HONDURAS: THE NOVEMBER 1981 ELECTIONS AND FUTURE COOPERATION WITH THE US

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000601700012-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: November 18, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP84B00049R0006017
The De uty Director of Ccnir9l Intfd(liOence
November 24, 1981
The Honorable Vernon A. Walters
Ambassador at Large (S/AL)
Department of State
Washington, D.C. -?,20520
Dear ' =cr!;! The paper you sent me on Honduras has been
reviewed by CIA elements. Attached is CIA's view,
written by the National Intelligence Officer for
Latin America. If I may do more to assist you,
please let me know.
Si ncerqly,
B' R. INMAN
Admiral, U.S. Navy
STAT
C'i
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SECRET
HONDURAS: THE NOVEMBER 1901 ELECTIONS
AND FUTURE COOPERT ON WITH THE U;*
Summary
CIA does not believe that the leadership of the Honduran Liberal Party
is controlled by persons aligned with the revolutionary left nor does CIA
view the possible elections of its leader, Roberto Suazo Cordoba, as an
obstacle to US foreign policy goals or a security threat to the region.
There are influential Sandinista sympathizers in the Liberal Party, and their
actions and strength must be closely monitored. The Honduran military shares
this concern and can act as a political counterweight 'Co the radical elements
within the Liberal Party.
The Sandinistas are working actively with Cuba to destabilize Honduras
and promote revolution, but they are relying on leftist subversive groups
as their main allies, not the Liberal Party. It is our judcgraent that the
majority of Liberals--incl uding Suazo--are anti-communists and that a post-
ponement of the election would he counterproductive.
I. Will the C!._tcome of the November 1981 Elections Endanger US Cooperation
with Honduras
Among the two front-running parties, the Liberal Party is currently
believed most likely to win the 29 November elections. Elements in two of
the three Liberal Party factions which united just before the April 1900
constituent assembly elections are believed to have sympathetic political
and financial relationship with the Nicaraguan Sandinistas.
In the view of some non-government observers, this raises two dau,erous
possibilities: that a Liberal Party victory will lead to the end of Honduran
cooperation against the extreme left and that pro-comm nist sympathizers
within the new government would weaken its capacity to resist the expanded
destabilization and terrorism in Honduras which Cuba and Nicaragua are clearly
prepared to support and encourage.
II. Importance of a Friendly Honduras
A friendly Honduras can play a major role in the containment and defeat
of the revolutionary left in Central America by cooperating vJ th other
threatened governments to cut off the infiltration of guerrillas and weapons
and by serving as a staging area for anti -Sandinista forces which might
operate against the Nicaraguan export of subversion.
At the same time, a Honduras with a constitutional government resulting
from a military-directed peaceful transition (1979-81) has a powerful sybolic
appeal in the region for center and democratic left groups and important
*This paper was written by the NIO/LA and reflects the general consensus of
NFAC and DDO.
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international participants such as the major European and Latin American
party and trade union federations. This would be in positive contrast to
the systematic building of the Marxist-Leninist dictatorship in Nicaragua
and the repeated extreme left statements that only aired revolution can end
military rule.
III. Threat from the Extreme Left
In 1979 Castro described Honduras as the "funnel" through which Cuba and
Nicaragua would send weapons and other aid for the guerrillas in El Salvador
and Guatemala. Castro expects Honduras to fall automatically after communist
victories in the rest of Central America.
In 1979 Cuba began training Honduran terrorists and guerrillas while
aiding the Honduran Communist Party to build a special "apparat" which has
worked successfully in smuggling aid to the Salvadoran guerrillas.
With Cuban and Nicaraguan backing, Honduran guerrillas held a mid-October
1981 unity meeting in Nicaragua. They agreed to strengthen preparations for
guerrilla struggle while continuing to support the transhipment of arms to
Salvadoran insurgents.
CIA estimates that the various extreme left groups have increased their
armed strength from about 100 in 1980 to about 600-800 today which includes
about 40 guerrillas reportedly training in Nicaragua and about 90 in Cuba for
movement back to Honduras in January 1982.
Al though the extreme left is not yet in reach of conquer i,-g Honduras, it
could have the power to tie clown the Honduran armed forces and prevent their
cooperation with El Salvador or anti -Sandinista groups. It could also start
enough violence to bring about polarization through couunterterrorism and propel
the already weak economy toward a politically destructive downward spiral.
IV. Moderate Groups
Except for 18 months in 1971-72, the military has governed Honduras since
1963. Corruption has been a problem for civilian as Gail as military le:aders..
Generals were removed from the presidency in 1976 and 1978 by their fellow
officers after major financial scandals.
Nevertheless, military rule has been mild. The military took the lead in
restoring democratic government and learned to work with the Liberal Par ty as
well as its traditional partners, the National Party.
Therefore, the military has to be counted among the moderate political
forces which also include strong anti-communist trade unions (which recently
won a major victory against communists in the banana workers union), four
political parties, various business and civic groups, the churches, and a
pluralist media.
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Despite a low per capita income, Honduras has made significant social
and economic progress in the last two decades (life expectancy, school enroll-
ments, income gains, and living conditions), and there is every reason to
expect that this moderate coalition could defeat and counter the extreme left--
provided it avoids a major split and provided the US and others provide needed
economic, intelligence, and military help.
In October 1981, the military, led by President Paz, took steps to find
semi-legal ways of postponing the 29 November election. These were unsuccessful
both because the political leaders mostly 6pposed any delay and because some
senior military officers have a working relationship with the Liberal as well
as the National Party: for example, Col. Gustavo Alvarez, Chief of W Public
Security Forces and intended next Armed Forces Commander. The military
leadership itself decided that: "postponing the elections might stimulate
leftist insurgency or even touch off civil war" (CIA, The Honduran Armed
Forces, October 1981, ALA-10008X). International encouragement for elections
by the US, Venezuela, and Mexico also had some impact on the military decision
to go ahead.
The problem of Cuban/Nicaraguan penetration of and links with elements of
the Liberal Party requires very close and careful monitoring and far better
intelligence collection. Nevertheless, there is consensus within CIA that
though "there are influential Sandinista sympathizers in the Liberal Party.
the majority of Liberals, including (presidential candidate) Siazo, are anti
communists and that a postponement of the election would be counterproductive"
(NFAC memorandum, ALA/tICD, 13 November 1 981 ).
A coup at this time could threaten military unity, play into Cuban and
communist hands by preventing the establishment of a new legitimate government
that could work closely with Venezuela and other Latin American democracies
and its neighbors in a more active regional and international effort against the
extreme left.
VI . After the Election
If the National Party wins, the well-known corruption of its leader
together with his close ties to two senior military officers who are described
by NFAC as "one of the most blatantly corrupt" and "corrupt and reputedly
involved in drug traffic" suggests potential institutional weakness in terms
of moderate support. As mentioned, the armed forces have removed two military
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presidents in 1975 and 1978 for extreme corruption, and this possibility
would certainly exist with respect to a civilian president if his behavior
followed pessimistic predictions. Certainly, this potential issue of
increased corruption could divide the civilian political groups and the
military as well.
A Liberal Party victory poses the risk, first, that the National Party
and its sympathetic officers would justly or not claim fraud and seek to
undo the election. Second, the military will keep a very close watch on the
Liberal Party in government, and it would he prepared to step in if the
problem of pro-communist elements became more serious in fact or appearance.
This means that both the extreme right and the extreme left might manufacture
or exaggerate information about this real problem in order to stimulate a
coup which each, for different reasons, might want. Therefore, accurate and
timely information will be all the more important on this issue of pro-
communist Liberal Party leaders and factions.
Risks which most CIA analysts see as much less probable but which never-
theless deserve some attention are that the pro-communist elements in the
Liberal Party might secretly attempt to help the extreme left through actions
such as:
using the argument that Honduras would i ncr~ease its international
stature by staying out of the struggles in Central America and perhaps
even adopti rig a Mexi can- ,ype political solution/mediation pasture
-- using the real economic stringency as an argument to weaken the
military by slowing down or subtly denying spare parts, equipment,
and the like (as apparently occurred to some extent in Jamaica
during early 1980);
-- building "youth groups" which could serve as a nexus or cover for
paramilitary forces to be armed by the Salvadoran guerrillas or
Nicaragua at the time when full-scale guerrilla activitic's were to
begin in Honduras.
The various non-government assessments of the situation in Honduras have,
in my judgment, shown clearly that the US must monitor the post--election
situation very closely and add to its very considerable information through
increased collection and analysis in the next months,