NSC CENTRAL AMERICA CORE GROUP MEETING OF 13 MAY 1982*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R001800010023-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 23
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/05/10: M00914R001800010023-1
SECRETI
DDI-4053-82
14 May 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT : NSC Central America Core Group Meeting of 13 May 1982*
1. This note provides a brief overview of main topics discussed at
the Core Group meeting. A tentative date for the NSC meeting on Central
America remains Tuesday, 18 May 1982, with the State draft of 23 April (sent
to you with my note of that date) as the presumed basis for the NSC discussion.
Participants in yesterday's meeting were:
State: Stephen Bosworth (Chairman); Craig Johnstone (Director of
Central American Affairs)
DOD: Nestor Sanchez, General Paul Gorman
NSC: Richard Childress, Roger Fontaine
CIA: Duane Clarridge, Constantine Menges 25X1
2. CubantC1icaraguan Actions
CIA stated that it would modify State's more optimistic assumption
in the draft's likely case to state that "Cuba and Nicaragua will do whatever
they believe is necessary short of major conventional attack to help the
extreme left take power in El Salvador and Guatemala". Clarridge pointed to
the 180 tons of weapons for the Salvadoran guerrillas flown from Havana in
April 1982 and other evidence of the continuing, high level of support from
Cuba and Nicaragua.
3. Guatemala
State indicated it has taken the first steps toward restoring
economic aid this month and that gradually move toward some minor
military assistance later. I Isaid there was an immense opportu;~g
in Guatemala now, and there should be some immediate steps to help before the
chance passes. Clarridge commented that after October 1982, there might be
more funds for interdiction and other help. Menges urged an immediate look
at what political/intelligence/military support is needed and an NSC decision
on that so that time would not be lost. Defense agreed and State seemed open
to the idea of more special activities/interdiction but reluctant about
visible military help until the US congressional view changes more. The net
results were: (1) Clarridge said he would assess available additional
resources (he spoke of roughly $2M as needed) and indicate whether more were
needed. He agreed that waiting till October could result in lost opportunities.
(2) State mentioned a small mission to assess needs "in about six weeks" but
acceded to DOD/CIA views that this happen as soon as possible.
*Mr. Clarridge and
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have read this mem .
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4. El Salvador
DOD mentioned that only $2-4M in military aid remains, and they agreed
with Ambassador Hinton's assessment (11 May) that military operations could be
adversely affected unless more aid is available soon. State said there is no
congressional action on the military aid FY 1982 supplemental, but there is
some progress on the CBI economic supplemental and that, perhaps, El Salvador
could use some of those "fundible!'ESF funds when they arrive. CIA pointed to
the continuing high-level of military casualities (projected at 440 for April
compared with 450 in the pre-elections high period) as a sign of the continuing
danger.
5. Discussing interdiction, several participants (DOD, NSC) mentioned
the possible need for more effort to cope with the shift to sea and air supply
routes. Clarridge mentioned successes but also a continuing flow. NSC asked
about progress on General Gorman's idea (first mentioned in early March) of a
ship with COMINT capabilities and helicopter gunships which could conduct a
variety of special operations. The reply was that JCS had spent hardly any
time on Central America since the Falklands crisis began and there was no DOD
movement on this idea. NSC suggested this,and additional interdiction
activities might be highlighted in the NSC draft and discussion or added to
implementing language under existing Presidential directives, which have not
yet been fully implemented.
5._l~texico/Socialist International/Political Communications
Menges brought up the opportunity and need to pursuade the new Mexican
administration ' ate its support for the extreme left. There was general to ter agreement. said the time to start was now; State mentioned thX1
Mexican economic crisis; and Menges again raised the issue of using increased
oil purchase for the SPR as an incentive.
6. On the Socialist International and other political communications
efforts, DOD said not enough was being done; State said more efforts were being
made; but CIA/DOD argued that these were not yet enough.
7. CBI
State mentioned that there were congressional objections to various
Caribbean imports and to the investment guarantee which State will probably
drop. State hoped for congressional approval of the overall among and for a
lifting of the $75M cap on El Salvador (compared to the intended $128M).
8. Implications for DCI Action
The good news is that there seemed to be substantial consensus among
the Core Group members about what to do; the bad news is that there seemed to
be no real agenda or timetable of additional actions that taken soon could
build on the positive momentum in Central America. Therefore, responding to
your request today for a list of specific implications for action by you, I
would suggest:
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a. your reinforcing Judge Clark's view that there should be an
NSC meeting and strategy paper soon.
b. your discussing with Judge Clark and other NSC principals the
need for a clear and comprehensive listing of actions and.timetable to
include NSC decisions on negotiating objectives and timing.
d. your suggestion for periodic (at least bi-monthly) NSC review and
monitoring of progress/problems in Central America.
--ei your stating the intelligence case (threat and opportunity) for
more White House involvement and support.in obtaining the FY 82 supplemental
military and economic aid for El Salvador.
Constantine C. Menges
Att: (1 )
cc: DDCI
C/NIC
VC/NIC
SA/DCI/IA
C/MCD/ALA
C/LAD/ DD0
ED
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2007/05/10: CIA-RDP83M00914R001800010023-1
Approved For Release 2007/05/10: CIA-RDP83M00914R001800010023-1