S. 391 THE INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES PROTECTION ACT OF 1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2007
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: May 8, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/03~IA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-
?> ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Identities Testimony--8 May 1981--Before Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Security and
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO.
Legislative Counsel
DATE
' 1 MAY 1981
TO: (OfRcer designation, room number, and
buildin
)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
g
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column aker each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
-.
Attached for your review are:
DDCI
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2.
3.
~"~~'
'
~
DCI
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8
4.
(ii) lengthier "Statement for the
Record."
s?
Item (i), the "oral presentation,"
Q~,
is the same length as the oral
statement you presented on 7 April
6?
before the House Intelligence
Committee and contains all the
points you made at that time. The
~. ~
~
"Statement for the Record" goes
f
into greater detail about the
damage caused by the unauthorized
e?
Identi ~ disclosures.
9.
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re tic
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_
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11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM ~~ 0 USE PREVIOUS
I-79 EDITIONS
STAT
.:....Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDPB~ ,~ ~~ $,.~,
 Approved Ford Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9 ~
SUMMARY STATEMENT
BY
WILLIAM J. CASEY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM
ON
MAY 8, 1981
ON
S. 391, THE "INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES PROTECTION ACT OF 1981"
Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
 Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased
to be appearing before the Subcommittee on Security and
Terrorism, which is considering S. 391, the "Intelligence
Identities Protection Act." Early last month, I appeared
before the House Intelligence Subcommittee on Legislation to
testify on the House version of the Bill. With both chambers
considering this legislation I am hopeful that we will soon
see enactment of a measure which will finally put an end to the
pernicious and damaging unauthorized disclosures of intelligence
identities.
The Intelligence Community's support for legislation to
provide criminal penalties for the unauthorized disclosure
of information identifying certain individuals engaged or
assisting in the foreign intelligence activities of the
United States is well known. I want to emphasize that this
Administration believes that passage of the "Intelligence
Identities Protection Act" is essential to the maintenance
of a strong and effective intelligence apparatus. Enactment
of this legislation is an important component of the Adminis-
tration's effort to implement President Reagan's determination
to enhance the nation's intelligence capabilities.
Mr. Chairman, there exists a coterie of Arnericans who have
openly proclaimed themselves to be devoted to the destruction
of the nation's foreign intelligence agencies. T11is group has
engaged in actions avowedly aimed at undermining the nation's
intelligence capabilities through the identification and
exposure of undercover intelligence officers. The perpetrators
Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
 Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
of these disclosures understand correctly that secrecy is
the life blood of an intelligence organization and that
disclosures of the identities of individuals whose intelli-
gence affiliation is deliberately concealed can disrupt,
discredit and--they hope--ultimately destroy an agency such
as the CIA. Sorne of the persons engaged in this activity
have actually traveled to foreign countries with the aim of
stirring up local antagonism to U.S. officials througYi
thinly veiled incitements to violence. t~lr. Chairman, I
might say that since taking the position of Director of
Central Intelligence only a few months ago I can confirm
that these unauthorized disclosures have resulted in untold
damage, and, if not stopped, will result in further damage
to the effectiveness of our intelligence apparatus, and hence
to the nation itself. I might also say that I am appalled at
the degree to which concerted activity is being carried out
around the world to destroy a capacity which is critical to
our national security and which has been painstakingly
developed over many years with the full participation of
the Congress and an investrnent of billions of dollars.
The tragic results of unauthorized disclosures of intelligence
identities are well known. Five years ago, Richard Welcti was
murdered in Athens, Greece. Last July, only luck intervened
to prevent the death of the young daughter of a U.S. Embassy
Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
 Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
officer in Jamaica whose home was attacked only days after
one of the editors of a publication called Covert Action
Information Bulletin appeared in Jamaica, and at a highly
publicized news conference gave the names, addresses,
telepYione numbers, license plates, and descriptions of the
cars of U.S. government employees whom he alleged to be CIA
officers. Most recently, six Americans were expelled from
Mozambique following charges of engaging in espionage.
These expulsions followed visits to that country by members
of the Cuban intelligence service and the editors of the
Covert Action Information Bulletin.
Mr. Chairman, I do not think it is necessary to go
into great detail about the adverse effects that unauthorized
disclosures of intelligence identities are having on the work
of our nation's intelligence agencies. Simply put, the
credibility of our country and its relationships with foreign
intelligence services and individual human sources, the lives
of patriotic Americans serving their country, and the effectiveness
of our intelligence apparatus are all being placed in jeopardy.
extensive hearings before the House and Senate Intelligence
and Judiciary Committees have documented these pernicious
effects. The underlying basic issue is the fact tYiat our
ability to continue to recruit and retain human sources of
intelligence whose information could be crucial to the
nation's survival in an increasingly dangerous world, and
our equally important relations with the intelligence
services of other nations are in continuing jeopardy.
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
It is important to understand what legislation in this area seeks
to accomplish: It seeks to protect the secrecy of the participation
or cooperation of certain persons in the foreign intelligence
activities of the U.S. Government. These are activities which have
been authorized by the Congress; activities which we, as a nation,
have determined are essential. No existing statute clearly and
specifically makes the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence
identities a criminal offense. As matters now stand the impunity
with which unauthorized disclosures of intelligence identities can
be made implies a governmental position of neutrality in the matter.
It suggests that U.S. intelligence officers are "fair game" for those
members of their own society who take issue with the existence of CIA
or find other perverse motives for making these unauthorized
disclosures.
i~ir. Chairman, I believe it is important to emphasize that the
legislation which you are considering today is not an assault upon
the First Amendment. The "Intelligence Identities Protection Act"
would not inhibit public discussion and debate about U.S. foreign
policy or intelligence activities, and it would not operate to
prevent the exposure of allegedly illegal activities or abuses of
authority. The legislation is carefully crafted and narrowly
drawn to deal with conduct which serves no useful informing
function whatsoever; does not alert us to alleged abuses; does
not bring clarity to issues of national policy; does not enlighten
public debate; and does not contribute to an educated and informed
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
electorate.
The Bill creates three categories of the offense of disclosure
of intelligence identities:
a. Disclosure of information identifying a "covert
agent" by persons who have or have t7ad authorized access
to classified information that identifies such a covert
agent. This category covers primarily disclosure by
intelligence agency employees and others who get access
to classified information that directly identifies
"covert agents";
b. Disclosure of information identifying a "covert
agent" by persons who have learned the identity as a result
of authorized access to classified information. This
category covers disclosures by any person who learns
the identity of a covert agent as a result of governrient
service or other authorized access to classified
information that racy not directly identify or name a
specific "covert agent"; and
c. Disclosure of information identifying a "covert
agent" by anyone, under certain specified conditions
outlined below.
There is virtually no serious disagreement over the provisions
of the legislation which provide criminal penalties for the unauthorized
disclosure of intelligence identities by individuals who have tiad
authorized access to classified information. Controversy has centered
around subsection 601(c) of S. 391.
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
Disclosures of intelligence identities by persons who have
not had authorized access to classified information would be punish-
able only under specified conditions, which have been carefully
crafted and narrowly drawn so as to make the Act inapplicable to
anyone not engaged in an effort or pattern of activities designed
to identify and expose intelligence personnel. The proposed legis-
lation also contains defenses and exceptions which reinforce this
narrow construction. It is instructive, in this regard, to look at
the elements of proof that would be required in a prosecution under
subsection 601(c) of S. 391, keeping in mind that the government
would have to prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
The government would have to show:
-- That there was an intentional disclosure of infor-
mation which did in fact identify a "covert agent;"
-- That the disclosure was made to an individual not
authorized to receive classified information;
-- That the person who made the disclosure knew that
the information disclosed did in fact identify a covert agent;
-- That the person who made the disclosure knew that the
United States was taking affirmative measures to conceal the
covert agent's classified intelligence affiliation;
-- That the individual making the disclosure did so
in the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify
and expose covert agents; and,
-- That the disclosure was made with reason to believe
that such activities would impair or impede the foreign
Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
 Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
intelligence activities of the United States.
Because of these strict conditions, which narrowly define
the prohibited conduct, I believe it is clear that subsection
GO1(c) is directed at conduct which the Congress has the
authority and power to proscribe consistent with the First
Amendment, and that this Bill does so in a constitutional
fashion.
Mr. Chairman, I understand that the Department of
Justice believes that the Senate version of the Bill better
captures the concerted nature of the activity which is
intended to be proscribed than does tl~e house Bill, and
that there are prosecutorial and evidentiary advantages to the
Senate language. I believe that the Department's witness will
speak to this matter.
Nir. Chairman, S. 391 will deal with a clear and immediate
danger which currently--each and every day--endangers our
intelligence activities, our staff officers, and the lives
of those who are cooperating with our nation abroad. I want
to express m y gratitude and appreciation to the Subcommittee
for so promptly bringing this legislation forward and
reiterate the hope that it will be enacted into law as
quickly as possible so that this intolerable situation is
remedied.
I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
 Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
BY
WILLIAM J. CASEY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE TiiE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM
ON
MAY 8, 1981
ON
S. 391, THE "INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES PROTEC`PION ACT OF 1981"
Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
 Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased
to be appearing before the Subcommittee on Security and
Terrorism, which is considering S. 391., the "Intelligence
Identities Protection Act." Early last month, I appeared
before the House Intelligence Subcommittee on Legislation to
testify on the House version of the Bill. With both chambers
considering this legislation I am hopeful that we will soon
see enactment of a measure which will finally put an end to the
pernicious and damaging unauthorized disclosures of intelligence
identities.
The Intelligence Community's support for legislation to
provide criminal penalties for the unauthorized disclosure
of information identifying certain individuals engaged or
assisting in the foreign intelligence activities of the
United States is well known. I want to emphasize that this
Administration believes that passage of the "Intelligence
Identities Protection Act" is essential to the maintenance
of a strong and effective intelligence apparatus. Enactment
of this legislation is an important component of the Adminis-
tration's effort to implement President Reagan's determination
to enhance the nation's intelligence capabilities.
Mr. Chairman, there exists a coterie of Americans wlio have
openly proclaimed themselves to be devoted to ttre destruction
of the nation's foreign intelligence agencies. This group has
engaged in actions avowedly aimed at undermining the nation's
intelligence capabilities through the identification and
exposure of undercover intelligence officers. The perpetrators
Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
 Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
of these disclosures understand correctly that secrecy is
the life blood of an intelligence organization and that
disclosures of the identities of individuals whose intelli-
gence affiliation is deliberately concealed can disrupt,
discredit and--they hope--ultimately destroy an agency such
as the CIA. Some of the persons engaged in this activity
have actually traveled to foreign countries with the aim of
stirring up local antagonism to U.S. officials through
thinly veiled incitements to violence. Mr. Chairman, I
might say that since taking the position of Director of
Central Intelligence only a few mont~ls ago I can confirm
that these unauthorized disclosures have resulted in untold
damage, and, if not stopped, will result in further damage
to the effectiveness of our intelligence apparatus, and hence
to the nation itself. I might also say that I am appalled at
the degree to which concerted activity is being carried out
around the world to destroy a capacity which is critical to
our national security and which has been painstakingly
developed over many years with the full participation of
the Congress and an investment of billions of dollars.
The tragic results of unauthorized disclosures of intelligence
identities are well known. Five years ago, Richard Welch was
murdered in Athens, Greece. Last July, only luck intervened
to prevent the death of the young daughter of a U.S. Embassy
Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
 Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
officer in Jamaica whose home was attacked only days after
one of the editors of a publication called Covert Action
Information Bulletin appeared in Jamaica, and at a highly
publicized news conference gave the names, addresses,
telephone numbers, license plates, and descriptions of the
cars of U.S. government employees whom he alleged to be CIA
officers. Most recently, six Americans were expelled from
Mozambique following charges of engaging in espionage.
These expulsions followed visits to that country by members
of the Cuban intelligence service and the editors of the
Covert Action Information Bulletin.
Extensive hearings before the Senate and House Intelligence
Committees and before the two Judiciary Committees during the
96th Congress documented the pernicious effects of these
unauthorized disclosures. Obviously, security considerations
preclude my confirming or denying specific instances of purported
identification of U.S. intelligence personnel. Suffice it to
say that a substantial number of these disclosures have been
accurate. Unauthorized disclosures are undermining the
Intelligence Community's human source collection capabilities
and endangering the lives of our intelligence officers in the
field. The destructive effects of these disclosures have
been varied and wide ranging.
Our relations with foreign sources of intelligence have
been impaired. Sources have evinced increased concern for
their own safety. Sorne active sources and individuals
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
contemplating cooperation with tYie United States Yiave terminated
or reduced their contact with us. Sources have questioned how
the U.S. Government can expect its friends to provide information
in view of continuing disclosures of information that may
jeopardize their careers, liberty, and very lives.
Many foreign intelligence services with which we have
important liaison relationships have undertaken reviews of
their relations with us. Some immediately discernible results
of continuing disclosures include reduction of contact and
reduced passage of information. In taking these actions, some
foreign services have explicitly cited disclosures of intelligence
identities.
We are increasingly being asked to explain how we can
guarantee the safety of individuals who cooperate with us when
we cannot protect our own officers from exposure. You can
imagine the chilling effect it must have on a source to one day
discover that the individual with whom he has been in contact
has been openly identified as a CIA officer.
The professional effectiveness of officers so compromised
is substantially and sometimes irreparably damaged. They must
reduce or break contact with sensitive covert sources. Continued
contact must be coupled with increased defensive measures that
are inevitably more costly and time consuming.
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
Some officers must be removed from their assignments
and returned from overseas at substantial cost. Years of
irreplaceable area experience and linguistic skills are lost.
Reassignment mobility of the compromised officer is impaired.
As a result, the pool of experienced CIA officers available
for specific overseas assignments is being reduced. Such
losses are deeply felt in view of the fact that, in comparison
with the intelligence services of our adversaries, we are not a
large organization. Replacement of officers thus compromised
is difficult and, in some cases, impossible.
Once an officer's identity is disclosed, moreover,
counterintelligence analysis by adversary services allows
the officer's previous assignments to be scrutinized, producing
an expanded pattern of compromise through association.
Such disclosures also sensitize hostile security services
and foreign populations to CIA presence, making our job far
more difficult. Finally, such disclosures can place intelligence
personnel and their families in physical danger from terrorist
or violence-prone organizations.
It is also essential to bear in mind that the collection of
intelligence is something of an art. The success of our officers
overseas depends to a very large extent on intangible psychological
and human chemistry factors, on feelings of trust and confidence
that human beings engender in each other and on atmosphere and
milieu. Unauthorized disclosure of identities information
destroys that chemistry.
Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
 Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
Mr. Chairman, I do not think it is necessary or advisable
to go into greater detail about the adverse effects that
unauthorized disclosures of intelligence identities are having
on the work of our nation's intelligence agencies. Simply put,
the credibility of our country and its relationships with
foreign intelligence services and individual human sources, the
lives of patriotic Americans serving their country, and the
effectiveness of our intelligence apparatus are all being
placed in jeopardy. The underlying basic issue is the fact
that our ability to continue to recruit and retain human
sources of intelligence whose information could be crucial to
the nation's survival in an increasingly dangerous world, and
our equally important relations with the intelligence services
of other nations are in continuing jeopardy.
It is important to understand what legislation in this area seeks
to accomplish: It seeks to protect the secrecy of the participation
or cooperation of certain persons in the foreign intelligence
activities of the U.S. Government. These are activities which have
been authorized by the Congress; activities which we, as a nation,
have determined are essential. No existing statute clearly and
specifically makes the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence
identities a criminal offense. As matters now stand the impunity
with which unauthorized disclosures of intelligence identities can
be made implies a governmental position of neutrality in the matter.
It suggests that U.S. intelligence officers are "fair game" for those
Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
 Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
members of their own society who take issue with the existence of CIA
or find other perverse motives for making these unauthorized
disclosures.
Mr. Chairman, I believe it is important to emphasize that the
legislation which you are considering today is not an assault upon
the First Amendment. The "Intelligence Identities Protection Act"
would not inhibit public discussion and debate about U.S. foreign
policy or intelligence activities, and it would not operate to
prevent the exposure of allegedly illegal activities or abuses of
authority. The legislation is carefully crafted and narrowly
drawn to deal with conduct which serves no useful informing
function whatsoever; does not alert us to alleged abuses; does
not bring clarity to issues of national policy; does not enlighten
public debate; and does not contribute to an educated and informed
electorate.
The Bill creates three categories of the offense of disclosure
of intelligence identities:
a. Disclosure of information identifying a "covert
agent" by persons who have or have had authorized access
to classified information that identifies such a covert
agent. This category covers primarily disclosure by
intelligence agency employees and others who get access
to classified information that directly identifies
"covert agents";
 Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
b. Disclosure of information identifying a "covert
agent" by persons who have learned the identity as a result
of authorized access to classified information. This
category covers disclosures by any person who learns
the identity of a covert agent as a result of government
service or other authorized access to classified
information that may not directly identify or name a
specific "covert agent;" and
c. Disclosure of information identifying a "covert
agent" by anyone, under certain specified conditions
outlined below.
There is virtually no serious disagreement over the provisions
of the legislation which provide criminal penalties for the unauthorized
disclosure of intelligence identities by individuals who have had
authorized access to classified information. Controversy has centered
around subsection GO1(c) of S. 391.
Disclosures of intelligence identities by persons who have
not had authorized access to classified information would be punish-
able only under specified conditions, whickl have been carefully
crafted and narrowly drawn so as to make the Act inapplicable to
anyone not engaged in an effort or pattern of activities designed
to identify and expose intelligence personnel. The proposed legis-
lation also contains defenses and exceptions which reinforce this
narrow construction. It is instructive, in this regard, to look at
the elements of proof that would be required in a prosecution under
Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
 Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
subsection 601(c) of S. 391, keeping in mind that the government
would have to prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
The governrent would have to show:
-- That there was an intentional disclosure of infor-
mation which did in fact identify a "covert agent;"
-- That the disclosure was made to an individual not
authorized to receive classified information;
-- That the person who made the disclosure knew that
the information disclosed did in fact identify a covert agent;
-- That the person who made the disclosure knew that the
United States was taking affirmative measures to conceal the
covert agent's classified intelligence affiliation;
-- That the individual making the disclosure did so
in the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify
and expose covert agents; and,
-- That the disclosure was made with reason to believe
that such activities would impair or impede the foreign
intelligence activities of the United States.
Because of these strict conditions, which narrowly define
the prohibited conduct, I believe it is clear that subsection
601 (c) is directed at conduct which the Congress teas the
authority and power to proscribe consistent with the First
Amendment, and that this Bill does so in a constitutional
fashion.
Mr. Chairman, I understand that the Department of
Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
 pprove~~or Release 2007/03/01 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300060018-9
Justice believes that the Senate version of the Bill better
captures the concerted nature of the activity which is
intended to be proscribed than does the House Bill, and
that there are prosecutorial and evidentiary advantages to the
Senate language. I believe that the Department's witness will
speak to this matter.
1~1r. Chairman, S. 391 will deal with a clear and immediate
danger which currently--each and every day--endangers our
intelligence activities, our staff officers, and the lives
of those who are cooperating with our nation abroad. I want
to express my gratitude and appreciation to the Subcornrnittee
for so promptly bringing this legislation forward and
reiterate the hope that it will be enacted into law as
quickly as possible so that this intolerable situation is
remedied.
I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.