STAFF MEETING MINUTES OF 10 SEPTEMBER 1979

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010142-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 17, 2007
• Sequence Number: 142
• Publication Date: September 10, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

10 September 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Staff Meeting Minutes of 10 September 1979
The Director chaired the meeting.
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25X1
McMahon reported briefly on the following:
-- The Soviets have 3600 troops in Kabul, Afghanistan to protect
Soviet civilians and other military personnel. He said also
insurgents had captured four Soviets including a colonel and
a major during the fall of Asmar several weeks ago.
-- President Marcos had instructed the Philippine delegation to
the Nonaligned Conference to enter into an understanding with
Nonaligned members that his government does not plan to renew
agreement in 1991 re U.S. bases in the Philippines. This is
intended by Marcos to gain observor status within the Nonaligned
movement.
Taylor reported his office is "hip-deep" in preparing the 1981 budget
submission to OMB this week.) 25X1
Hetu commented briefly on yesterday's Washington Post article: "The
'Brigada:' An Unwelcome Sighting in Cuba" by Don Oberdorfer (attached).
Mr. Carlucci noted the article included a lot of detail which he felt 25X1
certain Oberdorfer did not get from us. 0 25X1
Clarke re orted NIO/EA has returned to academia and that 25X1
Clarke said he would be meeting with the Scientific and Technical
Advisory Panel today and tomorrow. The Director noted his regret that he
will not be able to meet with the Panel due to his schedule. Clarke
will take on Nat's account for the time being.
Mr. Carlucci called to Clarke's attention David Aaron's 7 September
memorandum requesting by 14 September an analysis and assessment of the 25X1
Nonaligned Movement proceedings in Havana. Clarke said an analysis was 25X1
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a 40
Clarke reported on a Presidential request for the NID distribution
list. The Director said he had seen and agreed with the response prepared
by Clarke and noted the cover memorandum was especially useful. The
Director asked Mr. Carlucci to pay particular attention to this topic and
explained that it would be difficult to cope with any White House-directed
reduction in distribution. Relatedly, the Director discussed briefly
with Silver the fulfilling of our responsibility under EO 12036 to keep
appropriate officials informed including the Hill, and in this regard, the
meaningful role of the NID.~~ 25X1
The Director briefly discussed Martin Schram's article--"Chapter
Two: Response: Avoiding a Crisis Time"--in Yesterday's Washington Post
(attached). Relatedly, Clarke noted how well an ed t e 25X1
behind the scene activity during the public unfolding o t e Soviet troop
situation in Cuba.F___1 25X1
additional details if needed. He reported also is in
Georgetown Hospital after suffering a coronary but appears to be doing
Silver reported a setback on the Agee situation (see Staff Minutes of
7 September). He said after having pressured Justice to act if Agee appeared
in Washington, he was called by Justice on Friday to let them know the
moment Agee might be sighted--in order to serve a civil suit. Silver said
the information source that Agee might appear had suddenly dried up and the
responsible NOC had gone away for the weekend and could not be reached.
Mr. Carlucci said he does not favor a civil suit, that legislation would be
more meaningful regarding Agee, et al. The Director said, however, that he
wants us to keep pressing Justice to action--to let people know how
serious we are on this matter. Silver said if we could get State and
Justice to agree, revocation of A ee's passport would be a very effective
curb on Agee's activities. 25X1
May reported Don Wortman's father died in Iowa on Saturday and that
funeral arrangements are set for Wednesday, 12 September; May said he has 25X1
well.
May explained recent power outages at Headquarters which will put us 25X1
at reduced emergency capability during a repair period of several months; 25X1
he said some computers and commo activities may be impacted. Lastly, May
said as of 30 September personnel have or will hav~nnounced retirement;
this compares with_for a 1 of 1978 and that up t ore retirements 25x125X1
can be expected by year end.~I 25X1
TOP SECRET
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? JLVRL1 ?
The Director noted the upcoming World Administrative Radio Conference
and his concern for any impacts that may result; he said, for example,
COMSAT's new way of doing business has already impacted us. (It was later
learned OSI has completed assessment of the current situation and will be
forwarding same shortly to the Director.) 25X1
The Director suggested a think piece be prepared by NFAC on why the
Soviets are reportedly changing their position re the Ayatollah Khomeini. 25X1
Mr. Carlucci noted the damage that could result if such a piece were
leaked; a brief discussion followed and Clarke will have NIO prepare a
background piece for the DCI, after which dissemination will e reviewed. 25X1
Attachments 2
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i vL T'~~J: 1. it J:l v7T
^~^ r
ON - 9 SE 43ER 1979
1 ) v t
TJL W
By Don Oberdorfer
} v33i1tn ton Post matt writer-
On Friday, Aug: 17, a U.S.. spy satellite in orbit over
the Caribbean trained its high-powered lenses on a tract
of rugged country near the southern coast of Cuba. The
pictures transmitted electronically; to the ground' were_
examined by photo interpreters in offices scattered'
around Washington. They revealed t, ie tanks,. artillery,
trucks. and tents of a military unit on field maneuvers.
The photographs were of grave significance, for a
reason known. only to a handful of U.S.. intelligence
officials: A few days before, they had been tipped off
that a Soviet combat unit stationed near Havana planned
maneuvers across the island at the time and. place
where the- satellite cameras . trained their- lenses for-
high-resolution zoom shots.
On Aug. 2Q, another satellite mission over Cuba. found
the maneuver area deserted and the heavy artillery
equipment parked once more in two inconspicuous. areas
a few miles west of Havana that are the suspected base
camps of a Soviet brigade.
The pictures of the Russian, guns ofAugust, together
with confirming data that. still- are secret, ended an
internecine argument of longstanding among U.S. intel-
ligence agencies and officials. Most of the-skeptics and.
the doubters now agree that a -Soviet combat force of'
several thousand men has- been stationed in Cuba for
many months-perhaps formany years.
new
ff
d
o
a
This unavoidable conclusions as touche
Intelligence Agency official said last
Soviet-American confrontation, endangered the embat- week, "Soviet ground forces in Cuba.
tled strategic arms limitation treaty between. the super- ; have not been a priority item . .
powers. and has posed a new challenge to= the'-sagging- they were&t considered a. threat to
political fortunes of President Carter.. the United States."
Last Friday- afternoon, three weeks after satellite pho- It was well known in. Washington
tographs ended an argument and began a new crisis, and no secret in Havana that hun-
a somber Carter appealed to the nation from the White dreds of Soviet military advisers-I,-
House for "calm and a sense of proportion" in equal- 500 by one estimate-were left behind
measure with `'firmness and strength." in 1962. Beginning in the early 1970s, .i
In the public metaphor of high officialdom, the prob- there. were also well-documented re-
ports that some of these troops were
on hand to guard and operate a large
and highly sophisticated Soviet elec-
tronic eavesdropping station estaky
lisped on the Caribbean island.
0
lem- of finding a unit of 2.000 to. 3,000 Russian soldiers
on a Caribbean island of 10 million persons and 190,0001
? Soviet-equipped Cuban.-troops was _a "jigsaw puzzle"
of excruciating difficulty. While there is. no. doubt that 1
the- challenge was formidable,. it, is also true that only
a few people and a- tiny- fraction' of. American intelli-.
gence resources were devoted, until recently, to fitting }
together this unexpected and unwelcome picture.
. The origins of the Soviet. effort are obscure, but top
officials. of several U.S. intelligence. agencies -suspect
-that the starting point was the Russian buildup of 196::---
17 years ago-when- Moscow put offensive missiles,
bombers and about 20,000 first-line troops in Cuba. - -
The resolution of that missile crisis, perhaps the most
dangerous superpower. confrontation of the nuclear age.
required the removal from Cuba of the Soviet offensive
weapons- and of all Soviet forces associated with. the
missiles and bombers According to, those who have
studied the diplomatic exchanges and
understandings-some of which have
never been made public in full de- -'
tail-there was no agreement covering
Soviet ground forces in general.
Nor was there much attention to
the subject then or in mostof the I
years since. An official who recently
reviewed the record of highly con- -
fidential U.S. deliberations and action
in the missile crisis, a stack of docu-
ments several inches thick,.could find
only 1?=s pages which made reference
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On the basis of retrospective hints, Brzezinski. Until this--'summer, the Na-
aigh officials now believe it is plausi-
b:e and possible that a Soviet ground
combat wait has remained in Cuba,
under the nose of the United States.
-"'e the buildup and the withdrawal
62. The evidence is slender and
r conclusive, however.
egianir_z at least a decade ago,
77.S. intelligence received periodic
-,::d fragmentary reports of Soviet
ground force units of a few thousand
men in Cuba. These reports were not
taken at face value and "raised no
alarm signals at the top of the govern-
ment CIA officials said it Is doubtful,
in fact, that they ever got to the top..
One reason was that in the late '60s
and early '70s, the intelligence com-
munity (like the rest of the govern-
ment) was obsessed with . Vietuam..In
telligence "assets," both human and
technological, were directed. at that
part of the. world; there was little left.,:
over-for intelligence operations aimed.,
tional Security Agency, which s a i
'err Iar.Te organization, had only one
analyst assigned fulltime to material
from Cuba.
The first break in the process of dis-
covery came in early 1978, when "a
happy accident" brought to U.S. intel-
ligence within a few days two specific I
pieces of information about a Soviet
brigade in Cuba. An intensified study
was ordered. It produced photographs
of modern Soviet military equipment
deployed in camps near Los Palacios
and photographs of a Soviet training
mission- at a Cuban gunnery range in
the western part of the island.
From, this evidence, officials at the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the
Central Intelligence Agency drew the
wrong conclusion. They ruled that the-
military equipment was. assigned : to
Cuban, instead of Soviet,, forces and
that the "brigade" bivouac areas, were
:Cuban, camps. Some lower-level U.S.
at Cuba. intelligence'. officials:, strongly' ?dis
By the mid'70s the Vietnam. adven. ' agreed with that assessment..,:: -
ture-had ended but there was still in- Late in 1978, U.S. concern over the
terest in Cuba The National Security arrival. in. Cuba of, modern Mig23
Agency picked up references to a ~ combat aircraft prompted the, first-
Soviet. "brigada in?Cuba in 1976: But. U.S- spy plane'flights.over the. island
nothing was done about it; the in-- since? Carter called. their off' in 1977 as
formation, in effect, was-ignored. , . a gesture of goodwill ot.. Havana. The
Several explanations are now being M1g23 incident heightened- U.S.-
inter-offered. est and surveillance, but the over-
First. the analysts didn't know what flights were not continued on a7 regu- f
to make of references ' to a, brigade. . lair basis.;
it is an aberrational form of military In March this year. a White House
urit_iq, the Soviet arnly_ Most, Soviet,. memo - signed by Brzezinski ordered
ground forces. are organized into regi'CIA Director Stansfield Turner to as-
rents and divisions- Only four. "bri-. . sess the size, location, capabilities and
gades" were known to exists in-., the 'Purposes .of. Soviet ground forces in
entire 1,300,000-man' army-a core. - Cuba. One of the practical results was
monial unit in East Berlin. a unit. in to send NSA's lone Cuban analyst
Fast Germany, and two units in Mon. back-through the agency's voluminous
,~olia. whose functions 'are still. un- computerized files for hits of perti-'
known. ment information. After a second
So -the intercepted "brigada chat->: White House memo a month later;
ter out of Cuba set off no alarm., in
the intelligence- community in 197&
Analysts assumed that somebody waste
other . intelligence . , , organizations
joined. the search.
By mid-June the NSA 'analyst corn-
. pleted a, study which, in, retrospect,
lengths to conceal' the presence of 'Russian brigade: For the-first time an
their ground unit among the Cubans... accumulation.. of evidence argued con-
The Russian colonel in charge and his.. vincingly.that, at a minimum, a Soviet
men, who are believed'to serve tours " brigade headquarters. had. been-.estab-
of two to three years in. Cuba, were lished ih Cuba.
never mentioned in public by either'
Moscow or Havana. '
The brigade was. split between two-
separate locations resembling Cuban
camps a few kilometers: from.. one
another near Lost Palacios, 60 miles
west of Havana,. rather than camped:
together in recognizable Soviet. style...
The unit maintained a high degree of'
radio silence and only rarely con-
ducted maneuvers,.. according. to
American officials
Third, there was very little U.S.
Interest in the subject Without in-
dications of "sufficient weight to war-?
rent a presumption" of a Soviet com-
bat unit in Cuba, "we weren't looking
for it," according to presidential' na-
tional security affairs adviser Zbigniew
'-The study set off a `fierce ~ dispute.,
within the intelligence field, in part .
because of its implications for U.S_..
policy. NSA and Army intelligence ar-
gued that a combination of photogra-
phy, signal intelligence and a rare bit -
of human intelligence.. pointed unmis-
takeably, to the presence of 'a clandes--
tine Soviet brigade. According to in- -.
formed sources, CIA, DIA-. State De-
partment, Air' Force and Navy intelli
Vence chiefs disagreed.
The basic information was available"
to all the agencies, and thus the: issue
was one of interpretation and evalua-
tion. With Carter signing the long-
awaited. SALT U. treaty. with Soviet.,,)
in mid-June and the administration
preparing for a battle royal over Sen-
tions of belatedly discovering Soviet
combat troops in Cuba were ,rave.
According to a senior intelligence offi-
cer, his superiors said repeatedly,
"We're got to save SALT, whatever
you do keep that in mind."
An early July review of the intelli-
gence did nothing to resolve the dead-
lock. NSA and the Army were even
firmer in their insistence- that there-
were strong and precise indications of
a Soviet combat force. Other, agencies
were unmoved. The compromise re-
sult, engineered by CLA6's Turner, was
a mid-July agreement that a Soviet
force was present as a? separate unit;..
not" part of an advisory group. But
there was- no agreement on the size,;.
organization or mission of the Soviet
force. .. . _ "
During the July.. deliberations - the
Army argued that the official report
should take note of the purposes of
the Soviet unit, including the possibil-
ity that Its mission is to guard exist,
ing or potential. nuclear weapons. Ac- -
cording to an., official present at the-
coordinating - meeting, Turner tele-
phoned a high Army officer to argue
against any such statement, even as a-.
dissenting view.
"We heard only one end of the- con-
versation, but that, consisted of firm
statements that Army was being un-
reasonable and that it should fall off
He [Turner] in effect ordered
them to. cave in" and the Army did so.,
the. participant reported.. A CL
spokesman, asked- about the incident,.
said Turner had intervened to keep
'gratuitous speculation" out of the co-
ordinated intelligence report.
One result of the mid-July coordi-
nated report was a memo.-from Carter
to Turner directing, stepped-up intelli-
gence surveillance to determine the-'
nature and purpose of, the Soviet"
ground pnit, if one in fact existed: and
authorizing a ; diversion of resources
;Q TL Ui+:~
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from other areas of the world if neces- public attention. and were denied in tial directive because of strong indica-
sar;'. _a very heavy effort involving essence by official spokesmen. tions of a Soviet brigade in Cuba.
atel!ite photography and other highly Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. Stone called the Vance letter "a ;vhite-
sophisticated technology was appearing belure the Senate Foreign wash." Another official said the
;ro nted. The Same concentration of Relations Committee on July 17, re- Vance-Brown statements contained
extort. if carried out on a worldwide norted that there was no, evidence of a part truths which are commonplace in
ba_i for a y ear. according to an in- ". ubstantial increase" in the size of public statements on controveisiai in-
io)cmeci official. -.would cost about 5100 the Soviet military presence in Cuba telli enee studies.
i!On. nearlw as much as the entire over the past several years. He added in the e.u?!y part of Au_ust. the in-
Lepactment of Defense budget. that apart from the Soviet military ad- telli ence drive paid off with a report
Another result of the. intelligence visory group, "our intelligence does that the Soviet brigade planned ma-
controversy and compromises of July not warrant the conclusion that there neuvers across. the island near the
was a series of leaks to members. of are any other significant Soviet mili-. middle of the month.. Also. in. early
Congress and news organizations.. Oa, -- -tart' forces. in. Cuba The same lan- August-.: perhaps ? in response to such
July 11. Sen. Richard Ston6 (D-Fla.) guage.was -useclby:Secretary of State findings. Carter directed,- through
cuestioned. the Joint Chiefs of Staff Cyrus\R.. Vane on July 27 in replying Brzezinski and Turner, that intelli-
about Soviet forces in Cuba. and on for the administration to a letter from geace on---Soviet forces in Cuba be
July 13 he began a series of public Stone. . . stepped up ttr?!-'highest priority." '
charges about Soviet military activi- These cautiously hedged.statements ? It was this, effort-that paid off on
ties there. On July 20. ABC 'News re- did not define such terms as "signifi-. _.Aug. 17. in a fraction- of a second and
ported that Soviet combat forces were cant" nor did they reveal that- a crash ~ the snap of a shutter high above the
in Cuba. These reports attracted little effort had been, mounted' at presiden- Cuban countryside.
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'~AS~DIGTO'N POST
9 SE. ? y: Mt 1970,
se:
?
By Martin Schram - , _
:va;ainzton post Staff writer "This was something of significant section chief in Havana, Wayne
While satellite pictures of the So- concern. to us," he said. but it was Smith, was unable to obtain an ap-
viet brigade in Cuba were being ana-? not a matter of. imminent crisis or ? pointment with the Cuban officials
lazed in Washington, the president, of danger The troops had been there for I until Sept. 1. By that time the ores-
de had become pub- i
i
n
b
do
h
w
the United States was floating
the mississippi aboard the old` 13addle-
wheeler, the Delta Queen.
Jimmy Carter didn't need any more
bad news. His U.N. ambassador, An-
drew Young, had just resigned in a
flap over Young's contacts with the-:
Palestinians. That incident set off re-
eriminations between American -
blacks and American Jews.
Robert Strauss, Carter's Middle
East envoy, was in a jurisdictional dis-.
the secre--,
Vance
R
C
,
yrus
pute with
. tary of state, and Zbigniew.Brzezinski, -1 forced to interrupt his vacation' at
the national security affairs adviser.. I Martha's Vinyard once before for a
There was the continuing bad news quick 24-hour visit to Washington to
from the public opinion polls; his en- see Strauss. Vice President -Mondale,
ergy program and his SALT pact were.. and Brzezinski in a meeting that was
art show-and-tell and part showdown.
Li
n- p
there was
embattled in. Congress; Bering fallout from the Cabinet Now, on Aug. 28, was back again,
shakeup. his vacation officially over, and await-
It was not until Aug. 23 that the ing him was the diplomatic snarl over
president was informed about the bri- the Soviet ballerina who was sitting
wade in Cuba. That- day he was in on an Aeroflot airliner grounded at
Hannibal, ZIo., where he? reminisced- New York's Kennedy airport, and the
about the Mark Twin era. undiplomatic snarl . of details in Time
The night before, press secretary magazine about the- in-fighting of
Jody Powell had explained. that the- Strauss versus. Vance versus Brzezin-
president was on top of his job and -ski,.. which read like. Strauss and
that "it doesn't mean a damn bit of Brzezinski verus Vance, which infuri-
difference where-the president is - ated the secretary of state.
in the White House or on the banks of For Vance, the Soviet brigade in
the tiiississippi.' - Cuba was the issue of first priority.
In any case, the report on the bri- The officials decided to press the mat-
gade reached Carter as part- of the ter through diplomatic- channels.
daily intelligence briefing he received On the afternoon of Aug.. 29, Under-
from the CIA. secretary of State - David D:, Newsom
The information was sent to. Carter - . called Soviet Deputy Ambassador Vla-
;ia a mobile communications center dillen-Vasev (Sovet Ambassador Ana-
set up on the Delta Queen. It was a tolly Dobrynin was on home leave in
the Soviet Union.) Newsom told Vasev
rsecure for ant wnrd hacbask tAd`Brzr-z e21nsk1 that the United States had conclusive
wnrd
t all of
h
orm-
a
---- inf
in in Washington t
tion on Soviet ground forces in Cuba
should be assembled and that an in-
teragency meeting should be held. at'-.
t e White House to discuss the mat
ter.
Almost a week later,.-that meeting
was held. As a . senior administrator
official recalls it, it was of no impor-
tance that it took so long to. pull to-
,ether the military, intelligence and
diplomatic records and data.--.
ga
r
e
some time. It was. just that- now we. ;. ence of. t
had to address it diplomatically." l.7ic knowledge.
The group that met in the Situation- Carter administration: officials in.
om in the -basement of the. White 1 tially had planned to postpone the dis-
R
o
House consisted of?top-level officials closure of the bri;ade; hoping to deal
from the intelligencecommunity, the with the-matter first through quiet di-
State and Defense departments and plomacy. "There was never going to 1
the -National Security Council.-. be a way to hold it." said' one official,
For the! officials gathered around only a ouestion of whether you could
hold it temooratilyuntil you had are-
the table; it had already beeen an Au- ply from the- Russians. If - so, you
gust far more eventful than they had would have been--able to go to the.
envisioned or wanted. Vance had been public with some disturbing news but
combat brigade in Cuba, ano that tnis
was a: matter of great concern to the
tinted States. He said that Vance
would want to address the matter
with Dobrynin upon his return.
In conjunction with the Newsom-Va-
ser meeting, officials at the U.S. diplo-
matic interest section in Havana were
directed to take the matter up simul-
with the Cuban foreign min-
taneously
istry. But it turned out.that the U.S.
some Russian reply." .
But this was not to be.
On Aug. 27, the National Intelli-
gence Daily,- a clas3ified 'U.S., govern-
ment document with a daily circula-
tion to several hundred officials with'
top security clearance-including the
Senate and House Intelligence com-
mittees-carried an account of the
confirmation that the- Soviet brigade
was operating in Cuba-.
On Aug. 30, in the State Depart-
ment an. interagency meeting of Un
dersecretaries and assistant secretar-
ies was held to decide how and when.,
the matter should -- be made public.:
They. decided that a few key members-
of. Congress would. be informed later
that day and tht the next day,. State
Department spokesman Hodding Car-
ter would announce, in a manner that,
would convey concern but no sense of
crisis or alarm. that the presence of
the- Soviet brigade had been con-
firmed and that U.S. -concern had
been, expressed to the Soviets, and -
that the= diplomatic- negotiations were
proceeding. - ' ,
The State Department spokesman !
would handle it rather than the White-
House press secretary because,-the
Carter officials agreed-: this, would
help keen the matter relatively :ow
key so that iC' would not: be viewed as
an issue of crisis: proportions. "'The '
idea- was to keep the president away'
from it," said one administration offi-
cial. .. _
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?~. events moved faster than did
:: d:rinistration. For on the same
l:at the officials were discussing
i.. r: o moke the information public: a
- presentative of .al. iation Week mag-
a.i.e c,uecied both the departments of
that. a Soviet brigade was in
-:)a, an action indicating tact the
:biication had a detailed account of
tae intelligence report.
That afternoon, Undersecretary of
State Newsoribegan contacting mem-
bers of Congress.
He called Sen. Richard Stone (D-
Fla.), who had been raising questions
about the presence of a Soviet brigade
in Cuba more than a month ago.
- Stone. who was home in Tallahassee
at the time, recalls that Newsom: told
him: "We've concluded our gathering
of the intelligence inormation and.
we're ready to tell., you..; what. we've. -
learned. pi
Of all the calls, the one to Church is-
the one that will be remembered-he-
catise it was through Church that the
world would first hear oi the presence
of the Soviet brigade.
Church earned a reputation for be-
in., a foreign policy liberal and a dove
on Vietnam: and he has been finding
out now that these liberal credentials
are doing him no good in conservative
Idaho, where he is expected to have a
difficult time winning reelection next
year.
As Church recalls Newsom's call,
"he said that he wanted me to know
that the existence of this brigade had
hie for our own nolitical situation."
said one senior White House official.
"If he was ?_oing to put a statement
out, he could have been more respon-
sible. The way he said it put pressure
on other liberal and moderate sena-
tors to match it."
President Carter was back from his
riverboat working vacation and on his
way home to Pains. Ga., for the La-
bor Day weekend, unaware at the
time that Church was taking care of
his foreign policy public relations for.
him.. White House officials say they
had not heard from either Vance or
Church.what the Idao senator was
But Stone says ne ~oiu ~;ewsom notir
to bother. `-I said. 'Don't tell me let's.;'
do it in person when I get back to -<
Washingtom'~ "
Newsom also telephoned Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Chair-
man Frank Church (D-Idaho) and
ranking committee Republican Jacob
.Davits. (N.Y.), House Foreign Affairs-?.
Committee Chairman Clement, Za
blocki (D-Wis.) and ranking Republi-
can William Broomfield (Mich:), Sen-
ate Majority Leader Robert C.? Byrd
(D-W. Va.) and Senate Minority
Leader Howard H.. Baker Jr. (R-
Tenn.). Pentagon officials contacted-
Senate Armed Sen-ices Committee-
Chairman John Stennis (D-.Miss.) and
House . Armed Services Committee
Chairman Melvin Price
been confirmed. He said he wanted about to do.
me to know before I read it in the T e next morning, on Aug. 31, the
newspapers within 24 to 48 hours."
Church says he took this to mean
Newsom thought it would be leaked to
the press. And that, he says, is one
reason why he.' decided to tell the
president discussed the matter by tel-
ephone with Vance. The president de-
cided to try to salvage the-low-keyed
approach and said that Vance should
handle the matter by issuing a state
press. meat. Carter went for a walk through
, The .other reason; Church says, is downtown Plains, which consists of a
that it:'was his committee that issued single row of shops, mostly devoted to
the statement. in July, based on testi- selling Jimmy Carter souvenirs, and
mony from Secretary of Defense Ha- he repeatedly refused to comment on
rold Brown, that there was no Soviet questions about the Soviet brigade,
buildup in Cuba, a statement that cer- saying only that Vance would do the
tainly was misleading, in retrospect, if: talking back in Washington.
not unture. Despite the low-key efforts of the
So an hour later, Church called the president and his advisers, the tone
"cheap shots." And the president,. back on the job
He says: "I can't believe the presi- in Washington, concluded on Friday
dent intended to keep the matter se- that his lowkey battle was lost and be
cret. I made it public because I had to speak out before. as one-aide
thought it best that the information said. "senators got so far out on a
come from someone in. a public re- limb against SALT that they couldn't
. .
sponsibility, not just leaked by an get back..'
anonymous source." . On Friday afternoon, the -president
Meanwhile, back at the White - strode into the press room of the
House, presidential advisers bristle at White House and, as television cam-
the thought of what Church did. They eras covered the event, Carter de-
see him as having set a crisis tone to a dared: - -
matter that deserved moderate and "This is a time for firm diplomacy,
restrained handling, not panic and not exaggeration."
"There is not the feeling here that The president had a political prob-
the way Church behaved- was excusa- v Iem.
secretary of state. He asked for some had been set. Several days later,
more data and then he says he told Church was announcing that he was
Vance he intended to make the infor- postponing the hearings on SALT II
mation public Church says Vance's so his committee could "deal immedi-
only response was: "I lmow, you'll use. ately" with the issue of the Soviet bri-
your best judgment in what you say." gade.
Church rounded up a few local re- Some Senate liberals and moderates
porters and invited them to join him who supported the strategic arms Jim.
in the living room of his home in Ration pact joined with more conserv-
Idaho. There he unloaded to the as- . ative SALT critics in saying they
sembled Idaho reporters one of the doubted the pact would be approved
year's major foreign policy stories. if the question of the Soviet brigade
His words were clearly hard line. was not resolved statisfactorily.
He called for 'the. immediate re- . Newspaper editorials around the
moval of all Russian combat units. country were sounding a hard line.
from Cuba." - The Wall Street Journal, in an edito-
Church now bristles at suggestions rial headlined "Exploding Cigar," sug-
that he publicized the- information (be gested that perhaps the Soviets would
fore the State Department spokesman give the United States assurances that
could) for his own political reasons. the troops were not for offensive pur-
He has seen those comments from poses by sewing medic patches on top
Senate colleagues and he calls them . of the soldiers' artillery insivgnia..
Approved For Release 2007/10/29: CIA-RDP84B00130R000600010142-2