NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON CARIBBEAN BASIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001303230028-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2007
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: February 10, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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10
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on Caribbean Basin
10 February 1982
The threat to Central America and the Caribbean has many facets. t-vttTFW-
LkJQ start with Cuba. For a nation of 10 million people, Cuba has displayed a
remarkable reach on a worldwide scale. It has 70,000 military and civilian
advisors abroad in almost 30 countries. Of these, more than half are military.
Over 40,000 are in Africa, and some 7,000 in the Middle East. There are 12,000
Cuban technical trainees working in Czechoslovakia and East Germany, and
5-6,000 studying in the Soviet Union.
How did this phenomenon develop? Part of it springs from the demographics--
the same source--a combination of overpopulation and youth unemployment.
Since 1980, there has been a surge in the 15-19 year old age group of 50
percent. Castro has admitted that tens of thousands of youths are out of
work. Recently, he said in a speech that he would like to send 10,000 Cuban
youths to Siberia to cut timber for Cuban construction projects. They have
lots of young men to train and send into other countries--and that's the way
to get preferment in government employment in Castro's Cuba.
The other source of Cuba's aggression is Soviet influence and support.
The Soviets sell their weapons. Arms sales earn about 20 percent of their
hard currency. Last year they gave a billion dollars worth of weapons to Cuba--
66,000 tons of equipment, compared with the previous ten-year annual average of
15,000 tons. The new stuff includes 34 MIG-21s and -23s, SA-6s, T-62 tanks,
MI-24 helicopters, mine sweepers, and guided missile attack boats.
6YD
Today Cuba sits astride the Caribbean with a modernized army of (50,000 troops,
reserves of 100,000 and 200 Soviet MIGs.
NSC review completed - may be declassified in
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In addition to free military equipment, the Soviet Union gives Cuba
$8 million a day, or $3 billion a year, to keep its economy going. The Russians
buy sugar at a premium and sell oil at a discount. There is no way that Cuba
could play the role it does in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East
without this cash and military support from the Soviet Union.
The Soviets do not extend that kind of support without getting something back
that is valuable to them. If the Soviets are to be credited as rational,
Cuba's activity as a base and a wedge on our door step has great value to
Soviet interests and aspirations.
After trying to export revolution unsuccessfully for over a decade, Cuba
scored its first big successes in Angola and Ethiopia, and then just two and a
half years ago its most important success in Nicaragua.
There is every indication that Nicaragua is being built up to a superpower
on the Central America scale. With a population of about 2 1/2 million, its
army of 20,000 active duty troops plus a militia reserve force of an additional
20,000 with 25 T-55 tanks and an expected arrival in coming months of MIG
aircraft will achieve military domination over neighboring Honduras, El Salvador,
Guatemala and Costa Rica with a combined population seven times theirs. With
the help of 1,800 Cuban military and security advisors, 50 Soviets, smaller
numbers of East Germans and Bulgarians, Vietnamese, North Koreans, and radical
Arabs gathered in Managua, the insurgency in El Salvador is being directed,
trained and supplied. Under Cuban and East German guidance, the Sandinista
junta is imposing a totalitarian control with a block system of population control
on the Cuban model, repression of newspapers, opposition politicians, labor unions,
and other private sector leaders.
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The repression has created a significant anti-Sandinista movement. The
Argentine and Honduran governments are training about 1,000 men in four camps
in Honduras. In Caracas, an organization protesting a Cuban takeover in Honduras
has been formed with members in Colombia and Mexico as well as Nicaragua and
other Central American countries. It's holding a symposium in Caracas on
February 22 to offset a Socialist international meeting which will probably
support the El Salvador insurgents in Caracas two days later. The reaction
of the Sandinistas is to clamp down harder, particularly in the remote eastern
part of the country where villages of 100,000 Miskito Indians living there have
been attacked by raids from the air. A lot of Indians have been killed and
some 5,000 have fled to Honduras where some are being trained for resistance
activities.
The conflict in El Salvador pits 5,000 full-time guerrillas and 5,000
support militia against a government army of 16,000 and a national guard,
border guards and police aggregating about 9,000 men. Put these uniformed
forces together and you have a force with a superiority of 3 or 4 to 1, counting
some of the part-time guerrillas. The rule of thumb is that a margin of between
8 and 10 to 1 is needed to defeat a well armed insurgency. The insurgents are
being supplied with arms by air, by sea and by land through Honduras from
Nicaragua. They are being directed by experienced Cubans and Nicaraguans over
a sophisticated communications net located in Nicaragua. The conflict has
been stalemated for over a year. Government forces can make large sweeps, and
after they return to their bases the guerrillas regain control of many roads,
villages and large segments of the countryside. They are now attacking provincial
towns and economic targets to intimidate voters from going to the polls in the
March election and to depress the economy. As long as the insurgents are able
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to attack economic targets, any possible level of economic assistance will not
keep up with the economic loss the insurgents can inflict. In an insurgency
conflict, unless the government wins it ultimately loses, and that is a prospect
for El Salvador as long as the insurgency can be supplied and trained from
outside the country.
To achieve a military victory, the government would have to double its
forces. Even though there is no trouble recruiting soldiers in El Salvador,
there is little insurance as to how long it would take to build the government
forces up sufficiently to give them an advantage as long as additional trained
guerrillas and the continued flow flow of arms can be provided from Nicaragua.
In addition, the direction of the combat from a central command headquarters
through a sophisticated communications system that reaches all the guerrilla
factions and units in Nicaragua gives the guerrillas an increasingly valuable
advantage over the unsophisticated El Salvador military command. While this
is being done, the dynamism of subversion from Cuba and Nicaragua is being
extended to Guatemala and Honduras to make it even more difficult to turn the
tide.
The insurgency has spread to Guatemala where during this year the number
of insurgents more than doubled to 4,500 and trained leaders and arms came in
from Cuba and Nicaragua. The Guatemalan government is under heavy pressure
and if El Salvador falls there is little chance that Guatemala can survive.
The Honduran government is helping El Salvador by trying to reduce the
flow of arms by road and sea from Nicaragua through Honduras into El Salvador.
There is no active insurgency in Honduras, but about 100 guerrillas have been
trained in Cuba.
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To evaluate what is happening here it is important to know that there
has been a consistent pattern in developing these insurgencies. Before getting
started in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, leaders of some
4 or 5 leading leftist factions were brought to Havana and promised support
in money, arms and training if they would unify. The resulting cohesion has
made the ensuing insurgency more effective. Thus far the Cubans and Nicaraguans
have seen their efforts succeed and there have been no indications of a readiness
to pull back and negotiate away this success, particularly in El Salvador.
There has been a growing concern on the part of other Latin American countries.
Fifteen?of them spoke out against the declaration of support for the El Salvador
insurgency promulgated by Mexico and France. OAS, by a vote of 22 to 3,
supported the elections in El Salvador with only Nicaragua, Mexico and Grenada
voting against. This last month Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador joined
in requesting protection from the United States, Venezuela and Colombia
against the threat they perceived in the growing militarization of Nicaragua.
A National Intelligence Estimate made in September concluded that a
continuation of the present trends could result in victory for the extreme
left in El Salvador, and such a victory would heighten prospects for the
revolutionaries in Guatemala. Today the outlook is even more alarming.
When Nicaragua receives Soviet MIGs it can threaten the Panama Canal.
Tanks can roll into Honduras and also through Costa Rica to the borders of
Panama. In short, Nicaragua will be able to intimidate its neighbors by
military force. We see Cuba active training or planting guerrillas in virtually
every Latin American country, 600 of them in Colombia. Looking beyond that,
a Cuba and a communist Central America organized on the Cuban style with a
high level of militarization could constitute a formidable armed force in
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Central America that could threaten the Panama Canal and the sea lanes of
the Caribbean. An NIE of September 1981 concurred in by the entire Intelligence
Community pointed out that success of the Central American subversion "would
bring the revolution to the Mexican border, thereby raising the risks of the
internal destabilization."
25X1
No loss for Soviet - let situation continue - portray as impotent -
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NSC review completed - may be declassified in
full
Draft Talking Points: U.S. Strategy
1. There are three requirements for an effective
strategy:
must deal with the situation on the ground in
El Salvador, with Nicaragua as a platform for
destabilizing the area, and with Cuba as the
source of the trouble;
must maintain majority support in the U.S. public
and Congress;
must mobilize as much support in the region as
possible.
The three are interrelated: the more company we have
in the region, the more support we'll get at home. The
more effective our action is on the ground, the more likely
Congress and the public will be to suspend judgment.
2. In U.S. public and Congressional opinion there
is a broad but still unmobilized majority that doesn't
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want to see the communists win in Central America, an over-
lapping (and aroused) majority that recoils against the
violence, and a hostile minority composed of the old Vietnam
network plus many church groups.
3. In the region there are many countries -- with
Venezuela and Colombia the most important -- that fear
a communist victory and want to act to prevent it. Little
by little they are coming out in the open. But they are
still not sure the U.S. has the will and staying power
to win Mexico which talks left abroad and rules right at
home, is unlikely to change course, although de la Madrid
will probably take fewer foreign initiatives than Lopez
Portillo. The gathering economic crisis will inhibit Mexican
activism.
4. The strategy that has emerged from many NSC discus-
sions and the two NSDD's responds to these requirements.
It has six elements.
First, we have to hold on the ground in El Salvador.
That means training and equiping a substantially
larger army that will gain the military advantage.
But it also means increased economic aid. The
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insurgents' attack against the economy will discredit
the government unless we offset the costs.
Second, we have to press on with the reforms
in El Salvador -- elections, land reform, human
rights. This is the way ultimately to defeat
the insurgents (they marginalize themselves by
not participating in the process). It also is
the only way to maintain U.S. Congressional and
public support or tolerance.
Third, we must take the war to Nicaragua. They
are vulnerable, as the Miskito Indian and various
high level defections indicate. We doubt we
can overthrow the government. But we can disrupt
support to El Salvador, and up the cost to the
Cubans and Soviets.
Fourth, we must isolate Nicaragua, preparing
a coalition of countries to support us and possibly
act with us should the Soviets and Cubans move
fast to arm Nicaragua. That is the purpose of
the CADC, including Nicaragua's neighbors, with
support from Venezuela, Colombia and us. It
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is now a political and economic grouping. More
heavy arms flowing into Nicaragua would transform
it into a military grouping.
Fifth, we must lay the basis for future prosperity
in the area through the CBI. The program, which
is an innovative blend of government action and
private enterprise, is intended to preempt new
insurrections in the area, broaden support at
home, and provide a vehicle for cooperation (if
not cooptation) of such regional powers as Canada,
Mexico, Venezuela. Colombia may now join. .
Sixth, we must build pressure on Cuba. Radio
Marti (which at last is moving), preparation
to defend against a new Mariel, tightening the
embargo, squeezing Cuban staffs at the UN and
in Washington, and the use of military exercises
and simulations are all elements here.
5. That is where we are at the moment. Two remarks.
First, this is still, most of us who have been
working on it believe, an incomplete strategy.
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We have yet to find the way to deal effectively
with Cuba. You authorized contingency planning
for petroleum quarantine/embargo/air strikes
against Cuba, along with similar actions against
Nicaragua. The planning has been done. But
central questions remain: could the U.S. stand
up to a long crisis? Could Castro claim victory
merely by surviving? Could the tentacles (Cuban
activities in Africa and Central America) survive
even if the head were struck? What we need is
the right political concept. If Poland were
invaded we could "take Cuba hostage" (for example
by a petroleum quarantine) and hold it at low
levels of economic performance for as long as
the Soviets stayed in Polana. The U.S. public
would probably support us in that case. We are
looking for other concepts. Once we find a way
to bring a credible threat against Cuba -- one
we would be prepared to carry out -- we can construct
a bargaining scenario that offers Castro an alterna-
tive.
Second, this is an interrelated strategy. It
won't do us much good to squeeze Nicaragua or
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hassle Cuba if we lose on the ground in El Salvaaor.
But in order to hold there, we need emergency
economic as well as military assistance. The
economic aid is part of the CBI, still to be
announced. To those such as myself who have
been spending a lot of time on the Hill lately,
it will not be possible to get Congressional
consent to the CBI in this year of recession,
budget cutting and elections, unless we make
the strategic argument vigorously and at very
high level.
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(DRAFT DISCUSSION PAPER)
Combined NSC/NSPG
Cuba/Central America: The Next Six Months
NSC review completed - may be declassified in
full
Concept
The President has now approved the major elements of a Caribbean
Basin strategy. These include:
Request to Congress for major trade and investment authorities
in the Caribbean Basin Initiative to address underlying
causes of instability in the region;
Request to Congress for emergency increases in financial
assistance (FY 82 supplemental and FY 83 budget increases)
to meet the short-term economic crisis in certain key
countries (El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Jamaica,
etc.);
Increased military assistance to El Salvador and others
under active threat (506(a) plus requests for supplemental
FY 82 assistance);
Firm stance toward Cuba (tightening of embargo, Radio
Marti, military preparedness measures, etc.);
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Contingency planning for possible action against Cuba
and/or Nicaragua.
There are three problems to overcome if over the next six
months we are to integrate these elements into an effective policy.
I. First, how to gain the initiative and get the budgetary
and other authorities we need even if the news from El Salvador
(military, elections, human rights) continues bad.
To do this, we need actions that
Keep the focus on Cuba and Nicaragua (they may help by
arms imports, etc., but we can dramatize their role by
a series of moves against them). However, we also should
refrain during this period from action forcing statements
or actions toward Cuba and Nicaragua to avoid either
jeopardizing Congressional approval of the CBI authorities
or diverting attention from Soviet actions in Poland.
Remind the U.S. (and Latin) public that we are not alone
in our concerns or our actions, especially by continuing
to promote the new Central American Democratic Community
(CADC) ;
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Balance our security focus with economic remedies, both
to win friends in the area for a possible Rio Treaty
action, and to bring along those in this country who
contend Cuba is not really the problem.
The draft scenario given below is intended to meet these require-
II. Second, do we use the expected arrival of MiG's in Nicaragua
primarily to rally the area and get our program through Congress
-- or do we make it the occasion for a showdown with Nicaragua
and possibly Cuba?
III. Third, should we begin to plan now for direct action
against Cuba and Nicaragua once our program is through Congress,
anticipating that the actions directed under NSDDs 17 and 21 may
not by themselves be adequate to meet the threat to US interests.
These last two questions are addressed after the scenario.
Scenario:
January
-- Presidential Certification on aid to El Salvador;
-- $55 million Section 506(a) action for military assistance
to El Salvador;
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February
(before the Congressional recess) Presidential speech on the
dangers in the Caribbean Basin: announcing CBI; followed
up by submission of CBI legislation;
Begin moving Radio Marti authorization through the Congress;*
Introduce FY 83 budget requests for economic and security
assistance for the region in the Congress;*
Continue efforts to cause Socialist International to back
away from support for Nicaragua;*
Curb activities of the Cuban Mission to the UN;
Initiate economic measures against Cuba (blacklisting ships
and curtailing tourism);*
Start base access talks with Honduras, Colombia (and possibly
Jamaica);
Central American Democratic Community (CADC) continues to
build support for Salvadoran elections and calls on Nicaragua
not to import further heavy offensive weapons;
Approach Castro to see whether he will address our agenda.
If he does, we would have exchanges (to last as long as it
takes to get program through Congress) to establish what concession
(if any) Cuba will grant;
Introduce repeal of Clark Amendment;*
Introduce Caribbean Basin military assistance supplemental;*
*Action continues through the period of the scenario.
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Lay down markers with Soviets, Nicaraguans and Cubans on the
introduction of MIGs into Nicaragua;
March
Second Foreign Ministers' Meeting on the CBI; bring Colombia
in; ask others to put offers on the table;
Salvadoran army offensive to preempt guerrilla efforts tc
disrupt the election;
(March 15) Radio Marti Commission submits interim report;
press for Congressional authorization of $10 million;
First guerrilla activity in Nicaragua;
Constituent Assembly elections in El Salvador;
April
Formation of transitional government in El Salvador (revamping?);
Possible opportunity for improvement in international image
on control of violence, greater civilian influence, etc.
Salvadoran Constituent Assembly invites FMLN/FAR to present
their views (this might help with Congressional passage of
our legislative program);
Ministerial meeting of the CADC with Venezuela, Colombia and
U.S. to assess Central American situation;
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Final Congressional action on CBI and emergency aid authorities;
Peak of military maneuvers and other measures to increase
sense of insecurity in Cuba (2-carrier exercise);
Final discussion with Cubans, followed (if discussions are
sterile) by closing of the Cuban Interests Section.
When the MiG's come into Nicaragua:
The model introduced will affect to some degree US public
and Third Country concerns. For example, MiG 15s or 17s are unlikely
to be seen as causing a major shift in the current military balance.
There are three alternative courses of action (not necessarily
mutually exclusive).
(A) Move U.S. air units to San Andres and Honduras.
Pro
Military response to a military action; helps convince
new regional group of need for eventual Rio Treaty action
(without forcing the pace unduly); helps get our legislative
program through Congress.
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Could be taken by Central Americans as indication we
won't act with force; may have effect of validating MiG
presence.
(B) If MiGs are delivered by sea, seek to board the ship and seize
demonstrates that we are prepared to act forcefully;
prevents arrival of MiGs with minimum risk of casualties.
Will be difficult to detect shipment in advance and to
intercept;
Boarding and seizure of foreign flag ship will be seen
as act of war.
(C) Take out the planes (plus as many tanks and as much FMLN command/
control as possible without major civilian casualties) seeking
CADC blessing and token participation.
convinces Latin American and Caribbean leadership that
we are serious about defending our interests in the area,
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and
sends a clear signal to the Cubans and Soviets that we
are prepared to respond with violence if they continue
to test us in the area (or, implicitly, elsewhere).
Will have no permanent strategic result;
However impressed in private, most Hemispheric govern-
ments would condemn us in public (probably including
close friends such as Venezuela), while even such supporters
as Argentina, Chile, Honduras may be reserved in public;
would reunite Nicaragua under the Sandinistas; without
it, the regime in Managua will be increasingly vulnerable
to internal challenge;
would re-cement foreign support for the Sandinistas;
without it, the European Socialists are pulling back;
the Congress might well find a way to condition additional
military and economic resources for the area on no further
military intervention, or at least to delay their passage;
El Salvador will go under if there is a significant delay
in providing added monies on either the economic or the
security side; and
we will have exposed ourselves while Cuba retains its
freedom of action.
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(D) Use the MiG's as the occasion to move to a showdown with Nica-
ragua and Cuba, imposing a full blockada on the former ana
a petroleum quarantine on the latter, with the aim of obtaining
removal of the planes, tanks and other offensive weapons plus
Cuban advisors, along with Nicaraguan/Cuban commitments to
stop all export of subversion.
would, if successful, inflict a major defeat on Cubans/Soviets,
enabling us to straighten out Central America and change
the East/West balance;
might attract qualified majority Rio Treaty support (14
votes);
doesn't include U.S. first use of force but blockade
is act of war.
would involve the Administration in a prolonged crisis,
with lowered political and military flexibility;
could lead to US/Soviet clash over a Soviet tanker, or
major Soviet countermove in Berlin, Poland, or the Trans-
Caucasus;
could be drawn-out and non-decisive if Cubans decide
to wait us out; Castro could try to score a victory merely
by showing he could survive;
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is (at least as far as advisors and no-interference pledge
go) impossible to verify.
-- adverse impact on our military capabilities in Mediterranean
and elsewhere.
-- Even if we weaken Cuba in a major way, we do not ipso
facto assure stability in Central America.
IV. If currently planned moves are indeed adequate
(A) We could prepare to impose the blockade/quarantine once
the CBI and other resource bills are passed. Costs and risks are
similar to alternative (D) above, except that
we wouldn't run the same risk of losing our legislative
requests on the Hill (necessary to get a Rio Treaty majority
and win the war on the ground in El Salvador);
we could complete the record building in talks with Cuba;
coincides with development of covert capability against
Nicaragua.
(B) We could move to take out all Cuban offensive capabilities
(air force, naval ships, POL storage, etc.), followed up by blockade/
quarantine.
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Short crisis, demonstrating USSR cannot protect its proxy;
Cubans military/economic power could be kept at a low
level indefinitely.
There would be U.S. losses (up to 100 planes);
Castro could claim victory merely by surviving;
African and Central American investments of Cuba would
remain; Castro would have nothing to lose;
USSR could retaliate elsewhere.
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Outline of Caribbean. Basi. Speech
1. Regional Objectives
Our overall regional objective is to promote peaceful
change, security and stability in-the Caribbean Basin and to
ensure that external forces. hostile to US interests are
excluded. Under-development is the long-term problem of the
region; subversion is the short-term threat. Both must be
addressed in order to meet our objectives.
II. Threats to Regional Stability and Security
Economic underdevelopment and the absence of strong
political institutions have created conditions in which
externally sponsored subversion and aggression threaten the
region. Poverty and political disaffection allow military
subversion from the Soviet Union and its clients, Cuba and
Nicaragua. The threat is reinforced by the success of the
leftist propaganda campaign which has over and over again been
telling the "big lie." In the near term, problems of subversion
must be met i*:unediately and the seeds for longer-term political
and economic development must be sown simultaneously.
III. US Strategy
To respond to these threats, our strategy must proceed
along three basic lines.. The economic and political measures
attack the fundamental problem; the security actions attack
subversion which threatens the development process.
A. Acceleration of economic development in friendly states-
The Caribbean Basin Initiative serves this purpose.
B. Enhancing the evolution of political democracy
Our efforts center on support for free and
internationally credible elections in all states,
particularly in El Salvador in Marc'.,.. Other measures in
this area include:
Radio Marti
Strong support for Central American community
Carrying our message to our friends and Allies
NSC review completed - may be declassified in
full
CONFIDENTIAL
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C. Regional security
in this area our efforts are designed to address
the near-term problems first. Measures include specific
initiatives designed to strengthen military capabilities
of friendly governments in the region and at the same
time to provide powerful disincentives for Cuba and
Nicaragua to continue to export subversion.
.IV. Implementation
Our objectives in these measures require a phased program
-of implementation. We will in the. course of the next few weeks
submit legislation to Congress to help in the areas of economic
development and the evolution of political democracy. This
approach to fundamental problems in the region should be given
center stage in our presentation to Congress and the public. At
the same time we will begin a series of increasingly strong
measures to ensure that the region is sufficiently secure and
stable to allow economic growth and political development.
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NSC review completed - may be declassified in
part
SECRET/SENSITIVE
(Draft) Cuba/Central America: The Next Six Months
ITEM (NSDD)
Presidential Certification
506(a) Action (17-3)
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN
X
X
Monitor GRN actions private sector (17-6)
Contingency Plans: Cuba/Nicaragua (17-10)
Improved Military Preparedness (17-11)
ACTION
State
DOD
State
DOD
DOD
Haig/Gromyko (21/PE-1)
President's Speech-CBI (17-1)
Public/Legislative Task Force (17-1)
Radio Marti action (21/PE-2)
FY 83 budget economic/security assistance
Emergency economic assistance FY 82 (17-2)
Discourage SI support to Nicaragua
Restrict Cuban UN Mission (21/PE-7)
X
x---------------------------------
X--(interim report 3/15)----------
X---------------------------------
X----------------
x---------------------------------
SECRET/SENSITIVE
RDS 2,3 2/9/02
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State
WH
WH
State
State
State
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
Economic measures against Cuba (21/PE-3)
Base Access Talks (Honduras,Colombia,
Jamaica?) (21/MI-3)
Tighten Cuba embargo (17-7)
CADC support ES elections; requests
Nicaraqua not import further heavy
offensive weapons
Approach Castro re our Agenda
Introduce repeal of Clark Amendment (21/PE-5)
Introduce CB mil assistance supplemental
Lay down markers w/Soviets,Niearaguans,
Cubans on introduction of MiGs into
Nicaragua
Second FonMin Meeting on CBI;
bring Colombia in; ask others
put offers on table (21/MI-5)
Salvadoran army offensive to preempt
guerrilla efforts to disrupt elections
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN
x---------------------------------
x---------------------------------
X
x---------------------------------
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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ACTION
State
State
DOD
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
Constituent Assembly elections in
El Salvador
Defense of southeastern U.S. (21/MI-4)
Formation transitional govt in El
Salvador
Salvadoran Constituent Assembly invites
FMLN/FAR to present their views
X-------------------------
X
X
ACTION
Ministerial Meeting of CADC w/Venezuela
Colombia and US to assess C.A. situation X
Final Congressional action on CBI and
emergency aid measures
Peak of military maneuvers/other measures
to increase sense of insecurity in Cuba
(2-carrier exercise) (21/MI-2) X DOD
Final discussion w/Cubans,followed-if dis-
cussions sterile--by closing of Cuban
Interests Section.(21/PE-4) X State
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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