SUPPORT INCREASES FOR INF LINKED TO ARMS TALKS, BUT FEW FAVOR NUCLEAR FIRST USE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R003000110010-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2007
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: May 7, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

May 7, 1982
SUPPORT INCREASES FOR INF LINKED TO ARMS TALKS,
BUT FEW FAVOR NUCLEAR FIRST USE
is a report of USICA public opinion surveys in
Imlil- and late April by the Gallup affiliates in
Britain, Germany, and Italy, and by Demoscopie in
France. About 1000 adults were interviewed in each
country. Interviews in Britain were conducted while
the British fleet was en route to the Falkland
Islands.
Summary
West Europeans are divided over INF deployment. However,
support generally prevails when stationing is linked to
arms talks. In fact, conditional support for INF is back
to about the same level as before the anti-nuclear demon-
strations last fall. Moreover, the perception is growing
that INF will strengthen Western deterrence. Relatively
few, however, favor NATO's first use of nuclear weapons in
Europe. At the same time, pro-NATO sentiment is widespread
and increasing.
End Summary
When INF Linked to Talks, Support Prevails
When told of Soviet dominance in European. INF missiles,
West European publics. are divided over INF stationing.
Support prevails in Britain (50%-to-37%), while opposition
prevails in Italy (41% to-52%). Opinion is closely split
in France (45%-to-40%) and West Germany (38%-to-39%).
In the case of the FRG, this is a significant shift since
January when opposition outweighed approval by 41-to-32
percent.. _
However, except in Italy, support for INF stationing when
liked to arms talks has widened, apparently reversing
declines registered in the wake of last fall's anti-nuclear
demonstrations.
More specifically, the proportion favoring INF stationing
if arms talks fail or if they are,underway at the same time
remains the same in Italy (40%), but has increased by nearly
ten percent since February to the prevailing view in Britain
(53%), France (44%), and West Germany (49%). Conditional
supporters now equal or surpass their numbers of last
summer. A handful (8% to 12%) in all countries favor INF
regardless of arms talks. (See attached chart)
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Taken together, conditional and unconditional supporters of
INF deployment now constitute majorities in Britain (65%),
France (56%), and West Germany (58%).
As the chart shows, unconditional opposition likewise has
declined. It stands at about 30 percent in Britain, France,
and West Germany, but higher (44%) in Italy. This is a drop
of about ten percent in Britain and West Germany, and
somewhat less in Italy, since last fall and winter. The
decline in opposition leaves Italian opinion closely divided
between opposition (44%) and support (48%).
While public views on INF have changed in recent months,
there continues to be extensive public unawareness or
inisinforirtation about the Soviet monopoly of European INF
missiles. While three-quarters or more in all four coun-
tries are aware of missiles such as the SS-20 on Soviet
soil, "about the same number don't know or think NATO has
offsetting INF missile capabilities. These figures are
substantially unchanged since last summer.
View That.INF Strengthens Deterrence Fairly Widespread
Steady or increasing public support for INF may reflect the
growing perception that INF will strengthen deterrence.
Majorities in Britain (56%-to-22%) and France (55%-to-27%)
and pluralities in West Germany (47%-to-21%) and Italy (43%-
to-33%) think that deploying INF missiles in Europe will
help prevent a Soviet attack rather than make one more
likely.
In the last six months, the view that INF enhances Western
deterrence has grown by about ten percent in the UK, France,
and Germany. .
At the same time, though, West Europeans tend to see little
if any likelihood of a Soviet attack on Western Europe in
the next five years. Clear majorities (of 60% to 80%) say
an attack is unlikely. And, except in France, not more than
one-in-five believes the contrary. In France this figure is
29 percent--double what it was last July.
Reagan Proposal Widely Favored Over Brezhnev Plan
Of the public INF arms talks proposals made by both sides,
wide majorities in each of the four countries prefer Pres-
ident Reagan's zero-option proposal to the Brezhnev freeze
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plan.as "more likely to prevent war." At most only one-
in-five favors the Krenil.in' s proposal to freeze I14F missiles
in European Russia in return for NATO cancelling its plans
to deploy U. S. INF.
On credibility too, Mr. Reagan's proposal comes out on top.
majorities in West Germany (58%) and Italy (56%) and plur-
alities (of about 50%) in Britain and France believe the
President's proposal is "a sincere effort to reduce nuclear
weapons in Europe." In sharp contrast, Brezhnev's plan is
d isbe i ~_eved by as many or more.
Relatively few West Europeans are confident that INF talks
will succeed in the next two years. February surveys showed
that pes8isism about the success of the talks prevailed in
every country except Italy.
Relatively Few Favor First Use of Nuclear Weapons
Despite the general belief that INF missiles will help to
deter Soviet aggression, most West Europeans oppose NATO's
first use of nuclear weapons. Except in the UK, where there
is less opposition to the use of nuclear weapons, no more .
than one-fifth or fewer favor NATO using nuclear weapons in
response to a conventional Soviet attack that "threatened to
overwhelm NATO forces." Another one-third approves only if
the Soviets use them first. And roughly one-third rejects
any use of nuclear weapons by NATO.
The level. of overall opposition has declined markedly in
recent months (except in France) and now stands about where
it did last summer. Striking reversals of public opinion
occurred in Germany and Italy:
o German. opinion went from a plurality (48%-to-42%)
opposed to NATO's use of nuclear weapons in January
to a majority (55%-to-34%) in support in April.
o Italian opinion similarly reversed from a majority
(55%-to-41%) opposed last October to a nearly
similar-sized majority (56o-to-39%) in favor.
Few Believe U.S. Has Nuclear Superiority over the USSR
At the same time that West Europeans generally oppose first
use, the belief is widespread that the U.S. is no longer
superior to the Soviet Union in nuclear strength. By narrow
margins, pluralities. in France and Italy perceive the U.S.
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? and USSR as about equal. German opinion splits between
parity (38%) and Soviet superiority (35%).
In general, from one-tenth to one-fifth in each of these
countries see the U.S. as ahead. Two to three times this
many (about a third) see the Soviets as ahead.
The picture five years hence is equally gloomy for the West.
No more believe the U.S. will be ahead in five years than
believe it to be ahead today. Similarly, about the same
number that see a nuclear balance today also see this in
five years. However, the proportions seeing the Soviets
ahead in five years are about ten percent less than those
seeing the. Soviets ahead today.
No Diminution in Confidence in U.S. Defense Pledge
Despite these views on the superpower nuclear balance,
there is, except in Britain, continuing confidence in the
U.S. pledge to defend Western Europe "even if this would
risk the destruction of U.S. cities." This view prevails
in France (56%-to-37%), Italy (56%-to-39%), and West
Germany (52%-to-37%).
British results probably are influenced by the Falklands
situation. Interviews done before the U.S. sided with
Britain show British opinion split on the confidence issue
(49%-t.o-47%). Last summer, confidence was the view of a
.56-to-37 percent majority.
Increased Defense Spending Widely Unpopular
Although west European publics tend at best only to see
the U.S. as Russia's military equal and would hesitate to
endorse use of nuclear weapons against a Soviet conventional
attack, they are reluctant to increase their countries'
defense budgets.
Except in Britain, no more than 16 percent favor increasing
defense expenditures:
o The prevailing view in France (55%) and in West
Germany (43%) is to hold defense spending at
present levels.
o Over a quarter in West Germany favor a cut in
defense spending--double the number in January. A
quarter in France also prefer less defense spending.
its is the prevailing view (of 46%) in economically-
troubled Italy.
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interviewed while their fleet was en route to the Falk-
lands, the British showed the highest level of support for
increasing defense spending (44%), with only a few (16%)
favoring a decrease. About a third (36%) support no
change.
Purely economic considerations do not seem to be at the
heart of opposition to increases in defense spending. Except
in France, nearly half of those who oppose an increase said
they still would be opposed even if more defense spending
meant more jobs. Between a quarter and a third, however,
would support more spending under these conditions. In
France, the opposite holds, with half changing their minds
and favoring more defense spending if it means more jobs.
Pro-NATO Sentiment Broadens
While there are mixed views on such NATO initiatives as
INF and defense spending, the preference for NATO (in
France, the Atlantic Alliance) over neutralism is wide-
spread and growing. Everywhere, large majorities--ranging
from 59 percent in Italy to 73 percent in Britain--want to
stay in the Alliance rather than leave and become neutral.
Pro-Alliance sentiments have increased appreciably since
February in Britain and France, and since last July in Italy
(when opinion was divided on this issue).
Neutralist views are most widespread in Italy.(34%) and
France (29%), with one-in-five voicing this preference
in Britain and the FRG.
Prepared by:
Stephen M. Shaffer (PGM/REU)
724-9140
R-5/7/8 2
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PUBLIC OPINION ON
.'7NF DEPLOYMENT IN 1981-82
FRANCE
30 UNCONvI''=OVAL OPPOSITION
0 -4 ............................ *...................................... x.................I
=c~ CONDT-T=ONAL SUPPORT
r -- .--------
20-
UNCONDITIONAL OPPOSITION
--------------x-----------------------------------
CONDITIONAL SUPPORT
UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORT
1 0 ............................. x..........................................................
APRIL
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