TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH PHILIP TAUBMAN, THE NEW YORK TIMES - 29 DECEMBER 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00148R000100100001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 29, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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100
SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Philip Taubman, The New
York Times - 29 December 1982
1. At 10:30 a.m. on December 29th, I contacted Philip Taubman at
the Pink Beach Hotel in Bermuda and relayed the following information
attributable to you:
(a) We cannot afford to let stand unchallenged the charges
that we fashion intelligence to fit Administration rhetoric.
The charges are absolutely false -- we go to great pains to
see that intelligence is just that, intelligence.
"From the Spring of 1980 to the January 1981 statement of
recently departed Secretary of State Ed Muskie, the previous
Administration in various statements recognized that the
insurgents in El Salvador were being supported by Cuba and
Nicaragua.
During 1981/82 the Intelligence Community issued a good
number of separate National Intelligence Estimates on Central
America. Each of these was concurred in by all 12 of the
separate components of the American Intelligence Community."
2. Taubman stated he did not know present status of story and
whether it was too late to get these remarks in. I urged him to make
every effort to do so and reemphasized that you felt quite strongly
that these positions be stated.
cc: DDCI
EXDIR
STAT
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Central Intelligence Agency
WSShingfon.D D.C. 20505
Mr. Philip Taubman
The New York Times
1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Mr. Casey has, in accordance with our agreement, reviewed your
submission and approved these quotations and attributions as attached.
Mr. Casey does not hold the "relatively simple" view that the U.S.
"must" make extensive use of covert operations because the Soviets do.
He does believe that to be, or perceived to be, unable or unwilling to act
in support of friendly governments facing destabilization or insurgency
from aggressor nations or to prevent groups standing for our values from
being snuffed out would undermine our security and leadership as well as
peace and stability in the world.
Mr. Casey does not believe that he should express any views publicly on
his qualifications. He does believe a fair and balanced treatment would
have to reflect that he came to his present post with experience, which
would rate high in any Cabinet, in directing four substantial and complex
Government organizations, including intelligence in World War II, and that
in books, magazines and newspaper articles by those who studied these
activities he has been credited with effective and decisive leadership
and with lifting the spirit and morale of the organization.
Also attached and approved are the quotes from Bob Gates.
Sincerely yours,
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CASEY QUOTATIONS APPROVED
On the estimating process: "We found that estimates had been kicking
around for close to a year, going through different drafts. We set up a
fast track system. Rather than a lot of pulling and hauling and papering over
of differences between agencies, we want to highlight differences and give
policymakers a range of views."
On having senior analysts brief top Administration officials every
morning and return to the C.I.A. with feedback: "It helps us determine and
develop the information and the analysis they need for the next day and for
dealing with issues on their forward agenda."
On the weekly watch meeting: the group assembles every Thursday to
survey world events, review trouble spots and, as Casey said, "warn of
potential surprise or other significant developments."
On covert operations: Casey calls covert actions "special activities."
"Through all the investigations and examinations of covert activities,"
Casey said, "very few people came away with the conclusion that the nation
should deprive itself of the ability to move quietly in private channels to
react to or influence the policies of other countries."
In practice, according to Casey, that means a series of "low-key, low-
level" efforts, involving a "small number of people" which are in support of
other governments, closer to the area of operation, and with a bigger stake
in it and ready to take the main responsibility." This means, he said
emphatically, avoiding anything like the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in
1961. What it does cover, according to Casey, are efforts to provide
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countries threatened by externally supported guerrilla forces with equipment
and training to "help them defend themselves."
An example often cited by Casey is the behind-the-scenes role the
C.I.A. played in assuring free elections in El Salvador earlier this year.
By providing the Salvadoran military with equipment and training to help it
locate guerrilla units, reduce the flow of weapons from Cuba and Nicaragua,
and anticipate rebel offensives, Casey said, the Agency helped the
government prevent the pre-election attacks that insurgents promised would
disrupt the voting.
On the appointment of Max Hugel as DDO: Casey now calls the appointment
"a mistake."
On the cutbacks in money and manpower: During the 1970's, according
to Casey, there was a 40% reduction in funding for intelligence agencies
and a 5075 cut in manpower.
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On exchanging ideas with the academic community and sponsoring
seminars and conferences: "The object is to keep the intellectual
juices flowing. Sometimes we don't look enough at unorthodox views.
By sending analysts out to the field, by sponsoring conferences and
seminars, and by consulting more widely with outside experts we're
trying to counter the bureaucratic tendency toward insularity and being
satisfied with the conventional wisdom.
On the quality of finished intelligence: "We produce some work
that is absolutely brilliant. We also do a lot of good competent
analysis and research. If we have a problem, it's the difficulty of
instilling creativity, imagination and independence of thought in a
large bureaucracy."
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t Attu Uork Shuts
WASHINGTON BUREAU
1000 CONNECTICUT AVE. N W
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036
202 862-0300
Nov. 15, 1982
Externa airs
Central Intelligence Agency
The article is almost finished, so I'd like to let Bill Casey
and Bob Gates know what parts of our interviews I have used.
I'm leaving town this afternoon, but I will call you on Tuesday
morning to see if they have any objections to the material.
CASEY
On the estimating process: "We found that estimates had been
O kicking around for a year or more, going through different drafts.
We set up a fast track system. Rather than a lot of pulling and
hauling and papering over of differences between agencies, we want
to highlight differences and give policymakers a range of views."
? On having senior analysts brief top Administration officials
every morning and return to the C.I.A. with feedback: "It helps
us know what we should be doing the next day."
.l
On the weekly watch meeting: the group assembles every Thursday
to survey world events and, as Casey said, "identify trouble spots."
On covert operations: Casey calls covert actions "special
v activities."
"Through all the investigations and examinations of covert
activities," Casey said, "very few people came away with the
conclusion that the nation should deprive itself of the ability
to influence events in other countries." For Casey, the equation
seems relatively simple: the Soviets make extensive use of covert
operations to advance their interests around the world so the
United States must do the sane, though absent some of the more
extreme Soviet techniques such as assassination.
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In practice, according to Casey, that means a series of "low-
key, low-level" efforts, involving a "small number of people" that
are "confined to situations where other governments, closer to the
area of operation and with a bigger stake in it, are ready to take
the main responsibility." This means, he said emphatically,
avoiding anything like the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961.
What it does cover, according to Casey, are efforts to kit! provide
countries threatened by guerrilla forces with equipment and
training to "help them defend themselves."
An example often cited by Casey is the behind-the-scenes role
the C.I.A. played in assuring free elections in El Salvador
earlier this year. By providing the Salvadoran military with
equipment and training to help it locate guerrilla units and
anticipate rebel offensives, Casey said, the agency helped
the government prevent the pre-election attacks that insurgents
promised would disrupt the voting.
On the appointment of Max Hugel as DDO: Casey now calls the
appointment "a mistake."
On the Senate Intelligence Committee report on his background
and personal finances: He calls it a "stinking report."
On criticism of his qualifications to run the C.I.A.: "I get
annoyed by people who say I'm here because I ran Ronald Reagan's
campaign. The press has portrayed me as someone who doesn't have
the qualifications ka for this job. That just doesn't shape up.
The reason I'm here is because I've got a good track record."
On the cutbacks in money and manpower: During the 1970's, accordiig
to Casey, there was a 40% reduction in funding for intelligence
agencies and a 50% cut in manpower.
I have incorporated a lot of the other things Bill said in the
story as background, not attributed to him or to intelligence
officials. The material is weaved into the story. That also goes
for most of the interview with Bob: there was lots of useful
background information that is included throughout the story without
attribution to him.
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Page
GATES
On exchanging ideas with the academic community and
sponsoring seminars and conferences: "The object is to keep
the intellectual juices flowing. Sometimes we don't look enough
at unorthodox views. By sending analysts out to the field, by
sponsoring conferences and seminars, we're trying to counter
the bureaucratic tendency toward isolation and insularity."
On the quality of finished intelligence: "We produce some stuff that
is absolutely brilliant. We also do a lot of (good competenta
analysis and research. If we have a problem, it's the difficulty
of instilling creativity, independence and imagination in a large
bureaucracy."
I don't quote Jim Glerum.
The article has yet to be edited, so there may be revisions
that involve the use of other quotations. If so, I will let you
know. Thanks for your help.
 Oe
N
QOD'
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the t eW Mork dimes
WASHINGTON BUREAU
1000 CONNECTICUT AVE. N.W
WASHINGTON. DC 20036
[phone]
External Affairs
The Central Intelligence Agency
Washington DC 20505
0
The New York Times Magazine has asked me to do a story
on the C.I.A. It has been awhile since the Times Magazine, or
any major magazine, for that matter, has taken a comprehensive
look at the agency. The last piece published by the Times
Magazine appeared in July 1979. Written by Tad Szulc, it was a
look at the agency in the wake of the overthrow of the Shah of
Iran and Admiral Turner's shakeup of the operations directorate.
In September 1976, Taylor Branch wrote a piece about covert opera-
tions and the Church Committee investigation. Not surprisingly,
both articles concentrated on upheaval and problems.
It's time for a dispassionate, in-depth look at the
agency. The Reagan Administration has clearly set out to rebuild
American intelligence capabilities and Bill Casey has put a pre-
mium on improving the quality of intelligence analysis. There's
been much talk in the press about improving and expanding opera-
tions and an increased use of covert actions. However, no one
has stopped to pull all this together in a single story that, in
effect, gives the public a status report on the C.I.A.
If you strip away the frills, I guess it boils down to
a basic question: how good is the C.I.A.? That means beginning
with the ultimate product, the intelligence analyses and reports.
How accurate are they? How timely? How useful to decision-
makers? Since the reports reflect the quality of intelligence
collection, I would like to examine the steps that have been taken
to make improvements in that area. Given the public fears about
covert operations, I should try to report what the agency is, and
is not, doing.
 O
Obviously, I can write a story based on interviews
with intelligence consumers, members of congressional over-
sight committees and intelligence officials from other agencies,
but to do justice to what's happening at the C.I.A., I really
should spend time with agency officials. I realize I'm asking
for unusual access, but I think it's in both our interests.
Because the hysteria about intelligence abuses has passed, this
is a good time for an even-handed assessment of the C.I.A. The
best way for me to understand what the agency is doing, and the
best way for the agency to dispel a lot of public rumors and
suspicions, is to let me talk with agency officials.
Let me give you some examples. For an overview of the
C.I.A. I should talk to Mr. Casey and John McMahon. If I am to
understand and report on improvements in intelligence analysis,
I need to talk to Bob Gates and some of his analysts. I need to
find out what problems this Administration inherited in analysis
and how you've gone about correcting them. I need to know what
changes have been made in the content and timing of intelli ence
re orts. In this area, I would also like to meet with
Il and some of the national intelligence officers. STAT
In operations, I clearly must address the issue of what
rebuilding means. What improvements have been made in the
collection of foreign intelligence? One interesting issue is
training--how does the C.I.A. go about finding and training people
for foreign assignments? Without compromising your operations,
I'd like to write a little about the teaching of tradecraft.
What sorts of covert operations are considered acceptable these
days? For all these questions, I'd like to have some time with
John Stein and his people.
Similarly, I'd like to interview E.R. Hineman about his
science and technology shop and Harry Fitzwater about support
and logis On the issue of internal checks, I'd like to
and the new inspector general, gfApne
interviewilcs
has been name ecause there is a great deal of interest in,
and misunder t, counterintelligence, I would like
to talk withl STAT
 O
I am open to discussion about ground rules for some of
these interviews. I would like to do as many as possible on the
record, but in some of the more sensitive areas, you may prefer
background sessions. My deadline for reporting is mid-September,
so, if the agency is willing to help, I'd like to get started
with interviews as soon as possible.
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:;P.TSCLE 6?PE z-z-U
AGE
ammu
THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
29 July 1979
- furious. He sat in
the Oval Office on
.-this chill. Novem--11
day; staring at a
the note paper be-
fore him. Riots
were sweeping I
Iran. The Shah had just been.'
forced to impose a military gov
ernment on his nation. And the
.President- of. the United States
Those handwritten messages of last Nov. 11 were not
the President's first expression of concern over the
state of American intelligence, but they were by all
odds his strongest. They removed any doubts of White
House determination to force change upon the intelli-
gence apparatus. It had failed him in a most astonish-
ingmanner. _ _ .: ~. :.
A nation Jimmy Cartel considered America's linch-
pin of stability in the Middle East, a nation in which
the United States had essential strategic and economic
stakes, was in the midst of a profound crisis. By Febru-
ary, Mr. Carter would see Shah_ Mohammed -Rita
Pahlevi's government replaced by a radical Islamic re-
hadn't even known a revolution was coming-had, in
fact., been assured all along by the American intelli-
Bence community that there was no such danger. Mr.
Caner lifted his pen and wrote: "I am not satisfied
with the quality of political intelligence." The notes
were addressed to "Cy," "Stan" and "Zbig" - Secre-
tary of State Cyrus R. Vance, Director of Central In- -i
telligence Stansfield Turner and National Security i1
Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. = a
 dime with which the United States
had established no contact. The
loss of America's secret tracking
stations that monitored Soviet
missile testing would damage
prospects for Congressional ap-
proval of the latest strategic arms
limitations talks (SALT II.) The
cutoff of Iranian oil production
would spark shortages that plague
American motorists to this day. -
Yet the President, until the end
was almost at hand, had not
known the depth or extent of the
Shah's problems. That kind of failure over the last few
years has led to the most comprehensive shake-up in
the history of the nation's intelligence community. A
major reorganization, begun early in 1978, continues.-
Special groups have been created to critique the com-
munity's efforts, including a new top-level unit, the
Political Intelligence Working Group, that is forcing
traditionally turf-conscious agencies to work together.
Hundreds of Central Intelligence Agency operatives
have been fired, sending the organization's morale -
already low following the traumatic investigations of '
the mid-70's - plummeting to new depths. Congress is .
putting together legislation that would, for the first time, legally define the powers of, and limitations on,
the intelligence community.
Only a few years ago, the C.I.A. and its partner agen-
cies were being attacked as too aggressive and too I
powerful. Now, irony of ironies, some of the same
liberals in Congress and the Administration who had,'
led the charge have begun to worry over the failures in
political intelligence. And they are calling upon the ,
C.I.A. to assert itself, to take a greater role in policy t
formulation. The watchdog Senate Select Committee_j
On Intelligence is actually approving
clandestine missions that would have
been taboo as recently as 1976.
Meanwhile, the uproar over the na-
tion's intelligence record has come full
circle. The brickbats are no longer re-
served for the "producers" of intelli.
gence, such as the C.I.A. Critics charge
that preconceptions and misconcep-
tions on the part of the "consumers,"
the top policy makers, have prevented
good decisions, regardless of the qual-
ity of the intelligence material pre-
sented them. The "consumers," of
course, are primarily the National Se-
curity Council - and an angry letter-
writernamed Jimmy Caner.
THE BERING
STORM
We will continue to anticipate
tomorrow's crises as often as we can."
says Adm. Stanfield Turner. "But our
record here will never be as good as we
would like it to be." Admiral Turner
rules an empire with an estimated an-
nual bumlget of $15 billion and an army
of tens of thousands, at home and
abroad- overt and covert. But uneasy
lies the read that wears that crown; the
record of Admiral Turner's troops is
not as good as his peers and masters
would Ii$e i c to be_
C.I.A ona of the wartime Office of Spe-
cial Se. vices in 1947, the chief of that or-
ganizaamo has also been responsible in
theory for the larger intelligence corn-
munity. Bence Admiral Turner's offi-
cial title: Director of Central Intelli-
gence/Director of the Central Intelli-
genceAgency. But keeping rein on the dozen or so
elementsof the intelligence community
can try a Director's soul. The C.IA,
the mairmprtng of the community, is a
single, clearly defined entity. The other
members of the community are a dis-
parate lot. ranging from the Penta-
gon's National Reconnaissance Office, 4
with its spy-in-the-sky satellites, to a i
Treasury Department unit that collects
foreign financial data. Thus the Direc-
tor of the community faces a built-in
division of loyalty. The offices of the
Department of Defense that collect for.
eign intelligence, for example, operate
within a military hierarchy as well as
within the intelligence community hier-
archy.
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heels of two of the worst years in the Admiral Turner and Secretary Vance i
Over the years, that arrangement community's history: expressing his unhappiness over the
has helped make the Directorship one Attacks on the C.I.A. and its sister quality of American political inteili-
of the more notorious revolving-door agencies traditionally focus on interfer- gene. Among his complaints: a lack of
jobs in Washington. Between 1973 and ence with the rights of other nations, or basic source material and, as one of his
17,,, for example, four men - James with the rights of American citizens. associates put it, a lack of emphasis on
H. Schlesinger, William E. Colby and And it was the illegal surveillance at "making sense."
G-crge Bush - held the post. Probably home and abroad of American citizens There were other critics. The Senate
the only Director who actually sac- suspected of antiwar activism that Select Committee on Intelligence, in a
ceeded in exercising full control over brought down on the C.I.A.'s head the report issued last spring. took the com-
the :n.telhgence community as a whole Congressional investigations of 1975 munity's "political-social analysis"
was the imperious Allen W. Dulles, who and 1976. The agency's dirty linen was record to task. In some instances, the
was forced to resign seven months after
the C.1A-sponsored Bay of Pigs disas-
terof'961.
Admiral Turner was given a decisive
I_ up in the struggle. Eighteen months
ago President Carter issued an execu-
tive order that, for the first time, gave
the Director budgetary control over all
elements of the intelligence communi-
ty. Just how long Admiral Turner - a
controversial figure in his own right-
would be around to enjoy the benefits of
that change, however, has been a mat-
ter of conjecture.
The Admiral is trim and earnest, a 55-
year-old intellectual who was a Rhodes
Scholar at Oxford University after
graduation from Annapolis. He was
sworn in as Director by Jimmy Carter
in 1977; Senate opposition had led Mr.
Carter to drop his first candidate for
the job, former Kennedy speechwriter
Theodore Sorensen.
Those who have worked with the Ad-
miral say he's "tough" and "mean."
Presumably they were necessary qual-
ities for a man who commanded fleets
for the United States and for the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and who
was in charge of Allied Forces Southern
Europe. Presumably they came in
handy on his C.I.A. assignment.
But the Admiral has drawn different
kinds of comments of late, the kindest
of them being "inept." The White
House staff complained that he had
failed to breathe new life into the C.I.A.
There was a pronounced coolness to-
ward him at the top of the Defense De-
partment's intelligence establishment.
Many of the Congressmen involved in
C.I_k. oversight were dissatisfied. And
he was not liked within the agency it-
piled sky high: secret assassination committee found, "the performance of
plots against Patrice Lumumba in the specialized public sources," such as
Congo and Fidel Castro in Cuba ... sub- trade publications, "equaled or ex-
version of the Marxist regime in Chile ceeded that of the intelligence com-
... mind-control experiments with dan- mumty." The community was said to
gerous drugs ... unlawful ties with emphasize current developments at the
American journalists and academics. expense of analysis, and to have a lim-
The necessity for the gathering of for- ited ability to integrate political and
eign intelligence was never seriously in economic factors in those analyses it
question. For a President to make in- Produced-
formed decisions about arms-limita- Ray Cline, former C.IA. Deputy Di-
tion talks or oil imports, he requires rector for Intelligence, says that the
some kind of intelligence-gathering and agency's political' intelligence skills
'960'
_ _ h
'
`- - -
s as a
e
ate
disu
sional revelations led to demands that
the intelligence community cease in-
fringing upon individual liberties, and
forsake its aggressive role in the mak-
ing of foreign policy. Congress named a
total of eight committees in both houses
to oversee C.I.A. operations.
The intelligence community was
shaken, but its problems were just
beginning. Having been tried and con-
victed in the public eye on charges of
being unethical, it was up an charges of
being inefficient.
The issue was apparently first raised
by National Security Adviser Brzezin-
ski at a dinner given by Admiral Turner
at C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va.,
on Oct. 27, 1977. Brzezinski complained
to the senior officials present that the
intelligence community had allowed its
human-intelligence (known in the trade
as "HUMINT") skills in gathering
political data to decay because of the
increased emphasis on technical intelli-
gence - essentially the use of elec-
tronic and photographic devices- The
data and information he was receiving
at the White House, he said, fell far
short of the mark in terms of policy-
self making requirements. (He noted along
For close to a year, there has been the way that he had stopped reading
insistent speculation that Admiral telegrams from most American ambas-
Turner was on his way out of the job. sadors abroad because they provided
However, there is some doubt that the no coherent assessment of political
President would wish to give the re- situations.)
voiving door another turn so soon. Meanwhile, the staff of the National
Mr. Cartel s executive order of Jan. Security Council, the President's chief
24, 1978, calling for reorganization, was policy-making body for international
,not greeted with great enthusiasm affairs, was undertaking a full review
throughout the intelligence communi- of American security and intelligence,
I ry. It was, after all, the first public sign and that led ultimately to President
of the deep discontent the community's Carter's executive order. Ten days be-
top consumers were feeling about prod- fore that order was issued, Brzezinski
uct quality. Moreover, it arrived on the wrote forceful secret memorandums to
_ mite by cutting down on detailed re-
porting from the field - "in favor of
summary analytical reporting." But,
he insists, "if you don't have patient ac-
cumulation on political and economic
events and trends, you're at a loss for
relevant estimates when new data
come in."
The critics have no dearth of specific
instances of community failure:
? A still-classified Senate committee
study claims that the C.I.A. led the Ad-
ministration to believe that Cuba was
actively behind the 1978 invasion of
Zaire's Shaba province by exiles at-
tacking from Angola, an assessment
that has never been adequately docu.
mented. It led President Carter to pub-
licly denounce the Cubans for mounting
the invasion, to his subsequent extreme
embarrassment-
a When the President announced in
1977 his plans to reduce the United
States military presence in South
Korea. he was not aware of the extent
to which the North Koreans had been
building up their armed forces since
1970. Army intelligence campaigned for
a full review, but was ignored for
nearly a year; only last spring did the
community finally conclude that there
were 550,000 to 600,000 troops arrayed in
North Korea rather than the 450.000 it
had previously reported. And nine days
ago the White House officially an-
nounced the indefinite suspension of
troop withdrawals, citing "security
considerations."
CONTitY_I 4Q
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? Both the C.I.A. and the State De-
partment mistakenly predicted that,
thocgh Saudi Arabia might make ap-
propriately loud noises about an Egyp-
tian-Israeli peace treaty, the Saudis
would not actively oppose the treaty or
join Arab "rejectionist" states in pun-
ishing President Sadat. In fact, the
treaty led at least temporarily to a
souring of United States-Saudi rela-
tion-s. In May, for instance, the C.I.A.
station chief and five of his subordi-
nates were quietly asked to leave that
country, ostensibly because they
probed too deeply into politics within
the royal family. And given the Ameri-
can dependence upon Saudi oil, the
repercussions of such a mistake in
judgment could clearly betraumatic.
Another kind of criticism, one with
more than a few ironic overtones, is
leveled at the community. Once ac.
cased of forcing its views upon policy
makers, of reveling in "dirty tricks,"
the C.I.A. is now said to be too timid. It
failed to come up with an in-depth study
of Zimbabwe Rhodesia last spring, for
example; State Department officials
think the agency simply considered the
topic too politically controversial. It
turned down a State Department re-
quest this year for a study of the flow of
Indochinese refugees, the "boat peo-
ple," on the grounds that it was not im-
portant enough. And even though it re-
ceived encouragement from a Senate
oversight committee, the C.I.A. re-
fused to provide a foreign government
assistance in combating terrorism be-
cause the agency feared being identi-
fied with what it called "repressive po-
lice action."
The community has its defenders, of
course. They cite successes to match
the failures. Last winter, for example,
the C.I.A. predicted that China was
about to invade Vietnam, that the inva-
sion had limited goals and that the
Soviet Union would remain militarily
uninvolved unless the struggle esca.
lated into a major conflict. The agency
turned out to be right on all counts, ena-
bling the Administration to respond ap-
propriately.
Moreover, agency officials are quick
to point out, some of the problems laid
at the community's door have less to do
with the quality of the product they pro-
vide than with the inability or refusal of
the President and National Security
Council to use the product efficiently. A
dramatic instance of policy failure was
played out in Nicaragua.
By the spring of 1979, after having un-
derestimated the national following of
the Sandinist guerrillas, the intelli-
gence community finally started warn-
ing the White House that the guerrillas
had a good shot at toppling thedictator-
ship of Gen. Anastasio Somoza De-
bayle. But the Administration paid lit-
tle mind. No in-depth studies were or-
dered that looked toward a post-
Somoza Nicaragua, nor did the intelli-
gence com mu ni ty generate any.
Late in June, as a major guerrilla at-
tack was bringing the Somoza regime
close to collapse, the United States
policy makers succeeded in antagoniz-
ing both the dictator and the guerrillas
by proposing, over objections from the
State Department, the dispatch of an
inter-American peace force to Nicara-
gua. It was unanimously rejected by
the Organization of American States.
Given the historic Latin American fear
of United States intervention, that reac-
tion was easily predictable, in fact
inevitable, notwithstanding the multi-
nation makeup of the proposed peace
force. The question critics asked: Why
was this not evident to the leaders in the
White House who made the decision?
On New Year's Eve, 1977, in the
Niavaran Palace in Teheran, Jimmy
Carter offered a champagne toast-to
Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi. Iran,
the President said, "is an island of
stability in one of the most troubled
areas of the world." A year later, a
bloody revolution forced the Shah to ab-
dicate his throne. It was only a few
months before the end that the Presi-
dent's intelligence aides gave him any
clear idea of how serious the situation
was.
The material that follows, a study of
the Caner Administration's response
to the Iranian crisis, is based upon
scores of interviews with senior civilian
and military policy makers, intelli-
-ge ace officers and -mm bets of Cott-
gress. It documents the errors in intelli-
gence gathering, analysis and policy
making, precisely the kind of errors
that had led Jimmy Carter to impose a
massive reorganization on the intelli-
gencecommunity. _
BLESS IN IRAN
On Oct. 9, 1977, students rioted in Te-
heran, demanding the return of the
exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,
the supreme leader of Iran's conserva-
tive Shiite Moslems- On Jan. 3, a week
after President Caner departed, the
Shah's police killed 20 religious demon-
strators in the holy Shiite city of Qum.
Protests and strikes erupted through-
out the country.
These events before and after the
President's stay were dutifully re-
ported to Washington by the American
Embassy, which employed more than
100 professionals. They were reported
by the Teheran station of the Central
Intelligence Agency, which employed
about 50 persons; the agency had other
sites in the country as well, plus an un-
known number of covert agents.
But embassy and C.I.A. telegrams
minimized the significance of the rising
unrest in Iran. As a senior State De-
partment official later explained, "We
didn't think it was important." For the
United States was totally dependent on
the Shah and his sewn police, Sarak,
for an understanding of the situation,
and the Shah didn't think it was all that
important, either. American intelli-
gence gatherers were allowed no ac-
tions that would upset the Shah, and
that ruled out any C.I.A. or embassy
contact with his real or potential politi-
calopponents.
Though on United States official, past
or present, interviewed for this article
was aware of any written directive
issued by any Admi.nisoration forbid-
ding contact with the Shah's opponents,
it was clearly understood to be policy.
"Everyone knew it," a senior official i
said-"It didn't have tobe on paper."
In any event, as late as fall 1978, the
Carter Administration was absolutely
convinced that the Shah was politically
invulnerable. One reflection of that at-
titude: The C.I.A. in 1978 decided not to
do a full-dress update of its 1975 Iran
National Intelligence Estimate
(N.I.E.) - an in-depth study designed
to analyze present and future trends -
on -the-assumption -that at- would -be a
pointless waste of its relatively limited
analytical assets.
So it happened that the C.I.A. and
other American intelligence agencies
basically did business only with the
Shah and Savak. It was familiar terri-
tory for all involved; they had worked
together before. It was the C.I.A. that
had restored the Shah to power in 1953.
after he fled in the face of a challenge
from Prime Minister Mohammed Mos-
sadegh- The C.I.A. actually helped to
organize Savak four years later. And
the special relationship deepened when
Richard M. Helms, for nearly seven
 years the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, was named Ambassador to Iran
by President Nixon in 1973.
There was, however, some question
about Savak's effectiveness. A senior
American official well acquainted with
its operations commented, "Savak
break out in 1978, but the top-secret
document did discuss in long-range
terms the viability of the Iranian
armed forces, the political attitudes of
Iranian students at home and abroad,
and the growing disaffection in the
cities. Some agency officials say that
the authors of the 1975 estimat
h
d
e
a
ac-
wasn't all that good.... Though it did many tried to "talk up" a better oven
ali right on Soviet clandestine opera- and covert collection effort in Iran, but
Lions inside Iran, it found itself Pere- had been ignored by their bosses,
trated by the Russians.... Savak also On March 18, 1978, the Shah an-
overreacted when it came to any politi-: notunced what would be the first of a
cal opponents. One time, in 1977, itsi series of concessions - the release of
agents badly beat up some innocuous 385 prisoners. But day after day,
kids in Teheran. So it was the sort of through May and into June, chi demon-
thing that just added to the pressures
for the Shah's overthrow." strations and riots continued, as did the
There was a third leg to the basic in- '. flow of assurances from the Iranian
teiligence relationship in Iran - Mos- Government that all was, in fact, tinder
sad, the Israeli secret service. Mossad control. Ambassador Sullivan was tell-
did not labor under the same kind of tog Washington that things were "stir-
self-imposed limits as did the Ameri- ring." but not enough to prevent him
Gans- Moreover, they enjoyed the ad- from flying home for a summer vaca-
vantage of a major source of informa- lion at the end of June. The British Am-
tion in the influential Jewish com- bassador, Sir Anthony Parsons, with
muniry of 80,000 in Iran. Thus, Israeli whom Sul Ivan was in close comac:t, left
Ambassador Uri Lubrani was able to on vacation at the same time.
correctly inform a visiting United Ambassador Sullivan returned to Te-
States senator in 1976 that the greatest heran late in August. On Sept. 7, mar-
danger to the Shah tame from the con- tial law was declared, and the following l
servative Islamic clergy. And early in
1978, the Israeli Embassy in Washing-
ton sought to alert the' State Depart-
ment to danger signals in Iran. (It was
repeatedly assured that all was well
with the Shah.)
William H. Sullivan arrived in Tehe-
ran in June 1977 to replace Helms as
American Ambassador. (Sullivan's
background included a stint as Ambas-
sador to Laos, during which he in effect
ran the "secret war" of the C.I.A. and
the Air Force against the North Vietna-
mese.) He quickly sized up the inade-
quacies in the collection of internal
political intelligence. Even contacts
with the middle-of-the-road opposition,
the men who would soon form the Na-
tional Front movement, were limited
because many of the leaders were in
exile and some of the others feared
Savak reprisals if they talked to Ameri-
cans. There were only three officers in
the embassy who could speak the Per-
sian language, Farsi; that was not
enough to keep tabs on "the bazaars"
- shorthand for the thousands of small
shopowners who are the commercial
and social heart of the big cities.
One source of information the C.I.A.
ignored was in its own files, the Na-
tional Intelligence Estimate of 1975. It
identified the Islamic religious corn-
munity, including Khomeini, as a basic
cause of future unrest. It did not, of
course, Predict that a revolution would
fired into protesting crowds; the oppo- be had selected as one of his principal
sition claimed that thousands of civil- sources of information He had other
ians were killed. outside sources as well, including some
From Baghdad, the Ayatollah Rho-
-
meini called upon the Iranian armed Iranians who had been among his
forces to rise against the Shah. In Qum, ?` graduate students at Columbia Univer-
the Ayatollah Shariat-Madari asked for sity.
"revenge from God against those who During November, Brzezinski appar-
so bestially treated our children." And ently persuaded Zahedi to fly to Tehe-
in Camp David, Jimmy Carter took ran to keep him advised of develop-
time out from his meetings with menus- Zahedi's communications were
Egypt's President Sadat and Israeli invariably optimistic, and they became
Prime Minister Begin to telephone the the- central influence on American
Shah and assure him of continued policy decisions.
United States support. ~ Brzezinski was the principal officer
What could have led President Carter, in charge of American policy in Iran.
to go out on such a limb? One factor Secretary of State Vance spent most of
was a report produced by the C.I.A. on his time on the Israeli-Egyptian peace
Aug. 16, following three days of riots in negotiations, and was for all practical
Isfahan and presented to Mr. Carter i purposes cut off from Iranian decision
personally by Admiral Turner in the ! making- So were his top deputies.
course of a regular Wednesday White: Nor did Admiral Turner playa major
House briefing. This top-secret, TSpage' policy role - his agency's stock at the
document was far less exhaustive a White House was that low. A small but
product than the National Intelligence telling example of how that had hap.
Estimate of three years before, and it pened was making the rounds of Wash-
took a different tack. Its conclusion: ington_ The C.I.A. had just discovered
"Iran is not in a revolutionary or even that Khomeini had written and pub-
prerevolutionary situation." The re- fished years before a book about his
port stated that "those who are in oppo- philosophy. The book was said to state
sition, both violent and nonviolent, do precisely what he would do should he
not have the capability to be more than come to power. It was the kind of infor-
troublesome." mation an intelligence apparatus might
have been expected to turn up automat-
COViI::uE-?
The C.LA.'s confidence in the Shah
knew no bounds. In midSeptember, as
part of a routine rotation of personnel
and as though no crisis existed, a new
station chief, Horace Fleischman, was
installed in Teheran. He had been serv-
ing in Tokyo.
There is general agreement today
that the worst period of the "intelli-
gence gap" ended in September. Thee
C.IA. station acquired a Farsispeak_.
ing officer who could pick up the gossip
in the bazaars- Ambassador Sullivan's
reports home were taking on a more
worried tone, as were those of the
C.I.A. station. Strikes were erupting all
over Iran - in the oil fields, the refin-
eries, the banks.
Yet even as the intelligence gap was
being closed by the "producers" in the `
field, another gap was yawning among
the intelligence "consnets" back in
Washington. Pessimistic views were,
being consistently rejected by the '
White House in general, and by Na-
tional Security Adviser Brzezirsld in
Particular. He remained convinced'
that the Shah should and would survive, '
and be was receiving assurances to this
effect from Ardeshir Zahedi, the Ira-.
 icaLly; in fact, it was not found until
late in the game, and even then it was a
private citizen who happened upon it
and informed the agency.
Brzezinski was putting ever more
trust in the Iranian armed forces to
keep the lid on. But there were high-
level doubters. In November, Lieut.
Gen. Eugene F. Tighe, director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, visited
Teheran. He came away with the im-
pression that the army was trained and
equipped to defend the country from ex-
ternal attack, but that it had not been
taught how to deal with an internal
threat.
Another November visitor to Teheran
was then-Treasury Secretary W. Mi-
chael Blumenthal, who upon his return
recommended that Mr. Carter get an
independent evaluation of the mounting
Iranian crisis. On Nov. 28, the Presi-
dent asked George W. Ball, a New York
investment banker and Under Secre.
tary of State in the Kennedy and John-
son Administrations, to prepare a spe-
cial report. Two weeks later, as Iranian
ttoops were killing at least 40 demon-
strators in Isfahan, and Ambassador
Sullivan was preparing the evacuation
of dependents of American diplomatic
and military personnel, George Ball
submitted his report to the President, a
document the Administration chose not
to make public. Ball had come to Wash.
ington with his mind pretty much made
up that the Shah was finished; his study
of the situation had reinforced that
view.
Ball presented his pessimistic report
at a meeting in the Oval Office on Dec.
12, but later in the day, Mr. Carter told
a news conference: "I fully expect the
Shah to maintain power in Iran and for
the present problems in Iran to be re-
solved. ... I think the predictions of
doom and disaster that came from
some sources have certainly not been
realized at all." White House officials
said that the "doom and disaster"
reference reflected Mr. Carter's unhap-
piness with the reporting by the em-
bassy in Teheran and the C.I.A. station
there.
Another Presidential mission was in
the works. According to White House
sources, National Security Adviser
Brzezinski had proposed that he him-
self secretly travel to Teheran to get
the facts, hiding his presence there as
Henry Kissinger had done in Peking in
1971. The President had agreed, but
just beforethe scheduled Dec. 13 depar-
ture. Mr. Carter canceled the expedi-
tion, convinced that it simply could not
remain secret'
Meanwhile, voices were being raised,
particularly in the State Department,
about the need for the United States to
establish some form of contact with
Khomeini, who had moved from Bagh-
dad to a suburb of Paris, from where he
was running the revolution. Men like
Ambassador Sullivan thought that it
would be impossible for the Adminis-
tration to plan future policies without
understanding the Ayatollah, and a
sound judgment required a face-to-face
meeting. In December, there were ac-
tually some secret meetings between a
political officer at the American Em-
bassy in Paris and Ibrahim Yazdi, an
adviser to Khomeini. Yazdi told the
American diplomat that the Ayatollah
was interested in conferring with a sen-
ior United States official, and Ambas-
sador Sullivan called Secretary Vance
to recommend that the United States
send an envoy to meet with Khomeini.
Vance agreed, and called Theodore
L. Eliot Jr., who had retired three
months earlier as Inspector General of
the Foreign Service. But the mission
was aborted On Jan. 6, Vance received
a telegram from Guadeloupe, site of a
summit meeting of Western leaders. It
was signed by Brzezinski, who was with
the President at the meeting and was
speaking in the President's name. The
mission to Khomeini was canceled.
Later, White House officials would ex-
plain that if word of Eliot's trip were to
leak out, the mission might be con-
strued as undermining the Shah.
By the first week of January, Iran
was virtually paralyzed by strikes in
every sector of the economy. The Shah
named Shahpur Bakhtiar, a political
moderate, as Prime Minister with a
general understanding that he would be
asked to organize a transitional govern-
ment. Ambassador Sullivan was sure
that it signaled the Shah's decision to
leave Iran, at least temporarily.
Now American policy makers fo-
cused once again on the army. Would it
stand by Bakhtiar in the immediate
post-Shah period and prevent Khomeini
from grabbing power? Ambassador
Sullivan asked Washington to rush a
senior United States military officer to
Iran to establish liaison with the com-
manders. Air Force Gen. Robert E.
Huyser, deputy commander of United
States forces in Europe, was tapped for
the job.
On Jan. 16, the Shah left Iran for
Egypt, his first stop in exile. The mili-
tary question was no longer academic,
but General Huyser and Sullivan had a
problem: They were receiving from
Washington "tactical instructions" -
how to deal with Bakhtiar on a day-to-
day basis - when what they wanted
was policy guidance. For the two men
had developed very different assess-
ments of the situation- The Ambassa-
dor felt the armed forces had been
"shellshocked"by theShah's flight and
thought they would split under a severe
challenge. He worried that General
Huyser was concentrating only on the
top brass. The general, on the other
hand, felt that the army had adjusted to
the loss of the Shah and that morale
was so high that they would bold fast it
challenged by Khomeini. C.I.A. Station
Chief Fleischman agreed with Sullivan.
The three men openly discussed their
differences, and when Huyser was
called to Washington early in Febru-
ary, he presented both sets of views-
Brzezinski and his aides gratefully ac-
cepted General Huyser'sestimates.
The Ayatollah Khomeini returned to
Teheran in triumph on Feb. 1. In Wash-
ington. the Administration still ex-
pected the Iranian military to hold the
fort for Bahktiar. Even at this 11th
hour, no alternative policies had been
devised. On Feb. 11, following a pro-
Khomeini demonstration at an air-
force base outside Teheran. the army
withdrew to its barracks. The end had
come - an historic defeat for one of
Washington's most important allies,
for the entire American intelligence
community and for the Carter Adminis-
tration i tself-
PUTTING BACK
THE PIECES
The office is quiet, spare: a wooden
conference table, a large desk. no ash-
trays, some big briefing charts with
their transparent overlays. Adm.
Stansfield Turner takes his private
elevator to the top floor, the seventh,
and moves toward his desk. It is Febru-
ary 1977, and he has just been con-
firmed in his new posL The C.I.A. is
emerging from a public battering over
its illegal misadventures in the United
States and abroad. Morale is in need of
a boost. But there is nothing to suggest
to the Admiral that, before the year is
out, he and the intelligence community
will be under concerted bureaucratic
attack and subjected to a sweeping
reorganization.
Admiral Turner's tenure has seen a
dramatic change in the relationship
among the members of the intelligence
community. The intelligence units of
agencies outside the C.I.A., once pretty
much autonomous, have been incorpo-
rated into a new chain of command
 -Appr ved For Re~ease 20q /0&34 cI&-RDP84B00148R000100100001-4
under the trec:or. e c echo tion Tasking, responsible for economic and political materi-
lso been given the power of the purse assigning intelligence units in als spew out of banks of com-
over :hem. Thus, the Pentagon's Na- other directorates to do the ac- puters. Experts in a dozen dis-
tional Security Agency. for example, that collection of data. (In the ciplines analyze the results,
which specializes in such arcane tasks
as breaking Soviet codes, has become
more responsive to overall intelligence
community needs. Moreover, new com-
mittees have been created with ex-
traordinary powers to poke into the
nooks and crannies of the community
and to cut across traditional tables of
organization. Such moves, plus whole-
sale firings, plus continuing bureau-
jargon of the community, "as- and finally a report emerges to
signing" is translated as make its way back up the
"tasking.") Within the direc- chain of command through the
torate, the assignment job is Director's office to the Na-
farmed out among specialists tional Security Council and,
-in PHOTINI' (Photographic eventually, to the top con-
Intelligence) and HUMINT sumerof the intelligence com-
(Human Intelligence), for ex- munity's product, the Presi-
ample - who will figure out dent.
what community resources to O
cratic hassles, have exacerbated the tap. Along with the administra-
morale problem. And there is concern In addition to Collection tive changes has come a star-
within the community that the legisla- 1 Tasking, the Director and tling turnover in the top eche-
tion now being drawn up in Congress to Deputy Director supervise Ions over the past 18 months.
define the parameters of intelligence three other operational dirk- Frank C. Carlucci, for exam-
operations will cut further into C.I.A. torates: National Intelligence, ple, has taken over as Deputy
prerogatives. Science and Technology, Director, second only to Admi-
The central goal of virtually all of Operations. All are to be in- ral Turner in the community.
these changes is to improve efficiency, volved in the Soviet troop- A short, slim bureaucratic in-
to prevent the kind of failure of intelli- movement inquiry. The Direc- fighter, the 49,-year-old Car-
Bence gathering and analysis that took tor also has the authority to lucci is a career Foreign Serv-
place in Iran. And the cutting edge of task member agencies of the ice officer who won high
change has been bureaucratic - the intelligence community. For marks as ambassador in Lis
reorganization of the community, from this inquiry, be calls upon the bon during the Portuguese
a relatively loose assemblage of ele- National Reconnaissance of. revolution of 1975, but he also
ments into a tightly structured table of j fice and the National Security served as director of the Office
organization (see chart, Page 15). Agency, both Pentagon-con- of Economic Opportunity and
At the top sit Director Turner and trolled operations. in other domestic posts under
Deputy Director Frank C. Carlucci. Re- At the supersecret National the Nixon Administration.
porting to them are six deputies, each Photographic Interpretation President Caner named him
of whom supervises a number of spe- Center, part of the Science and to his current post in 1978. He
cialized offices. And within each office, Technology directorate, spe- has the respect of virtually all
the personnel may beall C.I.A. or a mix cialists are instructed to the power centers of Washing-
of C.I.A. and otheragency staffers. The search high-resolution photo- ton, legislative as well as bu-
theory is that the integration improves graphs from satellites and U-2 reaucratic, to a degree not en-
coordination among the elements, mak- spy planes for details of the joyed byAdmiral Turner,
ing use of the best skills of the entire troop movements. The Na. One of Carlucci's major re-
community on any given assignment. tional Reconnaissance Office, sponsibilities is his role on the
Moreover, the six directorates make it which spends the largest share Political Intelligence Working
more easily possible for those seeking of the intelligence communi- Group, created this year with li
to apportion blame to pin the tail on the ty's budget, may be asked to no public notice to find waysof
right donkey. send new satellites aloft. The improving the product. Under
How does the intelligence complex National Security Agency or- Secretary of State for Political
actually operate when confronted with ders a major new campaign of Affairs David D. Newsom and
a problem? The following scenario re- electronic eavesdropping on Deputy National Security Ad-
flects the community's workings as of coded Soviet communications. viser David L. Aaron are the
the summer of 79. Meanwhile, the Deputy Di- other members of the group,
Assumption: The United States Gov- rector for Operations, the which has no chairman but op-
ernment becomes aware of a sudden, cloakand-dagger chief, has erates with a small staff. It
unexplained movement of Soviet troops alerted his network of agents
in Eastern Europe. around the world to be on the
In the National Security Council, it is
the Special Coordination Committee
that considers what is officially de-
scribed as "sensitive foreign-intelli-
gence collection operations." The Na-
tional Security Adviser takes the chair;
the Director of Central Intelligence, the
Secretaries of State and Defense, the
Attorney Genera! and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in attend-
ance.
The Director of Central Intelligence
is instructed to find the information
lookout for information bear-
ing on the Soviet troop move-
ments. More specifically, he
has set his operatives in East-
ern Europe and the Soviet
Union itself to ferreting out the
reasons for the moves.
All the data stream in to the
directorate for National Intel-
ligence. Here the thousands of
bits and pieces are shaken
down and pored over; related
conducts regular studies on
what it calls "vulnerable coun-
tries," recommending priori-
ties in political and sociologi-
cal intelligence reporting in
the field by embassies and
C.I.A. stations.
The principal objective of
the organization is to improve
the coordination of overt and
covert reporting by the State
Department and the C.I.A.;
they are now under orders to
work together, pooling their
necessary to understand the scope and
intent of the Soviet troop movement.
Upon his return to his Langley, Va.,
base, he calls in his Deputy for Collec-
Approved For Release 2007/05/24 : CIA-RDP84B00148R000100100001-4
 -Approved For Release 2007/05/24 : CIA-RDP84B00148R000100100001-4
assets, rather than pursusing
the kind of separate operations
typical of the past. In the
course of its coordinating ef-
forts, the group takes up such
matters as "nominal" versus
"integrated" covers for C.I.A.
personnel in the embassies. A
"nominal" cover is usually
known to the host govern-
ment; an "integrated" cover
is deeply concealed.
international networks of nar-
cotics smugglers. The State
Department's Intelligence and
Research Bureau specializes
in analyzing information flow.
ing from American embassies
and consulates abroad. The
Pentagon's Office of Net As-
sessments is concerned with
the balance of strategic and
conventional forces between
the United States and the
Soviet Union.
The net-assessments func-
Specific intelligence assess-
ments are produced for Bowie
by the corps of National Intel-
ligence Officers. Years ago.
the Office of Estimates drew
on information and views from
the entire intelligence com-
munity and reached conclu-
sions by consensus (with dis-
sents footnoted). Today, a Na-
tional Intelligence Officer, a
specialist in a given area, may
seek cooperation from others
in the community, but he
drafts his own assessment.
leader charged with increas-
ing coordination among agen-
cies is Lieut. Gen. Frank A.
Carom, who runs Collection
Tasking, a new C.I.A. post. A
lanky, 6-foot 4-inch native of
Kentucky, he holds graduate
degrees from Harvard (engi-
neering) and George Washing-
ton (international relations)
and has helped to run the
Corps of Engineers and the
Atomic Energy Commission.
He's been given the job of set-
ting priorities within the com-
munity as to who will do what
jobs and how the available re-
sources in terms of people and
money will be expended.
Under General Camm's
wing, for example, is the
newly created National Intelli-
gence Tasking Office, staffed
by representatives of the civil-
tween the Pentagon and the
C.I.A., the kind of issue that
suggests why there's a need
for coordination. The Defense
Department insists that with-
out access to the most classi-
fied aspects of the United
States defense posture - ac-
cess that the Defense Depart-
ment denies to the C.I.A. -net
assessment should not be
made. Let the C.I.A. stick to
its collection of information on
the war-making potential of
foreign nations, says the Pen-
tagon, and leave the weighing
of the balance of forces, histor-
ically a military-command
function, to the military.
Admiral Turner protests
that his agency "is not in the
business of making net assess-
ments nor does it intend to get
into it." However, he does add
ian and military agencies that that through the National In-
make up the intelligence com- telligence directorate the
munity along with the C.I.A. C.I.A. is "trying to find ways
The center is intended to to make our assessments more
"coordinate" the intelligence meaningful (and) this inevita-
units of these agencies, units bly involves some compari-
that had been relatively au- sons...."
tonomous before President ^
Carter's Executive Order The single most criticized
forced cooperation upon them. area of intelligence activity is
The Energy Department, for now centralized in the direc-
example, is charged with - - -
overt collection of all informa- torate of National Intelli-
tion on energy masers gence, which is responsible for
abroad, and it cooperates with maintaining the now of data
the C.I.P.- in preparing against and analysis, short-and long-
the day terrorists might try term, to policy makers. This
nuclear thefts. The Treasury army of 1,500 analysts is com-
Department collects foreign manded by Deputy Director
financial and monetary data. Robert R. Bowie, a dapper, 69-
The Drug Enforcement Ad- year-old lawyer, educator and
ministration is supported by foreign-policy specialist whom
the C.I.A. (abroad) and the Admiral Turner hired in 1977.
F.B.I. (at home) in rooting out He had once been chairman of
the State Department's Policy
Planning Staff, but this is his
first job in the intelligence
community.
It' is 'the N.I.O.'s who
produce the lengthy National
Intelligence Estimates (N.I -
E.'s), sometimes projecting a
nation 10 years into the future;
these papers, which include
dissenting views in the actual
text, must be approved by the
National Foreign Intelligence
Board, made up of the chief in-
telligence officers of the com-
munity.
The trouble with such
studies, as members of the
community reluctantly admit,
is that policy makers have no
time to read them. Only the
annual N.I.E. on the Soviet
Union's strategic posture and
intentions has a wide reader-
ship. As a rule, policy makers
prefer daily current intelli-
gence ("the quick fix," as a
C.I.A. official calls it) al-
though they complain about a
lack of in-depth material after
something - like Iran - has
gone wrong. All of which poses
what Bowie calls "tensions"
between long-term and short-
term intelligence require-
ments. He is constantly urged
to provide current intelli-
gence, making it increasingly
hard to spring analysts loose
for the N.I.E.'s and other in-
depth studies.
Last fall Bowie established
the post of National Intelli-
gence Officer for Warning.
and gave it to Richard Leh-
man, a C.I.A. Aveteran of 30
years. The Pentagon's Strate-
gic Warning Staff, which had
been primarily designed to
provide advance notice of an
impending nuclear conflict,
was absorbed and its role ex-
panded by Lehman. It now
keeps the Government abreast
of major developments
through "alert memoranda."
It was Lehman's staff, for ex-
ample, that warned the Ad-
ministration that China would
invade Vietnam last February
and provided a correct
merit of how the situatio
would develop. Basically, tht
warning system is geared tc
situations with a potential tot
a Soviet-American confronta
Lion- A coup d'etat in, say. th
Chad. does not trigger ale
memorandums.
Yet another newly created
unit is the super-secret "Mos-
cow Committee," set up by the
C.1-A. this year. It seeks to
deal with Soviet efforts to de-
stroy American intelligence
networks abroad.
Meanwhile, Bowie has
created a little-known but
much-experienced group to
oversee the whole collection
and analysis effort The Senior
Review Panel is headed by the
former Ambassador to Tana
nia and Yugoslavia, Willies
Le nhart- Its other members
are retired Army Gen. Bruce
Palmer, a former Vice Chief o
Staff, and Princeton Univer
siry Prof. Klaus Knorr,
scholar in the field of intelli
gence. The full-time panel
serves as an in-house critic o
the quality of intelligence; it'
involved at the inception o
every estimating process in all of the post-mortems. and
0
The most demoralized of tim
departments under Admiral
Turner's wing is the director
ate for Operations, home of th<
cloak and dagger. John N
McMahon, a graying, 50-year
old veteran of almost three de,
odes with the C.A, brings
quiet demeanor to his post
is said to have considerabl
popularity with his subo
nates - but be has bad an
bill snuggle coping with
body blows his organizati
has absorbed.
The Operations responsibi
ities are officially defined
the collection of "foreign in
ligence,largely through secyl
CONTli.v UED
 means," counterintelligence der whether the SALT II
missions abroad and "other treaty was even verifiable.
secret foreign intelligence Government experts claimed
tasks." But for all the roman-
tic and/or grisly tales of its
oceratives. coven spying
today s devoted more to so-
phistictted espionage - re-
cruiung foreign officals to
serve as American spies, for
example-than to the subver-
sion, political action and guer-
rilla warfare of the past.
In that reflects the in,
are
major outside check on
the community, however, is
the Senate and House over-
that because of complex satel- ! sight committees. And it is in
lite and radar surveillance the Congress that the most sig-
networks around the world, nificant limits ever imposed
the United States would not be- on the country's intelligence
come blind altogether, even if apparatus are now being de-
it takes three or four years to signed, in the form of draft
replace fully the stations in legislation. The so-called
Iran. What's more, though no "charters," drawn up by the
one in Government will die Senate Select Committee on
cuss the matter in detail, there intelligence, will cover the
are other sources of informa- C.LA-, the Defense Intelli-
p
vestiga[ions of a few years lion concerning new missile igence Agency and the Federal 1.
ago: Congressional oversight designs, even before they have I Bureau of Investigation. The
committees are still sensitive, been test flown. The indica- goal: to definewith reasonable
about approving major covert tions are that these sources precision the parameters for
operations, and the National are human agents who have in spying operations in all fields,
Security Council's Special some fashion penetrated the including the setting of certain
Coordination Committee Soviet defense establishment. , constraints on what the agen-
(chaired by Brrwrinski) is re- Thus the human element cies are permitted to do- The
luctant to propose "special ac- HUMINT - can still have a central dilemma: how to
tivities." Moreover, this major role in strategic intelli- reconcile national-security
change has dramatically af- gence; presumably it will con- needs with the constitutional
fected personnel. The agen- tinue to do so. "We have to rights of Americans.
cy's paramilitary capability, play all the systems together." Reasonable men may differ
for instance, has virtually van-
ished_ Some 27 percent of the
C.I.A-'s clandestine services
staff is now 50 years of age or
d lacemenrs don't
re
d
a senior C.I.A. officiLl said the on such an issue. The White
other day. "Spies tell you that House, for example, opposes
there's something unusual on! as too cumbersome the com-
the ground, say, in the Soviet) mittee's desire to require the
Union, so you order photogra-I President's personal approval
an
er,
ol
p h and signal intercepts, and
grow on trees As Admiral p Y of all major covert operations.
Turner recently remarked, then you have to go back to the The C.I.A. is holding out
spy. On the other hand, you against Senators who would
"You can't just recruit from
the street for the spy urcP - don't want to send a spy to get deny the agency the right to
hat can be obtained from
~ecretly use electronic
Recruiting of course has what
been a major activity photographs. So it's a syner- lance nce on on officials ials of of foreign
within the community of late. genic affair; the problem is countries who hold American
During the last two years the how to get the synergism citizenship.
Admiral has fired more than going' The committee staff hopes tc
400 officers in the clandestine O have a draft completed by
services. The C.I.A. had be- Labor Day, in an atmosphere
come 't he says- The public concern over the viewed as remarkably favora-
wry', ethics of the C.I.A. was re-
- personnel cutback has bie toward the intelligence
damaged the agency's morale flatted in the creation of the community, given past histo-
more than the Congressional Intelligence Oversight Board, rv. "The environment has
rove tigatiorvs and all the other a private citizens' panel ap- cyanQed.,, says Senator Birch
criticssm put together. pointed by the President and Bayh of Indiana, committee
operating from the Executive chairman. He says that the
All of which is not to suggest Office Building next to the proposed charter will not in-
tronic gadgets have totally Thomas L. Farmer, a Wash- "ability to penetrate the deci-
taken over from flesh-and- ington lawyer, chairman; for- sion-making process of foreign
blood spies. Covert operations mer Senator Albert Gore of nations." But some members
continue, and in at least one Tennessee and former Gov. of the intelligence community,
important instance, they may William S. Scranton of Penn- given the shaking up they've
be taking the place of scien- sylvania. received of late, feel they're
tific hardware. The board reviews all activi. entitled to a few doubts.
The loss of the missile-track- ties of the intelligence agen-
iog stations in Iran was a low ties that might raise questions
blow to American surveillance of propriety and legality. It
of soviet strategic testing. and has a mandate to report di-
it made some in Congress won rectly to the President any
such flaws.
E NEW
ItE IN-FEW GENCE
There has been no obvious
change in the status of Ameri-
ca's intelligence community-
Each morning, the President
of the United States still re-
ceives the topsecret docu-
ment called the President's
Daily Intelligence Brief. (Only
five copies are produced.)
Once a week, the President
continues to welcome Admiral
Turner or Deputy Director
Carlucci to the Oval Office for
a half-hour intelligence up-
date. The very reorganization
that Jimmy Carter has de-
manded of the intelligence
community indicates his con-
tinuing interest - not to men-
tion disappointment.
Yet the glory days of the
C.I.A. seem to have passed.
When the Cold War was per-
ceived by the nation and its
President as representing a
clear and present danger, the
intelligence community had a
special aura. There was little
public discussion then of its
"efficiency" (which in all like-
lihood was no greater than it is
today) and Congress tended to
look the other way when ques-
tions of means and ends arose.
There is no lack of major
problem areas for the modern
intelligence community to ex-
plore, from the growing turbu-
lence in Latin America and the
Caribbean to the strategic
issues of SALT II and the eco-
nomic threat posed by the Or-
ganization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries. And the
C.I.A- is expected by its mas-
ters in the White House to
come up with the data and
analyses needed to deal with
those issues. But it is apt to be
a more careful, deliberate ef-
fort, relying more on elec-
tronic tools and patient collec-
tion than on the cloak and dag-
ger-
 -Approved For Release 2007/05/24 : CIA-RDP84BO0148R000100100001-4
On the top levels of the Intel-
ligence community, there is
some uncertainty about that
prospect, and considerable re-
sentment of the criticism the
agencies have attracted. A
Senator recently commented,
for example, on the failure of
today's C.I.A. to play a role on
the policy-making level:
"They must have some opin-
ions." To which a top C.I.A. of-
ficial responds: "What is it
that they want us to do? It's
damned if we get involved in
policy and damned if we don't.
I guess, on balance, we prefer
to stay out of it..,
The complaints about the
agency's efficiency, according
to Admiral Turner, reflect
some confusion as to the na-
ture of intelligence work. Ac-
curate political analysis, he
says, "depends upon anticipat-
ing and correctly interpreting
human action and reaction,
some of which is inconsistent,
or irrational, or driven by per-
sonal rather than nationalcon-
siderations. The best the ana-
lyst can do is to alert the deci-
sion maker to trends, possibil-
ities, likelihoods."
As Admiral Turner sees it,:
the whole process of intelli-
gence gathering and analysis
is undergoing evolution from
what he has called the old-
fashioned "military-intelli-I
gence mentality" to a modern
political, economic and socio-
logical approach. "We are re-
tooling," he says, "trying to
understand the world." There
is, however, pressure to speed
up the process. The Congress
and the President are impa-
tient.
/0
 'Approved For Release 2007/05/24 : CIA-RDP84BO0148R000100100001-4
/ Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assnronl to P. Prn dent for
7 Notional Secur,rvAfiairs
In on effort to improve the quality of
its "product," the intelligence
community-the C.I.A. and
h
b
een
as
other ogencies-
reorganized. Four of the key new
- ?- ?RODUCERS
 ;, rgye ~p R pse 2007/05/24 : CIFX>hiE 48Ot21 QQ~?@Q1ejJ001-4
1 7 o v PAC P- ~? 12 SS?:-7h3^3 1-q70-
-Not all its covert actions have succeeded; but the
.agency did manage to outfox Congressional investigators..
There have been enough revelations about the iCentral 'Intelligence
Agency over the past two years to keep diplomats, prosecutors, reporters and
philosophers busy for entire careers. Three separate investigations not only
stretched the imagination with show-biz material about cobra venom and
deadly skindiving suits but twisted the lens on the American self-image in j
foreign affairs. The investigations rewrote history-the history, for example, of the relationship between the United States and the Castro Government
in Cuba. They showed that -the C.I.A., in some COG foreign interventions
over the. past two decades, has run secret wars around the globe and has
clandestinely-dominated foreign governments so thoroughly as to make
them virtual client-states- In contrast to Watergate, the C.LA. investiga-.
tions proved that abuses of power have not been limited to one particular
Administration or one political party. They also established facts that few
people were prepared. to believe -such as that distinguished gentlemen
from the C.I.A. hatched assassination plots with Mafia gangsters:
With 'all these surprises percolating, the most interesting surprise has
been largely ignored. And that is how the C.I.A- investigations ceased. The'--
topic faded away so quickly as to make the whole episode look like a fad.
Unlike the. F.B.I. issue, which' has moved to the prosecutors' offices and
stayed on the front page, the vaunted trial of the C.I.A. has already become
a memory. And the agency itself has survived the scandals with its covert
operations intact, if not strengthened.
The collapse of the C.I.A. investigations has been duelargely to in-
eptitude, poorjudgment and lack of will on the part of the Congressional
committees. But the agency also played a role. Its strategy was flawless.
"Those guys reallyknew what they were doing," says a staff member of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence chaired by Frank Church. 'T
think they defended themselves just like any other agency would, except
they're better. They had a whole office set up to deal with us, and I some-
times had the feeling that they ran operations against us like they run them -
against foreign governments. It was like the C.I.A." station for the Congress
instead of for Greece or Vietnam." The story of how they came out ahead of
their investigatorssays a great deal about both the Congress and the agency,
and about the problem of reconciling the demands of the superspy with the
democracy he is supposed to protect.
Approved For Release 2007/05/24 : CIA-RDP84BOOl48R000100100001-4 Co IN TIN_UEE
 whee!s'or several months without much success. Charged with the task of
nvesugating more than a dozen intelligence
were stalling, hoping to deflect attention else-
,' here. Then the committee got a break
other cases, someone else got there first Of the Diem assassination the
ommittee could only say that the C.I.A. had sanctioned and encouraged a
little blurred. Even the most direct written
communications, as in the Lumumba case,
were couched in opaque C.IA. language:
-Hunting good here when tights right." .
Smoking guns are considered thoroughly
unprofessional in- clandestine operations,
where secrecy is paramount and it is a mark
of skill to channel existing forces subtly. The
assassination report, on the other hand, was
publicly judged by
standards built for palpable terest was down. Assassin
and exotic murders. Because tions proved peripheral to t
no foreign leaders were main business of C.I.A. con(]
killed outright by American action, and the investigati
initiative, planning and ex- of that unknown realm h
ecution, the C.I.A. benefited scarcely begun. With li
from a general impression vestigations of the other int
assassination inquiry - with
clean hands. This impression
is false.
Certainly many thousands
of people have died as-a result
of secret C.I.A. paramilitary
interventions in countries
ranging from Laos to Cuba to
the Congo. (The Church com-
mittee obtained some casualty
figures but did not publish
them at the agency's request)
And, in the case of selected
killings detailed in the report,
the line between involvement
and actual murder is often
shadowy. For example, the
Church committee reported
extensively on the maneuver-_i
ing that preceded the assassi_
nation of Rafael Trujillo io
1961. It showed how Ameri-1
can policy turned against the-1
Dominican strongman, how-
F.B.I., still ahead or them, f
crucial months had been I
-along with much of
committee's momentum.
Senate's February 1976 de
line for the completion of
work loomed large.
Church wanted to wrap
his investigative chores
order to begin his own Pry
dential campaign.
The Church committee 1
gambled heavily on the ass
sination report. And 105L
chording to Mitt)
ttogovm, tme u..
special counsel
ing the invest
tion, the crux of the inq
from the agency's point of %+
was covert action-secret
terventibns abroad by me
of propaganda, bribes, trial
ulation of foreign agents ,
antes of support to those who
plotted- against him, how
force - as distinct from g,
ering and analyzing int
C.I.A. officials smuggled gence.-The promotion sys
weapons into the country and for C.I.A. case officers
exchanged cryptic messages
on the likelihood of a success-
ful assassination. In keep'ng
with its courtroomdefinition
of assassination, however, the
committee exonerated the
been built around operati
and C.I.A. leadership has
drawn from the operato
Allen Dulles, Richard He
William Colby-inste?d o
telligence analysts. Vet
agency of Trujillo's murder on agency operatives often
the ground that the weapons - that without covert action
it smuggled in were probably
not the ones used in the kill-
our own energy and will
power, and our leadership.
Quite candidly, we had lost
Frank Church." The Senator,,
according to this investigator,
had given up hope of achiev-
ing major reforms in the pre'
nailing atmosphere. Public in-
- the assassination report, re-
he cialized version of the
calls the leader of one of the-
committees task forces. "we Department - - -
had lost three things-the The .I.A. approached
public's attention, much of CongreCssional investiga
. C.I.A. would be nothing
a _collection of sophistic
professors with mounds o
telligence, and the-agent
 5
~kpneoocentralved Re Ite~aese 22QO7/05/2gie(;IA-RDfRdB001 f
o 8RO.0010 0 , t h4 Attorney seeking. on one occasion, to
ch f 1
Cire'ri -r. n +~ :?~, ti;v i'~ -.`?'-rC- w -.k-counse any cl Isis,
-:roteCt the?mean< and prat -, ^al r -em -
ice .a covert action. it way.n ~'o it -en 'e , n - i7g
n lira ?uirn '-I's >rrategy that , ctie .nay had ,'~atnr _bout Ca.,lro herder verified story trot r icon aido
Colby and Rogovin gave covert action in the course of -The assassination report, Alexander Butterfield had
11
g on the marginal issue the assassination investiga- outside sources generally been a C.I.A. "plant" in t
ee
was
of assassination, cooperating tion had made them realize it agree, was the high point of White refuted. lHouse. eaving ng the The story
committee
with the Church committee, was one of the hardest but the committee's investi-gation. wih less l credibility th
at B :
turning over more informs- also one of the most important After that, the staff divided with less
jealousy
tion than committee could i issues to deal with. "That is into two groups, one known be fall, the traditional jealousy
digest, helping the committee why we went so heavily, into: informally as "the lawyers"- Sees the Ho and in
cse itself up. Then, when the Mongoose in the assassinz' Sennatate had flared se d up behind
a group o` attomeys drawn the scene's, and ,l Sieben Ro-
assassination report was com tion repod, Schwe_ ex- together largely by'Schwarz
is eted. Rogovin became tough Plains- -and the other as "the ovin, negotiating with both
about information to be grant- Operation Mongoose was a - professors," who were g enet- c committees, was finding them
ed for the remainder of the covert action designed to ally foreign-policy experts Roovincogovin,i"h. "hh'toxi nays
hear-
investigation - especially in vreaken and destroy the Cas- with academic roots or Ca pi- us e he was he was afraid
n d
regard to covert action. The Under ings ' because affr
tro regime through an_orches- tot Hill experience- Under
committee was floundering; trate*A program of economic task - force leader William Pike would do it if he didn't.".
Rogovin pressed his advan- sab.,tage, commando raids Bader, the "professors" be- By December, the House and
tage. "We agreed with the and paramilitary. harassment. came responsible for the C.I.A. Senate committees were set on
committee that ;hey could it was the heart of the agen-
imps courses. Pike wanted
information for yens" ig went while the "law- oppositte
have access to c~ s effort to overthrow Cas- yes" went[ off after the to impale the the C.I.A. . for its
six case studies in covert ac- tro; simultaneous assassins= F.B.I.- Frictions developed be- abuses- Church wanted to
Lion," he says. "provided they. tion attempts complemented, der the _ two a growps, the show that a Senate committee.
would o public with only one Mongoose
g rather than vice Bader g~ovp tending to eriti- could. handle national secrets ?.
of them- They swore all kinds . versa. Although the campaign._ -
of secrecy oaths that they failed, it was kept so secret "uze the "-lawyers--- as too responsibly. The Ford Admini-
would not even let the names that the American public was prosecutorial and,"Watergate- tees played -the commit-
of the other five countries a fundamentally ills- minded," and the Schwarz toes against each other. When"
left with
team hinting that
leak." The case study he chose ,orted view of United States- the Bader Pike demanded information
was C: ile-a selection favora- 1 Cuba relations for more than group was too soft in its and denounced "delaying tae
ble to the agency, since a loth - .--., - handling of the C.I.A.'s pros.- tics," Administration spokes-
a decade- inany event, discouraged by men-would point to the ex--.
of material on the C.I.A.'s in-'I Before the committee's re-
tervention in Chile had al- the-covert-action compromise, emplary behavior of the Church 1
{ port, it was generally accepted -
ready leaked the professors never recov- committee and appeal for a -
to the
-
"It was a bad pre ss. that the Kennedy Admimstra
dealsays tion ceased hostilities against crag the initiative more cooper m spirit V.1hen
F.A.0. Schwarz,.. the commit-- Bay of the Church committee cooper- {
Castro. after the Pigs. n the House, the Select sled, the Admin heist ion tended
until forced to act t defensively f; -
by the unprovoked introduc- Committee"- on Inteiii- to see it as a sign of weakness
.T -
tion of Russian missiles on ? genre chaired. by Otis and feel freer to hold nark
Cuban soil. The Church com-- [-, Pike-the counterpart on information. Secretary of
mittee revealed that not only of lire Church committee- State Henry Kissinger and
C-IA director William " E.
were there repeated attempts pursued an arduous and ir-
on Castro's life before and dependent course. Created Colby simply boycotted aJ
after the missile crisis but only after a long internecine the covert-action hearings,
covert Mongoose raids were squabble over its leadership, and the committee accepted
being its mandate weakened by con_ the rebuff instead of subpoe
the e intensified
Thentensified assass throughout ination tinuirg feuds in -Lee House, naing them.
? - - : - -.~ '
report .quotes the-minutes of. the committee.-:struggled The object of the exercise,"-
high-]eve! tee tings, less than though the sun-ner of ,1575 says a Church com-i-.tee ..taff
two weeksbefore t, 'missile to-breathe-life `into itself- - iember;"was to p ovcroot-
 Approved For Release 2007/05/24 : CIA-RDP84B00l48R000100100001-4
we were dot Pike. WNe were C.I.A. secrets is an invitation C.I.A. official by Greek news- !!_ Pike developed two themat-
'nc going t,y n"ve the Corr to the killing of C.I.A. uffi- papers and an American is cnt:cisms of :tee C.I.A.
tress or the public by more vials. magazlnd. First, he amaise+t e-1111, "We Or
expose. What was going to Sources on both sides of the. On Jan. 29, 1976, Represent- repeated intelligence failures.
carry us was the kind of edi- C.I.A. investigation now agree ative John Young, Democrat showing how the agency had
tonal we finally got in The that neither the magazine nor , of Texas, offered a motion on failed to anticipate such major
Washington Post: 'An Intelli- the Church committee is the House floor to suppress world events as the 1968 Tet
Sent Approach to Intelli- likely to have caused Welch's the final report of the Pike offensive in Vietnam, the Rus-
Bence."' The committee evi- death. He was a relatively committee. The ensuing de- sian invasion of Czechoslova-
denced an increasing aware-
ness of its public image, of
its ability to keep secrets.
avoid leaks and work in some
semblance of public harmony
with the C.I.A. Many on the
committee staff endorsed this
approach as the path toward
"establishing a relationship"
that would serve the Congres-
sional committee that was to
be set up to exercise over-
sight-supervision of the in-
telligence agencies. Some of
these investigators have, in
fact, moved on to jobs with
the oversight committee, now
in business. Their attitude was
infectious: Even today, many _
former Church committee
staff members are more reti-
cent in discussing C.I.A. mat-
ters than C.I.A. officialsthem-
selves.
n Dec. 24, a band of
=P_
iunknown terrorists
i assassinated
Rich- ard Welch, the C.I.A.
chief of station in Greece.
Welch had been identified as
a C.I.A. official by a small
anti-C.I.A. magazine, and a
furor immediately arose over
whether the revelation had
anything to do with his death.
The Senators on the Church
committee received a flood of
letters denouncing its work on
the grounds that exposure of
well-known figure in Athens, bate was not distinguished. 1 Via the same year, and the
certainly to the kind of organ- Some speakers argued that 1973 Yom Kippur war in the
ized political groups likely to I the report-which they admit- Middle East. Citing various
have killed him. These proba- ted they had not read - bureaucratic entanglements
bilities were overwhelmed, would endanger national se- and preoccupations as the
however, by the emotional curity and align the House ~ cause of poor performance.
power of the tragedy, and the
C.T.A. encouraged the idea
that C.I.A. critics might have
contributed indirectly to the
murder. Rogovin would only
tell the Church committee
that its own investigations
were not "directly" responsi-
ble, Colby lashed out in public
at those who revealed C.I.A.
secrets as being more sinister
than the secrets themselves.
Ford made public statements
to the effect that inquiries
into C.I-A. methods were
unpatriotic.
No single event did more to
turn public opinion against
the investigations than the
Welch affair. As 1975 ended,
the press was shying away
from the C.I.A. issue, and hos-
tility toward the inquiry was
building up in Congress itself.
As to the C.I.A's private
thoughts on whether naming
senior officials makes them
more vulnerable to "the other
side," a move that escaped
public attention may provide
some insight: Welch was re-
placed in Athens by a man
who had been identified as a
with the murderers of Richard
Welch. Others, like Wayne
Hays, argued for suppression
on the grounds that the report
would be boring. "I suspect
... that when this report
comes out it is going to be
the biggest nonevent since
Brigitte Bardot, after 40 years
and four husbands and numer-
ous lovers, held a press con-
ference to armounce that she
was no longer a virgin."
Views like these prevailed.
and the House, by a vote of
246 to 124, ordered its own
Pike took the agency to task
for bungling the one function
- gathering intelligence -
against which there is no au-
dible dissent. Pike's second 11
tine of criticism was more
substantive: He attacked cov-
ert action by revealing a few
of the more startling case
studies. His most poignant ex-
ample involved the Kurdish
minority in Iraq.
Like many of the world's
mountain peoples-the Tibe-
tans, the Mee in Laos, the
blontagnards of Vietnam, the
report to be locked away in I, Indians of South America-
the clerk's sate. the Kurds have always
The document did not re- t seemed destined for a hard
main suppressed very long. It ' time. They have been strug-
was leaked to CBS comes- gling against the Iraqi Gov-
pondent Daniel Schorr, who in ernment for years. For years
turn leaked it to The Vilage they have been losing. In
Voice through a series of inter- 1972, when the Kurdish cam-
mediaries. When The Voice paigri for autonomy was in a
published the report in two brief period of dormancy, the
special supplementsunderban- Shah of Iran asked the United ;
ner headlines, it became the States to help him in one of
most spectacular leak of the his perpetual feuds with'
C.I.A. investigations, neighboring Iraq- This time it
h
was a border dispute. T
e:
Shah -wanted the United
States to channel clandestine
military aid to the Kurds, rea-
soning that American support
would inspire the Kurds for i
another. military offensive
against the Iraqi Government,
thus weakening Iraq and aid-
ing the Shah. -
Secretary of the Treasury
John Connally, acting on be-
half of Henry Kissinger and
President Nixon, informed the
Shah that the United States
would go along. A S16 million
covert - action project went
into effect According to
Pike's documents, the deal
was made in a convivial spirit
-a favor to the Shah as one
of the fellows. (He himself
had been returned to power
by the C.I.A. in a 1953 coup.)
Even the C.I.A. opposed the
scheme, but was overruled.
 .nd money to the Kurds for
- -.v? teen tw'r nears, and the
-:::cads once again rose up in
rebellion. Their leader was so
moved by American support
for the Kurdish cause that he
sent Kissinger a gold, and
pearl necklace for his new
bride. He also sent word to
Kissinger that the Kurds were
ready "to become the 51st
state" after achieving libera-
tion.
In March 1975, the bloodied
Iraqi Government came to
urns with the Shah. The very
next day, Iran and the United
States cut off all aid to the
?Curds, and the Iraqi Army
mounted a full-scale offensi/e
:.gains[ them. The Kurdish
leader, who could not bring
himself to believe the United
States had reversed itself so
cynically, wrote desperate,
pitiful appeals for help, to
Kissinger- Kissinger did not
reply.
An estimated 5,000 Kurdish
refugees died fleeing the Iraqi
'Ins Iaught. The Shah, prag-
matic to the last, forcibly
repatriated 40,000 Kurdish
refugees to Iraq, where their
fate. while unknown, has
presumably been sad. The
United States declined to pro-
vide any relief assistance to
tnz remaining refugees and
refused to accept a single
b_ur'dish application for asy-
,ind tb