STAFF MEETING MINUTES OF 19 OCTOBER 1979

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010195-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2007
• Sequence Number: 195
• Publication Date: October 19, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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0 TOP SECRET -
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Staff Meeting Minutes of 19 October 1979
The Director chaired the meeting.
Lehman briefly noted that Brezhnev is alive. Later in the meet-
ing, Hetu said we had received several calls seeking to confirm rumors
that he had died. The Director said he had visited the HPSCI office
yesterday where there was some conversation about the rumors. He did
not participate, but some correspondent had a story that the Director
confirmed Brezhnev's death by nodding during the course of the visit.
McMahon highlighted reports on the following topics:
--continued rioting in South Korea;
--a source advising that the only way China can bring pressure
on Vietnam to withdraw from Kampuchea is by another punitive
attack on Vietnam which is planned;
--friction between the Egyptian Army and Police continues;
--the Afghan Government sending 1500 students for study to the
Soviet Union and an additional 500 to Bulgaria; and
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--OPEC nations feel the U.S. and others are building large
reserves of oil and the only way to control this situation is
to cut production.
25X1
25X1
McMahon expressed concern that Dr. Brzezinski's memorandum of
17 October on Jamaica reflected a misunderstanding on the part of the
President concerning Manley's flexibility. A brief discussion followed,
and the Director asked that the DDO and NFAC prepare a brief paragraph on
this topic for his use.F_~ 25X1
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SECRET -
Hetu precipitated a brief discussion concerning our public position
on the HPSCI's Identities Protection Act. In response to the Director's
question, Silver acknowledged that it would only deal with those who have
declared an intent to harm intelligence assets. The Director suggested
that our position should be to welcome the HPSCI's initiative as dealing
with some of our problems and continue drafting a more comprehensive bill.
Clarke announced that
Deputy Manager
(OSR) will be ADDO John Stein's
25X1
25X1
25X1
Clarke said reports are circulating that Ambassador Ron Spiers will
replace Ambassador Bowdler as D/INR, and the latter is to become Assistant
Secretary of State for Latin America.F---] 25X1
Hitz reported that Mr. Carlucci had called six Senators to foment
Hitz advised that John Hicks, supported by Hetu, will testify before
the HPSCI Monday concerning our unclassified publications policy. He will
support for travel funds.
be followed by former DCIs Colby and Helms.
Hitz commented that D/OWI Hineman had satisfied Senator Baker's
questions concerning the SS-19 extra burn capability.
Hitz advised that Congressman Ichord and Senator Jackson will be
briefed this afternoon on a potential COCOM Export Control violation.
Silver noted that Bruce Clarke had undertaken a damage assessment of
the appearance of our classified report on Perspectives for Intelligence
1976-81 in the Covert Action Bulletin. He found that while its appearance
was certainly regrettable, no severe damage was done. Consequently, Silver
does not plan to report the matter to the Attorney General for investigation
and prosecution. 25X1
Silver related that IOB Counsel Kujovich is pushing for a briefing on
covert action and sensitive collection. The Director noted that the IOB had
been briefed. A brief discussion followed, and Silver will offer to have
Kujovich briefed on covert action programs. 25X1
Silver noted that the Director and Deputy Director's meeting with the
Attorney General went well with the exception that little progress was made
in engendering enthusiasm for prosecution on leaks. Silver said that he
will pursue the Community General Counsels' consensus and develop a paper
for the SCC. He also noted that he would brief White House Counsel Cutler
on these topics.
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0 TOP SECRET ?
Legislative Counsel) 0 25X1
May briefed on measures being undertaken to tighten up the badging
of visitors. In response to Waller's query, McMahon noted that not all 25X1
Waller questioned whether or not we have methodically analyzed the
amount of time expended providing intelligence support to Congress. He
noted that some in NFAC claim that 30 percent of OPA's work is generated
by the Hill. The Director noted how supportive Senator Stennis was at
yesterday's hearing and questioned if Congress was not consuming too much
of his time. The Director suggested that we scope resources devoted to
substantive support to Congress differentiating between that provided to
oversight committees. Mr. Carlucci asked the Comptroller to undertake this
task with inputs from NFAC. The Director asked Hitz to provide data on how
many times the Director had appeared on the Hill. (Action: Comptroller &
are required to be escorted. A brief discussion
] 25X1
DDA) F
followed, and the irector asked that we c t grins with this Question 25X1
and establish a uniform policy for badging 7! a (Action:
__
May said the paycheck to be received 1 November will reflect the 5.5 25X1
percent pay increase. F__1 25X1
Zellmer said there is a favorable weather forecast over Cuba tomorrow
and noted plans to fly an SR-71 mission. In response to the Director's
query, he noted KH-11 coverage is programmed but the SR-71 flight is
recommended.
The Director mentioned a handwritten note received from the President
to Secretaries Vance and Brown, Dr. Brzezinski, and himself expressing con-
cern over the article appearing in yesterday's Washington Post by Branigin 25X1
(attached) reporting on the PRC meeting.
In response to the Director's query, several commented favorably on
yesterday's briefing of supergrades on the Senior Intelligence Service
(SIS). The Director expressed his support for same and noted that it
Hetu called attention to the article in today's Wall Street Journal
"A Former Master Spy Spins Intriguing Yarns of His Past Intrigues"
contained a number of significant and constructive changes.
(attached)
3
TOP SECRET
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 a r t rr w l ! A a 9 tt' .r 1 l i t ^ ^ i d'+ M E V A - G ^ {.:,3 5 --X I l1 !5 UM CL Lt j WESTERN
Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010195-4 ?,'~; SA1tnAR?
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n,. artnt,.A ?tt~,ntni i. .! h,4: I n.fAA rlloialAna: arithirt'thi* , em nl thl. At>ttard]ntnstrthintit'1d:Ilt at a.ntiirin2 Indeoendenc tot ttlb re- economy, the.' Carter adminiztratloui p
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icy members of a top U.S. policy. . The State Department' And, its sub. ';;{uWatfonal security.advisejr?ZbiguJe'w' Mauritania, Its economy badly hurt. to change its policy on arms sales to
rviking body are urging President sidiary body the Arms Control and Brzeziaalrl and the State ?aM by the war, signed a peace agreement, . Morocco. The Senate Foreign Reia-.'?;'
Depattmenl
are-
n , enc
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reti c
;, Near East bureau are said to favor theI.. ith,. the " q
tin: o the southern i , strictons by a narrow major ity, but--
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':r ?p King Hassan It fight Insurgents sources said. CIA's position tends to! ?;:.uea, to . Morocco, emphasizinq.,their, third of the Western Sahara, Morocco;.. did not make clear-"what specific. i
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uld be sold
ld a
,
.
gree co
':o are waging a desert war for cork-, buttress arguments..against,. the?sales ir'?,,alarm over Polisarlo;.guerrllla; rnida. which had held the northern two-,' weapons it wou
rimes a Cabinet-level Policy Re,,;,.. ally and. to demonstrate to other coon. Morocco some weapons, ouch as. air, Its already overextended orgies an expressed. Some congressional peep
t supply lines more stretched` ahdv l
;hents cited Improving relations,.with'i'
`cw Committee wound up a session - tries
notably Saudi Arabia, that the',. ?d
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;, csday sharply. split over proposals -.United States will stand by its friends, cop 'but not-:equlpment.:particu0r nerable than ever'-., :.Q t. Algeria, noting that .American firms
meet Hassan 's request for armed. --sources tail adAUion to Its phosphate richer.,: have won more than $a billion In con.
19706 and
"
Cobra helicopter ~'??" "'?"" , On the other band, the sales would".hara. Washington previously soldMo '; the Western. Sahara Is believed oy%,r ;tracts mere since wee+uu
i; ,I Cobra helicopter gunsblps to corn.' risk damaging U.S. relations with. Al.`1 rocco FS fighter aircraft..-which- hay some experts to contain oU shale and,: that the Algiers:: government. has
, It guerrillas of the Algerian-backed , geria an important OPEC member::;,' been employed recently in the' desert' the world's largest reserves of Lira. ? , taken positions opposed to the Soviets ? .
l.:aisario out sev, The guerrillllas as nave ,
which supplies 9 percent of.,U..S. oil .war des ite an'agreement-
Wattin
Num.. Dlorocco, which already ratrkson several Issues :rled out several et ix mrecent a, p as the world's largest. exporter of
icnths against targets Ir . Morocco, Imports,.~the sources said. The`sales,? their use to Internal defense. a A ^*nent.,r?, I. ?atrar to harnme n nra , ;, Opponents of theyproposal'to, selL
:.f "'"`4"s. ".". `""`ar`J envy self-determination for the Western Sa s,..
s lt,roccans in counterinsurgency;: rocco and Mauritania In. 1973. flat thei Alarmed by the Intensifying Pall= - United States. with, an issue that ap :
inch n1ques a proposal made in Wash.. Kara despite Moroccan objections. Poiisarfo Front. which claims to renre?? sarlo attacks on Morocco... and King.' pears likely to. rebound. against Wash
other U.S. friends in Africa.
t' ound the question of bow far the. ,ministration-when- another longtime ?', ,;
prop. up__Hassan? ..a pro-American` fighting to stay in powerlast wintery'
monarch whose damaging.warwith Repeated statements of strong--U.S..
the Polisarlo guerrillas. riiks under- ?? .: support for the shah contributed to,
Wining him domestically and putting anti?Americen feeling In Iran and left-,
iim on the path :of. the .-deposed shah;.- Washington with little influence there
Government. sources-aid members The .administration,faced--a'similar?
of the policy committee--representa?,: .;'quandary when Sandinista guerrillas
tires from the Central Intelligence'. began to. make gains- against the Ni?
Agency, the National" Security Coun.., caraguan government of Anastasio So.
ril, the Joint Chiefs-?of,Stuff and the-' moza. Some analysts believe Washing-
unable to agree en: a stogie recom? mas in other countries where. the dun
ir.dation ,and are---to present-option- ability of pro?Amerlcan leaders is in
5s,ue. &.''decision_to+,selt King Hassan.
the arms he wants-.-could face objec+.- and Arabia. In -
the present
Valid? debate,. the...
.'sources said
lions in Congress
t
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eet `the CIA.is understood to take the position.
If adopted, a :.policy to meet'
that the new US wea
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would da
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ting's requests wool- mar;, a. depar?. .
King Hassan little good, because. his,,
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s main military problems -cannot, be. I. ?. .
carefully maintained neutrz lity in the' ' .. _ ,
lilli lnn91 Srrrrife,!":innrll 4hrPnnfaentt battle by limiting .communications'
-
It flexibility
in - his
;cr,pons provideg?.a trey, m:',ICauoa of _-?..^ moving
v
ist.ra:ao r levnings on ?, an Issue forces,'the sources said. -..?
S1 Due Coak-Tha wu111t
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0 41
In CIA's Prime, Rocky Stone
Orchestrated Iran Coup,-
Walked Into Syrian Trap
Now, Organizing for SHHH
By DAVID IGNATIUS
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON-His big operation, these
days, is organizing a self-help group for the
hard of hearing. But in 1953, when he was 29
years old, Howard "Rocky"- Stone was help-
ing to foment a pro-American coup in Ilan.
It was his first foreign assignment as an ct-
ficer of the Central Intelligence Agency.
The Iranian coup was hailed at the time
as a triumph of American foreign policy,
and some CIA old-timers like to contrast its
.success with recent U.S. bumbling in Iran
and elsewhere. But Mr. Stone remembers ;
some of the unsettling details after the coup.
He recalls buttoning the uniform of Gen.
Fazlollah Zahedi on the day the general was
to announce over Radio Tehran that the
shah had designated him the new prime
minister. Gen. Zahedi, the CIA's key ally in
Iran, was too nervous to dress himself.
He remembers his young wife sitting in a
rocking chair at the Stones' home in Tehran,
hiding a pistol under her knitting as she
guarded the life of Ardeshir Zahedi, the gen-
eral's 25-year-old son, who Was also a friend
of the CIA. The young Mr.. Zahedi would
later strike a' more dashing pose, as the
shah's ambassador to the U.S. until the
shah's regime was toppled this year.
And he remembers a victory party at the
CIA station that night in 1953, after the coup
had succeeded. Gen. Zahedi, the neW prime
minister, and his son approached Mr. Stone
and said: "We're in.... We're in.... What
do we do now?
Mr. Stone, now 54 and retired from the
CIA, typifies the almost-missionary idealism
that gave birth to the spy agency in the late
1940s and sustained it for many years. For;:
better or worse, that spirit has 'been shat
and accusing one another of betraying the
agency. For them, the covert war continues
at Washington cocktail parties.
' For people raised on James Bond novels,
Rocky Stone doesn't look like a Spy: He has
a large, round face, .and he combs his hair
.neatly across the top 'of his head to cover a
bald spot. He doesn't wear stylish clothes.
.He drinks beer rather than martinis, and
`then there's the hearing aid, which he wore
for all of his 25 years with the CIA.
? But to the Soviet intelligence service,
which repeatedly denounced his. exploits,
Mr. Stone was a "master spy." And in the
view of former CIA Director Richard
Helms, he was one of the best intelligence
operatives the U.S.. has ever produced.
When he left the CIA, he received the Distin-
guished Intelligence Medal, the agency's
highest career award.
Mr. Stone remains something' of a mis-
sionary. He is a devout Catholic; when hei
retired from the agency in 1975, his first nra
jor project was to help organize clinics fort
alcoholic priests and nuns.
No Apologies
His current passion is organizing an ac-
tivist group for the hard of hearing. He pro?
poses to call the organization "SHHH" (an'
acronym for "Self-Help for the Hard of
Hearing" ), and he hopes to establish chap-
ters around the country. Meanwhile, he is
tinkering with ideas for new devices to aid.
those with impaired hearing. One source of
advice: former CIA colleagues who produce!,
eavesdropping equipment for the agency.
Mr. Stone has no apologies for his years
with the CIA. Sitting at the poker table in,
the basement of his Washington home,
smoking cigars arid drinking beer, he shared
over many months his experiences as an
American intelligence officer. -A sampling of
these real -life spy stories-drawn from a ca- .
reer that took Mr. Stone to Iran, Sudan,
Syria, Nepal, Vietnam and Italy-shows the
CIA, at its.best and worst, struggling to as-
sert American power around the world.
The former CIA official refused, how=
ever, to discuss aspects of his career that
might compromise current CIA operations
or reveal the 'identity of CIA agents over-
seas. His recollections have been checked,
to the extent possible, with other sources of
information.
Betrayal in Syria
Four years after the triumph In Iran,
Rocky Stone walked into a disastrous trap in
Syria. His cover job there was second secre-
tary at the U.S. Mission in Damascus. His
real task was to arrange a coup against the
Syrian government, which was, then begin.
ning its drift toward Moscow.
` Those were the days when the techniques
of "covert political action" captivated the
CIA. Success in overthrowing' governments
in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954 had
led U.S. policy makers to believe that'the
agency was invincible. They needed only to
push a button in Washington and-presto-a'
hostile government would collapse in some,
distant corner of the world.
"Operation ' Wakeful" was the name
given to the effort to install a pro-American
military regime in Syria. Two years of
cheery reports about the project had pre-
ceded Mr. Stone's arrival in Damascus in'
early 1957 to direct the final stages of the '
operation. The view at CIA headquarters'
was that "all Rocky needs to do is light a
match," he remembers.
Mr.. Stone soon discovered that
"Wakeful" was mostly wishful thinking. The
operation had mainly involved delivery of
huge bribes to a few Syrian leaders. The
success of a coup would depend on a clam
destine movement in Syria that didn't exist.
Mr. Stone cabled the bad news to CIA Direc-
tor Allen Dulles: "It is my duty to inform j
you that there is no Wakeful to trigger."
Meanwhile, he began searching for Syrian, conspirators who could do the job.
Had, Wakeful succeeded, the subsequent
history of the Mideast might have been far
different. Instead, the operation was be-
trayed.
Mr. Stone-still worried In the days be-
fore the planned coup that the operation had
been entrusted to incompetent Syrian mili-
tary officials-brought ? a charismatic young
tank commander into the final planning. The
young officer later informed the Syrian re-
gime about its imminent overthrow-and
named Mr. Stone as the organizer of the
Mr. Stone, who was protected by diplo-
matic immunity, was given 24 hours to get'
out of Syria with his wife and three children.
Syrian troops lined both sides of the street
between his house and the embassy. Later,
after he had' departed, scores of Syrians
were tortured by the regime for details of
the plot. . .. .
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OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS
NEWS SERVICE
DISTRIBUTION II Article from The Wall Street Journal, 19 October 1979,
appearing on page 1.
In From the Cold ! tered-by exposes of -questionable actions,
by congressional investigations, and by the ,
A agency's own burgeoning bureaucracy. The I
?A Former Master Spy ' CIA is demoralized, and many of its alumni
'Spins Intriguing Yarns
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In From the Cold: former Top Spy'
Spins Intriguing Yarns of Intrigues..
that makes Mr. Stone smile today is the cov-' it was a flod," Mr.. Stone remembers. The
erage of the events at the time by the U.S. operation provided the U.S. over many
press. Most stories, he remembers, pre- Years with thousands of useful documents.
sented him as a bewildered man with a The agent, now dead, was never discovered.
hearing aid who couldn't comprehend why "What I did was take this man apart psy-
he was being expelled from Syria. chologically and put him back together,",
That, of course, was the cover story. And ! W. Stone says. "My rationalization for
it was completely accepted by major publi- i meddling in his life was that the man was,
cations. Time magazine, for example, re- j better off the way we put him back to- '
ported in its Aug. 26, 1957, issue that the
Syrian charges about the planned coup were
a "big lie" and a "yam" hatched in Mos-
cow. Time noted happily that "Washington,
denouncing the whole fantastic plot as a
'fabrication,' promptly retaliated."
The Perfect Recruitment
A CIA officer's normal chore overseas is
to recruit and handle agents who can pro-
vide useful information. These agents, who
can be a rather scurvy lot, are often re-
cruited by bribery or blackmail.
Mr. Stone disliked such methods. He be-
lieved they often produced unreliable agents
who only pretended to have access to impor-
tant information. Convinced that he could
"recruit a lamppost" if need be, Mr. Stone
felt the agency should try to win over promi-
nent foreign officials of sound moral charac-
ter. In the mid-1950s, he set out to prove his
point, with a recruitment that was cited for
years after at the CIA as a classic espionage
success.
The target was a high-level official at a
key government ministry of a Third World
country. Mr. Stone spent months gettipg to
know him, struggling to discover "what this
man really wanted out of life." His prob- The gift was a miniature replica of a can-
lems, it became clear, were mundane: He non. A microphone and a batterypowered
was an unattractive man who was abused transmitter had been installed in the base of
life was his young child, but he was raving
trouble paying for the child's to ion at
boarding school.
The secret to recruiting the office was
understanding how deeply he w:-,rated a
happy marriage. That was what h : nvied
about Mr. Stone. "Every time tn.- man
would come to our home, our ,- ghter
would give him a hug," Mr. Stone mem=
bers. "If there was anything he we ,lave
wanted, it was that ambiance."
Taking the role of a marriage cu~. selor,
Mr. Stone set out to improve the t rnan's
home life. When the official's wife v,ss abu-
sive in Mr. Stone's presence, the CIA officer
would "put her in her place" by telling her
that she hadn't any right to treat her hus-
band that way, "He loved that," Mr.. Stone
recalls. "I was doing something at he
10
band around the world, with few complaints.
,In Sudan, she had even ridden a donkey to
the CIA station in the evenings to send her
husband's coded messages. But when Mr. ;
Stone went to Vietnam as CIA operations
chief, his wife stayed behind in Washington.
For a time Mr. Stone thought he could
help pioduce a negotiated settlement in
Vietnam. With top-level approval in Wash-"
ington, the CIA sent an agent, by bicycle, to
gether." the headquarters of the Vietcong. The agent
The Hidden Microphone delivered a special code that would allow'
the Vietcong to communicate with the CIA
An old politician's vanity provided the without being detected by the Russians or
key to a spy operation in Nepal in the early the Chinese. But Washington's interest sud-
1960s. denly cooled in this spy venture, and the be-
Mr. Stone, who was then station chief in wildered Vietcong leaders, so far aS' Mr)'
Katmandu, was worried about the stability Stone could tell, "felt they had been be-
of the Nepalese monarchy. One Nepalese , dyed."
faction, headed by a former government At the end of 1967, Mr. Stone returned
minister, seemed to be contemplating a home to Washington to become chief .ot
coup against the king. The CIA wanted in-
formation, but breaking into the former
operations for the CIA's Soviet-bloc division
The new job brought him back to the head
of the agency's mission: gathering intelll
seemed too risky. Trusting in the old offs- gence about a hostile superpower. His cov.
cial's self-regard, Mr. Stone devised a plan. ert-action adventures-organizing coups and
At the time, Pakistan International Air- propping up unreliable generals In distant
lines was about to open air service between lands-were over.
Dacca and Katmandu. Mr. Stone arranged
for CIA operatives in Pakistan to obtain
some of the airline's stationery. He then
composed a flattering note to the former
minister telling him that the airline hoped to '
establish good relations with the important
citizens of Nepal. As a token of the airline's
good - wishes, the letter concluded, It was
hoped that the former minister would accept,
the cannon.
"I just knew that he would put it right on
his desk," Mr. Stone remembers. And sure
enough, he did. For the next few months,
the CIA monitored by microphone all the
meetings of the dissident group. This intelli-
gence made clear that the group's hopes for
overthrowing, the king were as vain as the
personality of its leader, and the CIA left
the would-be conspirators alone.
Vietnam
For Rocky Stone, and for the CIA as a
whole, the Vietnam war was a time of frus-
tration. The warnings that CIA analysts had
offered about the futility of a military solu-
tion there had been ignored. The calibrated
skills of an intelligence officer were of little
use in a war that featured saturation bomb-
couldn't do." As for the wife, ' 'e was ' ?"b'
amazed that someone in my posit!+ould I But the action was in Vietnam, and in
acare about a schnook like that." ; -smile, early 1966 Mr. Stone volunteered for duty.
tapped the CIA's schnook like that." e, He made the decision without telling his,
Mr. Stone
help finance the education oft , man's wife, Ahme. It was the low point of their
child. marriage. Mrs. Stone had followed her bus-, 1. 1i Gradually, the official began to volunteer,'
bits of information, but Mr. Stone resisted
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