LETTER TO DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REGARDING PROTECTION FOR CERTAIN HIGH-LEVEL FEDERAL OFFICIALS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002900070007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2007
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 14, 1982
• Content Type: LETTER

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (optional) Letter to Department of Justice regarding Protection
for Certain High-Level Federal Officials
FROM: erector o. Security
EXTENSION
NO.
OS 2 1705/A
4-E-60 Headquarters
DATE
14 JUL 1982
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
-1. Executive Registry-
7-E-12 Hqs.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM 61 0 USE PREVIOUS
1_79 EDITIONS
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CONFIDENTIAL I Exe^u j~11 flegistry
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20505
- 14 J UL 1982
Mr. D. Lowell Jensen
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
U.S. Department of Justice
Main Justice Building
Room 2107
10th and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has asked me to
respond to your letter of 29 June 1982 concerning the possibility
of establishing a special protective unit within the U.S.
Marshals Service to rovide physical protection to certain
federal officials.
I appreciate your concern that no federal agency has been
given the express authority to provide physical protection to
certain federal officials. Establishment of a special protective
unit within the U.S. Marshals Service may be a possible solution
Our current authority to protect Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) personnel may be found in a recent amendment to section 5
of the CIA Act of 1949. This amendment authorizes the CIA to
provide its personnel with armed protection. The amendment was
enacted in December 1981 to clarify the CIA's authority in this
area. Prior to the enactment of these provisions, the CIA
protected. its personnel as described in the enclosed hearing
transcript (Hearing before the Subcommittee on Legislation of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, First Session, April 4,
1979).
Historically, the highly sensitive nature of the classified
information and activities attendant to the position of the DCI
and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) has
dictated that they be provided physical protection and that the
protective staff assigned to those individuals be composed of
CONFIDENTIAL
OS 2 1705/A
 ~w..r
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CONFIDENTIAL
career CIA security officers. The duties of this staff go beyond
the basic responsibility of physical protection and include
administrative support tasks demanding comprehensive knowledge of
CIA functions and disciplines. Since 1 January 1981, 25X1
has been assigned this protective response- 25X1
bility on a full-time basis. Additionally, officers stationed at
domestic security field offices may be assigned temporary protec-
ies when the DCI or DDCI visit their respective locales.
With respect to the remaining questions raised in your
letter, the CIA has not undertaken to protect any federal
officials other than the DCI and DDCI from 1 January 1981 to the
present, nor has the CIA received a request for such protec-
tion. Moreover, no CIA employee has been granted Special Deputy
Marshal status during this period; such status would be inappro-
priate in light of the provision of the National Security. Act of
1947, as amended, which prohibits the CIA from having any police
or law enforcement powers.
I hope that you find this of some value in deciding how best
to resolve the protection problem for other federal officials.
Sincerely,
Director of Security
Distribution:
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1 - DCI Security Staff (w/o enc)
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/01 CIA D 14#Sdnb@07
Criminal Division
Honorable. William J. Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
? IN 2 9, 1932
'TD/A Rs3is ,
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Dear Mr. Casey:
The Department of Justice currently is reviewing the
problems associated with protecting the physical safety of
certain Federal officials. Specifically, our review has focused
on the fact that no Federal agency has express authority to
provide physical protection to certain high-level Federal
officials, including some Members of .the Cabinet.
In some situations where physical protection of an official
was deemed necessary, certain agencies have assigned their own
employees to protect the official, and have arranged for -the
protecting employees to be designated as Special Deputy
U.'S. Marshals, thereby granting to these employees all of the
general law enforcement powers of a Deputy U. S. Marshal,
including authorization to carry firearms. In addition, various
agencies have requested Special Deputation for employees having
other security or investigative duties.
The Department of'..Justice is considering proposing
legislation which would establish a special protective unit
within the U. S. Marshals Service, for the purpose of providing
physical protection to Federal officials, as an alternative to
granting Special Deputy status to protective personnel. In our
view, a protective unit, under the supervision and control of
the U. S. Marshals Service; would have the capability of
providing more effective protection to a significant number of
high-level Federal officials.
In order to evaluate this problem and the need for such
legislation, we are attempting to ascertain the number of
Federal officials that have received physical protection since
January 1, 1981, the number of employers assigned to furnish
this protection, and the nature and extent of protection
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afforded. Accordingly,.we would appreciate your-assistance in
this matter by furnishing your agency's responses. to the
following questions. In your responses, please consider
Inspector General and contract employees if applicable to your
agency. Please feel free to furnish any additional comments or
observations pertinent to this matter.
(1) Since January 1, 1981, have any of your
employees been assigned to provide physical
protection to any.Federal official? If so,
please identify the protectees.by title, the
number of employees assigned to protective
duties, the nature and extent of the pro-
tection afforded,. and the legal authority
for providing such protection.
(2) Since January 1, 1981, has your agency
declined the request of any Federal official
for protective services? If so, how many
such requests were received, and in each case,
how was the perceived need for protection
ultimately resolved?
(3) Since January 1, 1981, has any employee of
your agency been granted Special Deputy
Marshal status? If so, what functions do
these employees perform which require such
authority?
Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated. Please
contact Mr. Arthur Norton of the Criminal Division (724-7526) if
you have any questions or comments concerning this matter.
Sincerely,
D. Lowell'Jensen
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
 CIA/FIREARMS
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION
OF THE
PERMANENT
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST. SESSION
Printed for the use of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1980
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PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(Established by House Resolution 658, 95th Congress, 1st Session)
EDWARD P. BOLAND, Massachusetts, Chairman
'CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin J. KENNETH ROBINSON, Virginia
BILL D. BURLISON, Missouri JOHN M. ASHB ROOK, Ohio
MORGAN F. MURPHY, Illinois ROBERT McCLORY, Illinois
LES ASPIN, Wisconsin G. WILLIAM WHITEHURST, Virginia
CHARLES ROSE, North Carolina C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida
ROMANO L. MAZZOLI, Kentucky
NORMAN Y. MINETA, California
WYCHE FOWLER, JR., Georgia
THOMAS K. LATIMER, Staff Director
MICHAEL J. O'NELL, Chief Counsel
PATRICK G. LONG, Associate Counsel
JEANNE M: MCNALLY, Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION
MORGAN F. MURPHY, Illinois, Chairman
ROMANO L. MAZZOLI, Kentucky ROBERT McCLORY, Illinois
WYCHE FOWLER, JR., Georgia JOHN M. ASHB ROOK, Ohio
EDWARD P. BOLAND, Massachusetts
BERNARD RATIO, Jr., Counsel
IRA U. GOLDMAN, Counsel
 Approved For Release 2007/0
CONTENTS
Testimony of Robert Gambino
Dir
t
Page
,
ec
or, Office of Security, Central
Intelligence Agency______
Testimony of John D. Morrison, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, Central
Intelligence Agency----------
2
--- --------------------------------- A. CIA responses to written questions
Appendix B. CIA Firearm Auth
it
13
18
or
y
18
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CIA/FIREARMS
House Member or not.
So my apologies to the witnesses and to the audience.
This morning we meet to hear testimony from witnesses of the
Central Intelligence Agency in support of legislation that would
broaden current statutory authority for CIA personnel to carry
firearms in the course of their official duties.
At present, the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 provides
that, CIA couriers carrying classified 'documents may be authorized
to carry arms.
The CIA seeks to expand that authority to permit designated CIA
personnel to protect. CIA facilities. or property, the Director of CIA
and other designated CIA personnel and defectors. This legislation
has been advanced by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
Admiral Turner, with the support of the administration.
The committee appreciates the concern which motivates the ad-
vancement of this legislative proposal, and that is why we are here
today.
Our witnesses today are Mr. Robert Gambino, Director of the
CIA's Office of Security and Mr. 'John Morrison, Deputy General
Counsel. I see our good friend Mr. Hitz here today.
Gentlemen, welcome and please proceed with your statement. Mr.
Gambino. .
WEDNESDAY,, APRIL 4, 1979
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:35 a.m., in room
H-405, the Capitol, the Honorable. Morgan F. Murphy (chairman of
the subcommittee), presiding.
Present: Representative Murphy.
Also present: Michael J. O'Neil, chief counsel; Patrick G.. Long,
associate counsel; Bernard Raimo and Ira H. Goldman, committee
counsel; James O. Bush and Herbert Romerstein, professional staff
members. '
Mr. MURPHY. The meeting of the Subcommittee on Legislation will
come to order. The-first order of business will be an apology from the
chairman to our distinguished witnesses here today. I .was down in
the Ethics Committee into which I was, I think the proper term is
"pressed into service," at' the beginning of this session. It is an un-
pleasant task. We discipline Members of the House of Representatives,
and today we were voting on whether to bring charges against one
 STATEMENT OF ROBERT W. GAMBINO, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. GAMBINO. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to come before you
on the matter of the Agency's proposed firearms legislation, title IV
of the intelligence authorization bill, H.R. 2827. As Director of Se-
curity of the CIA, I am charged by the Director of Central Intelligence
to insure that the Agency has a sound security program.
The CIA, no less than the National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration, the Department of Energy,-and the Department of Defense,
for example, has a need to protect certain of its installations and
personnel with firearms. Yet the only explicit statutory authority
which the Agency has for arming CIA personnel is as stated in section
5(d) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended.
That authority provides that Agency "couriers and guards" are au-
thorized to carry firearms "when engaged in transporting confidential
documents." In contrast, the above-mentioned agencies enjoy a very
broad authority, generally being empowered to arm their employees
in the conduct of official business as deemed necessary by the Secre-
tary or Agency head.
It is axiomatic that the statutory responsibility of the DCI to pro-
tect sources and methods extends to the protection of Agency facilities
housing information dealing with such sources and methods, and to
its personnel in possession of such information. Nevertheless, the
authority to issue firearms to properly trained guard personnel at
Agency facilities is not clear in existing statutes. Moreover, the
Agency, particularly in this era of political terrorism, obviously has
the need to protect certain CIA personnel whose personal safety may
be threatened. There presently exists no explicit statutory authority
to provide physical security protection to the persons of the Director
or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Only in instances where
these persons are carrying classified documents does the present statute
permit armed protection. The irreparable damage that could accrue
to the national security and prestige of the United States in a terrorist
kidnaping operation cannot be permitted to remain unaddressed.
A similar situation is present in cases involving the personal safety
of defectors placed in our custody for debriefing and resettlement.
While these individuals are in our custody, their safety is always a
serious consideration. If bodily harm were to come to a defector inade-
quately protected by our security officers, there would be a devastat-
ing impact on all potential defectors. The Agency assumes an awesome
responsibility when it takes under its wing any defector and his
family, and must have commensurate protective authority.
The Agency must occasionally move significant liquid assets in
carrying out its operations. Security, cover, and operational considera-
tions preclude the use of private protective services such as Brinks,
Wells Fargo and so forth which are available for the protection of the'
conventional movement of moneys in the commercial world. Never-
theless, the possible loss of significant monetary assets exists in these
situations. The Agency must have the authority to protect these
assets with firearms.
There are presently only a limited number of Agency personnel
authorized to carry firearms in connection with the movement of
sensitive and classified materials. As a reflection of the Agency's con-
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tern in this area, it is noted that firearms are issued" only in selected
instances involving the movement of such materials, and then only-
when the sensitivity and classification warrant such additional pro--
tection. Transportation of a large percentage of Agency classified'
material does not meet this criteria and therefore no, firearms are
carried in these situations.
Agency personnel issued firearms are given strict instructions re-
garding their use. In order to indoctrinate and to qualify those em-
ployees selected for tasks requiring the carrying of firearms, the
Agency conducts a training program meeting the highest standards.
and also avails itself of established civil and military firearms range
facilities. Agency personnel, moreover, are required to requalify on a
semiannual basis.
The proposed firearms authority being sought by the Agency is,
viewed as correcting a serious and long-recognized deficiency in exist-
in g authority. It is not considered a license to place weapons in the.
hands of an inordinate number of Agency employees. This authorize-.
tion will not result in a significant increase in the number of Agency
employees carrying firearms. We would use the authority sparingly-
and judiciously as we now use our authority to arm couriers. But
when the need arises, we wish to be able to provide adequate protec-
tion with assurance to both ourselves and our employees that they-
are acting within the law. This authority would be controlled and
monitored at appropriate management levels within the Agency. Thee
quality of training and standards for qualification would remain con-
sistent with established norms. The procedural guidelines governing
issuances and possible use would be clearly defined and' restricted.-
Each issuance would be scrutinized on its own merits and any reported'
misuse of this authority would be immediately addressed and resolved...
In concluding, I would like to point out that the Church committee.
in its final report, "Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Ameri-
cans, Book II, Final Report of the Select Committee to:Study Govern-
mental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S...
Senate," page 299, footnote 15, stated,
As part of the CIA's responsibility for its own security, however, appropriate-
personnel should be permitted to carry firearms within the United States not..
only for courier protection of documents, but also to protect the Director and!
Deputy Director and defectors and to guard CIA installations..
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your attention to this. matter ands
welcome the opportunity to provide any additional comments you:
may desire.
I would like now to present Mr. John D. Morrison, Jr., Deputy-
General Counsel, who will provide additional details on the legal.,
questions involved.
Mr. MURPHY. Now, before we get into Mr. Morrison's testimony,.,
let me ask a question, if you can answer it in open session.
In the recent revolution in Iran, it was reported in the press that
certain stations of ours, listening stations, were under serge, and that
the equipment was destroyed, but there was some concern with re-
gard to the personnel.
Did those men have arms at that time?
Mr. GAMBINO. No, sir, they were not armed.
Mr. MURPHY. Were they in danger other than what was reported;
in the press?
Mr. GAMBINO. I really can't-I can't respond to that,, sir.
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Mr. MURPHY. Might not the fact that they had sidearms, might
-not they have attempted to use them and thus brought calamity
upon themselves? They got out of there all right this time without
-the use of arms. Had they had arms, might not a situation have oc-
curred, a firelight ensued, and then some casualties?
Mr. GAMBINO. Sir, I think you would have to put that in the
-same category as the Marines at the embassy. They were armed.
Their discipline was good. Under the direction of the Ambassador
.they did not use the arms. I think it was a proper move in that situa-
tion. I think the discipline we have over our employees would be
;precisely the same..
You are correct, in a situation such as that, I think the use of
firearms would have been counterproductive.
Mr. MURPHY. Other than protection of classified material, would
.,not a courier be transporting liquid assets?
Mr. GAMBINO. The present statute refers only to classified material.
Mr. MURPHY. You want to broaden that.
Mr. GAMBINo. Yes, sir.
Mr. MURPHY. And with whom would the discretion lie, the Direc-
-tor of the CIA?
Mr. GAMBINO, Yes, sir.
Mr. MURPHY. Or his designee?
Mr. GAMBINO. The Director or the designee, yes, sir.
Mr. MURPHY. And would there be applications filed for the use of
a firearm. Assume I were an agent and I felt I was engaged in some
hazardous covert action where I thought I needed protection. What
-would I do, put an application in, go through the system to the
;director for either his approval or disapproval?
Mr. GAMBINO. Sir, you are talking about an agent, I assume you
;mean an Agency employee who wanted to carry a firearm for some
reason.
Mr. MURPHY. Right.
Mr. GAMBINO. Under the present regulations, the Director of
Security has been delegated the authority in this narrow area that we
-..have the authority today, and it would be-application would have
to be made in writing. It would go through his own chain of command
for approvals up through his chain of command to me, and depending
,:on what the Director's delegation to me was, possibly back to the
Director for his final approval.
Mr. MURPHY. OK, Mr. Morrison, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF JOHN D. MORRISON, JR., DEPUTY GENERAL
COUNSEL, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. MORRISON. Thank you.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to speak about
.section 401 of the Intelligence Authorization bill. Mr. Gambino has
.discussed CIA policy and practices in the use of firearms as. well as
,some of the problems faced by the Agency because of the lack of clear
Authority to arm employees in some situations where that may be
necessary if the Agency is to properly carry out its mandated respon-
sibilities. I would like to complement his statement by discussing the
state of the law in this area, since it is the uncertain nature of the
present firearms authority utilized by CIA which has led us to the
,conclusion that we must seek statutory firearms authority.
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For quite some time now there has been some concern within CIA
as to the precise scope of its existing legal authority with regard to the
use of firearms. For this reason we have recently been reconsidering
the extent of that authority in order to insure that Agency activities'
are conducted on it firm legal basis. The urgency of such a task is
evident in view of the sensitivity of the information and material
warranting protection. Although we believe that legal authority exists
for the activities of CIA in this area, we recognize that there are
serious questions as to its limits, and we believe that an immediate
clarification of such authority is necessary. Of particular concern to us
is the uncertainty of this authority in the domestic context.
To begin this discussion, let me state that a fundamental attribute
of sovereignty is the inherent ability of a government to take necessary
action to protect its functions, personnel, and instrumentalities, and
to protect the national security. The authority of the Federal Govern-
ment to protect its property and personnel is firmly established, and
it has been held consistently by the courts that the power is analogous
to the police powers of the several States; that the Government has
with respect to its lands the rights of an ordinary proprietor; and that
the Government has complete power to exclude all persons thereform
and to issue special permits to go thereon. Furthermore, in terms of
pi operty rights, the courts have recognized that some Federal facilities
may be unique because of their peculiar and significant importance to
the defense of the United States.
It has been held that a facility of such peculiar and significant
importance as the Pentagon could constitutionally be made a totally
restricted area, and the government could deny public access to
Pentagon grounds as it so desired.
Aside from this authority inherent in the sovereign is the additional,
historically recognized right of individuals to take necessary action
in self-defense up to and including the use of lethal force in extreme
cases.
CIA does not possess explicit authority to authorize its employees
to carry firearms except under section 403 (f) of Title 50, United
States Code, which provides that:
In the performance of its functions, the Central Intelligence Agency is authorized
to * * *
(d) Authorize couriers and guards designated by the Director to carry firearms
when engaged in transportation of confidential documents and materials affecting
the national defense and security.
Despite this limited explicit authority, we believe that the inherent
authority of the sovereign and the right of self-defense of the indi-
vidual, along with several other sources, may be cited to support the
implicit authority of the CIA to authorize its employees to carry
firearms.
First, pursuant to the National Security Act, National Security
Council directives and memorandums have generally authorized CIA
to take necessary action in the interest of national security to protect
CIA functions and personnel, and otherwise carry out its foreign
intelligence responsibilities. In addition to these directives and memo-
randums, we believe that such authority further derives from 50 U.S.C.
section 403(d) (3) which provides that: " * * * the Director of Central
Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources
and methods from unauthorized disclosure."
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The Agency's personnel authority would also appear to authorize
the arming of CIA employees. This authority, at 50 U.S.C. 403(j),
authorized CIA to expend sums notwithstanding other laws for
purposes necessary to carry out its functions and particularly for
personal services without regard to limitations on types of persons
to be employed. More recently, however, the President in Executive
Order 12036 assigned to the CIA the responsibility to "Protect the
security of its installations, activities, inrormation, and personnel by
appropriate means * * *?"
. Taking these authorities together, we maintain that CIA, as an
instrumentality of the sovereign, may authorize its personnel to carry
firearms in appropriate circumstances to protect its functions and
personnel, and to carry out its responsibilities under law.
It can be argued, however, that the limited express statutory
authority in 50 U.S.C. 403(f) restricts the CIA's ability to act in
this area. We are concerned also with the effect of 50 U:S.C. 403 (d) (3)
to the extent protection of Federal property may be considered a law
enforcement or police activity. That statute provides that " . . . the
Agency shall have no police, subpena, law enforcement powers or
internal security functions . . .
It may be difficult to distinguish between protective and police
powers in some cases, so that if a CIA employee discharges a firearm
issued to him and injures someone, a court may look closely at the
prohibition of 50 U.S.C. 403 (d) (3). However, in our view, the legis-
lative history of that provision suggests that the drafters were not
focusing on CIA's authority to provide it facilities,
personnel with physical protection, but rather were attempting to
insure that the CIA on the one hand would not take over the domestic
security function of the FBI and Secret Service, and on the other
hand, insure that CIA would not develop into a Gestapo-type organi-
zation operating clandestinely within the United States. The legis-
lative history of the language in question makes it clear that such
language was not inserted in the act to prevent CIA from performing
a protective function that would provide CIA facilities, grounds,
personnel with operational security which would include, as necessary,
temporarily detaining trespassers or persons disturbing the peace
until law enforcement officials could be summoned. Nevertheless,
a statutory enactment would resolve any uncertainty about the
scope of CIA firearms authority.
We believe legislative clarification of CIA's authority in this area
is also necessary to resolve issues relating to the scope of authoriat
of individual CIA personnel who may be forced to use firearms, and
thereby risk exposure to possible civil and/or criminal liability.
While the number of circumstances in which CIA personnel carry
firearms is not great, those that do exist are extremely important.
For example, the CIA operates a small number of training and other
facilities that, for reasons of security, cannot be openly identified
.with the Agency. Without the security provided through the use of
armed employees, these facilities cannot be appropriately protected.
The language of our proposal for statutory firearms authority does
not purport to grant CIA any law enforcement or police power of
any kind whatsoever. We anticipate no drastic changes in CIA
and personnel previimmediate change ously unprotected would would nobe that certain w be protected. facilities
 Approved For Release 2007/03/01 _:R-
7
The concerns arising from the lack of clear authority in CIA's
use of firearms has led to a self-imposed moratorium on new authori-
zations for the domestic use of firearms. For this reason, immediate
clarification is essential. We view a statute as the optimum solution
to our dilemma. Though we may of necessity have to explore other
ways of establishing our firearms authority more clearly in the event
that our proposed firearms authority is not enacted into law, we
would view anything other than statute as merely a stop-gap measure
and less than satisfactory.
Before I conclude, I wish to remark upon the various provisions
of our proposed language. It should be noted before I continue, how-
ever, that the general circumstances under which Agency personnel
would be permitted to carry firearms pursuant to this language are
more narrowly defined than those in statutes authorizing the Sec-
retary of Defense [at 10 USC, 1585], the Administrator of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration [at 42 USC 2456], and the
Secretary of Energy [at 42 USC 2201], to authorize the use of firearms
by their personnel.
The initial portion of our language would authorize CIA personnel
to carry firearms while in the discharge of their official duties and
pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Director of Central
Intelligence. This provision would enable CIA to continue to fulfill
its mission and functions both within the United States and overseas.
The requirement that the DCI control the use of firearms by regulation
would also serve to guarantee that the use of firearms by CIA per-
sonnel would remain under strict supervision. Moreover, CIA per-
sonnel would be authorized to carry firearms within the United States
only for four purposes.
First, the Director may authorize CIA personnel to carry firearms
when safeguarding confidential information, documents or materials.
This partially corresponds with existing law, although the provision
allows for the protection of information documents and materials not
in the process of being transported.
Second, CIA personnel may be authorized to carry firearms for the
protection of CIA facilities, property and. mediums of exchange. This
portion of the proposed legislation recognizes the need to guard against
the physical penetration of sensitive CIA facilities located within the
United States. Such authority may also be necessary to protect large
amounts of money or monetary equivalents intended for confidential
operational purposes which therefore must be transported within the
United States under secure cover procedures.
Third, CIA personnel maybe authorized to carry firearms to protect
CIA personnel who are exposed to the risks of extortion, abduction
or even assassination.
Finally, CIA personnel may be authorized to carry firearms to
protect defectors and foreign persons visiting the United States under
Agency auspices. This may be necessary to prevent the assassination,
terrorization, extortion or abduction of defectors or sensitive foreign
guests. In this regard, I must stress to you that because the CIA
makes a personal commitment to protect both defectors and certain
foreign guests, because secrecy is of paramount importance in pro-
tection, and because other Federal or local laws enforcement agencies
cannot provide extensive or continuing security services to CIA, this
authority is particularly necessary. Our language would also permit the
 ee ease 2007/03/01: CIA-RDP83M00914R002900070
8
use of firearms for authorized training purposes so that CIA personnel
of est bl shed standards
or civil
the CIA in may nue to avail itself qualification
the y con
the l fora tutory firearms
firearms range facilities. for in opportunity couto speak regarding thank,
the
authority. Mr. Morrison.
Mr. MuizrnY. Thank you,
Any of you three gentlemen can answer this question.
en the ployeesState cD lying lfiz firearm s
What xsnhcon nection sh with between
the CIA i
overseas?
Mr. RITZ. Agency policy is that if the chief of station determines
that firearms are required for the defense of the facilities or personnel
and if time does not permit obtaining an authorization from head-
uarters, the chief of station may issue firearms under certain condi-
tions. One of these conditions is that the Ambassador concurs in the
issuance of the firearms and only if the Embassy does not possess a
sufficient number of suitable weapons for issuance to Agency personnel.
Mr. MURPHY. Is State Department approval needed?
Mr. HITZ. No, only the Ambassador's approval.
Mr.Munrx'Y. Has there been a problem with the State/CIA
relationship?
Mr. HnTZ. No.
1\/Ir. MURPHY. Does State endorse your proposal? The premise for
these questions is that the Ambassador to a foreign nation is really
the President when the President is not there.
Mr RITZ. I think, Mr. Chairman, we would prefer to supply the
committee with a statement for the record on the question of our
overseas situation.
With respect to the proposal itself, the State Department does
ap )rove it.
MMIr. MURPHY. They do approve it?
Mr. Hnz. Yes.
Mr. MURPHY. Could you g~ Fnerall3 T describe what personnel are
rearms, and guider what circumstances fire-
authorized to carry firearms;,-
arms are carried now?
Mr. GA IBINO. Yes, sir. In the case of a courier, where we have
specific statutory authority, the type of material which a courier must
carry', the assessment of the threat is taken into consideration before a
decision is made whether or not firearms are justified to protect that
material. If we come to the conclusion that the material is extremely
sensitive, our assessment of the threat is that it needs the protection
t
of firearms, we look to the courier then himself to see whether or not
he has qualified in the use of firearms, and if he has, look to
if the qualification is less than 6 months old. Our regulations require
reqalification every 6 months. At
ons, I may issue a CIA firearms per m tland tinder sue thour e firearm present
xe?
That is in the area of the couriers.
I might say, sir, that over the years we have taken a hard look at who
is issued firearms for transporting classified material, and we have
found a. number of instances where we did not feel the risk justified the
use of firearms, and in those instances we have in fact withdrawn the
premission to these couriers to carry firearms.
 Approved For Release 2007/03/01: CIA-RDP83MOO914R002900070007-1
Mr. MURPHY. Why are the GSA guards currently guarding the
CIA building in Langley not adequate for this task. That is one of the
installations you have in mind?
Mr. GAMBINO. No, sir, we would continue to ask GSA for the person-
nel to guard our headquarters buildings and the other installations we
have here in the Washington area which are identified as CIA
buildings. We feel that GSA has provided us with an outstanding
group of officers, and speaking a little parochially, we feel that our
GSA contingent is probably the best in Government.
However, there are other installations which, because of cover or
because of operational contingencies, it would not be appropriate to
have GSA guards, and it is those installations where we would like
to use our own personnel rather than GSA.
Mr. MURPHY. What immediate necessity is there for a statute now,
or could you possibly get by on Presidential authority?
Mr. GAMBINO. I would have to defer to my legal colleague on that.
Mr. MORRISON. It would not be, as I said, it would not be the
optimum solution. The problem is that the authority now is in a, very
confused and arguable state, and even if we go to an Executive order to
authorize firearms, there would still be questions whether some of the
other statutes would permit the Executive order to issue and be valid.
Mr. MURPHY. How does Justice feel toward this, and the FBI?
Do you have an opinion from Justice?
Mr. HITZ. Yes, we do. We have received clearance from them, Mr.
Chairman, and support from Justice and the Bureau for this provision.
Mr. MURPHY. Why couldn't Justice or FBI fulfill this function of
protecting defectors who are brought to this country, or important
personnel from overseas?
Mr. GAMBINO. Sir, the National Security Act of 1947 as you know
authorizes the Agency to bring up to 100 defectors per year for intelli-
gence purposes. These defectors are paroled to the Agency. We feel
it is the Agency's responsibility to protect them. We certainly do work
in very close coordination with the FBI, but they are neither staffed
nor flexible enough for our requirements to handle the defector pro-
tection responsibility. In addition, as Mr. Morrison mentioned, there
are foreign guests, mostly people in the category of senior intelligence
officers of foreign countries, who are invited to this country. It is para-
mount that their travel to the country be kept secret and the mini-
mum number of people possible know of their travel. We feel we have
a responsibility to them to provide personal protection if our? -alua-
tion of the threat requires it.
The other Government a encies just are not equipped to handle
that responsibility, and the FBI definitely is not.
Mr. MURPHY. They are not equipped to handle defectors, to bring
them in?
Mr. GAMBINO. Yes, sir, I am sure-and we have in the past availed
ourselves of some assistance from the FBI.
However, I don't want to speak for the FBI, but in dealing with
them directly on this issue
Mr. MURPHY. How about the Federal Protective Service? They
handle informants in the criminal justice system, when we know that
there are people out to kill them, there are contracts out to kill them.
We have had individuals testify before our various committees when
there are 15 or 20 fellows sitting around them.
 Approved For Release 2007/03/017
Mr. GAMBINO. Yes, sir, but there is a significant amount of protec-
tioin that accrues to these foreign officers because of the secrecy and
the cover in which they travel. To get some other Government agency
to provide their officers to protect these people
Mr. MURPHY. In other words, the concern is security. You would
have to send telegrams, make phone calls, et cetera?
Mr; GAMBINO. Cut an awful lot of people in,
primarily. security and cover,
Mr. MURPHY. Besides defectors, and foreign intelligence experts,
what other type of people are you talking about?
Mr., GAMBINO. In that category, defectors and it would in all
probability be senior intelligence officers or perhaps an agent of great
value to the Agency. That would be my view of the category of defec-
tors and foreigners. Now, with regard to protecting personnel, there is
the other category of our own employees.
Zvi h r.. MURPHY. What protective training is the CIA presently giving
regard to firearms, for those that are empowered to carry them?
Mr. GAMBINO. We have a very comprehensive, training Program,
sir which is adapted specifically to the type " .
firearm to he issued.
We training is conducted by instructors.
to pass a course which incudes sille uette r firing, firing fr 'T`hey have
positions, accuracy of fire, care and safety of using the firearms, typical
firearms course that is utilized-very simi
and FBI. lar to that used by Treasury
Mr. MURPHY. Why now, after all these yea
authority? in rs, from 1946 or 1947?
Why now all of a sudden is the CIA coming and asking for statutory
Mr. GAMBINO. Su*, my response to that would have to be that up
until the Church committee, we assumed the authority was there. It
might not be explicit, but certainly it was implicit. It was only after
some great scrutiny of the 1947 and 1949 statutes that some people
began to feel that the authority did not extend to sime of the things
that we were doing, such as protecting protecting
and b the DO,
protecting some of our facilities, and in the 'effort to by to put it
on a more firm and legal basis, we decided to go for corre
Mr. MORRISON. ction.
I would endorse that and say, some of which I said
in my statement, that we can make a very good legal brief for our
authority to carry firearms, and in another day we might well have
relied on that, but there is so much argument on the other side that
we do not feel comfortable, and wue feel that we must have the authority
clarified, preferably by statute so there is no question that we are
operating within the law.
Mr. MURPHY. You use the words "you must have." Are you saying
thatyou don't want to wait for the charter, thatyou want this independ-
ent of the charter?
Mr. MORRISON. We would prefer, I assume, to go ahead with this
bill where it is all set out.
Mr. HITZ. We feel there are certain interests, Mr. Chairman, some
,of, which have been sketched, that presently require protection, so
that just as soon as possible or just as soon as we are able to achieve a
Ie_ gislative remedy, we feel the need.
Mr. MURPHY. Any questions from chief counsel?
Mr. O'NEIL. Just one.
What is meant by the phrase "information concerning intelligence
sources and methods" in subsection (ii) of the proposal? Presumably
 Approved For Release 2007/03/0
1?
it does not include documents or material. Is it meant to include in-
formation in the head of some person and therefore the person as well?
Mr. MORRISON. It includes documents and material. It is a carry-
over of well-established law, as you know, in the National Security
Act of 1947, where the Director has the responsibility to protect
intelligence sources and methods.
Mr. O'NEIL. But it seems from the wording of the statute to be
exclusive of materials or documents because materials and docu-
ments are appended.
Mr. MORRISON. Yes; there can be sources, for example, that are
not documents., An individual may be a source of intelligence. He is
an intelligence source and he is not a document. Also, the section that
you are referring to says "or 1 '
b c ass ed intelligence documents or
material" and the phrase information concerning intelligence sources
and methods" is not qualified by the word "classified." Now, there
are situations where that might be necessary. For example, we may
have documents that are classifiable and in the ordinary course of
business would be so stamped, but because of the nature of the person
or the place where', they are to be used, it is necessary to have them
unmarked, and you could get into a debate as to whether that docu-
ment was protected if you said it had to be a classified document to
protect it. But if it involved intelligence sources and methods, it would
still be protected by this section.
Mr. MURPHY. Well, we want to thank you gentlemen. We will
consider it.
Mr. GAMBINO. Thank You, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MURPHY. Again my apologies for being late.
[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the subcommittee recessed subject to
the call of the Chair.]
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APPENDIX A
CIA RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS
Question 1.. 1~ould the number of CIA employees overseas authorized to carry
firearms increase if this legislation were enacted?
, Answer. There is no expectation that this legislation will dictate changes in
our overseas situ Lion.
Question 2(a). nder what authority. do CIA personnel overseas carry firearms?
?
thorit
t thi
y
s au
What-if anythin -is inadequate .abou
(b). Large num rs ,of CIA personnel carried firearms during the secret war in
Laos. Under what uthority did they do so?
Answer. In the i ternational arena, as well as on the domestic front, CIA relies
upon the inherent uthority of the sovereign, the right of self-defense of the in-
dividual, National Security Council directives and memorandums, and various
provisions of the National Security Act, the CIA Act, and Executive Order 12036
as a basis for utilizing firearms to protect CIA functions and personnel, and to
otherwise carry out its foreign intelligence responsibilities. Though the law-
enforcement prohibition of the National Security Act and the limited firearms
authority of the CIA Act do not militate against the use of firearms by CIA out-
side of the United States, the proposed statutory CIA firearms authority would
make it clear that any use of firearms by CIA rests upon a firm legal basis and is
strictly controlled by regulation of the Director.
Question S. Shouldn't the question. of this proposed authority to carry fire-
arms be coupled with such charter issues as whether or not there ought to be a
ban on assassinations and whether or not foreign governments may be over-
thrown by force?
Answer. No. Such issues are presently being considered in the context of the
comprehensive Intelligence Charter Legislation Process. Although the firearms
issue is also addressed in provisions of the proposed Charter legislation, legisla-
tive clarification of the CIA's firearms authority is of sufficient importance and
urgency-to warrant separate, prompt action. Further, the issues of a ban on
assassination and whether a foreign government may be overthrown by force are
not really germane to the Agency's proposal for statutory firearms authority.
Such issues fall within the category of special activities and bear little relation to
the legislative clarification the Agency is seeking in.the firearms area.
Question 4. Why do CIA employees within the U.S. need to carry firearms?
Answer. To provide adequate protection for: sensitive classified materials and
information concerning intelligence sources and methods; facilities, property and
monies or other mediums of exchange; the person of the Director, Deputy Director
or other persons so designated and the person/family of defectors or other foreign
persons visiting the U.S. whose safety and well-being are entrusted to the Agency.
Question 5. What is the current authority under which CIA personnel in the
U.S. may now carry guns?
Answer. Within the United States, CIA utilizes the statutory firearms authority
contained in section 5(d) of the CIA Act when arming couriers and guards who
will be engaged in the transport of certain national security documents or materials.
For all other domestic protective purposes, CIA relies upon the inherent authority
-of the sovereign, the right of self-defense of the individual, National Security
Council directives and memorandum, and various provisions of the National
Security Act, the CIA Act, and Executive Order 12036.
Question 6. Are there guidelines or regulations which govern the use of firearms
by CIA personnel? Could you generally describe how individuals are authorized
to carry firearms and under what circumsta nces firearms may be used?
Answer.(Domestic). There are well-defined regulations governing the authoriza-
tion and control of firearms issued to Agency personnel. Requests are approved by
the Director of Security subject to completion of appropriate qualification training.
Weapons are secured in approved safekeeping facilities until specific tasks war-
ranting their issuance are received. Upon completion of such tasks all items
 Approved For Release 2007/03/01: CIA-RDP83M00914R002900070007-
Answer. (Overseas) Presently, the use of firearms overseas is stringently con-
trolled; we anticipate no drastic change in CIA practices or procedure's relating to
the use of firearms overseas if our proposed firearms authority is enacted into law.
What follows is a summary of CIA policy concerning the use of firearms outside
of the United States. Bear in mind that the following summary does not apply to
firearms authorized within the scope of lawfully approved paramilitary operations.
The use of firearms in those operations is subject to separate, stringent controls.
With regard to the overseas placement and issuance of firearms the policy of the
Agency is as follows: first, firearms will be placed at overseas stations or bases only
in extraordinary situations when it is necessary for the protection of classified
information or facilities, or for the protection of employees or their dependents;
and, secondly, since the Chief of Station (COS) relies primarily on host govern-
ment authorities and the cover organization for the protection/of facilities and
personnel, firearms are not issued to Agency personnel abroad except in ex-
traordinary circumstances.
In each case, firearms placement and issuance are subject to the approval of the
Deputy Director for Operations (DDO); events, such as the unforeseen outbreak
of violence in areas of political instability, may preclude prior DDO approval in
which case the decision may be made by the COS with Chief o Mission (or Chief
of the official cover installation if other than the Department o State) concurrence
and immediate notification of the DDO of the facts and circu tances surrounding
the issuance.
Extraordinary circumstances which may dictate the issuance of firearms to
CIA personnel abroad include the imminent possibility of mob violence or terrorist
activity targeted against station facilities or the reasonable belief that the lives of
specific employees or their dependents are threatened by assassination or other
terrorist activity. It is to be noted that for purposes of firearms issuance when
extraordinary circumstances exist, CIA firearms are issued only after it becomes
apparent that the Embassy or official cover installation (if other than the Em-
bassy) does not possess a sufficient number of weapons to issue to CIA personnel.
In addition, each COS, having firearms placed at his station, must establish
written firearms control procedures which are reviewed and revised annually as
necessary and forwarded to Headquarters.
Question 7. How many CIA employees in the U.S. now carry firearms?
Answer. Approximately 70, all of which, of course, are not on duty at any one
time.
Question 8. How many more CIA employees in the U.S. would be carrying
firearms if the requested legislation were enacted?
Answer. Approximately 40 more, all of which, of course, will not be on duty at
any one time.
Question 9. Are there CIA facilities in the U.S. that need increased protection?
Answer. Yes. At present a sensitive intelligence facility lacks the degree of
protection deemed appropriate by all standards of measurement.
Question 10. Why are alternatives other than CIA guards not feasible?
Answer. Cover and sensitive sources and methods considerations preclude using
other than CIA direct hire employees for guard duties in these few domestic
instances. Further, with other than CIA personnel, there may be questions of
clearances and lack of continuity on the job. For example, with military personnel
as well as with contract guards, there is a constant turnover which allows for
further proliferation of the numbers of people who are allowed access to highly
sensitive intelligence information and facilities.
Question 11. If this legislation were enacted, would CIA employees take over all
guard duties at facilities in the U.S. now performed by other armed guards?
Answer. No. GSA FPO's would continue to provide the majority of guard
duties for Agency facilities in the U.S.
Question 12. Are you seeking extended authority only for CIA security officers
or will it cover any CIA employee designated by the Director?
Answer. The proposed firearms authority would cover all CIA personnel, but the
actual carrying of firearms would be restricted by regulation of the Director to only
those CIA personnel who have been properly designated.
Question 13(a). What immediate necessity is there for a statute now? Can't you
get by on Presidential authorization in the meantime?
(b) Have you asked the President for it?
(c) Is there any express statutory prohibition that you would be violating by
relying on Presidential authorization?
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/01
15
Answer. We are not sure that our existing authority to authorize the carrying of
firearms is indisputable in all the situations in which we think arming personnel
would be appropriate. In view of this uncertainty, enactment of new statutory the issue by Exe6utivesOrder but in view of the fact that ome of the questions st ons about
our authority, result from conflicting or unclear statutory provisons, we do not
believe that the issuance of an Executive Order is as satisfactory a solution as
would be new statutory authority.
Question 14 Describe what is meant by "information concerning intelligence
sources and methods" in subsection (ii) of the proposed legislation. Since classified
"intelligence documents or materials" are also included in this category, "infor-
mation concerning intelligence sources and methods" seems intended to embrace
other than classified documents or material.
Answer. The Director is responsible for the protection of intelligence sources
and methods from unauthorized disclosure under the provisions of th
Security Act. The ter
i
N
m
e
ational
s used in our proposed firearms authority to track the
National Security Act. Moreover, it may not always be appropriate to classify
all information concerning intelligence sources and methods which requires
protection.
Classification dictates that access to properly classified documents and materials
be strictly controlled and that the documents or materials be conspicuously
marked to indicate their level of classification. Classification would be inappro-
priate, though protection might be required, in instances where the subject
matter of particular documents or materials involves information concerning
intelligence sources or methods, which, although classifiable, cannot be marked
due to the covert nature of CIA's relationship with the person who must handle
the documents or materials or the place where they must be used. The classifica-
tion markings or the highly visible security access controls required by the formal
classification of any documents or materials in such a case could easily result in
the compromise of the sources or methods involved.
Similarly, classification would be inappropriate in instances where the subject
matter of particular documents or materials does not involve information which
is classifiable per se, but where the fact of CIA's association with that subject
In order to prevent lthelcgompromise of such einformation,etheldocuments or
materials themselves, which represent the tangible evidence of CIA's association
with the subject matter involved, may have to be protected. For example, a
class of a contract executed
when by an in Agehe y proprietary would not be marked as
needs to be protected from disclosure becauspossession of an e disclosure wou dgreveal h
the Agency's association
fa
ith
e
w
ct of
w the proprietary.
Question 15. How do you guard information in someone's head except by
guarding the person? Isn't this authority contained in subsection (iii)?
Answer. The authority to protect Agency personnel contained in subsection
(iii) of our proposal would be sufficient to protect the information in someone's
head when protection is required.
Question 16. How frequently is the authority to guard a medium of exchange
likely to be used?
Answer. Infrequent; otherwise, impossible to forecast.
Question 17(a). How many firearms, on the average, are being carried by CIA
personnel within the U.S. today?
(b) Overseas?
(c) What kinds of firearms are used?
Answer. (a) At any
ive
g
n moment-in-time, under 20.
(b) It depends on the situation in the host country. See answer to question
No. 6 for discussion of firearms issuance overseas.
(c) Conventional handguns and shotguns.
Question 18. What other agency personnel do you envision providing
tection for, beyond the Director and Deputy Director? Will the DDO be re-
quiring such protection? b pro-
Answer. The purpose of subsection (iii) of the proposed firearms authority
is to provide CIA with the capability to protect the Director and Deputy Director
at all times and to protect any of its personnel in the event of any specific exigency
warranting protective action, such as threats of extortion, abduction, terroriza-
tion, or even assassination.
Question 19. Are
war ant pro ecttion you aware of
personnel or classified mater al? the U.S. that would
 Approved For Release 2007/03/01': CIA-RDP83M00 14 00 -
16
Answer. Yes, there have been instances of serious threats to the Director,
serious threats to defectors which we have become aware of through foreign
sources, as well as instances of serious threats to other Agency personnel such as
the General Counsel.
Question 20. Assuming passage of this legislation, would you pro ide a copy of
the regulation dealing with firearms and a one time report on the increased
numbers of personnel carrying firearms? What numbers of w apons will be
concealed, rules for use etc.?
Answer. The set of headquarters regulations currently maintai ed by HPSCI
would reflect any changes in the headquarters regulation conce ning control of
firearms. HPSCI would also be provided with a one time report On the increased
number of CIA personnel that would carry firearms on a regu;ar basis; such a
report would also include information concerning the number of c ncealed weapons
involved and rules for their use.
Question 21. Where do you plan to conduct firearms training f; r CIA personnel?
Where is training accomplished today?
Answer. At selected Agency domestic training facilities and civilian or military
ranges where such arrangements can be made. /
Question 22(a). Can you conceive of a requirement to protect other non
Agency personnel beyond defectors and foreign persons? /
(b) Have you requested the FBI or others to provide protection for CIA spon-
sored travelers in the U.S.?
Answer. (a) No.
(b) No.
Question 23. Has the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice
issued a definitive legal opinion stating CIA's firearms authority is limited to
what is contained in the CIA Act of 1949?
Answer. No. We believe that it is more appropriate to obtain statutory clarifi-
cation of CIA firearms authority because such clarification would be more legally
certain. Though we may, of necessity, have to explore other ways of establishing
our firearms authority more clearly if our proposal for statutory firearms authority
is not enacted into law, we would view anything other than statute as less than
satisfactory.
Question 24. In the past, we have heard that electronic surveillance of American
citizens, in the U.S. or abroad, could be conducted without a warrant pursuant
to inherent Presidential power. Do you now question the existence of a similar
power regarding the authorization of CIA employees to carry firearms?
Answer. We believe that CIA, as an instrumentality of the sovereign, has the
inherent authority to protect its functions and personnel. However, it can be
argued that the limited express firearms authority of the CIA Act and the law-
enforcement prohibition of the National Security Act impair the ability of CIA
to take action in this area. A statutory enactment would resolve any uncertainty
about the scope of CIA firearms authority.
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE,
Mr. IRA H. GOLDMAN, Washington, D.C., December 28, 1979.
Counsel, Subcommittee on Legislation, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR IRA: This is in response to your recent inquiry re Question No. 6 of the
"Firearms" Q's and A's that were supplied to the Committee in May, 1979
following the Subcommittee's 4 April 1979 hearing.
As I recall, you asked that the answer to Question No. 6 be expanded to cover
the use of firearms by CIA personnel domestically and overseas. It was your
contention that the response provided in May speaks only to the question of the
issuance and carrying of firearms, not their use. After reviewing the question and
answer in light of your assessment I concurred with your conclusion and posed
the following to appropriate components:
(1) Are there guidelines or regulations which govern the use of firearms by CIA
personnel? : '
(a) Domestically; and
(b) Overseas.
(2) Generally describe under what circumstances firearms may be used.
(a) Domestically; and
(b) Overseas.
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17
With regards to the domestic situation, "guard instructions" do exist to govern
the use of firearms by CIA guards. I have attached a copy of the "guard instruc-
tions" which will serve to answer the question dealing with circumstances under
which firearms may be used. The only other instances in which weapons are
authorized to be used are during qualification and currency training exercises
which are sti`ictly controlled. As for the overseas situation, current regulations
limit themselves to the questions of the issuance and carrying of firearms.
Should you\neod further classification, please feel free to call me directly.
SincerciVl ROBERT J. WINCHESTER,
lC
Assistant Legislative Counsel.
UARD INSTRUCTIONS ON THE USE OF FIREARMS
1. Guards wh are qualified and authorized to carry firearms while on duty
shall have the pi tol fully loaded, carry the pistol only in the holster provided and
carry no firearm ther than the one provided for his use.
2. Aside from p actice firing on the range, the pistol shall remain holstered and
shall be fired onl when it is necessary for the guard to protect himself or others
from grievous bod ly harm or death, when placed in great peril on U.S. Govern-
ment property.
3. Firearms shall of be fired from or at a moving vehicle and shall not be fired
when the lives of bystanders may be endangered. Firearms shall not be used to
intimidate or threat n and shall not be used to fire warning shots.
4. In the event of either an accidental or intentional discharge of the firearm,
the gaurd shall imm diately notify his supervisor, who will impound both the
ammunition and the pistol until an official investitation is completed.
have read the above provisions and completely
understand the responsibility placed upon me in the use of firearms by virtue of my
position as a guard.
Signature
 Approved For Release 2007/03/01: CIA-RDP83M00914R002900070007-1.
APPENDIX B
TITLE IV-CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FIREARMS AUTHORITY
SEc. 401. Subsection 5(d) of the Central Intelligence Agenc~ Act of 1949
(50 U.S.C. 403f(d)) is amended by striking out subsection 5(d)/ in its entirety
and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
"(d) Authorize, under such regulations as the Director shall prescribe, Agency
personnel, while in the discharge of their official duties, to carry firearms: Provided,
That within the United States, such official duties shall include' only the protec-
tion of: (i) information concerning intelligence sources or methods, or classified
intelligence documents or material; (ii) facilities, property, or any medium of
exchange owned or utilized by the Agency; (iii) the Director and the Deputy
Director, and other Agency personnel as may be designated by the Director or
Deputy Director, such designations to be made only upon determination of the
Director or Deputy Director that a specific stated exigency, warrants such pro-
tective action, which is to be terminated, unless sooner renewed in the same
fashion, upon expiration of the exigency or as specified in the designation order
or at the end of one hundred and twenty days, whichever is sooner; and (iv)
defectors and foreign persons visiting the United States under Agency auspices:
And provided further, That such duties shall include the transportation and utili-
zation of firearms for authorized training;".
(18)
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