INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS POLICIES: A SCENARIO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001303350009-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: December 11, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

State"Dept. review c wppWadFor Release 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP84B00049R001303350009-3
T T-
11 Lir, 91
? geed to a corn ehensivE
an overall s:ratecic policy an,~ res "-? ~?
a_t_v_:i.es - -
Backcround
The USG has not prO' de Vi O a CO,Tt: rE.:e:^.51Ve focus to
"comrnunlcatjCn activities" supported by various elements of the
government (ICr., State, 7-1D, Cif:) as well as Quasi private
elements, such as RFF/RL, since the days of OCB. In the late 25X1
1950's and. 1960's functional orientation was rather successfully
accomplished because of a deep financial and operational
commitment by CIA to a wide range of activities
e e
activities were paralleled by similar thrusts in the Department of
State's Bureau of Cultural and Educational Af~airs, in USIA and
elsewhere. Effective interagency committ_e-e_ work or, vD th and
students and labor actfvfty was also evident as was central focus
on radio operations. AID's activity in labor and in certain
"nation building" areas was closely related to CIk's operations.
State's "CU" activities were integrated into the totality of the
US foreign policy. This also was a time in which the US private
foundations such as Ford, Carnegie and Rockefeller felt a deep
responsibility to participate in foreign progi- aT.s.
-- One by one various parts of this total packace began to
drop off. In the case of CIA, security flaps in 1567 led to the
unraveling of its international program. As a result, many of the
activities were either discontinued and/or set uo on their own to
survive as best they could in the jungle of oovernmental
bureaucracy (or via private philanthropy) without any _nside
sponsor to effectively articulate the interrelation of the
procram with US national strategies. Radio Free Eurcpe and Radic
Liberty were merged and set up as a free standing structure under
the Board of International Broadcasting (BIB}. These radios
received an erratic level of support With support. father directly
affected by both the. warmness of debate and the post-Viet Nan
reaction which affected the body politic 'v;a# nc:cn in the
second half of the 1970's "
Problems affecting V0= and :.CA were of
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C- dr or Z..e CO-, ::ed F'c Z_ C C. for 'are
- c.._. r:' :ams WE" - _C CC -?e
cct. ?_.. E
eac-. ..ccc-nC _r_C~Or O. ^e and
_G
-- CI= Cr~..a.n.s, SL.=ereG a more d' `f CL :-t e _c_
Otne former C_T.'? aCt1Vltic .~ ----
s > liCr: had bee, ed u by
foundations found most er?h rcp_es fac_nc_ _^>~_d _r. the
a= .er:~;a z^ of the _966 urban Cts and wit`: the consequence that
-..=Ernat_O.,,a_ programs were Cu'. Those that
_ ^ remained fund-ed
hE Government were s_mp1v tag-ons to budgets of selected agencies
and, as such, received "house-keeping" funding and little else.
For example, the 'Asia Foundation anticipates receiving a core
grant of $4.1 million from State, a sum which is less than it
received from CIA when this entity was funded by the agency in the
late 1960's. The very important Regional Labo'rrInstitutes, -which
were originally provided a funding supplement by CIS, now receive
Governmental funds exclusively from AID. As a consecuence of
straight line budgeting, these institutions have received the same
amount of funds (S13 million) over the past five Years and the
result has been a shift from a very effective balance between
operations and overhead of 70% - 30% to a current distribution of
30% - 70? -- in other words 70% of total funds now 'go to overhead.
We are paying for mechanisms but we are not giving them sufficient
funds to run programs in a meaningful way. Other activities which
were supported in a comprehensive fashion by CIA or other parts of
the Government have atrophied or are non-existent. These include
such specif-ic- pto ects as the- former Congress for Cultural F reedo7-rm
(CCF) which provided, in the post-war era, an effective means of
mobilizing the world intelligentsia around key issues of concern
to the DS and the West. Other areas that are not covered which
come to mind rapidly include the need for a reinvigoration of an
European/American dialogue, a comprehensive program dealing with
youth and students -around the world as well as political and cadre
training, particularly in Third World.
Discussion
-- There is a need to weave the elements of these programs
together as a comprehensive national security package so that the
proper strategies, goals and resource commitments Can be Trade.
The power of ideas should not be unilaterally handed over to the
o^.pos t10n. The current Administration has made COnSiderabse
progress at the tactical level to improve interagency coordination
and to generate a greater SenSe of mutual purpose for on=ooinc
programs. Several specific coordinative efforts should be cited:
-- Charlie wick's creative initiative to establish
P~o~ect Truth. uth? - This grout has "ed
pro: an i:rcreas_nciy
effective inter'ace. coordination . rs _
psi c.':-war iemes. ='he _41 officers in this - -
tnt re' . cencie recccni z e t-?
c,
_~~.. _~sa~~.,.-?._~, .ti~x~ ~~~... ~.:~~. ~ . :~-. ,tee- ~.p ~-.,~-k,.:.:~~~..? -
~?
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E - eve Str" ctu re t _
C SEri'e as an c..G r
CC'- - - -
-' T o` .a': on coorC_:;a:Inc
oac:er than Pro_ ect Truth .
-- ;)n6er
Lepa :;: e- -
~~ -.;QE o= =_aze C':cirt, -s'a _uroo an
tit COOrc~net_.7c Ccrum.:ttee has been es.co_i 'L
_C- ~ has :EC
which
ii p rovi OeC use.L_ stems-by-step tact i cal C' _dance
for one 1 ienenLasor o= pol_
~ C+' arlr.. -rci .+C~..nva _~~.ES
Europe.
An integrated State, CIA and !CA effort is in
and unoerwav to exploit and
counter Soviet active
Measures.
place
2.. A series of ' gabs are attached which illustrate certain of
the types of programs which require our focus and support.
Recommendations
3. A comprehensive policy requires a Presidential
endorsement. We would recommend that this issue be discussed at
an up-cominc NSC/NSPG meetinc in which these diverse activities
can be endorsed with a pledge of funding as part of the national
security program. Following such an endorsement, a manacer_al
process can be set in motion to support these programs probably
util_zino the interagency information coordinating committee
concept. Mr. Wick had mentioned in his July presentation to the
President that it might be necessary to establish, at the
direction o_` the President, a Committee on Information Po:_cv
Coordination wii t~ini she fram.ewo"
. ~K of one ?CSC. pOI*: would
be to identify existing crogra
mS and once z:r:Ev aav e .._e-
cev__oped, move with sufficient rep e - -
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E-":c as- an
C 1.7.
C OC; z.':E.SE c ee cL-
:E ccv-rC-'"c E staff
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$8M (up from $4.1M core grant) Gov't (via Stale)
Li Lutes
"oli tical Program) t18M (up from $13M grant) Gov't (via AID)
25X1
:.(Pan Dialogue $3M Gov't (parallel I)rival.e funrt
ing should he encouraged
on cif ICII Cut tural Budget 10M
RFt:/R1. Capabi l i ty
V 0 A Capab11 i ty ?
mm~ fo.r a Free world $5M
alive Par Lies" Program ?
Gov't (via ICII)
Congressional ap11.11'aI.u; to ItI
Gov't (via ICA)
Private
Pri v a to
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TA has an establishhed ^resen a
undertake a number of activities which are d rect _ o.. overall USG needs and intere`s, T :' ree _p~ s`~ / r has the capability to reach
the emerging leadership in a number of key countries, to
C0McT+L'ni Cate and seek to influence the politi Cal opPOsi tic. and tc
maximize in-place infrastructures without having to go through the
leadtime necessary to construct such a capability. Two examples:
TA: initiatives have resulted in the development of an exchange
program with the PRC; TAF is actively involved in private support
to ASEAN and has facilitated dialoque among research centers in
the area on political and security matters.
TAF has consistently been in a white knuckle situation every
year with its budget. As best I can understand it the current
situation is that State will provide within its budget $4.1
million as a core grant. Very little other money is available.
ICA which has funded in the past has indicated that it will not be
able to renew its program in FY82 because of budget cuts. The
cutoff of FY82 funds for TAF of $700,000 of-program monies
eliminates -a number of significant exchange programs including the
Young Diplomats Program, Congressional Fellowships and Journalism,
'ellowships. In addition, a number of programs designed to
strengthen democratic institutes in Asia were eliminated. More
details can be provided.
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L
I....e Asian '' -Der_ can Free ., ah o y t
r:rrC =..~ ~- - _ns~_ utE (mil' LI) ~ the
_r
i c_.can :"a5Cr Center
F - (? ~ . 1 and .. e '_-.c,-_.- "s t?
-
r e
e L abor DE'.'E_o en t (L.-. I C
-esent the =O-_e; pec c i - s `; es wh; c.
_c pOlcy ac'
A T
^.r.OC? am5 to overhead was 70% - 3COP?_c :. O. L/CI C%. The relic c
than ~ reversed: 30? - four years ado. Now it is mgr e
70?. There has been no growth for the past
our tC five veers. The :und_nc o ?q =ar FY E2.
AAFLI (Asia)
AALC (Africa)
AIFLD (Latin America)
S4.1M
2. 7M
6.3M
Thus, the budoetino was moved in the direction of a grant
principally focused on maintaining overhead. It would require a
supplemental S5 million to Oct a 50? - 50? split and nearly $10
million to restore the ratio to a 70% program.
The International Trade Secretariats, which, are involved in 25X6
most functional areas of labor, are also significantly affected by
the absence of ?funds. Some of this fundinc
J caw-1d. uery efre-ctive_v be funded by AID
A specific example points up the problem. One of the
ITS's turned down a proposal to fund the Peruvian Bank Workers
Union. This organization is an effective and powerful force in
Latin America. Since 'Western funding has dried up, the Peruvian
Bank Workers Union has been taken over by the communists. The
Union provides $50,000 monthly checkoff dues which are used by the
communist union leaders to support Communist Party activities.
Support to the appropriate ITS, the InternationalfFederation of
Commercial, Clerical and Technical Employees (FIFT) would give u-
a fighting chance to recain control over the Union. Other areas
where procrams can be developed include Nicaragua, El Salvador,
Brazil, Argentina, the Phillipines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea.
T, for example received $25,000 per year for Africa but needed
$100,000 to $125,000. This kind of infrastructure has to come via
AID. Exchange and visitor programs in the labor field which
include such things as labor education procra^s, union-to-union
contacts t and training seminars are held hostace to a perilous
budcet.
The labor unions and affiliate Organizations have the ability
to function not only. in the political center but also the
democratic left. The three institutions cited above have
established track records t'... in `hose areas can
Shc ld not have an. Are' can _cbE_` t% :Ere an Or Ca ,_Zc _C'
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Cverr_c_. need .c ceve_~_ - v
- .ran _ arZ_c d_a loCue. ?E .:eeC .O reV_tal_2e
E -dE of 2 - ,
s EC rui
Cn tla 1: 1C ..s. we need to re_ndle
cncensus for the :^sep _ i l L r - .
c"ab 1 ~v O~ .TiEri cart/European intEreS~-
Suc:: c_alocue draws on Official and non-off icia' croups and
.
P Er J cularly should focus on the successor genera;,?
c... F. spec:el
Concern would be center, center/left audiences in Europe.
This general prograrr, is one which should receive sicnificant
covernmental interest. This necessitates expansion of the
person-to-person procram of ICA. It includes provision for
speeches, conferences, publications and exchanoes.
A second portion of this procram involves the private sector.
If we seek to revitalize the whole spectrum of Atlantic links,
this could be accomplished by a consortium of concerned citizens
who could be brought together to provide funcinc support for the
private sector. A longer term solution is the creation of
something analagous to the "American Council" which would provide
a more permanent funding basis for proems it this area. Such a
Proposal' conjures up an image of an te for international
or human rights affairs or a National endow-gent. This will
require careful development with several agencies as well as
Capitol Hill. It. is a downstream; option. The Council concept is
a second stage. The financial resources for public or private
dialogue are needed now.
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-r=
t.EstCrc'`C~ _C~. U)- Ural UCCE
.__cs tc Cr was c constrlicte ,?:Cvc bL:t t'.e
ancinc by the Carter ..C,;, _nstrct_Cn Of te e-L "e
_rol.i the foreign Dolicy apparatus resulted in %sccnceptions of
he CP role and an inadequate defense ox -he _ CA budCE'
the national security, Each of to
E cVLe c OESC r
ibed above
;.aye c r relationship. The cuttinc C= the ICA exchange
rocram (the "CU" account) results in c ticht bud,cetarv situat_Cn
thus preventing the development of e. viable US/European dialogue
and thus impacting on the ability to further i? ,"& :
~ W-her
th_ncs, si as
More importantly, if we view ICA as executinc one of the
tra~itional instruments of foreign policy, namely "information
~rocram we must ensure that it is Given the resources to do the
-lob effectively.
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FX^.anded . ,ad_C !_Ga Coast inC Ca:.;at__ _
_he e has bee; : PC Ef_`ect-Ve r d
yanninc 'co:- n--e - :,a r:
_-er,a:,cE F. .
StrE _ theninc c_ radio operations on thepar ~h jC c
o rd rdministrazion. Durinc the 1976-13c^^ pe
~ riod, the budce.er
exercise was a Berry built phenomenon with no serious attention., to
the reed to revitalize the facilities oOt'i frog: the Stancpo? r:t of
physical and technical needs as Well as to seric::s'y adjust the
procra,% to meet any world crises. This would be a good _terf, for
the interagency coordinatinG Committee which could examine all t^E
evidence and make a judgment as to what the position should be.
The VOA story, or lack of story, concerning program-nine to
Afchanistan in the period after December 1979 underscores the
problem graphically. Leadtime is essential in order. to develop a
communications capability. The Polish crisis underscores the need
but we knew this when confronted with the Iran, Afghanistan, Cuba,
and the Central America problems.
A concurrent .issue concerning RFE/RL, is to ensure that it
continues to maintain the integrity of its programs and does not
become victimized by the heavy bureaucratic hand of over
supervision. The Pell Amendment is designed to place the RF#/RL
structure u.nde_r much tighter cbntrol of ~ Ledera2 agency, thus
making a mockery of the argument that the radios are a private
organization, independent of the Government. General cuidelines
are relevant but tight control is stifling. I believe the whole
Question of the Pell Amendment should have much deeper examination
and review.within the Executive Branch. There is considerable
evidence to suggest that the Pell Amendment -is not being offered
in the best interests of the radios. It involves far reaching
ramifications and legally unclear changes with managerial
consecuences'which are far from certain. One tactic may be to
endowrace Congress to take s broader view of radio p rocr a,mrT.inc
to determine their problems and their effectiveness. This will
move the debate up to a broader issue, removing it from Pell'
personal domain and would set up a useful backdrop. for
Congressional support to proposals frori. the Aaministratlon for
exr)arded financial assistance to our various radios.
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_ _cc
. e Lasky -as Ti a0e an Tess i ve Cace r c
_c= icnif Cc7
i'1tE" _:C-. h& private Sector icr a'
de s _cned :c ocusjon -he
tarCEL. This is a cluster concept dCSiCned to generate
ideolocical support to free world ideas. The battlefield c ideas
must be entered, Dart i cularl'v' by private citizens
C= the
intel_ec-Luel croup, focused on t.-.E key issues of peace,
neutralization, security and the basic restatement Of Weste7n
values are critical. As Lackey stated: I1 - s .little government ar,d
information as is necessary. As much independent non-Government
activity as possible."
This concept requires private funding. The most effective
way to proceed immediately will be to call a croup of prestigious
American private citizens concerned with world affairs and the
adverse trends affecting the US. This croup should receive a
presentation from a high level official of the USG, underscoring
the importance of the need to effectively reenter the battlefield
of ideas. A cash commitment from five to ten businessmen of the
US to support such a dialocue with counterpart funding from
Europeans is essential and now. A. major meetinc is scheduled in
January in Vashinaton. As Lasky stated on 10 December, if
appropriate donors could be -found -- Rockefeller, Annenberg,
Scalfe, and others -- funds could be made available to the
"Cultural Council of International Com:ur.icatio*s^ via Freedom
house which is tax exempt. Leonard Sussman would be the
intermediary according to Lasky. If major' financial support is
provided, the meeting in January would be a kickoff to a major
international campaign and program. Leo Labedz advises that
evidence of top level support -- perhaps with a brief Presidential
appearance at the meetine -- would assure the attendance of such
people as Craxi , Jenkins, Rocard, and Kohl '
This private
infrastructure would have orcanizational counterparts in the US,
UK, France, Germany, Scandinavia and Southern Europe. Later Other
international programs could be involved `as the croup recreates `
the essence but not the body- of the Concress for Cultural
freedom.
~?._-- ._oeC . _OCraT7 cescr -Cec -.. Winer CECCE aDC'~E wCU!C rC'. _C~
cn tc a ooverT.-e ;Z
c==_c_a s - ILLEGIB
Major program support for a number of acti vines has beet
proposed in CIA, ICA and State. h2 a ^_-iate funding Ef_`crt is
to some degree, separate from NSPG action, it is thoucht that
discussions of this lnlt_at ,i h-1 constructi,
mode . The ~'_1 ' _ngness c= `ale USG - _E in c _
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