SOVIET PENETRATION OF THE THIRD WORLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001102650002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 31, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/03/19: CIA-RDP84B00049R001102650002-0
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
The Soviet Union-employs a sophisticated mix of tactics
in its efforts to penetrate Third World areas and influence
events and organizations in ways that benefit Soviet political
purposes. Moscow 'a moat dramatic gains have come from its support
of radical, non-Communist elements that ultimately became anti-
Western ruling groups in such countries as Algeria, South Yemen,
and Angola.
Where the USSR has no formal. relations with the established
governments being challenged- by such groups, its support for the
radicals tends to be open and large-scale, enhancing its creden-
tials as a revolutionary power. In other areas, .ossow attempts
to protect its relations with tar etea governments by disguising
and channeling its assistance to the subversive groups through
third parties.
Iloscowa's most enduring Third World policies, however, have
been'in its relations with leftist,, anti-US regimes which it
frequently props up with military 4. sistanee. These regimes
undertake a variety of actions, sometimes encouraged by Moscow
The-Soviets occasionally have come to the open military support
of some governments, such as Nasir's Egypt, or facilitated large-
scale rili oiy ventures by others, such as tr:e Ethiopians and
This mer:oran was prepared by of the Office of Political.
Analysis at the request of the Director of Central Intelligence. Comments
and questions should be addressed to the Chief, USSR-EE Division, Office
of Political Analysis,
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Ifoccow's eubstz tiaZ World*,,%ide interests cause it constantly
to weigh its equitiea and ahifs /te policies between countries with
which it r.' ante to r.a-ntain got' ,reZations and their often subversive-
minded neighbors. these as ! other ir.atancee, the Soviets will
frequently try to u;e local assets, inoluding Communist parties, to
affect events in.the favored direction.
Direct Military Involvement
The Soviets have extended billions of dollars of military
assistance and sent thousands of military advisors to the
Third World in an attempt to foster dependence on them by
the local regimes. They also have been willing to provide
assistance to their clients.directly, engaging in airlifts
in times of crisis and even participating directly in military
engagements. Some of the most dramatic provisions of military
aid have been to: -
Egypt and Syria during the war with Israel in 1973.
Ethiopia in 1978-79.
Angola in 1975-76.
North Yemen during the civil war of 1967-68.
~rl Vietnam during the Vietnam War and tho Sino-
Vietnamese conflict of 1979-80.
Soviet personnel have been in combat in:
Soviet transport aircraft and crews have been helping ferry
Laos on behalf of neutrals and leftists in 1960-62.
North Yemen in support of the republican government
in 1967-68.
..
Pilots as well as air-dfense combat personnel were active
in Egypt during the "war of attrition" with Israel in 1970,
and air-defense personnel were active in Vietnam in 1965-66.
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The most direct and dramatic Soviet military intervention,
of course, was the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.
This operation was designed to ensure the Communist, pro-
Soviet orientation of this border nation. Since the invasion,
the Soviets have maintained their forces in Afghanistan,
using their own airborne and ground personnel to prop up the
puppet regime.
Use-of-Surrogates
The Soviets have supported clients and allies bent on
changing the status quo; they have backed Vietnam's efforts
to establish its hegemony in Laos and Kampuchea and Libyan
efforts to overthrow Sudanese President Numayri. They have
also encouraged clients to help bolster regimes faced with
severe challenges--for examples paying for Cuban military
involvement in Angola and Ethiopia.
1y' Soviet clients frequently act on their own without
Sc.viet prompting. Much of the Cuban support for militants
in Latin America falls into this category as do the Libyan
ventures in Tunisia and Chad and Vietnam's decision to
overrun all of Kampuchea in 1979. Xhile the Soviets have
not necessarily approved such actions in advance, they have
generally supported them when they proved successful.
The Soviets have made their most dramatic gains by
supporting radical, non-Communist elements. While such
forces are not as susceptible to Soviet control as are
Communist parties, their potential is greater because their
roots are indigenous. They are attractive to the Soviets
%-because their orientation is generally anti-Western.
Assistance--even though meager--to ultimately successful
movements in Algeria, South Yemen, Angola, and Mozambique
gave the Soviets access to radical, strongly anti-US regimes.
The nature and extent of Soviet assistance to such
forces has varied greatly. Open, large-.tale support has
gone only to groups that have broad regional support and in
situations where the USSR had virtually no relationship with
the existing government. The Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO), South-West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO),
the African National Congress (ANC), and Zimbabwe African
People's Union (ZAPU) fall into this category. Although
military supplies have been funnelled through their regional
protectors, Moscow has openly proclaimed its support, believing
this enhances its credibility. as a revolutionary power. ,
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Often, however, Moscow seeks to disguise its involvement
with radical militants in order to protect its formal relations
with the target government and avoid stirring regional or
international antagonism. Soviet assistance to El Salvadoran
insurgents, for example, has been delivered clandestinely
through surrogates; aid to the National Democratic Front
(NDF)--a group targeted against North Yemen--is channelled
through South Yemen. The Soviets provide some support to the
Somali Salvation Front (SSF) through Ethiopia and are apparently
considering support of the Shaba (Katangan) rebels through
Angola.
The Soviets also maintain contacts with many ethnic
naticnality groups, mostly along their southern border. They
have links to Al Zulfikar, the Pakistani anti-Zia terrorist
group based in Afghanistan, as well as with Kurdish, Armenian,
Baluch, Azeri and other such elements in Iran and Turkey.
The extent of their actual assistance is not clear, but they
have probably provided limited aid to some of them from timer
to time. The purpose of these contacts ranges from the
gathering of information and development of assets-to the
pressuring of neighboring governments and ensuring future
access to potentially successful radical movements.
Communist Parties
Moscow has consistently backed pro-Soviet Communist
parties in the Third World. Moscow often sees-this support
as an important element in its claims to leadership in the
world Communist movement and its competition with China
rather than as a viable tool for gaining political influence.
In some cases, however, links to local Communist parties
give Moscow a degree of leverage over the ruling regime and
provide access to the political system.
Soviet guidance to local Communist parties depends on
the nature of the USSR's relationship with the ruling regime
and the party's chances of success. In South American
countries where the USSR is seeking economic ties to existing
governments, the parties are told to maintain low-key political
activity. In Central America, however, where the Soviets
have few bilateral equities and where they see a chance of
success, they are urging the Communist parties to shift from
political activity to participation in armed struggle.
Soviet-backed Communist parties in the Third World have
had little success gaining power internally since the Chinese
Communist takeover in 1949. A major exception was the
Communist coup in Afghanistan in April 1978; although the
extent of Moscow's knowledge of the coup remains unclear,
its subsequent commitment to defend the regime has proven
substantial. In Cuba, an originally broad leftist grouping
Y:-
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developed into a pro-Soviet Communist party after it gained
power, but this case has proved to be the exception in
spite of Soviet efforts elsewhere to encourage national-
istic leftist regimes to adopt Communist ideology and structure.
Political Contacts
Moscow's most effective policy in the Third World has
been the straightforward development of bilateral relations
with existing leftist, anti-US regimes. Combining political
support with their ability to supply large quantities of
arms on favorable terms, the Soviets have developed close
relations with such important and diverse states as India,
Ethiopia, Syria, Libya, Iraq, and the Congo. Some of their
favorite tactics include cn'peration agreements in areas
such as party-to-party relations, intelligence, and security.
The Soviets then seek to exploit these relationships to
cultivate and recruit key government members.
The Soviets support individual pro-Soviet government
members as well as legal opposition parties in some Third
World states such as Mauritius. They also engage in large-
scale cultivation of members of student, labor and professional
organizations, hoping that their contacts will eventually
gain positions of power and prove sympathetic to Soviet
interests.
Conclusion
The willingness of the Soviets to employ both overt and
covert tactics and even to pursue seemingly contradictory
policies gives them considerable flexibility in Third World
states. It also creates dilemmas; their natural inclina:.ion
to support the Polisario guerrilla movement in the Western
Sahara, for example, is tempered btttheir desire to protect
their economic relationship with b ;rocco. Similarly, their
support for the Iraqi Communist Pj ty over the years has
created severe strains in their rgllations with the ruling
Iraqi Baath Party. Generally, however, this flexibility
gives the Soviets considerable leeway in their persistent
and patient probing for opportunities and in selecting the
most promising targets and courses of action.
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Approved For Release 2007/03/19: CIA-RDP84B00049RO01102650002-0
 - DCI
- DDCI
- D/DCI-DDCI/ES
- D/NFAC
- DD/NFAC
- NIO/USSR
- PDB Staff
-.D/OPA
- OPA/PS
- PPG
- OCO Foreign Liaison Staff
- NIC
1 .C/OPA/USSR-EE
l- DC/OPA/USSR-EE
1 --OPA/USSR-EE Chrono
1 - OPA/USSR-EE/SRE Chrono
I - OPA/NESA
1.- OPA/AF
1 - OPA/LA
1 - OPA/EAP
Approved For Release 2007/03/19: CIA-RDP84B00049R001102650002-0
SUBJECT: Soviet Penetration of the Third World