MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: LATIN AMERICA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP83B01027R000300080037-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Sequence Number: 
37
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP83B01027R000300080037-0.pdf127.36 KB
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Approved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP83BO 1027R000300080037-0 . SECRET 0 NIO/W NFAC-0684-80/1 28 January 1980 MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Latin America SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America C 1. Attached is a copy of the Latin Americ ning Assessment based upon our discussion of 23 January 1980. 25X1 2. The next warning meeting will be held on 20 February 1980 at 1100 hours i 0 at CIA headquarters. Please call by noon on 19 February to give her the 25X1 name of the individual participating from your office. 25X1 att: (1) Approved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300080037-0 Approved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300080037-0 Approved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300080037-0 ? SECRET ? NFAC-0684-80 28 January 1980 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence THROUGH . Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment National Intelligence Officer for Warning FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Latin America SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America 1. Action Requested: None; for your information only. 2. El Salvador The participants of the monthly warning meeting were in general agreement that a. the extreme left was gaining in military strength and popular support, b. the center-left Junta was ineffective and not likely to survive for long, c. the military establishment was split and a rightist coup was possible. The general feeling was that a major thrust for power by the leftist extremists could come at any time--through preplanned military action or massive demonstrations the result of some development, such as a righist military coup. I 25X1 The participants generally agreed that the Castro regime would Approved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300080037-0 ? SECRET ? The impact of Castro's domestic problems on his foreign policy was discussed, with the following judgments expressed: a. There would probably be no impact on his low-cost, low- risk activities in support of Central American and Caribbean revolutionaries. b. Castro would probably be more hesitant to undertake a major military deployment in Africa or the Middle East, because of popular grumbling about costs and casualties. c. There was, however, an outside chance that he would seek a new foreign adventure to divert domestic discontent. This was judged somewhat more likely if the US could be effectively posed as "the enemy". 3. Jamaica The participants agreed that there was a considerable prospect for the outbreak of major disorders, because of intensifying economic deprivations (food shortages, layoffs). The ability of the security forces to maintain order was questionable at best, very poor if the disorders are prolonged and widespread. The chances for politically- inspired action against US personnel, companies, or tourists was judged small. But the danger of crimes against US citizens or Physical harm to those caught in the midst of mob actions was high. 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300080037-0 is SECRET Distribution: 1 - DCI 1 - DDCI 1 - DD/NFA 1 - NIO/W 1 - NI0/AF 1 - NI0/CH-EA 1 - NI0/GPF 1 - NI0/MESA 1 - NI0/AL (Heymann) 1 - NI0/USSR-EE 1 - NI0/WE 1 - Senior Review Panel 1 - NSC Coordinator 1 - SA/NPI 1 - D/OCO 1 - D/OCR 1 - D/OER 1 - D/OGCR 1 - D/OIA 1 - D/OPA 1 - D/ OS I 1 - D/OSR 1 - D/OWI 1 - ER 1 - NFAC Reg 2 - N I 0/ LA