issue in.their separate contexts. All are invited to address
manpower, but that i option as are any other issues they may wish to
address separately. 25X1
Timing
Outlines for each section of the Overview are due by 15 November 1982
with the specific contribution to the DCI's Overview due by 15 December
1982. Individual agency reports are due by 1 January 1983. The Overview will
be ready for the DCI's review by 1 January,- and the entire report will be sent
to the printers by 15 Janauary 1983, and published by 31 January 1983. In
order to expedite the editing and printing process, contributions are to Fe
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Ambassador Anne Armstrong
Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20500
Thank you for providing to me Sy Weiss' report on his meetings
with a number of policymakers concerning their perceptions of the
intelligence support they are receiving. .1 found what they had to
say both encouraging and dismaying. It was encouraging because their
concerns and complaints so closely paralleled the problems that I
perceived when I arrived here, a perception which has served as the
foundation for a number of organizational and policy changes. I am
dismayed because we have apparently not made as much progress as I -
would have hoped in conveying the significance of these changes to
many policy people and they in turn appear not to have paid close
enough attention to detect a number of the changes that have been made.
With respect to many of the concerns expressed, T believe that the
attachments that I am forwarding, with this letter will confirm that we
have been aware of the shortcomings in our work and have acted to redress
them over the last year or so. First, I would call your attention to the
text (Tab A) of remarks which Bob Gates delivered to 1300 analysts in
his first week as DDI last January. I think you will find it a startingly
candid appraisal of problems with Agency analysis - the first time the
analysts had ever been told some of these things. $eyond a lecture on
the shortcomings, however, it offers a concrete program to begin addressing
many of the concerns noted by those to whom Sy talked- This includes our
need for better insight into how the policy process works and how intelligence
is used in that process, the need for longer term research that looks beyond
near term developments, the need for a much more aggressive program of
soliciting the views of experts on the outside, and a number of. others.
The second attachment is a copy of the revamped research program for 1932
put together this last spring. You will see that it presents a program
reflecting for the first time the new capabilities afforded by the
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reorganization of the DDI a year ago and translating Bob's references
on his January speech into a concrete program of longer range research
on key issues of policy relevance over the next number of years. This
is the first long range, directorate wide research program in the history
of the Agency. It is a first effort and both Bob and I expect it to be
even better in 1983. The program is at Tab B.
The third attachment that I would bring to your attention is a list
of the NIEs and SNIEs published in the last year (Tab C). I think that,
this list conveys important changes in the way estimates have been produced
in the Community. First, we have published several times more Community
estimates in the last year than in any preceding period for a generation.
Second, many of these estimates are relatively short, were prepared in a
brief period of time and are highly policy relevant. Finally, any review
of these estimates would see that the conclusions -- and particularly
differences.of_view - are more sharply highlighted 'than in the past.
In sum, I believe that we have made substantial progress in making the
Community estimative program much more useful to the policy community.
By way of example, the SNIE on the Soviet Gas Pipeline in Perspective
was read by virtually every principal who participated in the NSC meeting
on this subject.
As I noted above, I am a little disappointed that the scope of these
changes is not yet perceived by some of our policy users. I believe there
are two causes for this. First, our -dialogue with policymakers tends to
be very issue oriented. When the DDI office directors and NIOs talk with
policymakers - which is very frequently -- it generally relates to specific
requirements or issues and often does not get at the larger question of
overall intelligence support or how it could be improved. Second, I believe
many policymakers do not understand or know how intelligence is organized,
who the right person is to call on various problems, or the extent of longer
range intelligence research and analysis already completed or underway.
There is another aspect of the problem: the difficulty of getting "negative
feedback" from policymakers at the Assistant Secretary level and above.
To overcome these problems, we have taken several steps. First, I
have renewed the charge to the National Intelligence'Officers to use their
frequent meetings with their policy community contacts to maintain a dialogue
about consumer views of the Intelligence Community. Next, because the major
portion of the intelligence analysis comes from the Directorate of Intelligence
in CIA, Bob Gates has asked all of his office directors to establish a regular
meeting with their substantive interlocutors at State, NSC and DoD that is
not driven by issues but instead will provide an opportunity to review the
overall level and quality of support on a routine basis. Second, we need
to move quickly to reach new appointees both during an administration and
at the beginning of an administration to explain to them intelligence
organization, where they can go for help and to *let them in on work and
research of interest to them that already has been completed. (To this
end, we have begun preparing bibliographies of intelligence research on
longer range problems by region -- three examples are at Tab D).
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Sy's report has brought home to us that the frequent, issue-driven
contacts between our substantive managers and policy officials have not
provided an adequate vehicle to discuss policy needs and analytical
support/quality. Accordingly, Bob Gates now is visiting a number of
the people interviewed by Sy to encourage them to meet every two or
three weeks with the appropriate DDI office directors and NIOs for this
purpose. Bob also is stressing to them the importance of providing
their candid comments and criticisms so that we can make our work more
relevant and useful to them. He also has provided them with both the
research program and the bibliographies so that they can be aware that
considerable long range work is in fact underway of has already been
completed and is potentially of great value to them.
As I mentioned in my first letter, to you on this subject, we have
been making a number of changes.here'at CIA in the way we do analysis
that are intended to improve substantially the quality.nf support for
the American policymaker. It is important to all of us here to be aware
of criticisms and concern about our analysis so that we can make it more
useful, timely and relevant for the user. Your help in providing the
comments of those interviewed by Ambassador Weiss is helpful in that
regard and I appreciate it. I hope that the above comments and the
attachments to this letter will be shared widely with the members of
the PFIAB so that' they too may have greater understanding of the efforts
we are making here.
William J. Casey
Director of'Central Intelligence
Attachments:
Tab A - Speech
Tab B - DDI Research Program
Tab C - Listing of NIEs and SNIEs
Tab D - Bibliographies (3)
All Portions of the Above Letter
are Classified SECRET.
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7 January 1982
REMARKS TO CDI ANALYSTS AND MANAGERS
I want to thank you for coming today and giving me an
opportunity to describe to you directly my views on the
Directorate of Intelligence and its work and the steps that the
Director, Admiral Inman, and I have agreed would be helpful to
improve its capabilities and the quality of its work.
Let me say at the outset, for those of you who do not know
me, that I come from the analytical ranks. I began as an analyst
in the Office of Current Intelligence and remained basically an
analyst until I first went to the NSC Staff
early in 1974. So I understand your problems and your
perspective.
--I too have tried to cope with vague or. ambiguous
instructions.
--I have had drafts I sweated over sit in a branch or
division chief's in-box for days or weeks.
4
--I have been pulled off of research to fight current fires.
--I have tried to write analysis knowing full well
policymakers and sometimes my own leaders had and were not
sharing information essential to my work.
--I-too had to prove myself again and again to a-rapid
succession of branch and division chiefs.
--I saw first-rate work produced under adverse
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25 October 1982 4
The Honorable William P. Clark
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Bill:.
I write this to follow up on the President's indication, in his recent
letter to me, that he. would like me to discuss with you how we can respond
to the recommendations contained in PFIAB's initial report to him.
Anne Armstrong has provided us with the specifics of the comments and
criticisms of the approximately 30 current and past U.S. officials interviewed
over a seven-month period. I enclose a copy of a letter expressing our
appreciation and outlining steps already taken and the additional ones planned
to improve the quality of analysis and improve policymaker understanding of
the Intelligence Community. For the first time in close to a decade, the scope
of the analytical and estimative program now reasonably matches the scope of
the issues and problems faced by the policy community. To illustrate, national
estimates dwindled from an annual average of 51 in the late 60s to 33 in the
early 70s and all the way down to an annual average of 12 in the 6 years from
1975 through 1980. During 1981 we did 38 national estimates and we will do 60
or more during 1982.
Under NSC auspices we have completed a comprehensive review of the hostile
intelligence and the additional capabilities with which to deal. The implemen-
tation of those recommendations is proceeding in an IG on counterintelligence
and an IG on cnuntprmpacurac_ Tn the ma2nrimo ...... r, .. L__._
We are working to assist PFIAB in developing an independent assessment on
the Soviet economy under the auspices of the Department of Commerce supported
by outside experts. In addition, CIA economists will support Allen Wallis
,
the new Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, to make a net assessment
of trade with the Soviet Union on their economy and ours which Secretary Shultz
has asked him to do. This is likely to involve an evaluation of our work on
the Soviet economy by Dr. Wallis and his colleagues who have high economic
competence.
Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, and I have met with Johnny Foster's
arms control committee. I found the recommendations made in their letter to
the President both innovative and sound and we either have or will iv@iMent
most of those relating to verification.
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I have redirected the SAFE program which had bogged down badly after
some seven }!ears and many millions of dollars. Shiftin to proven technology
and enlists ng software, we are now scheduled to hail, vqtq 2$ e
with a first-stage system in 1983. I have engaged 1
critique this redirection and will have their report shortly.
The system in the SIG-1 under NSC auspices which has prevailed for ten
years for an annual consumer formulation of key intelligence topics had become
quite static and sterile. We will now have a quarterly review of intelligence
products produced on thekey topics and, at the same time, specify additional
You are familiar, with the efforts being made to tighten Cocom and reduce
cc: Chairman, President's. Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
O/DCI w/partial enclosures
DDCI
EXDIR
DDI
DDA
D/ICS Executive Registry w/All Enclosures
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REMARKS OF WILLIAM J. CASEY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
to
CIA EMPLOYEES
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Good afternoon. I'm glad to be here this afternoon with all of you.
As we move into a new fiscal year I thought I'd like to tell you where we are,
how we're functioning and where we're headed as I see it.
job. In each case I've been powerfully impressed by our operations, our
support and our technical people. In each country, almost always with our
Europe into Asia. In all, I've visited tations since I've been is
station chief and the DDO division chief, I've had good talks of an hour or
more with the King or the President or the Prime Minister and have had good
STAT
working sessions
' - )I/In all, these travels have taken about 6% of my working time here.
It isn't restful to hit 11 countries in two working weeks plus three weekends,
but I find these visits extraordinarily valuable. They make me proud of the
people we have out there. They help refine and prioritize their objectives,
develop additional support they need, and permit us to better evaluate and use
their product back here. Talks on the scene always create a better grasp of
reality in assessing intelligence and developing cooperation. STAT
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Talking to our colleagues during my trips overseas and around the country,
I have found morale to be good. I think this can be attributed to an increased
interest and value placed on intelligence, a renewed sense of mission, an
improved public opinion, greater support at grass roots levels, and strong
support from both the Executive and Legislative branches of government.
Overseas service has become more attractive with overseas pay a permanent
thing, a stronger dollar, adoption of items contained in the Foreign Service
Act, our efforts to improve personal and physical security overseas, and better
training of our people prior to overseas assignments.
This Headquarters is an exciting place to be today because the national
security apparatus, and economic policymakers as well, are placing a high
value on good intelligence, on good analysis and on the versatility and can-do
spirit that characterizes this organization. We can all take satisfaction
in the knowledge that we are meeting the needs of the policymakers and that
they are reciprocating by funding improvements for us in the face of tight
fiscal pressure.
I see as my basic job to determine what it is that we need to know and
understand, to see that the existing collection and analytical capabilities
are focused on those subjects, and to develop any additional capabilities
necessary to deal more fully with existing intelligence needs and with others
likely to emerge.
To determine what it is we need to know is the starting point. This
requires a close working relationship with the decisionmaking apparatus. For
most of the last decade the formal mechanism for that has been an annually
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prepared and agreed list of key intelligence topics produced in an inter-agency
process under the auspices of the National Security Council. That exercise
had become rather static and sterile and we have supplemented it with a review
every three months to evaluate the actual intelligence production related to
those key topics and to define the additional collection and analysis still
needed on those topics.
Probably more important in determining our intelligence needs are informal
exchanges with decisionmakers. Every day, a CIA briefer reviews the President's
Daily Brief and significant last minute reports with the Vice President, the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President's National
Security Advisor. At about 11 a.m., the briefers come in to review with me
the reactions and interests expressed in the briefing. We discuss the next
day's brief and additional collection, analyses or estimates that may be
indicated. That daily playback is supplemented by meetings of the National
Security Council and the National Security Planning Group, which the President
almost always chairs, and by weekly meetings which I and John McMahan have
with Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger and Judge Clark.
This whole vast process of collection and analysis culminates in the
program of national estimates. It is the scope, the adequacy, the pertinence,
and the timeliness of those estimates in relation to the threats we face and
the needs of decisionmakers that ultimately determine how well we are doing
our job. You've heard Admiral Inman describe how the 50% drawdown in funding
and the 40% drawdown in personnel during the seventies required the concentration
of dwindling resources on the most devastating threats and led to the neglect
of many other areas of concern.
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This showed up most vividly in the national estimates which dwindled
from an annual average of 51 in the late 60s, down to 33 in the early 70s
and all the way down to an annual average of 12 in the 6 years from 1975 through
1980. During 1981 we did 38 national estimates and we will do 60 or more
during 1982.
The real value of this sharply increased number of estimates turns on
their timeliness, relevance and quality. As to timeliness, we haven't matched
the starting pace of General Bedell Smith. When he was sworn in as DCI, he
was told that President Truman was leaving the next day to confer with General
MacArthur at Wake Island and wanted to take with him national estimates on
seven subjects. He called the members of the then counterpart of the National
Foreign Intelligence Board to his Pentagon office at 4 p.m. and told them to
bring along their papers and experts and be prepared to spend the night.
He parceled out the subjects to each of seven principals with appropriate
advisors and announced that he would expect an estimate to be on his desk
early the ne;.t morning. When President Truman flew off to Wake Islard that
afternoon, he had the seven estimates to ponder on the plane. Perhaps things
were simpler and more clear cut in those days. We haven't found it necessary
to match that pace but we have turned out significant and urgent estimates in
a few days and one very complex and critical estimate in a week.
As to relevance, when the President and the NSC addressed Libyan sanctions,
technology transfer, Soviet trade and credit, the Siberian pipeline and Western
alternatives to Soviet gas, Lebanon, the next phases in the Iran-Iraq war, the
Mexican financial crisis, the Law of the Sea, the President's Palestinian
initiative, Poland, Kampuchea, the Horn of Africa, US strategic force improvements,
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arms sales to Taiwan and most other subjects, national estimates were on the
table. We've had a lot of catching up to do. We have completed or have in
progress estimates on important and pressing issues which have not been done
in years, sometimes in a decade. New ground has been broken with first-time
estimates on the economic stakes in the Law of the Sea, on the dependence of
the Soviet military build-up on Western technology and trade, on regional
aspects of Libyan, Cuban and Soviet-backed insurgencies in Central America,
in the Horn of Africa and in southern Africa, on potential instability and
regional tensions affecting strategically significant countries, on the high
technology arms market, on the European peace movement and on INF arms
negotiations in relation to the deployment of US and Soviet missiles in Europe.
Most of you know that we have instituted a new fast track system that
can produce estimates on issues coming up for policy decision very quickly.
Perhaps more important, we have taken steps to assure standards of integrity
and objectivity, accuracy and independence, as well as relevance and timeliness
to the national estimate process. The chiefs of the various components of the
Intelligence Community -- Olt, NSA, State's INR, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine
Corps, Treasury, FBI, Energy -- sit on the National Foreign Intelligence Board
and function as a Board of Estimates. Each chief at the table is charged with
seeing that the information and the judgments coming out of his organization
are reflected in the estimate. I'm responsible for the estimate but I charge
myself to see that all significant and substantiated judgments in the Community
are reflected so that in policy formulation and decisionmaking the full range
of intelligence judgments in the Community is on the table. I believe this
process has done a great deal to develop a new spirit of constructive collaboration
among the components of the intelligence Community.
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The strengthening and extension of our capabilities is being encouraged
and strongly supported. We have a completed comprehensive review of the
intelligence challenges we see for the rest of the decade, the adequacy of our
current collection and analytical capabilities to meet them and what it will
take to overcome the inadequacies. We have recently completed a similar review
of hostile intelligence threats, our present ability to counter them and the
Although we are sometimes severely pressed as the new missions assigned
us require carrying increasing activities and rebuilding at the same time, we
are still managing to do the job. This has required many of you to put in
longer hours, many have given up leave and undertaken extensive TDYs. We will
remedy this as we rebuild. Right now the load is lightened by several hundred
retirees working with us on contract.
programs. We have just completed 0MB hearings for our '84 budget and are
encouraged with expected further growth in Agency programs.
We have started over these two years on a substantial increase in
the number of human intelligence collectors overseas and the expansion of their
activities into new areas. We've made a good start on sizeable increases in
the number of intelligence analystlacross the full range of intelligence
problems 4ith particular emphasis on those areas of sharply increasing demand --
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-- Third World, nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, and global
resources. We are instituting a long-term program to upgrade the skills and
experience levels of our intelligence analysts through overseas assignments
and continuing education. These efforts are being supported by improvements
in automated data systems to provide support to analysts and in building and
maintaining expanded and improved data bases.
Initial efforts in the development of the SAFE system were disappointing
but we believe we have turned the corner. I have redirected this program to
provide an initial capability to screen, sift and store reports for at least
lanalysts starting in March '83. STAT
A major upgrading of our technical collection instruments and of
our ability to process and interpret the data they collect will be showing
results this year and be completed in 1986.
We are investing significant funds in our Office of Communications to
upgrade our domestic and foreign communications networks. Our training staff
and facilities, as we rebuild, are expanding and require additional resources.
As we expand, new challenges will be faced by our Offices of Medical Services,
Security, and Personnel. They performed yeoman work during the last fiscal
year as we processed and entered on duty over 50 percent more personnel than
in the prior fiscal year.
Thus, you see, there are new and immense challenges for every element and
every individual in this Agency.
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8
In this rebuilding process, we've gone public in our recruiting. I was
hesitant but I now believe it to be a very good thing. We get a quarter of
a million letters and telephone inquiries a year. It's an open and widely
known fact that there is a broad spectrum of opportunities for honorable,
satisfying and rewarding careers in the CIA. That by itself is a good thing.
The quarter of a million inquiries boil down in round numbers to 20,000
interviews, 10,000 applications,= people cleared and accepted a3T itable,
and=new recruits a year. So, we're bringing on the new people3liTneed
while maintaining a high standard of selectivity. When they come in we intend
to test their ability to meet high standards of performance early on and impose
responsibility as rapidly as possible.
locations in the metropolitan
AT
STAT
to reduce current crowding and to p-ovide
for our '83 increase in staff. Beyond that, we are planning for a new building
here on this campus. We have obtained approval by the National Capital Planning
Commission, the Fairfax Supervisors, and have the concurrence of local interest
groups. We appear to have Congressional support and we have selected an
architectural and engineering firm to design the new building during this year.
I am seeking funds in the '84 budget for construction of the new building.
How are we gearing ourselves to carry forward a long-term rebuilding and
at the same time handle the new pressures we face right now -- destabilization
and external support of insurgency and subversion in friendly countries,
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spreading terrorism, instability threatening disruption in strategically
situated countries, technology transfer imposing heavier defense burdens on
vs, intensified espionage and active measures by the KGB and its partners.
We've created new centers -- a Technology Transfer Center, a Center on Insurgency
and Instability, co-located DI and DO units on terrorism and counterintelligence.
We are strengthening the support we get from our intelligence liaison with
friendly countries by briefing and training their officers and providing technical
capabilities to generate greater assistance from them in counterintelligence,
anti-terrorism, and intelligence support of counterinsurgency.
One of my prime objectives has been to get better mutual support among
the components of the Intelligence Community and between the Directorates
and the offices of the CIA. The Defense Intelligence Agency and INR at State
are carrying as much as one-third of the drafting of the expanded estimates
program. Monthly warning meetings did not yield a close enough watch and
they are now supplemented by a watch meeting every Thursday in which the
chief of our Intelligence Directorate meets with the chiefs of DIA, State/INR,
and NSA to provide the President with a weekly watch report on Friday morning.
One of my special interests of late has been to energize analysts to actively
and regularly specify information gaps their analytical work points up. We
need this to assure that our extensive technical and human collection abilities
are driven primarily by the intelligence needs of analysts and decisionmakers
rather than by our collection capabilities. We need more analyst tasking of
the clandestine service and more contributions from field stations to analytical
products. DDI use of DDO reporting is up 300 percent and DOD reports are up
10 percent over last year. In every crisis we've had and every hot spot from
Namibia to Poland, from the Falklands to Central America and Lebanon, the
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Operational Directorate and its stations, the Intelligence Directorate and the
Science and Technology Directorate have been intimately involved in a mutually
supportive way, and the DDA has supported all of them. Throughout the Agency,
high quality performance from each and every segment is critical to the performance
which the government and the national interest requires from intelligence and
this is a challenge to every person here. Security, for example, which is so
essential to meeting our responsibility, depends not only on the vigilance of
the security office but also on the attention and discipline of each one of us.
Just because we have large needs and have thus far enjoyed generous support,
we need to prune wasteful, uneconomic or unproductive activity. I have tasked
our managers, in accordance with Administration directives, to search areas
where we may reduce waste and perform our jobs more efficiently and economically.
Significant savings have been realized by use of Government Travel Requests
whenever feasible. Automation has significantly reduced overtime costs and
improved efficiency and production in some areas. Through investments in
capital equipment, we have been able to both increase efficiency and improve
our responsiveness in a variety of ways -- as an example we have increased
our computing power three times in the last four years. I would encourage
each of you to make use of the Suggestion Awards Program to help us further
improve the cost effectiveness of operating our Agency.
In analysis we cannot tolerate reluctance to entertain alternative inter-
pretations or controversial views, defensiveness against outside criticism
or failure to lean forward and be specific about future trends, intentions and
alternative scenarios. In all our activities we cannot accept mediocre
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performance, lack of realism or failure to apply rigorous standards of review
and quality control. We are not prepared to apply scarce talent and resources
to projects of marginal value or interest to the policy community and this has
led to a certain amount of pruning and focusing of our research, development
and operational activities.
We are looking for outside input, challenge and criticism of our work.
Some 65 conferences and seminars bringing in experts from academia, think
tanks and business are scheduled for the fourth quarter of 1982. Our outside
contract research is broadening in scope. Work in the weapons area dropped
from 80 percent in 1980 to 57 percent in 1981 to make room for more outside
political, economic and strategic research.
In conclusion, let me say again that I appreciate what all of you have
done to get as far as we have. I know you will meet the additional challenges
ahead as I've tried to outline today and recognize new ones as they emerge.
Now I'll be glad to try to answer your questions and comment on any
additional subjects you'd like to suggest.
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Exe utive Registry:
cgx,4 8z -.?88O
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy Director for Administration
General Counsel
Inspector General
Comptroller
Director of Personnel
Director, Office of External Affairs
SUBJECT: Preparation of CIA Portion
of DCI'S Annual Report to Congress
1. At Tab A is the terms of reference for the 1982 DCI's
Annual Report to Congress. Our contribution to this report, like
last year's, should be brief and address major points. We should
take into account the accomplishments cited in the DCI's recent
letters to Judge Clark and Ambassador Armstrong (Tab B) and the
DCI's speech of 21 October 1982 to CIA employees (Tab C). -
2. I have asked my Planning Staff to compile the Agency's
portion of the Annual Report so that I can forward it to the
IC Staff by 1 January 1983. To facilitate this and to take into
account the holiday season, your section of the Agency report
should be in the hands of the Planning Staff by 17 December. ( VI/
Please provide the text on NBI disks if at all possible.
Attachments
DCI/ICS 82-4284
DDI 8068/1-82
700240004-6
ALL PORTIONS SECRET
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ornnr
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