MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: USSR-EE (MEETING HELD ON 19 FEBRUARY 1980)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300080032-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 32
• Content Type: MEMO

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National Intelligence Officers
25 February 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA . Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment
Richard Lehman
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM : Arnold L. Horelick
National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EE
(Meeting held on 19 February 1980)
leaders, they would probably not hesitate to do so. However, they are
not likely to be receptive at this point to a face-saving formula for
early evacuation of Afghanistan; Soviet withdrawal now would almost
certainly lead to the collapse of whatever Soviet installed regime the
Soviets left behind. In the near term, the Soviets are more likely to
pour additional forces into Afghanistan and assign their forces a more
aggressive counterinsurgency role than they are to make sizable troop
withdrawals, scale down their initial objective. d cast about for the
best available suboptimal termination option.) I 25X1
1. The Soviets in Afghanistan. Analysts largely agreed that post-
intervention developments in Afghanistan have disappointed Soviet hopes
and have probably not conformed to Soviet expectations. The disintegration
of the Afghan army, which all analysts believe to have been a critical
factor in the timing of the Soviet intervention, has not only not been
arrested, but proceeded at a rapid pace; the Babrak regime has not won
any appreciable public support; and the adverse international reactions
to the intervention have probably been harsher than the Soviets expected
and show no signs of abating. A variety of reports indicate that some
ranking Soviet officials failed fully to anticipate such outcomes and
feel that the intervention has been poorly managed and may even have
been ill-advised. 0 25X1
2. The prevailing consensus held that their disappointment with
developments to date was not likely to lead the Soviets to alter their
basic Afghan plan in the near future. If they could put together a more
viable regime by jettisoning Babrak and allotting more posts.to non-Communist
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3. No clear consensus emerged on the question of whether
additional Soviet forces, suitably organized and deployed, would
be able to reduce the insurgency to manageable proportions within
the forseeable future. Estimates of the number of Soviet troops
that might bring this goal within reach ranged as high as 300,000
although there was general agreement that a much smaller number
would suffice unless the insurgents received extensive outside
support. A number of analysts were inclined to believe.that
without such support the insurgents could eventually be successfully
contained by relatively modest -- 25 to cent -- increments
to the Soviet forces now on the scene. I 25X1
4. Attention was called to the high rate of replacement of
Soviet field commanders as an indicator of Moscow's dissatisfaction
with trends in Afghanistan, and it was suggested that greater c
stability could be taken as a sign of increasing satisfaction. 25X1
5. The Soviets and Post-Hostage Iran. It was agreed that the
resolution of the hostage crisis would make the Soviets more apprehensive
about a possible further improvement in US-Iranian relations. It was
also agreed that the Soviets fear that their failure quickly to stabilize
the situation in Afghanistan could lead to a further deterioration in
Soviet-Iranian relations. Unless developments transform these concerns
into acute anxieties, however, the Soviets are more likely to continue
to court the Khomeini/Bani-Sadr regime than to support local separatist
movements or to threaten military intervention. Although the Soviets
will maintain contacts with separatist groups and will continue to
upgrade their forces in the Transcaucasian Military District, we do
not expect them to do so in a demonstrative fashion or to undertake
the -sorts of preparations that might prefigure a full-fledged attack.
Precisely because we believe that Moscow would view such preparations
as politically counterproductive, we would be inclined to interpret
them as fairly strong indicato f an actual intention to intervene
if they should be undertaken. I 25X1
6. The Yugoslav Succession. The meeting agreed that the primary
variable affecting the near-term future of Yugoslavia will be the degree
of cohesion shown by Tito's heirs. The latter's conduct during the
past weeks has increased our confidence that Yugoslavia is not on the
verge of a bitter internecine succession struggle. If Tito survives
for some time but remains largely incapacitated, however, the chances
for a smooth interregnum could be somewhat diminished. In that event,
the acquisition of information about Tito's condition, the frequency
and focus of his periods of activity, and his accessibility t her
members of the leadership would become especially important. 25X1
25X1
gpxl
25 February 1980
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7. Recent Changes in the Polish Leadership. No dissent was
registered to the proposition that these changes are likely to
strengthen the immobilism of the Polish regime and thereby increase
somewhat the likelihood of an eventual economic and political crisis.
QA.
Arnold L. Horelick
25 February 1980
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SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EFFI
(Meeting held on 19 February 1980) IIII
Distribution:.
#1 - DCI
2 - DDCI
3 - NSC Coordination Staff
4 - ER
5 - DD/NFA
6 - NIO/Warning
7 - NI0/USSR-EE
8 - NFAC Registry
NIO/USSR-EE/ALHorelic 11
(25Feb80)
TOP SECR
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