STAFF MEETING MINUTES OF 22 OCTOBER 1979

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010194-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2007
• Sequence Number: 194
• Publication Date: October 22, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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0 .
Staff Meeting Minutes of 22 October 1979
The Director chaired the meeting.
Lehman reported no further intelligence re the recent report of Sovi
strategic forces alert; 25X1
Lehman opined the reported alert could conceivably relate to reports of
Brezhnev's illness. Lehman also reported on Soviet military activity along
the Afghanistan border, specifically Soviet divisions at Kushka and Fergana;
he noted activity could sim 1 be an effort by the Soviets to catch up on
its troop-training cycle. 25X1
McMahon cited a report of 17 October, in sharp contrast with an
earlier report of the same day, that Brezhnev had suffered a stroke--that
his speech is impaired and other body functions are difficult. McMahon
suggested that Brezhnev's fate--recovery or death--would probably be
evident within a few days. 0 25X1
McMahon reported the Saudis are "agonizing" over how to keep OPEC
prices from rising again; he said it appears likely the Saudis will be
forced to yield. In this regard, the Director reflected on his and Clarke's
recent meeting with the President in which the President asked that we
assess meaningful impacts on lesser developed countries stemming from oil
pricing. Clarke said, despite its heavy workload, OER is preparing a
paper on this.
Hetu commented favorably on a book review which appeared in yesterday's
Washington Post: "The Man Who Kept the Secrets" by Thomas Powers (attached).
Hetu said this book on Richard Helms and the CIA points up that the Agency
has been a "good and faithful servant" of the U.S. Government. 0 25X1
Clarke announced a change in the cover color (brown to gray) of
intelligence assessment publications. He commented briefly on Kampuchea's
Prime Minister Pol Pot and reports of a second invasion by Vietnam. He
said he would brief the Director on details; the Director requested we keep 25X1
Administration officials appropriately advised.F__1 25X1
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Hit z reported a successful SAC budget markup last week; he credited
Mr. Carlucci's phone calls to several Subcommittee members as instrumental
to success. He said all of the Director's appeal items had been approved;
he added that the Subcommittee will report to the full Committee this week, 25X1
followed by conference with the House next week. 0 25X1
Hit z reported briefly onl ((accompanied by
19 October briefing to Congressional Staffers Battista and Perle on COCOM
25X1
violations. He said Congressional members were appreciative of our initiating
the briefings and that the interests of Senator Jackson and Representative
Hitz gave a brief report on his meeting last Friday with Cutler re
"killer amendments" to SALT. He said discussions will resume today and
noted Cutler's expressed interest in our having available. Both
Hitz and the Director expressed their reluctance on the latter because of
difficulties which could arise, e.g., a direct debate between F----Iand
Senator Glenn on technicalities.
Hitz reported the HAC Subcommittee (Representative Chappell) has
requested the Subcommittee be briefed on 31 October re Soviet and Cuban
activities in Central and South America. Hitz noted this poses a problem
with Mr. Carlucci's current schedule and will get with him to work it
25X1
25X1
Hitz reported that, according to HPSCI's Mike O'Neil, further hearings
on Identities Legislation are unlikely until early next year. 0 25X1
Noting he has been in touch with Senator Bentsen, Hitz briefly described
the current situation re "Hostage to Charters Legislation." Lastly, Hitz
gave a summary by major category, i.e., budget, SALT and other special subjects,
on the number of Congressional appearances by the Director for this
year.
Silver, referring to Hitz's earlier comment re COCOM violations, said
he received a request (too late) last Friday from the Justice Department
that we not brief the Hill until the FBI had investigated one of the cases
of alleged violation.
May said Harry Fitzwater has reported HPSCI interest in the Agency's
Senior Intelligence Service and its implications re legislation. May said
he believes the Committee would like to examine how we have shaped our
Service as an aid in their review of NSA'.s proposal.
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October; he said this take will provide us with a good data base. The
Director advised that a memo to Dr. Brzezinski be prepared on the value of
this coverage including a rationale for when it would be necessary to
S
reported SR-71 65 percent cloud-free coverage of Cuba on 20
overfly the SR-71 again. (Action: CTS)
The Director briefly reviewed important activities for this week:
-- The Director said that, in a meeting with the President last
Friday re the situation in Central America and the Caribbean, he
noted opposing views expressed on whether or not Jamaica's Prime
Minister Manley is retrievable from Soviet influence. He said
NFAC should prepare a paper on Jamaica's future using DDO inputs
and, because of the opposing views, we may want to go on record.
work out ways to facilitate the decision process.
-- APEX--the Director said he hopes for progress this week, and
he has asked to have Walsh see him (Director) today to
25X1
25X1
-- The Director said a SCC meeting to be chaired by Dr. Br?.zezinski
will be held on Thursday re interrelationships between the energy
problem, future of the dollar, and national security. Clarke said 25X1
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-- The Director commented on his work this past Saturday with
Mr. Carlucci in addressing advanced work plans to be used for
individuals in the SIS and said that we should keep moving to get 25X1
this program in place and functioning as soon as possible.
-- The Director asked for comments and suggestions which might be
used for discussion during the Community retreat scheduled for
16-17 November 25X1
-- The Director questioned Secretary Brown's public comment this
weekend that the Soviets have a new submarine which is better than
anything in the U.S. fleet, but that the submarine is not yet
operational. 25X1
-- The Director commented briefly on a public report of the number of
Communists and Communist advisers in the developing world and
asked if we had published anything on this. In a brief conversation
which followed, Clarke speculated that it may be based on our
report to the NSC. 0 25X1
-- The Director commented on Richard Burt's New York Times article of
19 October: "Missile Bid to Dutch is Denied by Bonn" (attached),
noting this re orter's quick and continuing access to sensitive 25X1
information. 25X1
Attachments (2)
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
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?
THE WASHINGTON POST
21 October 1979
Good
a.Faithful
. S e__ -r'- v-'- - a n
THE MAN W11, KEPT THE SECRETS: Richard Helms i
and the CIA. By Thomas Powers. Knopf. 393 pp.
$12.95
By RICHARD HARWOOD
N THE PROCESS OF SHEDDING illusions over the
past decade or so, we Americans have fallen Into,
I quote from a recent .book review. by John Be
/
t
neth
albraj
"In the spate of aiew months in' 1969 and 1960, [A14
len] Dulles, as head of the CIA, showed himself to be a
master of disastrous ineptitude: In those months he
sent Gary Powers over the Paris Summit helped)
overthrow the neutralist government of Souvannai
Phouma in Laos. -:. and was the man In charge of the
organization that was responsible for perhaps the
greatest foul-up in our history, the Bay of Pigs." - -
Dulles did it. Or J. Edgar Hoover. Or some other
wretch who must suffer for our sins. It is the devil;
theory of history or, as someone has said-of the CIA,;
the notion that rogue elephants unaccountably ap-
pear in our happy land to bring shame to us all. It lsi
hard for us-to accept the possibility that such menu
and institutions have, in fact, been our good, and:
faithful servants and that we have been their witting'
sponsors. This impressive book by Thomas Powers addresses!
that possibility. It persuades me, beyond reasonable
doubt, that the Central Intelligence Agency, by and;
large, has beet a. most careful servant of the Amer)-
can governmentaud, by extension, the servant- of.us
all.
In 1948, as the : lacy was being put together, its
covert action unit- was given a -charter. by the Na..
tional Security- Ccnunci. It authorized "propaganda,(
economic warfare preventive direct action, includ
ing sabotag tage, .demolitions and evacua.,
lion measures; subversion against hostile states, in=
cluding assistance to underground resistance-groups
and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements;
in threatened countries of the free world." There was an,
other stipulation: These activities should be carried out ins
such a way "that any U.S. government responsibility for:
them is not evident to unauthorized persons and- that. if t
uncovered the U.S. government can plausibly disclaims
any responsibility for them.?''
This was. a charter for dirty- tricks. I suspect..that if it~
had been put to a .national referendum--at the time, it
would have met with the overwhelming: approval otthel
American people. . -:
It is clear, in any event,-what Harry Truman-andhis-Se.'
.curity Council expeeted of. the .agency, and, it' is' clear
from the evidence Powers assembles that:.t5ose expeeta'
tions were shared by every- subsequent president of the
United States. The covert. interventions, in Iran,. Guate-
mala, the Congo, Chile;. Cuba, Laos and elsewhere were
not. impulsive cowboy-operations. by mad agents. They,
were the. deliberate policies of the American.govern.l
meet. ? ~:_- `
When it comes to the assassination plots against foreigni
leaders, such, as Lumumba and Castro, the question is a!
bit stickier. The Church Committee investigated. those
matters four years ago and came in with a verdict of case
not proved. But the circumstantial evidence Powers: as'
sembles. persuades me that the CIA was not acting or itsi
own. ?
As Powers writes, "talk about killing was common-
place" in Washington in the 1950s and 1960s. A West Ger-
man general came to? Allert Duly, Richard Helms' an
others in 1952 with a proposal (whicli;-was rejected) for
the assassination of Walter Ulbricht, the East German
leader. At a State Department meeting in the raid-'509,1
the subject was. Gamal Abdul. Nasser of Egypt, of whom
Dulles said: "If that colonel of-yours pushes as too far, wed
will break him in half." In November 1960, Undersecrej
tary of StateUvingston.blerchant. asked his-colleagues' all
the Special Group overseeing covert-operations if "any
real planning had been done for taking direct positive-act
tion against Fidel; Raul and-CheGuevara." Their demise,
he suggested. would leave Cuba "leaderless and?-proba
brainless." Later in that decade,: Robert Murphy Of- the
president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory BoArd,'asked
why the CIA hadn't killed Ho Chi Minh as a solution
Vietnam: `Ho is the problem isn't he? Can1 you fellows!
do something-to get rid-of him?---)21 _ r~ ==
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? is
THE WASHE GTON POST
21 October 1979
The most damning illustration of White House involve,
ment in affairs of this kind was the Kennedy Administra?,
tion's determination to get Castro. The common view is;
that Richard Bissell, who directed the CIA operation at,
the Bay of Pigs; was- fired because that ill-conceived ad=
venture failed. .
"But this was only-.part of the explanation," Powers!
writes, "the public part, in fact;- while the private part:
had to do with Bissell's continued failure to make pro-;
gress in getting rid of Castro."
Bissell and others in the CIA were under constant and
extreme pressure from the- president and. the attorney
general; Robert Kennedy, to "get off their ass" and "do
something" about Castro. That was the whole point of Op-i
eration Mongoose; in which Robert Kennedy was a prime}
mover. The details Powers assembles about this operation-
are fascinating: the - reader- can decide for. himself whof
knew what
The subtitle. of this-book is "Richard Helms and then
CIA." But it is only incidentally about Helms and his fel>
-low secret-keepers: Mostly it is a masterful portrait-ofatr
agency and Its?manageisand-of their relationships-to the
governments they. served. Powers, who won a Pulitzerf
Prize as a wire-service reporter, spent hours with Helms,
and other celebrated CIA figures. Why they talked to him:
at such length and with such candor is hard. to say. Butt
they did, and they have given Powers the materials for
the finest bookl have-yet read on the CI.A. The agency's!
managers do not always or even frequently appear in a?
flattering light. They were often amoral and servile. But?
I think, more often than not they represented in thought!
and action- the purposes of ' the governments that em-;
pIoyed:them. They found it hard to say, "No,-" to-presi-
d ents`and cabinet-secretaries.
In.a.sense, they were bootlickers, fascinated and intimi~
dated by the presidency, like other bureaucrats of the.
federal estab;ishment:'Theprimacp,oggt.esidents" Paw-;
ers writes; "is-the-great fact in the-C A's-daily round. If'
the president does not trust or.value.the Agency's prodI
uct, then the paper it produces. ceases- ta-have weight in!
government councils and it might as well unplug its cop..
iers,-because, it is only talking to-itself. The first duty-of;
the [director of Central Intelligence}, then, not by statute!
but as a matter of practical-reality., is to win the trust, the!
confidence, and the: ear of the president'.'
And to keep the secrets. Above all',. to keep the secrets: I
"On May. 10, 1967, Helms went- to the?.White House tot
give Lyndon Johnson the answers to the questions he'd!
been asked seven weeks earlier- The- only. account of that!
meeting is. Helms' own.. He says he described the [inspec-4:
tor general's} conclusions and that-Johnson said:. -
" 'Then you were not responsible. for T-rujiilo.` 'No.'Correct -answer. 'Diem?' 'No.' Correct answer. 'Castro,!
he's. stilt alive, okay `Art the same meeting Helms also told;
Johnson about the-mail interception program 'and some-
other things that werd going on.' Johnson's- response tot
that was: equally laconic; he-just nodded and said some
thing' along the lines of;: 'gut : be_ careful -don't get,
caught' " `t- - - - r-,.
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 NEW YORK Approved For Release 2007/10/29 :
Friday, ucLoDer iy, /y
~. s MISSILEBID TO DUTCH'
.IS DENIED: BY 'BONN
Germans Declare- They Don't Link
aw Basing Rights-for Weapon to
Accord WNith $etherlandg , -
ByRICH4RDBURT
sped-, to'n>teew York Irmo
Washington, Oct. 18 on Dutch' soil is
not a prerequisite for a decision by Bonn
to allow the rockets on its territory, Gov-
? ernment officials said today. .
The,. officials said that the Administra-
tion, reactingto a report in The New York
Times today, asked West German diplo-
mats here to clarify Bonn's position on
accepting a. new generation of-American
missiles- on its soil.. Tin .report quoted a
Dutch parliamentarian -as saying. that.
West German officials had recently told a
group of Dutch politicians that unless the
Netherlands agreed-- to accept the new
} missiles, Bonn would- be unable to go.
along with plans to-place- the rockets in
West Germany.
Howe %,er-, -West Germ wdiplomats-in=
formed the Admin tration. today that-
while-: their- Govt- wants NATO
participation in theplanto put missiles in
Western Europe; Bmn is not
bons-to-what the-Netertands. decid to
do.
The-question of-whether Bonn would
accept. American missi seon-its-soil has
emerged as one- of the. most _ sensitive
issues in the Western ailiance..The Ad-
ministration has staked its prestige on
gaining European-support-for deploying
new missiles and -a=Last-minute-decision
by West GermanytheAmerican
plan would create-deeg;-strains between
Bonn and Washington;
Late last year,-wig the Administra-
tion first raised tt>e-idmof deploying new
missiles, Helmut-Schmidt, the West Ger-
man Chancellor;-announced- that Bonn
would accept the weapons as long as at
least one other allied country on the Con-
tinent allowed. the American system on
its soil. At present; ?he- Administration
hopes that the Netrlands, Belgium,
Britian and Italy-wii:: join with west Ger-
many in ac ceptingr_the-missiles on their
territories..
In an interview, tom, Max Van der
Stoel, a former- Dutcr'cor'?eign Minister
said that senior West German officials,
including Defe e,-der Hans Apel,
recently dismissed Beret's position on the
missiles with leaders:o;.-the Dutch Social-
ist Party. Mr. -Van: der- Stoel, who was
present at the meeting;-said that "what
the West Germans tom-as was nothing
more than what they have said many
times bor%,y
thskE ~S,asm was sspt
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Control P"f'OQOWIt#~ :
Mean '- House- aides dis-
closed today the Administra ion and
allied'governments, were, close-to agree
meat on the outlines of an arms control
offer that would ask Moscow to-reduce ex-
isting numbers of medium-range missiles
directed against Western Europe. .
The officials said the plan for seeking it.
reduction In the Soviet inventory of some
700 medium-range rockets was one of sev-.
eral aspects of a new American arms con.
trol proposal that could'be.presented to-
the Soviet Union next year: They said a
high-level, Government: ,. delegation,
headed,by David L. Aaron, the White
House's Deputy Assistant for-National
Security,-left for Europe today to consult
with allied governments on.'the offer and'
the Administration's drive to', achieve
support for the 'stationing -of. nearly 600
American missiles in West Germany and
other countries in the early 1980's. .
The arms control `proposal, -which.
would be raised.at the next round`of the
Soviet-American strategic arms talks,
,"was described by officials as critical to
the success of the Administration's effort
to gain the approval of governments of
the North. Atlantic Treaty Organization
for a new generation of American mis-
siles. _
Some American officials doubt that
Moscow would be willing to, reduce the
overall size of its medium-range missile
force. However, the White House believes
that without an. arms control offer,. it
would not be possible to-gain European
support for deploying new nuclear sys-
tems in Europe. -
Talks to Proceed Concurnntly:,
particularly -the Dutch, have suggested
that the Administration should first at
to proceed concurrently. with the station.
ing of American missiles in Europe.
bomber known in the West as the Back-
fire. At present, Moscow has 590 older SS-
4 and SS-5 missiles, 150 Backfire bombers
and nearly 100 SS-20 mobile rockets di-
rected against Europe.
The officials, noting that the SS-20 is
equipped with three separate nuclear
charges said there was general agree-
ment within the alliance that future arms
control talks should focus on putting a
ceiling on nuclear warheads rather than
numbers of missiles or bombers.:.