REMARKS OF JUDGE WILLIAM CLARK, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00966R000100060032-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: May 11, 1982
• Content Type: MISC

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Office of ^.e Press Secretary
or Irunediate Release
REMARKS OF
.AR R,
NATIONAL SECtRITY ADVISOR
TO THE PRESIDENT
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Georgetown University
3:05 P.M. EDT
May 21, 19 8 2
JUDGE. CLARK : Thank you, Dave. Thank you for the invita-
tion to be here and thank you, for inviting this very distinguished
group of people. I should say another thank you, and at certain risk
to your reputation, and to that of Joe Jordan..
Speaking of the Senate hearings a moment ago, I should.
state, probably for the first time, that. within hours after those
hearings I sought them both. cut to become low-paid, low-key consul-
tants, and they have been that during critical times in the past 15
months. Believe me, t have certainly, benefited by their advice during
those times and, even more importantly, their friendship.
Today's remarks or announcements, however you may wish to
characterize it, I'd_hope would be those of the President, because I'm
discussing today his. personal study, his. personal program, his personal
decision, the decision directive having been issued within. our organiza-
tion just this morning.
However, the first of the year the President announced
that he. was becoming far more involved in foreign affairs, foreign
policy-, defense, and. would. be speaking far more frequent iv in the area,
and. that is what he has. done . Within a. five or six-week period he will
have. given almost as many addresses, starting with the Eureka address.
He then. has. a foreign policy; defense address -- or. certainly
within that realm -- before the Parliament, an to Rome, and back to
the NATO conference in Bonn. And certainly a shorter address, but in
the same category, in Berlin.. Then. back to New York where he addresses
the United Nations Conference on Disarmament. So, what I guess I'm
suggesting is that the staff upstairs -- so, Bi?1, you, as did the
President, play proxy today and go into the matter we consider a very
imnor tant one, and that is our national security strategy.
i. would begin by saying that the pace of national security
affairs. has seldom been faster than. during the past one year and a.
ha1-.f.. The initial release of our strategic arms reduction proposals,
the present crisis over the Falkland Islands, the upcoming summits in
7'a-1'sailles and Bonn, are but the latest in a series of scheduled and
unscheduled events that. have seized. the attention of the national
security community.
We have seen the return of the Sinai to Egyat and the
regular launches and. recovery of the Space Shuttle Entermrise.. We have
witnessed,- in grief, the brutal murder of Anwar Sadat, General Dozier ' s
kidnapping in Europe, war in the fiddle East, and attempted guerrilla
insurrections in the Caribbean.
we have begun intermediate range nuclear force negotia-
tions in Geneva, participated in the Ottawa and Cancun sii wits, and
at with 76 heads of state or government. Z1 m speaking now that the
resid,_nt has personally met 76 heads of state -- unpreceder e I
mig +t Ladd, i n t.:is period of ti=e .
V
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We have -.?ra c ad ce::ccr_cv t we~:: i ~, ,
Y VcG.~=
u' a-Zi aiC:3 . i i 'c.-
e have seen tyr a n=-,7 zf; an_s to and Pala. : -
conplex, inter dependent world with c pcr" tun= _jes of ten .^._sguiseQ as
the President ~! r
has said, as challenges..
The pace is not likely to relent and in t! he rush of
events it is easy to lose sight of the forest, given the trees we
deal with are as ambulatory as Macbeth's BirnamJWood.
For these reasons, in early February of this year --
Februarv 5., to be exact -- the President directed a review of our
national security strategy. At that time our strategy was a collec-
tion cf depart-aental.policies which had been developed during the
Administration's first year in office. The President wanted to review
the results of that first year with .decisions often being made at the
departmental level, to see where: we were, to make sure our various
policies were consistent and to set the course-for the future.
In particular, he wanted to make sure that any discussions
we had with the leadership of Congress on reductions in our defense
budget, any discussions with the leadership of the Soviet Union
regarding arms reductions, were based both. on a well thought-through and
integrated strategy for preserving our national security..
The President's involvement in this study is a good
example of how he involves himself in national security affairs.
As a former governor, President Reagan's past experience more clearly
lies, as g think you would agree, in economic and domestic policy
areas. But a lifetime of interest. in and concern for, and debate of,
national security issues, has built a. framework of philosophy which
Ronald Reagan articulated to the American people, and which they
endorsed, a year and a half. ago..
The conversion. of that philosophy to policy has been one
of the president's major efforts since. January.. He views national
security as his most. compelling responsibility. He. has come to
t _-eat it accordingly.
In the past four- months about a. third of the President' s
office time. -- as V m. so often. reminded by Mike Deaver as we attempt
-to schedule another. appointment -- has been devoted to national
security work.--more than any other area or endeavor. He has already
signed 35 National Security Directives, 19 of them this year; a pace
that compares, favorably with his predecessors.
There have been 37" meetings of the National Security
Councilrduring this Administration, nearly one a. week. The President
has personally chaired each and every one of them. :ew Presidents --
ca ainly none in peacetime -- have paid as much attention to national
security problems or issues.
In. this particular security review that we discuss today,
as S mentioned, the decision or directive having been issued this
ma=in(;, the President played an extraordinarily active role. He
progressively reviewed, and. he. commented, an all nine interagency
draft segments as they were prepared. Sometimes we ret= ed to the
d,-awing board.
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0 -3- 0.
Sometimes our fuzzy language was.sharpened by the presidential -- first
person singular..
The NSC staff led the effort. in its role as the broker
of those ideas coming from the interagency efforts and beyond such--.
as Don Regan, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Mac Baldr.ige, participated as well,
even though not-within the formal NSC"process when issues pertaining
to their-areas arose.
And certainly Secretary Weinberger's 1982 defense policy
provided an excellent foundation.for-the military portion of this
study. The senior leadership at Defense, State,. CIA, as I mentioned,
were totally involved. JCS'met 12 times, consider the various. parts
of their portion of. the study. When it was done, the: study-and decision,
as they must be,. were the President's-
. Now that the work is done-or at. least the first major
portion. and we're at.a plateau here today. We have come to several.
conclusions, I believe,- seven..
First, the purpose of our strategy should be to preserve
our institutions of freedom and democracy -- to protect our citizens,
.to promote their economic well-being and to foster an international
orderliness supportive of these institutions'and these principles..
Second,. we'-re confident that the policies: of our first
year have been internally consistent and that-they do lay.the.groundwork
for a strategy that will protect. the. security of the United States.
Third conclusion,. a.successful.strategy must have diplomatic,
political,, economic, informational. components built on a foundation of
military strength.
Fourthly,.. our strategy must. be forward looking and active.
We must offer hope.. As the President said last year at Notre Dame,
collectivism and the subordination of the individual to the state is
now perceived around. the world asa bizzare. and evil' episode of history
whose last pages.are.even now-being-written.- We have something better
to offer namely freedom.. To. secure. the. America we all want and the
global. stability and prosperity we all seek, we. cannot sit back and
hope that somehow it all will happen. We must. believe in what. we're
doing and that requires initiatve,, patience, persistence." We find
we must be:-prepared to respond vigorously to opportunities as they
arise: and to create opportunities where they have not existed before.
We must be steadfast in. those: efforts ..
The fifth:. conclusion,. ours must be a. coalition strategy.
We, together with our friends, our allies, must pull together. And
that effort will certainly be evidenced as: we mentioned a. moment
ago,` the President. proceeds on the third of June to Versailles,. Rome,
London, Bonn, Berlin,- New York.
There's no other way, we must achieve an even closer
linkage with regional. allies and friends:. Next. month's-NATO summit
is a. case in point, of. course.. There may be a vocal.minority questioning
the basic assumptions of the Atlantic Alliance. It's not the first
time, nor will it be. the last. But. when. President Reagan and other
NATO leaders meet in Bonn, there should. be a strong reaffirmation of
Alliance unity, vitality, and resolve. A strong, unififed NATO remains
indispensible for the protection. of. all of our. Western interests..
The differences among NATO members involve shaping NATO, not
whether there should be an Alliance. At Bonn, we will witness fundamental
agreement on.the.need to strengthen our deterrent posture.. We will see
a balanced approach to arms control and NATO remains dedicated to
the common. task of preserving democracy.
Sixth, the conomic component of our strategy is particularly
important. We must promote a well-fuxfctioning international economic
system with minimal distortion to trade and broadly agreed rules for
resolving differences.
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The su mj ?s a-- O z wa aid CaY! c n played a
the search for a cooperative sera ~__?gv for economic growth The
`aribbean Basin Initiative is a further contr :but_On, offering a
constructive, long-term commitment to countries in our hemisphere.
?ext month's Versailles Summit will be another stem. '?e anticipate
an atmosphere of realism at Versailles.. We hope it will inspire
new thinking while deflating outworn concepts.-
oncepts . We must also force our
i 11aa V.. ~a~. VG'J ar. zar , -aa
shortcomings-
The
seventh. and final conclusion, the maintan. nce of peace
racuires a strong, flexible, and responsive military. The rebuilding
of our nation's defenses is now our urgent task.
For obvious reasons, I cannot discuss the defense portion
of cue: review in the detail that I. did to select members of Congress
this. morning or perhaps in the detail that you might desire. I. will
~.r.., however, to provide the highlights where I can, some degree of
speci'icity.
Our interests are global and they conflict with those of
the Soviet Union, a. state which pursues worldwide policies, most
unfriendly to our own_ The Soviet Union maintains the most heavily
armed military establishment in history and possesses the capability
to project its military forces. far beyond its own borders. It's
a.give:n that, of course, we have vital interests around the world,
including maritime sea lanes of communication. The hard fact is that
the military power of. the Soviet Union is now able to threaten these
vital interests as never before- The Soviet Union also complements
its direct military capabilities with proxy forces and surrogates
with. extensive arms sales and. grants by manipulation of. terrorist
and subversive organizations, and through support to a nuatb.er of.
insurgencies and. separatist movements: -- providing arms, advice,
military training, political backing..
Our military forces and those of our.. allies must protect our
common. interests in. our increasingly turbulent environment. We must
be prepared to. deter attack: and. to defeat such attack when. deterrence
fail..
In this regard,. the modernization of our strategic nuclear
forces will receive first priority in our efforts to rebuild the military
capabilities of the. United States. Nuclear deterrence can only be
achieved if our strategic nuclear posture makes Soviet assessment of
the risks of war, under any contingency, so great as to remove any
incentive for initiating attack.
The decisions reached, on strategic nuclear forces, which
the President announced last fall., remain, the foundation of our policy..
The. highest priority was to be accorded to survivable. strategic
communications systems.
In addition, we plan to modernize the manned bomber force,
increase the accuracy and payload of our submarine launched ballistic
missiles, add sea launched cruise missiles, improve strategic defenses,
and deploy a new larger, more accurate land based ballistic missile.
The latter decision was reaffirmed by the. President las
Monday. He- views the production of a modern ICBM, with the earliest
passible introduction into the operational force, as absolutely essential.
The President provided some guidance to the Deoart:-.ent
of Defense on priorities he wished accorded to various basing and
defense schemes, but he essentially asked Defense for their recommendation
am a.. =e=anent basing mode by early fall so that he could .:cmm_ lv with
congressional desires
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0
for an administration position, well before t e end of this yea=.
the s ..:.e bile, a dent made =_ lea = ==t
a more sur`r;vable basing made has been selected, funded, cleared for
corst_,c.. t
~icr_, he wishes to retain the option of ceolcv=n g a limited
number o !X and _'^ muteman silos as an intecra.. pare of tine overa_i
`'x program.
The silo basing option provides a hedge against unforeseen
technical developments, program changes. It is a clear incentive to
tie Soviets to negotiate arms reductions, and even is silos, MCC gains
in su+--~rivability as all. three legs of the strategic triad are mode_-nized.
The :CCprogram, the President has said, is too important
to allow the risk of technical environmental or arms control debates
delay introduction of the missile into force..
While the failure to strengthen our nuclear deterrent coulr.
be disastrous, recent history makes clear that conventional deterrence
is now more important than. ever. Current. overseas deployments will
be maintained to provide a capability for timely and flexible response
to contingencies and to demonstrate resolve to honor our commitments.
Ground,, naval and air forces will remain deployed in Eroee, in the
western Pacific, in Southwest. Asia. and elsewhere as appropriate. In th.. ~.
hemisphere, naval forces will maintain a presence in the North Atlantic,
the Caribbean Basin, the Mediterranean, the western Pacific and in the
Indian Ocean. Forward-deployed forces will be postured to facilitate
rapid I.esaonse.. Intermittent overseas developments. from the United..
States will be. madeas necessary.
Now,. our strategic reserve of U. S'..-based forces, both
active and reserve: components, will be maintained at a high state of
readiness and. will be periodically exercised. Last. year's Bright Star
exercise the Middle East, last nonth.' s Ocean Venture 8 2 in. the
Caribbean provided a valuable experience for those forces- They also
demonstrated a multi-national., multi-force. capability to defend our
interests and those of our friends worldwide. Our- need to swiftly _e-
inforcra worldwide means that improvements in cur strategic mobility
and. in our reserve structure are terribly important.
Although the most prozainent threat to our vital interests
worldwide is the Soviet Union, our interests can also be out in jecparv
by actions of ? other states,- other groups. In contingencies not involving
the Soviet Union, we hope. to rely on friendly regional states to provide
military force.
Should the threat exceed our capabi -I ties within regional
states we must be prepared within the framework of our constitutional
processes to comanit U.S. forces to assist cur allies. This, ofl course,
does not mean that we must push. ourselves into areas where we are neither
wanted. nor desired or. needed. What. it does mean is that we cannot
reject in advance any options we might need to protect those same
vital. interests. To do so is to invite aggression, undermine our
adibi ity and place at risk all. global objectives..
Now, this highlights the imnpor tarice of security assistance.
By this term we mean military sales, grant assistance, i~ztarnationa1
military education and training, economic support funds and peacekeeping
operations. if. we do not assist our allies and friends in meeting their
legiizate defense recuiraments', then their ability to cope with con-
fer i-ct goes down and the pressure for eventual U. S . involvement goes
up.. vet: today security assistance is not doing the job it should, as
discovered by these same studies.
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Resources are inadequate, of ten_ of the wrong k-'-d.
During the 1950s, the security assistance budget ranged from 5 to
10 pE. rc :eat %)I: the defense budget. But today, , 1 _ Is about ~..,, oe r C ^.t
Wb..l.e it is not necessary to return to-t-
o the cost war levels that re-
ar-zed and secure; Western =u_ope, scene S early _Owth seczri _ .
assistance can be our most Cost-effective in.vest.:Ient. Again, found
by our studies.
The annual. budget cycle constrains long-range planning.
Countries participating in our security assistance program and procure-
meat officers at the Defense Department both need to plan ahead.
Procurement lead times limit the responsiveness of the overall program.
And, finally, legislative restrictions reduce the ability of our gover~:.-
ment to react appropriately to emergency conditions.
An effective security assistance program, again, is a
critical element in meeting our security objectives abroad. At times
recently, have had difficulty explaining that on the Fill. Thus, it
is a real compliment to our own force structure. Security assistance
can'help deter conflict, can. increase the ability of our friends and
allies to defend. themselves without the commitment of our own combat
forces. Effective programs can establish a degree of compatibility
between U.S. forces and the forces of recipient countries so we can
work together in combat if necessary. Not only does security assistance
offer a cost-effective way of enhancing our security worldwide but
it also strengthens our. economy in general and our defense production
base in particular. In short, a. little assistance buys a lot of
security.
For- these reasons, we are planning a priority effort to
improve the effectiveness, the. responsiveness of this vital component
of our national security strategy.. We will be looking at ways of
reducing lead times.. We, will take a. hard look at existing legislation
futu eresources_ Programs require predictability. This points toward
more extensive use of. multiyear commitments and a larger capitalization
of the special. defense acquistion. fund.
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Suit, Secure .y assistance needs x. and ~. . g any we have plan to
No one should mistake the main goal of American global
strategy. The goal, of course, as the President has said over and
again, is peace.
We have devoted too large a portion of our national
resources and emotion over the past 40 years to the alleviation of
want, hunger, suffering and distress throughout the world, to want any-
thing but peace in every corner of the planet. And :.hose who slander
the United States with charges. of warmoncerin g can barely caper over
their own guilty consciences in this very regard..
In particular, the record of the Soviet Union in armed
suppression of popular movements since 1945 is unparalleled among
modern nations. To maintain peace with freedom, therefore, we are
forced, reluctantly, to plan carefully for the possibility that our
adversaries may prove unwilling to keep that peace. And when we turn
to a strategy for our military forces, we enter the world of assump-
tions, scenarios, and hypothetical projections. It would be our strategy
to employ military force to achieve specific political objectives
quickly on. terms favorable to the United States and cur Allies.
We need a better, more detailed strategy in order to
buy the right equipment, develop forces, and lay detailed plans.
This strategy must provide flexibility and yet allow preplanning.
In trying to solve. this problem we have looked at such strategy as
a planning continuum over the last four months. At the lower end
of the spectrum. our guidance emphasizes the integration of economic
aid and. security assistance, foreign military training, and supple-
mentary support capability..
At the higher end our strategy guidance takes into
account the global military capabilities of. the Soviet Union and the
interrelationship. of strategic- theaters.. We recognize that in spite
of our efforts preserve peace, any conflict with the Soviet Union
could. expand- to global dimension.
Thus, global planning is a necessity. This does not mean
that we must have the 'caaability to successfully engage Soviet forces
simultaneously on all fronts. We. can't, simply can't. What it does
mean is that we must procure balanced forces and establish priorities
far sec uential: operations to insure that military power would be
applied in the most effective way on a priority basis.
It is in the interest of the United States to limit the
scope of any conflict.. The capability for counteroffensives on. other
=onts is an essential element of our strategy, but it is not a
substitute for adequate military capability to defend our vital
interests. in the area in. which they are threatened.
On the other hand, the decision to expand a conflict may
well not be ours to make. Therefore., U.S. forces must be. capable of
responding to a major attack with unmistakable global implications
early on in any conflict.
The President has established priorities in the way cur
forces would be used in. combat, in terms of geography, in terms of
force development. We must ask, what do we fix first?
We have tried to analyze the risks we face. We cannot
fix them all at once, in part because things take time, and in part
because: the Soviet military advantage results from a whole* decade of
investment. and top priority. There is not enough money available to
e'1~ T 1L~.l.e the. risks we face overnight.
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;,hat we have
t=ied
first things (first, and deve_oc
the worst comes to worst.
do is analyze _= ose risks oat
how we wil_ c-r.duc-" ourselves
On the other hand, we want to haze for the best, and we
want to offer that hope to ath ers , our. Allies , our ?-nds , the -4-na
World, and especially to the citizens of the Soviet Union.
it is our fondest hope that with an active vet prudent -
I
security policy, we might one day convince the leadership Of
the Soviet Union to turn their attention inward, to seek the legiti-
macy that only comes from the. consent of the governed, and. thus to
address the homes and the dreams of their own ceocle.
Now, I've attempted to give an overview of four months
of work, and at this point suggest that Tom Reed, sitting at my left,
a. colleague of fifteen years and. an advisor to the Governor now
President for the same period, and Col. Al Myer. over the 'next several
days will be extending this study as far as it can go short of classi-
fied material in all of its aspects and in much greater explanation.
But if we have time, Dave? r'll entertain a cuestion or two, whatever
your custom is here..
MR. ABSHIRE: Good. Before calling on Jim Woolsey, let
me say that, for the background discussion, the attribution should be
to a senior White. House Official, and L would ask you. to please iden
t. fy yourself when you ask the question, in the interest of judge
Clark.
JIIDGZ CLARK: Yes, sir?
Q Jim Woolsey. r want to ask a political cuestion, L-
I righ.t. The 195.0s are sometimes looked back upon. fondly as a period
o bipartisanship in. foreign policy, the late '.40s and. '50s. And in
the last few months we've seen some examples of some what might be
called. 1950s-styla liberalism in the foreign policy area. service.
You've, seen both the New Republic and the Washington Post editorially
critical of the nuclear freeze and the. no-first-use proposal. by former
Secretary McNamara. and. others, you've seen. Congressman. Las Aspin
admittedly prop
ose defense budget cuts but. significantly less in cuts
1 7:
than the outgoing president of the Chamber of Commerce, and you've
seen the A.FL-CIO rather more supportive. of the Administration's defense
program than the Business Round Table, and you've even seen Susan
SSontag,aoparently somewhat mote able to distinguish between General
Jaruzelski and Lech Walesa than any random collection of New York
bankers. (Laughter.)
And L wonder if. you could suggest to us, in light of the
potential positive impact of rebuilding a 1950s-type consensus
toward at. least some major foreign policy and national security issues,
what. specifically the Administration is doing now
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and ... planning to do in the future to gi'v'e i 1.s hand _ in a positive
and affirmative fashion to those people who may disacree with it on
some things but an a number of important issues are clearly willing to
be helpful in support: of it. +
MR. ARSEIRE: Jim Woolsey is a Democrat, I should --
JUDGE CLARK: I have not seen all the premises of your
question, but I have seen the issue, Mr. . Woolsey, and I think that
the answer is fairly clear, that -- and we've reminded ourselves
within. the NSC process that our approach, more than at any other time
in recent tines, must. be that; that we are admonished to -- by Senator
Vandenburg and that is that this area of activity must be nonpartisan
and broadly based.
As I mentioned earlier, this morning's activities in
between NSC meetings included my going up to the Hill before the
House and Senate Armed Services 'Committees and before the Defense
subcommittees of both the-House and the Senate Appropriations
Committees to go into far more. detail for a couple of reasons. One,
Z think that's our duty to consult;- and, secondly, we're going to
need an awful lot of. help, particularly in the area of security
assistance -- and cur MX, "the problem of the moment." But -- so
I think, that both custom usage and success require a total nonpartisan
approach. I would hope that my experience on the. bench the last 12
years, which. also was nonpartisan, might assist in this. approach.
And plus I guess I could, end my answer by saytng that., pra .: atically,
one of the first things that we. learn. back here, particularly, the
novices, is how. to count- So I think. -- (daughter) from that
standpoint alone we' 11 continue being as nonpartisan. in our approach
as we try to realize our national interests in the new directive
that was signed this morning.
S2 Bob Kupperman. of CSIS ..
When the. administration first- came into office and
suggested that the National. Security Council staff and. the Security
advisor would assume-a lesser role than carried in the past administra-n
tions , I wonder, particularly in light. of the INF and ST1RT talcs
and the tremendous need for coordination, how the Security Council
is going to behave now coordinating these efforts by contrast with
the Less. diminished role than was. assumed in past administrations
JUDGE CLARK: Well, I would hope that whatever. the role
of the National Security staff -- or from the standpoint of prominence
a.bcut town, the. height or depth, would, not really play a part or
in any way suggest what the success or- its opposite is going to be.
in: the. area of which you speak. . I ; so far- for the !as-"-- 13 months,
find that area of activity to be well coordinated, act -- reporting
as it must by statute through the State. Department and on uv the
inverted funnel through the NSC staff and directly to the President.
I know a couple of recent articles that have been thrust on my desk
certain mornings -- that there might be an indication that within
the arms control community there has been some give and take. Without
commenting an the accuracy of any such articles, I. look upon that
give and take as being healthy in our democratic process and. I think
we're on track. Certainly Ed Rcwny, Paul Vitae, Gene Rostow and
on the conventional side, Mir. Star- -- General Starr, have all been
in to see the President numerous times as part. of that process. But
again reporting upward, and then as the decision-making, including
est.-v.ct_ons - ground-level instructions, going right in and --
as. past of the briefing now with the President, which occurs on one.
or more times a day, they've come in, particularly as they report
. fr m overseas. Paul Nitze I s arrival each time has been marked
by going into the Cvai Office within 24 hours upon arriving "acme.
SC I hope it's wcrkii.~'j .
MORE
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i am sorry. I am getting ahead of you.
back to my ?4c.
L'd better go
Q Judge Clark, Joe Mayer with Senator Jay Garn's of-
fce. you talked about strategy and arms control. One of the major
criticisms that was made of the Carter administration's Nuclear
Targeting Doctrine for example, PD-59, was the fact that we did
not have the forces to execute the policy. Now the President has
called. for negotiations seeking to reduce, substantially, our
nuclear arsenals on both sides. And I was curious as to what extent
an assessment of our Nuclear Targeting Doctrine or strategy was
taken into account in designing. our START negotiating positions?
And can we expect a major review of this issue in the future?
JUDGE CLARK: There has been a continuum. And I think
I am going to refer the specifics to Torn Reed whose particular
area you are in.
Tom, what part. did it play in your studies?
MR.. REED : That part of the security studies or part
of the things that occurred this spring was a review of the L
targeting doctrine that had its origin in PD-59. We are short of
forces to execute all the sorts of strategies that the Judge has
talked about. That is one of the things that we have ascertained, that
there. are risks. We. have: tried to allocate those. And decide what
we would do if worst comes to worst.
JUDGE CLARK-.. Thank you,. Tom.
By the way,. Z failed to mention not only was Tom point
man in these studies for the past- four months, but also, as Special
Assistant to. the President, he will overseeing the really important
part. The-part that has been too often forgotten. in past.
act=in;Lstrations. And, that is implementation.
u.R. ABSEIRE: Jack Nelson.
Q Jack Nelson of The Los Angeles Times, Judge Clark.
L realize this is a session mostly as an overview and maybe longer
range... But can you tell us something about the Falkland crisis
today, and how you see i.t developing, and how much aid, we are giving
to the British?
JUDGE CLARK:- Well, there are `ao or three points a
Littler outside the scope of direct examination, but just let me say
for the moment that, as I'm sure you've already determined, the situa-
tion there is at a very critical stage when weighed against what is or
is not happening in New York. I'd say that, as from the beginning
Q= the, situation, the President has watched it very closely on into
the ni.ght, as required, and the situation group, as in all such situa-
tions, is watching it on a 24-hour basis, keeping us all apprised.
MR. ABSHIRE: Allen?
Q What about the other part of the cuestion?
Ecw much aid are we civinc ;-n __--
about that?
JUDGE CLARK : A-";- t-lis time I can say that we are keeping
cur traditional ccrrzi` eats to Britain which, as we know, go back to
1X14, without going into any .
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Q Judge Clark, Allen Yleinstein , the editor of the
Washington Quarterly here at CSIS. There's been some talc in your
-- today, in your remarks, and Jim Pioolsey's,_ and others, about
presenting a blueprint for some new ;road, strategic consensus.
Not -- presumably, that the administration ho--es to persuade a bi-
partisan majority of the Congress to subuort, but also a majority of
the American people.
Are there any plans afoot at this point that you can
share with us to explain more carefully, perhaps more systematically
than in the past, what the administration has been doing in the area
of strategic planning, if only to try and convey, not simbly the de-
tails and the broad outlines, but to convey a sufficient sense of
coherence and purpose to achieve the kind of sur)port that certainly
the Administration wants to gain from the American oeople?
JUDGE CLARK: You're referring, what do we have planned?
To be sure of your question, that question being, how do we plan to
implement whatever we have been studying and whatever the President
has directed this morning?
Again, this has been part of the overall study that Tom
and Col. Myer will be going into,over the next week and I would like
to let them, in what will be an evolutionary stage, explain that as
they take these steps. But it comes under that old word, implementa-
tion, that I find so often lacking in the studies I've seen in my short
time here. But I think the President has been assured that that will
begin, come Monday morning.
MR. A.BSHIRE: Thank you very much, Judge Clark. We hope
we'vee set a precedent here that we can get you back. soon. We're
delighted you've been with. us..
(Abplause. )
END 3:53 P.M., EDT
JUDGE CLARK: Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen.
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