U.S. APPROVES COVERT PLAN IN NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001002440006-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2007
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 10, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Oil
T.S. Approves....
Cov6rt Plan
In Nicaragua:
- By Patrick E. Tyler
and Bob. Woodward
W= ttlomftnamaw"No "- e.-
. President. Reagan has authorised.
covert operations against the Central
American nation, - of Nicaragua,
which, administration officials have
charged, is serving as the- military
command center and supply Rine' to
guerrillas in El Salvador.' ....
According to informed adminis-
tration officials,: the president has.
ruled out the use of. U.S. militai..
forces in direct anti-Nicara6uari op-
erations. But the authorized covert
plan directs the CIA to begin to
build and fund a paramilitary force
of up to 500 Latin Americans, 'who
are- to operate out of commando
camps spread along the Nicataguan-
Honduran border- . ,a - .,
The officials. stressed that it will
take months for the paramilitary
force to be recruited, trained and
positioned. to, begin operations. They
did notsay precisely when the
border operations: are-.scheduled to
begin.
As part. of this plan, the comiaan-
dos eventually would attempt to' de-
stroy vital Nicaraguan targets;. such,
as power plants' and bridges fir. .art
effort- to disrupt the. economy and
:divert the-:attention'_and? the' ie-
sources. of the.-igoveiamen op
strategists -believe these ~covert?:op,
eration& inside.: Nicaragua will- slo
.the. flow of arms to.. El Salvador. and.
disrupt whst..they'cIainz. i& a Soviet-
and Cuban-co strolled government 4L
Nicaragua. ? ":' ,
'
a f ?$19 million
Operating rider
CIA budget,. the.--planned. 500'-roan
force could be? increased~frn `size';-if'
necessary, officials.`= said. - The , CIA=
force- would; be supplemented by an
other : Latirv American commando
force of: up to - 1440? men-eornw.o?
whom currently' -are . undergoing
training; by Argentine- military- off-
THE WASHINGTON POST
10 March 1982
This is the plan for CIA covert !
operations first reported in The
Washington Post on Feb. 14 as part:
of the Reagan administration's strat. j
e- in the region. At the time, it
could not been determined whether:
the president had authorized the;
LIA's plan to build a paramilitaryi
force against Nicaragua. :..
Several informed sources now say
that the president. did formally au-
thorize the proposal, but the precise
timing of his authorization could-not
be determined. It may have occurred
late last year.
. The covert action proposal was
developed by the . CIA and- first
.presented. in detail to President Rea-
gan by CIA Director. -William J.
..Casey at the Nov 16 meeting of the y
National Security Council It' was
supported by Secretary of State Al.
exander X. Haig Jr. ,and Defense
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, ac-
cording to knowledgeable officials-
Administration officials familiar
.with the CIA covert. program
stressed that the decision to focus on
economic targets was based on a de=
sire to' disrupt the Nicaraguan. arms
supply line to El Salvador in a man-
ner that is relatively inexpensive and
least -threatening to the:-civilian popM
ulation.
"If you blow up a dam, you cause
a lot.of,trouble, but.you're not kil.
ling people," one high-level . official
said...
Iri his Feb. 18 ' press conference
=Reagan' - was. asked if ' the- United
States- was 'planning- covert. opera-
tions. in Nicaragua, but' he declin a
to comment. = ..:. ? :...... ~~ __- +a~
..:- Nicaragua ? currently:: is'ruled b
the Sandinista National- Liberation
Front, whose. guerrilla: forces' ove
threw th+. government . of-- dictator
Anastasia Somoza in.. Jury,1979J'
Honduras has; a . close military re-
'lationship._with the :United.. States; I
and Honduran olticials.fear. that the
`political uphgavaLin EL alvador and
Nicaragua. will :spill ntatbeir-.COimc
try.- As a separate, &rt of=the-_U.S
strategy-in the regi6n,_tlie.U.3:.mik
.itaz r.currently is'engaged-in two-op-.
eratione- in neighboring.Honduras?i
indirectly, ; support: anti Nf
efforts,_informecd administration. of
According to hi;tsly'-.classsifuicl
NSC records, the initial CIA propos-
al in November called for "support
and conduct of political and para-
military operations against the
-Cuban presence. and CubanSandi-4
vista support structure in Nicaragua;
and elsewhere in. Central America."(
The CIA, in seeking presidential au-
thorization for the $19 million. parna
military force?erripbasized that "the
program should not. be confined .to
that- funding level or to the 500-man
force described,". the records show.. .
--Covert operations: under the CIA
proposal, according to . the NSC
-~e 'Build popular support in-Cen-
tral America ' and.. Nicaragua fo an
opposition front that would be nat.
tionalistic anti-Cuban and' ant.
Somoza:.
? "Support;. the' opposition .front
through formation and ,training of
:action. teams to collect intelligence
and engage in paramilitary and. p
litical- operations- in? Nicaragua and
.elsewhere.
? "Work . primarilyythrouglt non
Americans" to achieve these covert
objectives, but in some cases the-CIA
might "take unilateral. paramiIitary1
action-possibly using person-
nel-against special Cuban targets.".
After the* initial presentation, the~
CIA proposal was turned over to thel
national' security planning group, a
subcommittee of the NSC, as a draft
"presidential finding,: which- states
the need. for specific covert opera-
tions. Under national security stat--
urea, no funds can be expended for
covert: actions,."untilthe president
finds that each such operation is im-
portant to the national .security: of
the United States." ...._
Senior U.S. defense aitd intelli-,
gence officials, have said in. recent
weeks that without a ,slowdown in.
the arms supply. to- El. Salvador by.
-air, land and sea- routes fimrn Nica?
ragua, the - position OIL. government
`forces in the.war-tors countrycould
-deteriorate potentially
prompting an escalation of Salvador=
an requests for U.S. military assist:
'ante. Such requests aretlikely to run
into strong. congressional and public
resistance: .1 ..
.CON7VEWD
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According to administration offt-f
cials, the covert plan is part of a
broader program through which the
administration hopes to achieve
long-term stability in Central Amer-
ica by creating, nurturing and sup-
porting new political coalitions of
centrist forces in Nicaragua and !
other key countries. ? .
Central America currently is ex-
periencing a series of armed rebel-
lions, and officials here say U.S.-in-
telligence has obtained detailed out-
lines of Soviet and Cuban long-term
financial, military and political plans
to support armed insurgencies in the'
region. This outline of Soviet inten-
tions--along with intelligence of cur-
rent-Soviet, and. Cuban-activity in,
the area-has alarmed the . pr e3i-
dent's national security advisers and,1
according to officials, is a- central
reason for the administration's co-
vert program. . ... ;~- .
Several senior officials argue that
intelligence gathering-effortscin Cen-
tral America .lapsed; significantly
under presidents Nikon, F.oid: and
Carter and that each of those dmin?
'istrations underestimated theeprob-
lems of Central American govem-
men's and the strength o59pposition ~
movements.
The CIA 'station in. El Salvador,
for example;- was-closed' for' bout
five years-roughly from 1913 to
1978-to save money, and _the Vnit-
ed States.. had virtually. no: nuelli-.
pence sources there , L gyring. than pe-.
clod.
"It takes a long time- to:itevelo
this intelligence, spread'-,-a mo9e
around.-and put people: im cricia-Z
places and make the kind. oGfriends
we need;" one official said.last week.
Only' in the past. year, officials
.said, has the. United States learned
details of what the Soviets-arid=Cu-
bans hope to gain in. the region:
intelligence reports now sfiopatbat'in
1978 the Soviets and: Cubans, m-
mitted the money andrresources fob:
a major effort to support .Cuban; -
style rebellions in CentiaL mer c
. One senior official said, 'If you '
look what the goals were in 1973 and
realize how far they have come by'!,
1982, then where they want to be in-;
1937 has to be taken seriously ard_'
that wobld concern anyone" in thin
United States.
Other officials said' they are-
alarmed by convincing intelligence,
reports that one Soviet-Cuban goal
in the region is the development of.
an active insurgency to destabilizes
Mexico during this decade.
Some intelligence reports read. ins
the president support the adminis
tration charge-of an increased Sov'ig0
and Cuban threat in Central Amer.
ica. One recent report indicatesthat
the Soviet Union is training Latin.
American pilots to fly the most.-ad.,
vaned Soviet fighter, the Mig? :25
Foxbat, which has a radar system ca-
gable of directing other planes 'MA
large battle area:
The nationalities of the :.Latin
American pilots being twined on.the
Foxbat are not clear. Cuba already
has acquired a squadron of Mig -231
supersonic fighters; and previous. ins
telligence reports have confirmed
that Nicaraguans have trained :Oa
less sophisticated Mig fighters ?-:'.
Further,, Guatemala.. -potentially
the most prosperous Central. Amer J
scan country, is also being threw.
ened. by a leftist insurgency and Tha
most current CIA estimate- is. that
the government will undergo a majors
change of status within 18 months:-. ,
: ,.While some members- of the,sq6
ministration' remain skeptical about 1
broad claims of spreading Soviet+srwi '
Cuban influence - , in the . ? regier4
knowledgeable officiate ?sayq this'.
the interpretatiorx -tlraati hss~:bees.
largely- adopted;byenec
i.'... %:.'"w.i is ?l:'-?Q'
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