MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300100010-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2007
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: August 24, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
NFAC #4462-79
24 August 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Robert C. Ames
National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: Near East and South Asia
1. Arab Reaction to US Performance at UN. The recent controversy
over US policy toward the Palestinians has further heightened the
importance moderate Arabs attach to the performance of the US in the
UN debate on the Palestinian issue. The Arabs believe the US had begun
a significant initiative toward the Palestinians, that Israel weighed
in heavily against the perceived shift in US policy, and that the UN
debate serves as a litmus test of US attitudes towards the Palestinians,
of its will to stand against Israeli pressures, and ultimately of its
commitment to a comprehensive, just settlement of the Middle East
dispute. If the US fails to meet the challenge as the Arabs perceive
it, we believe confidence in the US could be seriously eroded.
Disillusionment with the US would serve to solidify the ranks of Arabs
opposed to the Camp David accords and refurbish the somewhat diminished
leadership of Iraq in the campaign to isolate Egypt. These developments
might well be given sharp expression in the NAM conference in Havana
and in new impetus for further anti-Egyptian sanctions. Reaction
against the US might be slower in coming and more subtle in expression;
the Saudis, for example, might decide-using a variety of justifications-
to lower their oil production from 9.5 to 8.5 million b/d and to
discourage any increase in the US military presence in the region. The
Arabs might also try to encourage increasing differences between the US
and its European allies on the Middle East issue.
2. Morocco. Morocco this month has annexed the southern portion
of the Western Sahara formerly claimed by Mauritania, and has strengthened
its military presence in the area. These moves were in reaction to a
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decision by Mauritania to conclude a separate peace with the Polisario
and to the overwhelming vote against Morocco at the OAU summit. These
political developments seriously undercut Morocco's diplomatic position
and have increased pressure on King Hassan to abandon his "no war, no
peace" policy in favor of more risky political or military strategies
aimed at resolving the nearly four-year-old conflict. Tensions in the
area could rise rapidly and could trigger spiraling events that might
ultimately topple the King. Although other, less ominous scenarios
are more likely as the King tests his various options, the US now faces
greater difficulty in managing good relations with all parties to the
dispute.
3. The Yemens. 'A military delegation from North Yemen may b
heading toward Moscow to sign a new arms agreement with the USSR. I 5X1
Salih and South Yemeni President Ismail will probably meet on 1 September
in Libya at celebrations marking the tenth anniversary of Qadhafi's take-
over. Should an announcement on some sort of unification be forthcoming,
it will likely spark 5X1
move against Salih. At the same time, political infighting is con inuing
in South Yemen between native South Yemenis and those of North Yemeni
origin, and could result in Ismail's ouster. A successor regime would
likely maintain close relations with the USSR.
4. Developments in Areas of Continuing Concern
a. Afghanistan. The Taraki regime continues to lose ground
to rebels and in the last several weeks has been forced to pull
back increasing numbers of loyal troops for the protection of Kabul.
As the government's position erodes, the chances of a broad mutiny
in the military or a military coup increase. The Soviets-although
still providing significant support to Taraki -may try to preempt
a military move against the regime by trying to orchestrate a change
in leadership and/or increasing their military involvement.
b. India. The new element in India's unfolding political
crisis is the decision by President Reddy to call for early elections-
a move that is being sharply protested by the remnants of the fallen
Janata party. The period leading up to elections-scheduled for
late November or early December-will be marked by intense political
infighting, possibly public disorders, and weak leadership by the
caretaker government of Charan Singh.
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acquired a nuclear weapon.
c. Iran. Challenges by the Kurds to central authority in
Tehran have sparked greater assertiveness on the part of Ayatollah
Khomeini. As is his wont, Khomeini has taken an extremely harsh
posture not only toward the Kurds.but toward the military and
security forces he has ordered to quell the recalcitrant province.
Khomeini's increasingly blatant authoritarianism, coupled with moves
to stifle his opposition and the press, has speeded the process of
polarization between pro- and anti-Khomeini groups and thus has
enhanced the prospects for renewed violence and turmoil.
d. Israel. Israel's deepening economic problems, sharp
splits within the cabinet, especially over the economy and peace
negotiations, and uncertainty about Prime Minister Begin's leader-
ship brought on by his increasingly precarious health have badly
eroded the position of the government. There is some concern in
the Community that these developments could conceivably cause the
government to fall.
e. Libya. Libya's continuing concern about the possibility
of an Egyptian attack increases the risk that Qadhafi may not act
with restraint toward the US, which he holds responsible for
Egyptian actions. We are particularly concerned about Libyan
reaction to US naval exercises in Libyan-claimed waters and to
regular US reconnaissance flights in the area. Qadhafi's pique
with the US over its cancellation of aircraft sales may prompt
him to follow through on threats to take action against US oil
interests. We rate less likely reports that he intends to announce
on 1 September, the anniversary of his takeover, that Libya has
Robert C. Ames
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Approved For Release 2007/04/03: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300100010-6