ROUGH NOTES OF ROSTOW COMMITTEE, MORNING OF 26 OCTOBER 1962

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R000100110025-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2007
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: January 1, 1962
• Content Type: NOTES

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NSC review completed
TOP SRCRE'T?'
BOUGH R'072S of Bestow Committee, Morning of 26 October 1962
---A. Rostov outlined three courses of US action, to be pursued concurrently.
1. The political line. This begins with the latest version of
the U Thant proposal and includes the Brazilian resolution on a
nuclear-free zone and a possible summit. The objective is to get
the missiles out, to give up nothing for it, but to provide the
Soviets with such face-savers as we can. Within Rostov'a purview,
is chief planning officer on this.
2. The military line. This is a series of actions leading up
to an air strike, which should in the meantime be ready on an emergency
basis. A further elaboration is needed of an ]Icecutive Committee paper
which states the pros and cons Cif &. us the political pre-
conditions for undertaking it. is responsible for this
scenario, will work with DOD, an w w on today's ISA paper as a
source of suggested intermediate, steps.
3. The economic line. This is based upon a POL embargo. Rostow
believes that existing estimates underrate the economic effects of this.
He lays more stress, however, on the political effects of this move as
demonstrating our determination and setting a terminus for the regime
which will influence the immediate and continuing estimates of Castroites
and the Soviets. Thus this line is designed to crack Cuba politically
from within. Bob Hurwitch is in charge.
---B. "Scenarios" on all these lines are to be prepared today and thereafter,
perhaps tomorrow, a unified scenario will be done. The caam~n elements
or guiding Principles governing all three courses are: a focus on the
existing missiles as the issue; a steady increase of pressures; a
political position which offers the Soviets not concessions but some
face-saving device, and the failure of which would justify unilateral
action.
---C. Hurwitch has an additional task: to head a continuing interagency
assessment of stability in Cuba. This is to include representatives
of the W/P and DD/I and is to have completed by c.o.b. today an assess-
ment of the situation in Cuba in the light of events of this week and
recommendations for the exploitation of vulnerabilities. IM and USIA
are to participate.
TOP am
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TOP 8ECRRT
.?>-D. CIA vas asked to prepare a short statement on the ability of the
Cubans to operate the Soviet missiles, either conventional or nuclear
if they overwhelmed Soviet guards. I have passed this on to 08I
(through Gail 8tringham) with instructions to send replies directly
to Roatow and
TOP MKM
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\ew York .-tCUI
By Warren Rogers Jr.
WASHINGTON.
When Congress comes back in January, one of the,
.first questions it will ask will be this: how good Is our
military intelligence on Cuba and Russia?
-graphs and a good deal of precise information gained
The Administration has not told all it knows about
the Soviet shipment of offensive weapons shipped to Cuba.
It has told only enough to make its point. For example,
this reporter knows the United States had extremely se-
curate knowledge of what was in those Soviet ships, and
the Russians knew we knew. This is not the sort of knowl-
edge to be gained through aerial photography and so the
;obvious inference is that the United States has agents in
the ports from which the cargo was shipped.
But this Is after-the-fact intelligence. Congress will
want to know, for example, how the Russians managed
to get the rockets to Cuba in the first place and it will ask
why the existence of such rockets in the Soviet arsenal
was not known in advance--or, if it was known, why this
was not made public.
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara has said
the medium-range and Intermediate-range Soviet missiles
are unlike anything the United States possesses. Congress
will be asking why this is so. The question is particularly
pertinent because Gen. Lauris Norstad, NATO Supreme
Commander, has been pressing for two years for a mobile
medium-range missile like .the one the Russians sent to
Cuba. Gen. Norstad had been scheduled to retire Nov. 1,
but'is staying In his post until Jan. 1 because of the Cuban
crisis.
Mr. McNamara has been cool to the Idea. He says
such a weapon would cost about $2 billion and is of doubt-
'ful value. But he offered to build one if the NATO coun-
tries would pay for it. So far, it has reached only the first
.stage, "program definition." This make it too tenuous to
be included in the new Defense budget unless it becomes
ai more urgent matter.
FIVE MEN BEHIND- THE SCENES
Five men who don't like to get their names in the
paper were the key figures behind scenes in the cat-
and-mouse game of collecting and analyzing the intelli-
-Air Force Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, chief of the
Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency. A former top
assistant to FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, Joe Carroll
Is a brilliant Intelligence officer. When the Air Force
was organized 15 years ago he created its intelligence
branch. When DIA was formed a year agog unifying
military Intelligence for the first time, he was a
natural to head it.
-Army Lt. Gen. William W. Quinn.,Joe Carroll's
deputy. "Buffalo Bill" Quinn, a football and lacrosse
star at West Point in the 1930s, Is a tough combat
commander, a former. chief of Army information, and a
highly capable intelligence expert.
-Rear Adm. Samuel B. Frankel, Joe Carroll's
other deputy. He speaks Chinese and Russian and Is
an expert on Red China and the Soviet Union. His
career, too, has centered on intelligence.
- -- %,T-shall S. Carter, deputy direc-
A, Orrnted Prue
TALK TEAM-Two of the three named by President
Kennedy yesterday to handle negotiations with Cuba
were, left, Under Secretary of State George Ball, and
Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. ;Gilpatric.
John MeCloy will head the group.
1
tor of the Central Intelligence Agency. "Pat" Carter
served on the Marshall mission to China after World
War II, as a military aide in Europe with the rank of
minister, and as a member of I S. delegations to in-
ternational conferences in Rio de Janeiro, Bogota and
Mexico City.
-Adm. Jerauld Wright, former commander,of the
Atlantic Fleet, and currently, by special act of a Con-
gress, a full-time consultant to the CIA. His long
Naval career involved him intimately with NATO and
Caribbean affairs and made him especially valuable
during the Cuban crisis.
These men will be queried on Capitol Hill during the
"military posture" hearings in January. How they answer
may well determine, among other things, how fast or slow
Secretary McNamara may hereafter proceed with his pro-
gram to unify the armed forces.
FIRST REAL UNIFICATION TEST
Cuba was the first real test of unification. If It is
found that unified intelligence lid a better job than the
three services could have done individually, Congress will
look more favorably on unification in other fields. If not,
the selling job McNamara had done will come unglued.
Other questions are tantalizingly persistent. For
example: if the Russians could suddenly come up with a
highly mobile missile with a 1,100-mile range and also a
hitherto unheard-of missile with a 2,200-mile range, what
did they do to achieve it? Did they take existing rockets
and give them added range by making the nuclear war?
head smaller. (since there is a direct ratio between rang(
and weight of payload)?
If so, of what effect will this have on Soviet inter
continental ballistic missiles? Will the Russians be abl
to do what the United States: has done-that is, build
lot of small-yield ICBMs, and even put - them on sub
marines? If so, will this hasten the day of nuclear stale
mate, when the American umbrella of nuclear superlorii
will no longer prevail?
Much secret data on these points plus pictures
clearer than those made public will be turned over to tl
NATO Council at its December meeting. The NATO Cow
cii may be forced to make new decisions, in light of obi
ous Soviet gains in medium-range and intermediate ran
rocketry.
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