FRIDAY MEETING WITH SECRETARY WEINBERGER REGARDING EXECUTIVE ORDER ON CLASSIFICATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 43
• Content Type: MEMO

.Approved For..Re1e6se 2007/0.411:
b0i
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Deputy General Counsel
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
ExDi r
.,DOCI
;-DC1
FORM ~1 O USE PREVIOUS
_,g EDITIONS
1-3-L.& ~3MQQ 1.4R 104800'170043-
Friday Meeting With Secretary Weinberger
Regarding Executive Order on Classification
,110.0
44R 000800170.043.-3.
OGC.82-01703
18 February 1982
OfRK?R'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
INITIALS I to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3r- -
Exe
-0 3i
M
co
OGC 82-01703
18 February 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA:
FROM:
Deputy General Counsel
SUBJECT: Friday Meeting With Secretary Weinberger
Regarding Executive Order on Classification
1. The Secretary of Defense has proposed amending the
draft Executive order on classification to protect certain
technological data that he believes cannot be protected
adequately under current standards.
2. The proposal was initiated to enable the United States
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
a. protect sensitive national security information,
particularly militarily critical technology and operational
data developed solely for the use of the Armed Forces;
b. prevent transfer of sensitive United States
technology to foreign powers on a silver platter;
c. rectify a perceived inability under the current
order to classify certain technological data;
d. facilitate dissemination and use of certain infor-
mation by federal personnel and contractors by removing
trustworthiness requirements and establishing only minimal
controls-over such data.
Specifically, the proposal (Tab 1)authorizes the Secretary of
Defense to classify information expected to cause the United
States to lose a military technological or operational
advantage. As drafted, it:
Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
e. authorizes the Secretary of Defense to classify
information that if disclosed could cause the United States
to lose a military technological or operational advantage;
f. allows classification without regard either to
current classification levels or safeguarding and clearance
requirements;
g. permits de facto creation of alternative classifi-
cation scheme including lesser classification levels;
h. enables the Secretary of Defense to promulgate
regulations binding on all agencies.-
I support, in principle, the DOD proposal to ensure protection of
technological data, but believe the approach raises serious
problems that need to be resolved.
3. In my view the DOD proposal runs counter to the very
essence of national security controls. Its adoption would dilute
the classification order in that it contemplates providing
classified information to noncleared personnel and authorizes
widespread dissemination of classified data without regard to
established safeguarding requirements. This attempt to "have it
both ways," I believe, will result in a meaningless classil:i-
cation scheme. Our ability to keep technological information
"classified" depends, at least in part, on the strength of our
efforts to properly safeguard it.
4. Moreover, I believe the current draft Executive order
does provide authority to protect such information adequately.
The draft authorizes classification upon a showing that
disclosure of information could damage the national security.
Such damage would include, I believe, the loss of technological
advantage. Trustworthiness requirements, which DOD wor'.d
eliminate for such technological information, should be retained,
but the current requirements offer sufficient flexibility to
permit less stringent standards.
5. For this reason, I propose as an alternative that we
cooperate with DOD to seek an amendment to the NSC directive
implementing the order. That amendment could lessen, but not
eliminate, safeguarding standards for sensitive but routinely
used technological data. Since the current directive now
contains a similar although more limited provision, my proposal
is not likely to receive significant adverse reaction.
Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
6. A more detailed review of the DoD proposal is attached
for your information at Tab 2. It concludes, and I agree, that
we should support DoD's objectives, but be wary of the approach.
Attachments:
As stated.
Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
 ApE oved Fir Release 2OE37i( 4/1.3: CT Rb MUT914RU08MT70F43--3
Add new Section 6.2(b) to read as follows:
tional security because it would cause the loss to the United
i;t States of a military technological or operational advantage. A
(b)
In the interest of the national defense, and notwithstanding
the provisions of Sections I and 4, the Secretary of Defense is
authorized to classify_informationth,- unq,uthorized disclosure of
+,, Wit ,,which reasonably could be expected to be prejudicial to the na-
classification designation other than as prescribed in Section
1.1 may be applied to such information. the Secretary of Defense-
shall promulgaL ._ regulations,thitshallt-e binding_on_the agen-
level lower--than Gonfidental. ?
Approved Far.Release 2047/Q4f1-3 : CIA-RDP83MOO914R000800170043-3
cies, providing that such information shall be safeguarded at a
 OGC 82-01641
18 February 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Deputy General Counsel
I
Assistant General Counsel
Background for DCI's Meeting With Secretary of
Defense on Classification Executive Order
1. The Secretary of Defense :-ias proposed amending the
draft Executive'order on classification and intends to discuss
that proposal with the DCI at their meeting on Friday. This
memorandum summarizes the Secretary's objectives and this
Agency's previous reaction, presents my views on the possible
ramifications of the proposal, and offers several options for
consideration. Because DoD did not send me the language it
intends to raise with the DCI until this afternoon, I have
addressed the previous proposal at greater length than I have
discussed the new proposal. The same principles and concerns
apply, however, and should be kept in mind when responding to the
new DoD proposal. That new proposal provides:
6.2(b). In the interest of the national
defense, and notwithstanding the provisions
of Sections 1 and 4, the Secretary of Defense
is authorized to classify information the
unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably
could be expected to be prejudicial to the
national security because it would cause the
loss to the United States of a military
technological or operational advantage. A
classification designation other than
prescribed in Section 1.1 may be applied to
such information. The Secretary of Defense
shall promulgate regulations, that shall be
binding on the agencies, providing that such
information shall be safeguarded at a level
lower than Confidential.
2. Secretary Weinberger initially proposed a fourth level
of classified information, called "Restricted," to be applied to
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
certain information, "particularly militarily critical technology
and operational data developed solely for the use of our Armed
Forces." Under that proposal (Tab A), the Executive order would
continue the classification levels Top Secret, Secret, and
Confidential, and further provide that:
"Restricted shall be applied to infor-
mation, the unauthorized disclosure of which
reasonably could be expected to cause the
loss to the United States of a technological,
diplomatic, intelligence, cryptologic, or
military advantage and which requires protec-
tion in the interest of national security.
Defense is willing to omit the underscored language if State and
CIA do not support the proposal. The Agency position to date has
been essentially to support DoD in principle, while expressing
reservations, both on legal and policy grounds,.about the
specific language proposed (Tab B).
3. The DoD position is based primarily on the premise that
certain sensitive information related to the national security,
particularly, although apparently not exclusively, information
involving critical state-of-the-art'military technology, cannot
be protected under current classification standards. The
proposal would enable the United States to protect a wide range
of technical and training data, produced solely for use by the
Armed Forces, upon showing that disclosure of the information
could result in a loss of an advantage to the United States. The
draft order now permits classification only upon showing a
reasonable expectation of damage to the national security, and
reflects a less stringent standard than that required to be met
under the current order, namely, "identifiable" damage. However,
this in itself seems to deflate the DoD argument that the
additional classification level is needed to provide increased
protection for sensitive technological information, for infor-
mation that will cause the loss of a technological advantage and
that requires protection in the interest of national security
implicitly also would be expected to cause damage to the national
security and warrant classification at the Confidential level.
Moreover, section 1-302 of the new draft explicitly requires that
information be classified if its release, when viewed in the
context of other information, could be expected to damage the
national security. This recognition of the so-called "mosaic" or
"aggregate" approach should further alleviate Secretary
Weinberger's concerns.
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
4. The proposal for further levels of classification is
further intended to enable the Department to safeguard sensitive
information while imposing only minimal controls within the
government and defense industry communities. Under the current
and proposed orders a person is eligible for access to classified
information only if trustworthy and if access is essential for a
government purpose (i.e., the person has a need-to-know). The
Defense proposal would eliminate the trustworthiness standard and
establish less stringent requirements for storing and handling
Restricted information. For example, DoD suggests that Army
field manuals describing the operational deployment of the LANCE
missile could be provided to noncleared personnel and subjected
to minimal safeguarding controls, but would be classified, for
example, Restricted, provided to nonclerical federal and
contractor personnel, and exempt from public release under the
FOIA. Thus, for certain categories of classified information, as
yet imprecisely defined, access determinations would be based
solely upon an exhibited need for the information, without any
consideration of the recipient's reliability.
5. While useful perhaps as a dissemination control, the
DOD approach is inherently inconsistent with the well-established
premise that information is to be classified, and provided
limited distribution, because of the potential disadvantage to
the national defense or foreign relations of the United States.
Such a wholesale abandonment of traditionalprinciples raises
serious questions about the sensitivity of, and the ability to
protect, information that will be provided without regard to
trustworthiness standards. Also, this approach could result in
improper use of the Restricted category by underclassifying to
avoid the bureaucratic burdens involved in clearing personnel and
storing material properly. To the extent the loss of information
could result in the United States suffering a militarily techno-
logical loss, that information should be classified at least at
the Confidential level and handled accordingly if public and
judicial scrutiny and criticism are to be avoided. More impor-
tantly, dissemination of information controlled solely on a need-
to=know basis could be insufficient to prevent entry of the
information into the public domain.
6. These concerns arise less with the concept espoused by
DoD than with the approach. The absence of any precise criteria
for determining what constitutes a technological, diplomatic,
intelligence, cryptologic, or military loss seems to present a
fatal flaw. This not only could result in underclassification
and disclosures to noncleared persons, but also could remove from
the public domain considerable information developed by industry
and now unclassified. There is no indication, for example,
Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
whether Restricted technological data would be limited to data
subject to export controls. If not, could persons who disclose
such data to foreign powers nevertheless be prosecuted for.
providing "classified" information in violation of U.S. criminal
laws? As drafted, the DOD proposal cannot resolve these
concerns.
7. As stated, it is my view. the DOD language as proposed
is unnecessary. If, as DOD concedes, loss of certain information
would be "demonstrably disadvantageous" to U.S. national security
interests, that information can be classified under the draft
Executive order.- Technological matters, military plans, weapons
and their capabilities, intelligence and diplomatic sources, and
cryptology all are classifiable pursuant to section 1-301.
Recognizing, however, the practical ramifications of the
increasing need to protect technological information, the
following alternatives are pr-esented for your consideration:
OPTION A:
Seek a separate Executive order addressing the need to
protect certain unclassified information from public
disclosure.
Advantages:
1) Provides further opportunity to study the
problem.
2) Avoids the trustworthiness issue.
3) Avoids dilution of. classification standards.
Disadvantages:
1) Does not carry FOIA protection of classified
information.
2) Avoids determining of classifiability of
sensitive technological data.
OPTION B(1):
Support DOD's initial proposal to create a fourth level
of classification, "Restricted," to cover technological,
diplomatic, intelligence, cryptologic, and military infor-
mation.
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
Advantages:
1) Recognizes desirability of protecting broad
categories of sensitive data.
2) Eases administrative burdens imposed by
clearance and safeguarding requirements.
3) Conforms U.S. system to NATO system using
"Restricted" caveats.
4) Provides strong mechanism to protect sensitive
data when doubt exists as to ability to classify.
5) Prevents giving technology away on a silver
platter.
Disadvantages:
1) Unnecessary in view of classification
standards under draft order.
2) Lacks precise guidelines or standards for
identifying classifiable information.
3) Invites abuse by authorizing underclassifi-
cation and dissemination to uncleared persons.
4) "Restricted" caveat easily confused with
"Restricted Data" caveat under Atomic Energy Act.
5) Invites public criticism of undue government
secrecy.
6) Probably will not be effective to prevent loss
to hostile services.
7) Dilutes effectiveness of other classification
categories.
OPTION B(2):
Support DoD's proposal, but limited to technological
and military loss.
Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
Advantages:
Same as B(1), plus less likely to receive so much
public criticism in view of more limited scope.
Disadvantages:
Same as B(1).
OPTION C:
Amend draft Executive order to define "damage to the
national security" as either a disadvantage to the United
States or an advantage to a foreign power.
Advantages:
Permits classification of information covered by
Defense's proposal at the Confidential level, but main-
tains trustworthiness standards and safeguard controls.
Disadvantages:
Permits overclassification, since foreign advan-
tages can be relative (i.e., an advantage to one
country may not be an advantage to another).
Ensure NSC directive implementing the order provides
limited waiver provisions governing security and safeguard-
ing requirements.
Advantages:
1) Avoids amending the order and the problems
that would entail.
2) Resolves DoD's practical problems in dealing
with contractors.
3) Provides flexibility to clearly define extent
of authorities.
4) Maintains traditional standards of classifi-
ability.
5) Limited precedent exists in current directive.
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
6) Properly enables emphasis to be placed on
dissemination controls rather than focus on classifi-
cation levels.
Disadvantages:
1) Perceived as subversion of Executive order if
waiver too broad.
2) Arguably lacks authority of Presidential order
and, thus, less effective.
OPTION E (Tab C):
Adopt revised DOD proposal to permit the Secretary of
Defense to establish guidelines to classify certain military
technological and operational information.
Advantages:
1) Satisifies all DOD's concerns;
2) Limited in scope to sensitive technological
information having military application, although
language still too broad.
3) Consistent with provisions of the order
enabling agency heads to create additional categories
of classifiable information.
4) Sends appropriate message on U.S. policies and
priorities.
Disadvantages:
1) In effect, permits Secretary of Defense to
establish a new classification scheme.
2) Permits underclassification and does not
resolve concerns with providing access to noncleared
persons.
3) Appears to permit additional classification.
levels that contain the same defects as a Restricted
category without being so explicit.
Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
4) Amending order likely to invite further public
or congressional scrutiny.
RECOMMENDATION: Options C and D.
8. Adopting both options C and D provides a dual
benefit. First, as the order already permits classification of
the information addressed by DOD, th,are is no need to effect any
substantive change to the order. Clearly, certain technology
losses can damage national security. In those cases, either when
the damage place's the U.S. at a disadvantage or gives a foreign
power a technological gain, the data can be classified Confiden-
tial. A clear definition of "damage" helps ensure this result.
Moreover, with that problem resolved, the practical concerns
raised by Defense can be disposed of by having the NSC directive
implementing the order authorize the Secretary, for clearly
definedtechnological data --.perhaps based in part upon export
laws -- provide limited waiver of the storage, dissemination and
other safeguarding requirements. While the directive currently
permits every agency head to do this to liirfted extent, minor
revisions can provide DOD, and CIA, the needed flexibility to
disseminate routinely used, but sensitive, classified data with
less chance of losing control over the information. Moreover,
since trustworthiness standards are not derined even in the
current order, ample flexibility appears to exist to provide
routine information labeled, for example, "Confidential
Technical" to contractor personnel based only on a National
Agency Records check. More importantly, this approach seems to
eliminate the possible criticism that the government zs
improperly extending its cloak of secrecy into the private sector
or that, on the other hand, national security standards are being
diluted.
9. The new DOD proposal at option E appears to offer none
of the advantages of options C and D. It is more narrowly drawn
but needs further revision, and does not actually create a
separate classification level but permits the Secretary of
Defense to do so. Moreover, any national security classification
system that does not require at least some trustworthiness
standards would seem to be fatally flawed. I do not believe DOD
can have it both ways; that it, we should not on the one hand
attempt to restrict access to sensitive information in the
interests of national security, while on the other hand decline
to impose proper safeguards for that information because of the
administrative burden that would be required to do so. This
inevitably will result in a meaningless classification scheme and
render us unable to keep the information "classified." Moreover,
query the impact such a scheme would have on the ability to
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
prosecute under title 18 for the disclosure of "classified"
information, or the ability to utilize the graymail legislation,
when information is classified but no efforts have been made -':o
properly safeguard it. These problems pose serious obstacles to
the DOD proposals.
10. Absent adoptio:. of these options, of course, is the
possiblity of taking no action to support Defense. In view of
the merits of the DOD concept, however, that would not appear to
be a viable option. I believe it would be useful to cooperate
with DOD to draft acceptable language to protect sensitive
technological information, whether that information involves
military or intelligence equities, and I believe an amendment to
the NSC directive offers the best opportunity of a worthwhile
revision.
Attachments:
As stated
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914RO08 17rLqA`1 'I t
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JAN9~f n
)i r
WASHINGTON. THE DISTRICT OF COLUN3IA SF' Rc. s~~ =t ~t Eh iE
5 JAN I ::?:.:.::,v~~ j
MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: Executive Order on Classification
This is in response to the December 23, 1981 memorandum from
the Counsellor to the President that requests that this
Department's comments on the latest draft replacement `or
Executive Order 12065, "National Security Information" be
provided to you..
While we can support much in the new, revision, we note that
only some 30% of previous DoD comments have been incorporated
into this revised draft.
Of greatest concern is the failure to include in this current
draft our previous proposal to establish a fourth level of
classification, namely,."Restricted." We believe this omission
is unfortunate. By its omission from the current draft, other
departments and agencies of the Executive Branch will not have
the opportunity to review and comment on its merits.
The existing three-level classification scheme has-not provided
adequate protection for a large body of sensitive rational
security information, particularly militaril`.? critical techno-
logy and operational data deve_oped solely for the use of our
Armed Forces. The current uncontrolled dissemination of this
sensitive information, especially when taken in the aggregate,
is demonstrably disadvantageous to U.S. national security
interests. The loss of such information and the consequent
advantages gained by our adversaries require that steps be
taken now to provide legal and positive control of it.
Of course, some will say that an added classification category
will draw criticism that the revised Order increases the sup-
pression of government information by broadenir:.g what' can? be
classified and increasing the amount of classified information.
While the number of classified documents will probs'bly increase
as a result of the fourth classification, this increase does
not mean denial to the general public of information it needs
to be informed. At issue is the establishment of a',:~ore equitable
balance between open government and the government's respoLsibility
IV00062
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
to secure the public interest. Restricting the public
availability of scientific and technical data and, for
example, Army field manuals describing the operational
deployment of the LANCE missile, does not constrain informa-
tion the public requires to be informed about the activities
and operating functions of its government. -Expansion of
the current classification system should not be viewed as
a radical departure but rather as'a reasonable, necessary,
and responsible extension of access control over certain
information based on legitimate national security concerns.
It is an immediate and proper solution to preclude further
loss of such information.
While we are willing to limit the scope of the 'aurth level
of classification to military technical and operational
information, we believe it would be a serious and unfortunate
mistake not to take this opportunity to help stem the flow
of U.S. national security information that is now freely
available and useful to our adversaries.
Attachment 1 contains a detailed, rationale sr-.aporting the
establishment oil" the -fourth level of.classiication -
RESTRICTED. The Department's. other changes to t1pe replace-
ment order are contained in Attachment 2.
Attachments
Copy furnished:
Counsellor to
the President
Lf /
Approved For Release 2007/04/13 :-CIA-R DP83M00914R000800170043-3
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
Defense Department Proposal to Establish the RESTRICTED Classification
Loss of U.S. technology is pervasive and.uncontrolled. The unremitting
flow of unclassified national security information to hostile nations,
particularly technology and technical data with military application,
is one of the more serious problems confronting this Administration.
There is ample evidence that Soviet -bloc acquisitions of unclassified
national security. related publications poses a considerable threat to
the U.S. military posture and that of our allies. It greatly enhances
our adversaries' capabilties to design, produce and field weapons sys-
tems of all types, as well as develop measures to counter U.S. weapons
systems. It cuts their production costs, shortens their production
times, and improves the quality of their product.
A Soviet scientist who defected several years ago told Congress that
the majority of Soviet information collection requirements can be open-
ly obtained in the United States. The FBI has estimated that as high
as 90% of the Soviet collection requirements can .3e satisfied through
open sources. We are painfully aware of Communist bloc efforts within
the United States to obtain technology, most of which through legal
means, which we are powerless to stop. Prior to February 1980, for
example, we stood helplessly by as the Soviet Union p;.:rchased 80.000
technical documents each year from the Natiinal Technical Informacion
Service (NTIS). Although their access to the NTIS has now been offic-
ially terminated, their surrogates continue to exploit this source of
extremely valuable information.
Members of Congress, industry spokesmen, and the media frequently la-
ment this state of affairs, and ask is there nothing that can be done.
Unfortunately it has always been presumed that little could or should
be done to limit such acquisitions, relying instead on the ability of
the originators of such documents to properly secure sensitive informa-
tion by using the existing security classification system. This is
precisely the point of the Defense proposal. The existing t~.ree-level
classification scheme has not provided adequate protection to a 1-arge
body of sensitive national security information, particularly militar-
ily critical technology and operational data developed solely for the
use of our Armed Forces.
Classification of such information under the current three-level system
has been neither possible nor practical. Although such sensitive na-
security information fits the categories permitted to be classi-
tional
fied, it does not rise to the level of the "identifiable damage" stan-
prescribed by the current Order, nor does it rise to the "damage"
dard
standard of the draft revision. Disclosure of the technical character-
istics of electronic components used in a missile guidance system, for
example, may not appear to damage the national security, and yet may
well provide our adversaries with precisely what they need to produce a
more effective missile. It is this "damage" standard that is applied
Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
by orginators in deciding whether to make their documents unclassified
or to protect them by security classification.
At the practical level, there is also need to permit defense com-
ponents, contractors, and other government entities to freely utilize
and exchange information of this nature without the costs and delays
entailed by safeguarding requirements imposed under the current three-
level system. Using the previous example, if the technical character-
istics of the electronic components were cl:ssified under the provi-
sions of the present Order, no one could handle them or have access to
them without a security clearance; they could not be stored or transmit-
ted except by approved means; and they could not be discussed except
over secure communications. Under the current system of classifica-
tion, technical information of this sort is frequently not classified
because the owner of the information believes his need to freel;* util-
ize it takes precedence over whatever advantage the United States might
lose if the-information were disclosed to -ur adversaries. He might
well be right, but the legal consequence of his decision is to make the
information available under a variety of circumstances such as the
Freedom of Information Act; through government distribution centers;
discussion in industry marketir-3, brochures, presentations, and meet-
ings; through the Federal Depository Library System; througIc the Inter-
national Exchange Program; speeches; cultural and trade exchanges.
It is to remedy this situation -- co make possible control over dissemi-
nation of technical information without at the same time creating a
system that would unduly inhibit the defe.,se industrial. process -- that
DoD has proposed the fourth level of classification. k would allow
us, and other agencies, to classify information useful to our adver-
saries, enabling us to keep it out of public dissemination channels
while at the same time subjecting it to minimal controls within the
federal government and defense industry communities. As we conceive
it, the only requirement for access to RESTRICTED would be a legitimate
need for it in the performance of official government functions. No
background investigation would be required prior to granting access.
Storage and handling requirements would similarly be minimal to prevent
persons who had no official need for the information from obtaining
access to it.
Some may argue that a fourth level of classification would dilute the
efficacy of the security classification system resulting in a loss of
its credibility. Quite the contrary, the fourth classification level
strengthens the system by authorizing the protection of valuable nation-
al security information that is now jeopardized because "nothing can be
done about it under the current Order. It recognizes a serious informa-
tion control problem and provides a credible solution. The "damage".
standard remains undiluted for the higher levels of classification; the
fourth classification level introduces a realistic "loss" standard for
the protection of sensitive national security information that is now
unprotected; and the overall classification protection of information
in the interest of national security is strenghtened. Expansion of the
current classification scheme will not be viewed as a radical departure
. Approved For Release.2007/04/13: CIA-R DP83M00914R0008O0170043 3
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
but rather as a reasonable, necessary, and responsible extension of
access controls over information based on legitimate security concerns.
Most of the NATO member nations and NATO itself use a four-level secur-
ity classification system to include the classification "Restricted."
The incompatibility of the U.S. three-level system with NATO and man;
countries outside of NATO continually creates operational. problems
having an adverse effect on NATO interoperability and standardization.
These and other persistent problems would be.resolved with the esta-
blishment of "Restricted" as a U.S. security classification.
Alternatives put forth to accomplish such increased controls, such as
amending the FOIA or existing statutes governing export control fail to
recognize the duty and authority to protect national security iniorma-
tion which clearly resides with the President.
Other alternatives, such as increased emphasis on dissemination control
systems by individual agencies or through additional Executive orders,
do not have the force or immediate effect of security classification.
Nor would such controls, under existing legislative policy, be suffi-
cient to effectively stem the flow of sensitive national security infor-
mation to hostile nations.
We want to make clear this additional category of classification is not
intended to preclude any greater public awareness of defense activi-
ties, operations or policy than is now possible. We emphasize our
purpose is solely to protect certain information by su_+jecting its
dissemination through open channels to greater 'Control. We want to
den- our adversaries the proverbial "silver platter" they now have.
Private firms and individuals in the United States who need this infor-
mation to continue to do business with the Government will continue to
get it, but through official channels rather than sources available to
the general public.
It is my understanding that other Executive Branch agencies are reluc-
tantly distributing and releasing information that is disadvantageous
to U.S. national security interests. It was for this reason that we
included in our proposed definition of Restricted loss of a "diplo-
matic" or "intelligence" advantage. However, if State and CIA do not
share the same degree of concern over loss of such information as we do
over military technology and operational information then we would
offer the following more narrow definition for Restricted information
as an alternate proposal:
"Restricted" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized
disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause the
loss to the United States of a technological or military advan-
tage and which requires protection in the interest of national
security.
This alternately defined fourth classification level would apply to a
wide range of technical and training data produced by this Department
Approved For Release 2007/04/13-: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
which does not meet the current criteria for classification. This
information, invaluable as a reflection of the state-of-the-art of
military technology and the extent to which it has tactical and strate-
gic military application is highly sought and easily obtained by our
adversaries. Several highly classified studies can be provided that
demonstrate the degree to which our advers.zries are using such informa-
tion to their immediate and long-range benefit. However, the benefit
of the alternative proposal principally accrues to this Department
since it.is the primary and largest user of technology related and
military operational information.
The current uncontrolled dissemination of sensitive but unclassified
national security information, especially when taken in the aggregate,
is demonstrably disadvantageous to U.S. National security interests.'
The loss of such information and the advantages gained by our adversar-
ies requires that steps be taken now to provide legal and positive
control of it. We continue to urge approval -of our initially proposed
fourth level of classification as an effective and inexpensive means to
restrict access to sensitive national security information that is now
unprotected. While we would accept the proposed alternate, more narrow
definition that ameliorates some of this Department's concerns, we
continue to believe that the problem of inadequate protection of sensi-
tive national security information extends throughout the Executive
Branch. There are no other acceptable alternatives if we are to dis-
charge effectively our considerable responsibility for she protection
of information in the interest of national security.
Changes to the revised order necessary to establish the RESTRICTED
classification are as follows:
Change Section 1-101 to read:
1-101. National security information... shall be classified at
one of the following [three] four levels:
Add Section 1-101(d) to read:
1-101(d). "Restricted" shall be applied to information, the
unauthorized disclosure of which reasonabl: could be _oected to
cause the loss to the United States of a technology; '.o-
matic, intelligence, cI";')tologLC. or military adva-caRe and which
requires protection in the interest of national secu tty.
Change Section 1-302 to read:
1-302. Information... shall be classified when... its unauthorized
disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause the less of an
advantage to the United States or cause damage to the iational
security.
Change Section 1-501(d) to read:
Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83MOO914R000800170043-3
(d) one of the [three] four classification designations....
Change Section 4-101 to
read:
4-101.. A person is eligible for access to Restr.cted information
only when such Access is essential to the accomoiishment c-f au-
thorized and lawful Government purposes. A person is eligible
for access to [classified] Tcr? Secret, Secret, or Confidential
information only after a [formal] favorable determination of
trustwothiness....
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800-170043-3
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20505
i 3NOVItAS
Mr. Arthur F. Van Cook
Director of Information Security
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy Review
Department of Defense
Room 3C260
Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
Dear 1 ,y. if Cook:
We share the concern, expressed in your letter of 19 October 1981, for
protecting certain information that does not meet the current criteria for
classification under Executive Order 12065. In particular, we believe that
advanced U.S. technology relating to national secu. ity systems should be
afforded protection. The proposal to provide this protection by adding
"RESTRICTED" as a fourth level of classification, however, rai-es several
questions that we feel should, be resolved before we can fully support this
approach.
As you know, the 16 October 1981 Information Security Overs ht
Office (ISOO) draft replacement for Executive Order 12065 enhances tL.tL ability
of the U.S. Government to protect technological information even without tlFe
addition of a new classification level. For examale, Section 1-101(c) no
longer would require a showing of "identifiable" damage to 'che national security
in order to classify information. Section 1-103 no longer would require that
information not be classified if there is reasonable doubt as to whether it
should be. Section 1-302 would require explicitly th.-t information be
classified if it is an element of what has been referred to as the "aggregate".
or "mosaic". And Section 1-401 no longer would require that a maximtun duration
of classification be set when information is classified.
Given these changes to Executive Order 12065, we believe that the proposal
to add a "RESTRICTED" classification could in some cases result in information
being provided less protection than it warrants. The new classification level
easily could become a "catchall" for i-iformation that in many cases should a',d
could be classified Confidential. We believe, for example, that a loss of
advantage to the U.S. resulting from the disclosure of technological info mation
relating to the national security would indeed damage the national security,
and therefore such information should be classified at least Confidential-
Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-R-DP8 M00.91A.R.f008D17 .4:1-~
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: -CIA-RDP83MOO914ROO0800170043-3
Classifying information "RESTRICTED" rather than Confidentia' would
be of particular concern in light of the proposal that access to such
information would require only need-to-know and would not require a security
clearance. While "RESTRICTED" information may be protected from public
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, dissemination controlled
only by need-to-lmow would be inadequate to prevent entry into the public
domain. With the positive approach ~o classification reflected in the ISOO
draft replacement for Executive Order 12065, we should be able to protect
against loss of advantage to the U.S. through general understanding and
increased utilization of classification in the aggregate. This would avoid
possibly throwing the entire national security classification system open to
question by the inclusion of information that'does not require a determination
of trustworthiness before granting access.
We are hopeful that the above questions might be resolved through a
reformulation of the "RESTRICTED" proposal that would include a -requirement
for a determination of trustworthiness consistent with the existing three
classification levels. Alternatively, we might support an effort to establish
a basis for protecting technological information through legislation or a
separate Executive order addressing the need to withhold certain unclas:ified
information from public disclosure. We would be happy to meet with You and
other interested parties to explore such alternative approaches to avoid"-MY
the loss of advantage to the U.S. resulting from premature disclosure of
sensitive information.
Director of Information Services
Directorate of Administration
DDA/OIS[
Distribution:
1(13 November 1981)
Original-OIS _
2-OIS SubJa~t ' Chron9
1-RSB Subject: Classification Ngt/EO 12065 Revision
1-RSB Chrono
Approved For Release 2007/04/13: C IA-R DP83M00914R000800170043-3
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83M00914R000800170043-3
Approved For-Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP$3MO09.14RO49800170043-3
 ~Ap{ a ed- ~ Retie -8 7 f 3 RTf i831sdi88914RS8C i8~ -Ge 8-3-=~
Add new Section 6.2(b) to read as follows:
(b) In the interest of the national defense, and notwithstanding
the provisions of Sections 1 and 4, the Secretary of Defense is
authorized to classify_Information the, unq:,uthorized disclosure of
,.,which reasonably could be expected to be prejudicial to the na-
tional security because it would cause the loss to the United
NI- __'
is States of a military'technological or operational advantage. A
classification designation other than as prescribed in Section
1.1 may be applied tosuch information. the Secretary of Defense
shall. promulgaue regulations, that d i n g nding on the e en-
'cies, providing that :'such information shall-be safeguarded at a
~.. -level :.lower-'than Confidential.
Approved ForPeleasj 2QR7Jd41.1.a: CIA RDP83M0Q914R000800170043-3