WARNING ASSESSMENT: LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110040-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: April 23, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/06/05 - 3B01027R000300110040-2
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
NFAC=2074-79/1
23 April 1979
? SECRE V
NIO/W
: Acting National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT : Warning Assessment: Latin America
1. Attached is the warning assessment of likely developments in
Latin America over the next sixty to ninety days, prepared on the
of views expressed in our warning meeting held on 19 April 1979.
2. The next warning meeting will be held on Thursday, 24 May at
1100 hours in room 7E32 in CIA headquarters. Please be prepa
discuss any impending developments you consider appropriate.
lease provide the names of your re resentatives to
o later than noon on 23 May. E
Attachment: (1) as stated
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 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300110040-2
Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110040-2
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05
? SECRET/
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America
0
NIO/W
NFAC-2074-79
23 April 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH . Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM : Acting National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
2. Colombia. Terrorist organizations in Colombia, notably the
19th of March Movement (M-19), and the FARC have issued orders to their
members to carry out random assassinations of uniformed personnel. The
anniversary of the M-19 group apparently passed without incident.
Colombian security forces have scored recent successes in rounding up
members of the M-19 group. Nevertheless, isolated terrorist activities
remain possible. US citizens may also be the t suchaction.
Colombian security is in a high state of alert.
3. Nicaragua. Sizeable groups of Sandinistas ue to move
into Nicaragua, apparently with a plan to continue their efforts to
unseat President Somoza. If they continue their tactic of seizing towns
(like Esteli) and holding them until the National Guard retakes them, it
is likely that the FSLN will suffer heavy losses. If, on the other
hand, they employ urban terrorist or guerrilla tactics, they could prove
to be a real challenge to the National Guard. Somoza's absence from
Nicaragua to visit members of his family in the United States during
Easter week provoked no serious incidents, demonstrating that he and the
National Guard are in control. The National Guard will continue to exert
pressure on the FSLN and will doubtless keep the upper hand. Cuban and
Panamanian assistance to the FSLN has been resumed. President Herrerra
of Venezuela has shown no interest in pursuing his predecessor's efforts
to unseat Somoza by aiding FSLN. II
1. Action Requested: None; for your information only
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? SECREJ ?
3. El Salvador. The situation is still tense in El Salvador.
About 25 of the 50 members of the Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation
Forces (FPL) have returned to El Salvador after four months of military
and political training in Cuba. They have been working with "popular
militia" units since their return and, according to one report, have
carried out two attacks unopposed. The situation deteriorated further
when President Romero yielded to trade union strikers who had taken
hostages to reinforce their demands. It is possible that other, more
moderate, trade unions will employ these tactics to improve their lot.
This, in turn will make the military and i fl civilians more
dissatisfied with Romero's performance. II
4. Grenada and the Eastern Caribbean. The coup d'etat in Grenada
appears unlikely to generate similar actions in other island nations in
the Eastern Caribbean in the next 60 to 90 days. In fact, it served to
alert these governments to the potential problem. It is not without
si nificance however that Cuba was aware of the New Jewel Movement's
plan to unseat Gairy well in advance and encouraged the plotters. Although
it acted cautiously in recognizing the Bishop government, holding back so
as not to be the first, it surreptitiously gave aid to Bishop immediately
after the coup. It is probable that Castro will increase his influence
in Grenada by providing the Bishop government with technicians to help
solve some of the basic problems of the island. 25X1
5. Cuba's Renewed Interest in the Caribbean and Central America.
It is evident that Castro is showing renewed interest in exerting his
influence in Central America and the Caribbean, as exemplified by Cuba's
role in supporting the FSLN in Nicaragua and the New Jewel Movement in
Grenada. Castro is doubtless tempted by the unstable situatio in El Salvador
and will probably move to improve his stature there. 25X1
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Distribution:
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1 - NI0/AF
1 - NIO/CH
1 - NIO/CF
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1 - NI0/NESA
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