MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: LATIN AMERICA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP83B01027R000300080037-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Sequence Number:
37
Case Number:
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
Approved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP83BO 1027R000300080037-0
. SECRET 0
NIO/W
NFAC-0684-80/1
28 January 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America C
1. Attached is a copy of the Latin Americ ning Assessment
based upon our discussion of 23 January 1980. 25X1
2. The next warning meeting will be held on 20 February 1980
at 1100 hours i 0 at CIA headquarters. Please call
by noon on 19 February to give her the 25X1
name of the individual participating from your office. 25X1
att: (1)
Approved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300080037-0
Approved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300080037-0
Approved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300080037-0
? SECRET ?
NFAC-0684-80
28 January 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH . Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America
1. Action Requested: None; for your information only.
2. El Salvador
The participants of the monthly warning meeting were in general
agreement that
a. the extreme left was gaining in military strength and
popular support,
b. the center-left Junta was ineffective and not likely to
survive for long,
c. the military establishment was split and a rightist coup
was possible.
The general feeling was that a major thrust for power by the
leftist extremists could come at any time--through preplanned military
action or massive demonstrations the result of some development,
such as a righist military coup. I 25X1
The participants generally agreed that the Castro regime would
Approved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300080037-0
? SECRET ?
The impact of Castro's domestic problems on his foreign policy
was discussed, with the following judgments expressed:
a. There would probably be no impact on his low-cost, low-
risk activities in support of Central American and Caribbean
revolutionaries.
b. Castro would probably be more hesitant to undertake a
major military deployment in Africa or the Middle East, because
of popular grumbling about costs and casualties.
c. There was, however, an outside chance that he would seek
a new foreign adventure to divert domestic discontent. This was
judged somewhat more likely if the US could be effectively posed
as "the enemy".
3. Jamaica
The participants agreed that there was a considerable prospect
for the outbreak of major disorders, because of intensifying economic
deprivations (food shortages, layoffs). The ability of the security
forces to maintain order was questionable at best, very poor if the
disorders are prolonged and widespread. The chances for politically-
inspired action against US personnel, companies, or tourists was judged
small. But the danger of crimes against US citizens or Physical harm
to those caught in the midst of mob actions was high. 25X1
Approved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300080037-0
is SECRET
Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - DD/NFA
1 - NIO/W
1 - NI0/AF
1 - NI0/CH-EA
1 - NI0/GPF
1 - NI0/MESA
1 - NI0/AL (Heymann)
1 - NI0/USSR-EE
1 - NI0/WE
1 - Senior Review Panel
1 - NSC Coordinator
1 - SA/NPI
1 - D/OCO
1 - D/OCR
1 - D/OER
1 - D/OGCR
1 - D/OIA
1 - D/OPA
1 - D/ OS I
1 - D/OSR
1 - D/OWI
1 - ER
1 - NFAC Reg
2 - N I 0/ LA